PUBLICATIONS  OF  THE 
AMERICAN  ACADEMY  OF  POLITICAL  AND  SOCIAL  SCIENCE. 


The  Outlines  of  Sociology. 


LUDWIG  GUMPLOWICZ, 

Professor  in  the  University  of  Graz,  Austria-Hungary. 


TRANSLATED    BY 

FREDERICK   W.  MOORE, 

Assistant  Professor  of  History  and  Political  Economy  in  Vanderbilt  University, 
Nashville,  Tenn. 


PHILADELPHIA : 

AMERICAN  ACADEMY  OF  POLITICAL  AND  SOCIAL  SCIENCE, 
1899. 


COPYRIGHT,  1899, 

BY  THE 

AMERICAN  ACADEMY  OF  POUTICAI,  AND  SOCIAL  SCIENCE. 


Annex 

V\fA 
51 


CONTENTS. 

PART  I. 

PAGE. 

TRANSLATOR'S  INTRODUCTION 5 

THE  HISTORY  OF  SOCIOLOGY. 

(Comte,  Quetelet,  Herbert  Spencer,  Systhne  de  la  Nature, 
Schaefler,  Lilienfeld,  DeRoberty,  Bastian,  Lippert,  Mohl, 
Stein,  Gneist,  Carey,  Post,  Rocholl,  Historians  of  civil- 
ization.)    7 

PART  II. 
FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTIONS. 

The  Three  Classes  of  Phenomena 66 

Universal  Laws 74 

Concept,  Function,  Scope  and  Importance  of  Sociology    .  82 

The  Substratum  of  Social  Laws 92 

Concept  and  Essence  of  Social  Law  ...       101 

PART  III. 

SOCIAL  ELEMENTS  AND  THEIR  COMBINATION. 

The  Primitive  Horde no 

The  State 116 

The  State  as  Industrial  Organization 123 

Development  of  Rank  and  Political  Organization     ....  127 

The  Two-fold  Origin  of  Classes 134 

Society 136 

Societies 138 

The  Group-making  Factors 141 

The  Social  Circles  in  the  Social  Struggle 143 

The  Field  of  Combat 145 

The  Moral  Character  of  the  Struggle 146 

The  Struggle  for  Emancipation 148 

The  Growth  of  States 150 

State  and  Folk      153 

(3) 


4  CONTENTS. 

PART  IV. 

PAGE 

THE  PSYCHO-SOCIAL  PHENOMENA  AND  THE  INDIVIDUAL. 

Individualism  and  Collectivism 155 

The  Individual  and  the  Social  Group 156 

Influence  of  Economic  Status  on  the  Individual 163 

Morals 168 

Morals  and  Truth  Perception 170 

Rights            177 

Rights  and  the  State 179 

Rights  and  Morals 182 

Individual  Efforts  and  Social  Necessities 190 

PART  V. 
THE  HISTORY  OF  MANKIND  AS  LIFE  OF  THE  SPECIES. 

Sociology  and  the  Philosophy  of  History <    .  199 

Conformity  to  I/aw  in  Development .  199 

The  Evolution  of  Mankind 203 

The  Cycle  of  Development 205 

Progress  and  Innovation 207 

Justice  in  History 211 

SUPPLEMENTS. 

Gustave  Le  Bon    .    , 214 

Might  and  Right 219 


THE  OUTLINES    OF   SOCIOLOGY.* 


INTRODUCTION. 

Gumplowicz's  "Outlines  of  Sociology  "  is  distinguished 
from  all  earlier  sociological  works  by  the  character  of  the 
sociological  unit  upon  which  it  is  based,  which  is  the  group. 
The  author  limits  himself  to  the  study  of  the  behavior  of 
social  units,  and  especially  to  the  study  of  the  action  of  groups 
on  each  other  and  the  action  of  the  group  on  the  individual. 
To  compare  Gumplowicz's  theory  with  the  theory  of  Gid- 
dings,  and  to  use  a  metaphor  for  brevity,  the  former  begins 
a  whole  stage  later  in  the  evolution  of  life;  it  does  not 
account  for  but  assumes  group  life. 

Starting  with  cohesively  aggregated  life,  Gumplowicz 
makes  important  use  of  the  principles  already  accepted  con- 
cerning the  influence  of  environment,  and  especially  of  the 
economic  wants  and  the  tendency  of  desires  to  grow  with 
the  opportunity  to  satisfy  them.  To  these  he  adds,  as  some- 
thing new,  the  postulates  that  the  normal  relation  of  unlike 
groups  is  conflict  and  that  progress  conies  through  the  con- 
flict of  groups.  Hence  the  important  sociological  phenomena 
are  those  relating  to  the  conflict  of  unlike  groups  and  to 
their  amalgamation  and  assimilation. 

Sociology  is  considered  the  fundamental  social  science,  for 
it  deals  with  the  same  subject-matter  that  all  social  sciences 
deal  with,  and  treats  of  laws  and  modes  of  behavior  in 
group  life  that  are  common  to  all  the  special  social  sciences 
alike.  If  what  is  general  and  common  to  all  is  set  apart  as 
the  sphere  of  a  particular  science,  then  what  is  peculiar  to 
each  differentiated  class  of  phenomena  may  be  properly  left 
to  a  special  science  working  on  the  principles  of  the  general 
science  as  a  basis. 

Further,  the  special  social  sciences,  which  have  developed 
in  advance  of  the  general  science,  must  submit  to  a  revo- 
lution in  point  of  view,  to  a  revision  of  method  and  a  re- 
statement of  accepted  laws  in  harmony  with  the  new  ideas 

*[The  translator  takes  pleasure  in  making  public  acknowledgement  of  the  im- 
portant assistance  rendered  him  by  his  friends  Dr.  A.  R.  Hohlfeld,  Professor  of 
German  in  Vanderbilt  University,  Dr.  C.  F.  Emerick,  Instructor  in  Economics  in 
the  same  institution,  and  W.  C.  Branham,  A.  M.,  Co-Principal  of  Branham  and 
Hughes  School,  String^  Hill,  Tenu.  The  first  named  carefully  compared  the 
translation  with  the  original  and  the  others  assisted  in  revising  the  proof.] 

(5) 


6  ANNAI<S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

in  sociology;  while  for  the  future,  whether  new  social  laws 
are  first  detected  in  general  sociology  or  in  one  of  the  special 
sciences,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  phenomena  which 
the  latter  study  are  social  also,  and  that  the  special  laws  of 
their  behavior  are  inherently  social  and  must  stand  the  test 
of  sociological  criticism. 

Gumplowicz's  sociology  is  not  properly  descriptive. 
Description  falls  to  anthropology,  ethnology,  politics,  his- 
tory, comparative  philology,  the  comparative  study  of  law, 
religion,  institutions,  etc.  It  is  considered  the  peculiar  task 
of  sociology  to  abstract  the  laws  of  the  behavior  of  social 
phenomena. 

The  volitional  element  plays  no  part,  or  a  negative  one, 
in  Gumplowicz's  theory.  Man,  misled  by  the  idea  of  human 
free  will  and  by  an  anthropomorphic  conception  of  deity,  has 
overestimated  his  own  influence  and  importance.  He  is 
most  successful  in  art  and  invention,  for  here  he  strives  to 
copy  nature.  In  other  spheres  he  is  not  infrequently  found 
striving  to  preserve  what  nature  has  ordained  to  decay.  But 
first  striving  to  learn  what  the  laws  of  nature  are,  he  should 
next  learn  to  adapt  himself  to  them  as  best  he  can  and  to 
bear  with  resignation  what  cannot  be  avoided.  Nature  is 
unchangeable  and  so  are  her  laws.  The  history  of  mankind 
is  the  history  of  a  species  as  such.  The  fate  which  befalls 
the  individual  in  societ}7  is  not  the  fate  which  he  merits 
always,  but  it  is  necessarily  that  which  his  group  makes 
inevitable.  Historic  justice  is  not  individual,  but  social. 

FREDERICK  W.  MOORE. 


ARGUMENT. 
Part  L 

Part  I  contains  a  survey  of  past  progress  in  social  science, 
intended  to  prepare  the  reader  for  the  new  departure  in 
sociological  thought  which  the  author  proposes  to  make. 

He  reviews  the  work  of  Comte,  Spencer,  Bastian,  I/ippert 
and  others,  and  the  relations  of  economics,  politics,  the  com- 
parative study  of  law,  the  philosophy  of  history  and  the 
history  of  civilization  to  the  science  of  society. 

Incidentally  four  important  propositions  are  laid  down: 

First. — Social  phenomena  are  subject  to  the  general  law 
of  causation  as  much  as  other  classes  of  phenomena  which 
have  been  successfully  treated  by  the  scientific  method. 
This  has  been  asserted  or  tacitly  assumed  by  all  the  earlier 
writers;  it  is  axiomatic. 

Second. — Human  acts,  whether  individual  or  social,  are 
the  product  of  natural  forces  and  they  excite  reflection. 
The  function  of  the  mind  or  soul  is  secondary  in  point  of 
time.  In  this  the  author  differs  from  some  of  his  predecessors. 

Third. — Differing  radically  from  other  writers,  the  author 
denies  that  society  is  simply  an  organism  analogous  to  but 
as  high  above  man  as  man  is  above  other  organisms  in 
nature.  In  his  conception,  society,  the  social  group,  the 
sociological  unit,  is  an  organism  or  organization  entirely, 
(totogenere) ,  different  from  any  other.  Considered  as  a  whole 
it  is  unlike  any  of  its  parts.  Its  nature  cannot  be  inferred 
from  their  nature,  but  more  probably  the  nature  of  the  indi- 
vidual will  be  influenced  by  it.  His  system  begins  with 
social  elements  (swarms,  hordes,  groups,  etc.) ,  and  logically 
proceeds  to  the  consideration  of  man,  their  product  both  in 
mind  and  body;  the  social  process  and  its  products;  and 
finally  the  ethico-social  products  of  the  action  of  society 
upon  the  individual. 

Fourth. — The  author  holds  and  defends  the  position  that 
every  political  organization,  and  hence  every  developing 
civilization,  begins  at  the  moment  when  one  group  perma- 
nently subjects  another.  Subjection  of  some  to  others  is  the 
source  of  political  organization  and  political  organization  is 
the  condition  essential  to  social  growth.  This  proposition 
and  the  preceding  constitute  the  corner  stone  of  the  author's 
theory. 

(7) 


8  ANNAI<S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

Part  II. 

Part  II  is  introductory.  Beginning  with  the  classification 
of  phenomena  and  defending  the  unity  of  science,  the  author 
proceeds  to  a  presentation  of  the  concepts  especially  con- 
nected with  sociology. 

SECTION  i .  The  author  takes  up  the  triple  classification 
of  phenomena  into  physical,  mental  and  social,  and  justifies 
it  and  the  corresponding  subdivision  of  the  sciences  by 
demonstrating  that  there  are  social  phenomena  subject  to 
laws  of  a  special  character. 

SEC.  2.  But  if  science  is  unitary  and  the  universe  of  phe- 
nomena monistic,  there  must  be  some  laws  at  once  specific 
enough  to  be  valuable  and  general  enough  to  apply  to  all 
three  classes  of  phenomena  alike. 

He  enumerates  the  laws  of  causality,  of  development,  of 
regularity  of  development,  of  periodicity,  of  complexity,  of 
the  reciprocal  action  of  unlike  forces,  of  adaptation,  of 
the  essential  likeness  and  identity  of  forces  and  events, 
and  of  parallelism,  showing  that  each  clearly  applies  to 
social  phenomena,  the  only  disputable  point. 

SEC.  3.  Within  each  class  the  behavior  of  the  phenomena 
is  capable  of  reduction  to  a  number  of  laws  which  are  more 
specific,  which  apply  to  that  one  sphere  (or  even  to  a  part 
of  it  alone)  and  are  more  fully  characteristic.  It  is  the 
function  of  sociology  to  find  the  laws  of  social  phenomena. 

Social  phenomena  are  defined  as  those  arising  out  of  the 
relations  of  social  groups  to  each  other.  Psycho-social  are 
those  again  which  result  from  the  influence  of  the  group 
upon  the  individual. 

[*Psycho-social  phenomena  and  psycho-social  laws  are  thus 
quite  distinct  from  social  phenomena  and  social  laws,  using 
the  word  social  in  the  narrower,  more  specific  sense  which 
the  author  gives  to  it  here  and  occasionally  elsewhere.  But 
he  uses  the  word  in  a  more  general  sense  also,  including 
social  in  this  narrower  sense  and  psycho-social  as  correlative 
subdivisions  of  it. 

[There  would  seem  to  be  need  also  for  a  third  subdivision 
including  phenomena  growing  out  of  the  relation  of  the 
group  to  its  physical  environment.  Critics  who  will  recog- 
nize the  importance  of  the  group  as  the  social  unit  and  the 
weighty  significance  of  the  antagonism  existing  between 

*[The  brackets,  wherever  found,  indicate  that  the  included  matter  has  been 
added  by  the  translator.] 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  9 

groups  will,  nevertheless,  show  that  such  factors  as  food 
supply  affect  the  size  and  coherency  of  groups  and  the  num- 
ber in  a  given  territory.  In  some  places  he  seems  inci- 
dentally to  allow  for  them.  But  his  definition  by  unmis- 
takable implication  excludes  them.  Had  he  broadened  his 
conception  of  sociology  so  as  to  include  this  class  of  phe- 
nomena, his  dispute  with  Lippert  would  have  fallen  to 
nothing  and  his  later  reference  to  the  origin  of  groups  by 
differentiation  would  have  been  much  more  natural  and 
easy.] 

Phenomena  that  have  been  treated  by  one  or  another  of 
the  sciences  currently  called  social  are  nevertheless  properly 
subject  to  reinvestigation  by  sociology,  for  they  have  been 
treated  from  the  individualistic  standpoint,  which  is  false. 
To  review  them  from  the  new  social  standpoint  and  to  ascer- 
tain the  social  laws  of  their  behavior  will  be  of  great  impor- 
tance. It  will  be  found  that  they  all  take  their  rise  in  a 
common  ground,  which  is  the  peculiar  sphere  of  sociology. 

SEC.  4.  As  there  must  be  unlike  forces  wherever  reciprocal 
action  is  expected,  the  author  assumes  that  there  must 
have  been  a  countless  number  of  unlike  original  primitive 
groups.  This  Irypothesis  is  then  supported  by  arguments 
proving  the  polygenetic  theory  of  man's  origin. 

SEC.  5.  However,  if  the  polygenetic  theory  is  true,  it  only 
proves  the  existence  of  primitive  groups  anthropological!}' 
homogeneous.  But  as  birth  and  especially  training  in  a 
group  are  the  factors  which  make  an  individual  a  member 
of  a  social  group,  these  primitive  anthropological  groups 
must  also  have  been  sociological  groups;  and  though 
anthropological  types  have  become  endlessly  mixed,  each 
syngenetic  group,  because  its  members  have  had  a  common 
birth  and  training  and  have  acquired  the  same  language, 
rights  and  religion,  still  continues  to  be  a  sociological  unit. 

Social  laws,  he  adds,  are  the  laws  of  the  action  and 
development  of  syngenetic  groups. 

[Thus,  narrow  as  he  seems  to  make  the  conception  of 
syngenetic  groups  and  important  as  such  groups  seem  to  be 
to  his  theory,  he  makes  allowance  here  incidentally  and 
specifically  later  for  the  origin  of  fully  accredited  social 
groups  by  differentiation  within  a  given  group. 

[Primitive  groups  are  unlike,  heterogen,  and  so  are  syn- 
genetic groups,  says  our  author.  Now  heterogen  and  homogen 
are  antithetical  and  should  refer  respectively  to  the  mutual 


io  ANNAI«S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

unlikeness  or  likeness  of  the  parts  of  a  given  whole.  But 
this  is  not  strictly  the  way  the  author  uses  them  and  his 
meaning  would  still  be  ambiguous  if  it  were.  There  are 
three  sets  of  relations  between  unlike  groups  to  be  distin- 
guished: those  between  the  differentiating  parts  of  a  whole 
that  was  beforetime  strictly  homogeneous ;  those  between 
the  parts  of  a  whole  which  is  tending  toward  homogeneity 
by  assimilation  and  amalgamation  of  its  parts ;  and  finally 
those  between  independent  wholes  which  exhibit  antagonism 
and  conflict  whenever  their  spheres  of  influence  overlap. 
These  independent  wholes  our  author  refers  to  as  heterogen, 
unlike  (improperly  called  heterogeneous).  Sometimes,  how- 
ever, the  adjective  seems  to  refer  to  wholes  whose  parts  are 
in  conflict  with  each  other  and  is  properly  translated 
heterogeneous.  The  translator  has  used  his  judgment  as  to 
the  signification  of  the  word  in  its  context  but  has  carefully 
inserted  the  German  word  in  parenthesis  wherever  it  occurred. 

[A  study  of  the  relations  of  the  several  classes  to  each 
other  will  show  a  logical  sequence  from  the  conflict  of  inde- 
pendent wholes  through  the  subjection  of  one  to  the  other 
even  up  to  the  complete  homogeneity  of  the  new  whole  by 
assimilation  or  amalgamation.  There  is  also  a  logical 
sequence  from  the  condition  of  homogeneity  to  the  condition 
of  differentiated  parts  with  their  proper  relations.  Now 
these  two  tendencies  are  so  antipodal  in  direction  and 
character  that  it  is  unscientific  and  ambiguous  not  to  dis- 
tinguish carefully  between  them.  But  the  author,  as  said, 
uses  one  and  the  same  word  heterogen,  heterogeneous,  to 
describe  the  two  conditions  indicated  in  the  first  and  second 
classes  of  relations  indicated  above.  He  does  not  distinguish 
the  former  and  therefore  omits  from  his  theory  of  sociology 
all  consideration  of  the  character  and  behavior  of  homogene- 
ous groups.] 

He  shows  that  the  failure  of  earlier  sociologists  to  obtain 
social  laws  was  due  to  their  failure  to  start  with  the  proper 
sociological  unit;  and  incidentally  he  proclaims  it  as  a  t}^pical 
social  law  that  it  is  the  tendency  of  every  social  community 
to  make  as  much  use  as  possible  of  every  other  social  com- 
munity that  comes  within  its  reach. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  n 

Part  HI. 

In  Part  III  the  author  treats  of  social  elements,  simple 
and  compound,  and  the  cause  and  manner  of  their  combina- 
tion. 

SECTION  i.  Proceeding  to  consider  the  nature  of  the  original 
syngenetic  group  he  concludes  that  it  must  have  been  a 
horde  of  human  beings  of  all  ages  and  both  sexes  living  in 
sexual  promiscuity.  Further  than  this  he  is  unable  to  carry 
the  analysis;  as  far  as  this  he  feels  justified  in  going,  since 
the  hypothesis  of  such  a  horde  enables  him  to  explain  the 
origin  of  the  mother-family  which  investigators  have  all  but 
proven  to  have  been  universal.  Uterine  consanguinity  is 
the  first  force  to  introduce  order  into  the  chaos  of  primitive 
promiscuity. 

But  the  groups  are  mutually  hostile  and  in  particular  in 
the  course  of  their  conflicts  females  are  captured  who  be- 
come the  property  of  their  captors.  [The  warriors  or  the 
group?  Are  rights  of  individual  property  in  movable 
goods  recognized  respecting  them  ?].  Then  the  men,  sup- 
ported by  the  favorable  conditions  growing  out  of  their  rela- 
tion to  the  captives,  are  able  to  resist  the  rule  of  the  women 
and  to  substitute  an  organization  controlled  by  the  males  in 
which  the  various  stages  of  the  father- family  are  developed 
down  to  and  including  the  development  of  the  rights  of  the 
children  to  inherit. 

Highly  significant  in  the  author's  opinion  is  the  inter- 
mixture of  different  ethnical  races  which  occurs  here.  [But 
this  emphasis  seems  overstrained.  Hither  the  males  as  a 
whole  subordinated  the  females  of  the  group  as  a  whole, 
still  keeping  them  in  the  group  except  as  they  were  dis- 
posed of  to  other  groups  by  purchase  or  capture  ;  or  the 
original  group  divided,  some  under  the  leadership  of  the 
women  retaining  the  organization  of  the  mother- family,  the 
rest  led  by  the  possessors  of  the  captive  females  forming  a 
new  whole  organized  as  a  father-family.  In  either  case 
the  conflict  within  the  original  group  between  the  two 
classes,  males  and  females,  with  their  peculiar  interests,  is 
quite  as  bitter  and  relentless  as  the  conflict  between  differ- 
ent syngenetic  groups ;  and  it  is  not  so  important  as  the 
author  represents  that  there  should  be  ethnically  different 
groups  to  antagonize  and  exploit  each  other.] 

Not  only  are  females  and  personal  property  captured  in 
the  raids  of  group  upon  group,  but  whole  groups  are  con- 


12  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

quered,  reduced  to  submission  and  put  to  work  on  the  soil 
they  occupied,  producing  supplies  for  the  conquerors.  In 
the  relations  thus  established  we  have  property  in  land  in 
distinction  from  personal  property  (which  is  a  very  different 
thing  and  arises  much  earlier),  the  organization  of  sove- 
reignty by  one  class  over  the  other,  and  finally  the  state. 

SEC.  2.  The  state  consists  of  two  parts,  the  ruling  and 
the  subject  classes,  of  which  the  former  is  inferior  in  num- 
bers but  superior  in  mental  power  and  military  discipline. 

There  are  two  sets  of  activities  in  the  state.  One  is  in 
the  ruling  class  directed  toward  external  defence  and  con- 
quest, and  the  other  arises  from  the  conflicts  of  the  two 
classes.  [The  differentiation  of  interests  within  each  group 
severally  is  not  an  activity  peculiar  to  the  state  !]  So  there 
are  but  two  points  essential  to  the  definition  of  the  state. 
They  are  the  organization  of  the  sovereignty  and  of  the 
minority.  The  purposes  commonly  attributed  to  the  state, 
like  the  promotion  of  justice,  are  simply  the  modes  of 
operation  appropriate  to  its  several  stages  of  development. 

An  important  incident  is  ethnical  heterogeneity.  The 
hostile  contact  of  different  social  elements  of  unlike  strength 
is  the  first  condition  for  the  creation  of  rights.  The  rela- 
tions established  by  force,  if  continued  in  peace,  become 
rightful.  Thus  inequality  is  stamped  on  every  right. 

SEC.  3.  The  life  of  the  state  is  summed  up  in  a  common 
industrial  enterprise  conducted  under  compulsion  in  which 
the  greater  burden  falls  on  the  subject  class  while  the  rulers 
perform  services  which  are  no  less  essential.  [Were  the 
author  as  fully  impregnated  with  democratic  ideals  as  Am- 
ericans are  his  language  at  this  point,  though  not  his  idea, 
would  be  somewhat  different.  For  in  a  democratic  govern- 
ment the  ruling  class  is  the  periodically  determined  majority, 
or  its  representatives.] 

Man's  material  need  is  the  prime  motive  of  his  con- 
duct. Efforts  to  satisfy  wants  promote  progress  and  are 
perpetual;  for  new  wants  are  constantly  arising  and  social 
distinctions  continue  the  antagonism  between  groups  which 
began  with  ethnical  differences. 

But  war,  if  perpetual,  would  defeat  its  own  end  in  the 
utter  exhaustion  of  both  parties.  Peace  is  necessary.  One 
party  is  victor  and  tries  to  establish  institutions  for  main- 
taining the  inequalities,  while  the  other  tries  to  reduce  them. 
So  apparent  peace  is  only  a  latent  struggle  over  the  body  of 
reciprocal  rights. 


THE  OUTLINES  OP  SOCIOLOGY.  13 

If  the  rulers  are  well  off  the  subject  class  must  rise  too  in 
order  still  to  be  most  serviceable.  But  social  facts  especially 
provoke  reflection;  and  the  life  of  the  subject  classes  is  the 
more  fruitful  in  ideas.  Well-being  and  enlightenment  are 
the  leaven  of  progress. 

SEC.  4.  The  ranks  or  classes  in  the  state  increase  in 
number,  and  political  organization  changes  to  correspond. 
The  third  class  in  order  is  that  of  the  foreign  merchants, 
catering  to  material  wants  chiefly;  the  fourth  is  the  priestly 
class  arising  by  differentiation  from  the  others  and  satisfying 
spiritual  wants.  The  development  of  wants  and  the  forma- 
tion of  classes  go  hand  in  hand.  Material  wants  may  be 
classed  as  primary,  and  intellectual  or  moral  wants  as 
secondary. 

The  power  of  any  class  in  the  state  can  be  expressed  in 
terms  of  human  labor  which  it  either  commands  directly  or 
can  purchase  through  its  possession  or  control  of  supplies 
and  means  of  promoting  production.  If  a  class  can  satisfy 
a  social  want  it  will  be  indispensable,  and  through  the  power 
it  acquires  in  return  will  participate  in  government. 

However,  habit,  a  purely  mental  factor,  is  also  a  source 
cf  power;  and  order,  custom  and  rights  belong  to  the  same 
category.  But  without  the  organization  of  the  state  the 
moral  powers  would  not  exist  and  the  material  possessions 
would  fall  to  the  physically  stronger. 

SEC.  5.  Some  social  groups,  like  the  ruling,  subject  and 
merchant  classes,  are  original,  primary,  ethnical  and  heredi- 
tary. Others,  like  the  priestly  and  professional  classes,  are 
secondary  and  evolutionary  and  arise  by  differentiation. 
Though  we  no  longer  see  primary  groups  arising,  it  has  not 
been  proven  that  no  groups  ever  arose  genetically;  though 
we  see  only  the  differentiation  of  secondary  groups  it  cannot 
be  asserted  that  all  groups  are  of  that  sort.  Nevertheless  all 
social  groups  of  whatever  origin  are  alike  active  as  social 
elements  and  those  of  the  secondary  sort  tend  by  endogamy 
and  otherwise  to  strengthen  their  coherence. 

SEC.  6.  The  word  society  should  properly  be  restricted  to 
denote  a  group  centering  about  one  or  more  common 
interests.  As  such  it  may  be  large  or  small;  local,  national 
or  international.  The  word  folk  should  be  used  co- 
extensively  with  the  state  to  denote  the  group  held  together 
not  only  by  political  organization,  but  also  by  common  terri- 
tory, language,  etc. 


14  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

SEC.  7.  Societies  are  numberless;  but  social  relations  and 
the  principles  underlying  social  power  conform  to  natural 
laws.  The  primary  binding  tie  is  association;  all  others  are 
evolutionary.  All  are  essentially  represented  in  the  primi- 
tive horde:  association,  with  consanguinity,  language  and  all 
that  they  imply,  and  common  needs  and  common  interests  in 
satisfying  them;  and  there  are  no  social  contrasts  which 
cannot  be  referred  to  dissimilarity  in  one  or  more  of  these 
respects.  So  we  observe  the  coherence  of  the  heterogeneous 
and  the  differentiation  of  the  homogeneous  for  cause.  But 
social  classes  overlap  and  are  curiously  involved. 

SEC.  8.  The  group-making  factors  are  classified  according 
to  fundamental  principles  as  material,  economic  and  moral. 
But  further,  each  varies  according  to  the  degree  of  its 
permanency.  Permanent  material,  economic  and  moral 
interests  make  a  group  unitary. 

SEC.  9.  The  power  of  the  group  in  the  social  struggle 
depends  on  the  number  of  group-making  factors  uniting  its 
members.  The  number  of  possible  binding  forces  increases 
with  civilization  but  decreases  at  any  time  with  the  number 
of  individuals  in  the  group. 

In  the  final  analysis  the  intensity  of  the  union  depends 
upon  the  personal  character  of  the  individuals  \i.  <?.,  on 
their  sociability.  This  is  one  of  the  rare  instances  in  which 
the  nature  of  the  individual  is  taken  into  account] ;  and  in 
times  of  revolution  numerical  strength  is  the  test,  but  such 
times  are  abnormal  with  civilized  man. 

Groups  struggle  for  their  interests  group- wise;  the  result 
does  not  depend  upon  individuals  and  success  is  the  standard 
of  conduct. 

The  means  of  utilizing  power  vary  infinitely,  but  generally 
take  the  form  of  an  appropriate  institution  or  exclusive 
right,  as  e.g.,  legislation.  However  it  may  be  with  the 
individual,  society  never  errs  in  seizing  and  applying  the 
right  means.  [This  is  a  paradox.  Conscientious  scruples 
which  would  constrain  the  action  of  individuals  are  in- 
effective to  guide  the  action  of  groups.  But  societies 
do  err;  for  they  perish  as  the  result  of  their  own  mistakes, 
and  in  those  which  succeed  there  are  traces,  if  we  look  for 
them,  of  choices  that  retarded  progress  or  threatened  extinc- 
tion and  therefore  had  to  be  abandoned.] 

SEC.  10.  The  struggle  must  always  be  conducted  between 
assemblages  and  they  must  adopt  a  form  of  organization 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  15 

suited  to  the  situation.  So  the  struggle  in  the  interest  of  the 
great  mass  of  the  people  is  most  difficult  and  the  slowest  to 
begin.  Historically  the  means  which  they  generally  seek  is 
participation  in  legislation. 

SEC.  1 1.  The  conduct  of  the  group  is  in  utter  disregard  of 
the  individual  and  his  code  of  morals.  His  moral  sense  is 
therefore  often  seriously  injured.  [The  difference  between 
the  individual  and  the  social  code  of  morals  demands 
explanation.  A  partial  explanation  will  doubtless  be  found 
in  the  current  theories  of  individualism.  But  this  is  insuffi- 
cient. There  would  be  a  remnant  which  can  probably  be 
best  explained  as  due  to  the  experience  of  individuals  in  the 
homogeneous  group.  This  will  be  in  harmony  with  the 
author's  theory  of  the  influence  of  the  group  on  the 
individual;  but  it  will  at  the  same  time  point  out  an  impor- 
tant omission  in  his  general  sociological  theory,  viz.,  the 
failure  to  give  due  consideration  to  the  life  of  the  homo- 
geneous group.] 

SEC.  12.  Bvery  right  ends  in  an  obligation,  the  right  of 
those  who  otherwise  have  no  rights.  Though  rights  are 
constantly  changing  the  idea  of  right  endures  and  is  a  fit 
weapon  for  the  social  struggle.  But  it  is  applied  indirectly. 
The  bourgeoisie  appeal  to  it  to  enlist  the  lower  classes  with 
them  against  the  upper.  With  success  the  lower  classes 
gain  some  amelioration  and  experience.  This  is  aptly  called 
the  struggle  for  emancipation.  It  may  lead  to  revolution  or 
anarchy;  but  a  reaction  and  a  new  period  of  evolutionary 
rights  will  follow. 

SEC.  13.  The  natural  tendency  of  the  state  is  to  increase 
in  territory  and  power.  But  relative  stability  within  and 
assimilation  of  former  conquests  are  essential  conditions  to 
continued  growth  the  absence  of  which  will  induce  a  catas- 
trophe. 

If  extreme  violence  is  necessary  to  subjugation  and  if 
assimilation  is  difficult,  morals  and  the  sense  of  humanity 
will  suffer  harm. 

The  principle  applies  as  well  to  other  social  domains  as  to 
the  political,  e.  g.,  it  explains  the  periodical  crises  of 
economic  production. 

SEC.  14.  Folk-states  will  arise.  But  if,  falling  into  opposi- 
tion, the  weaker  are  subjected  by  the  stronger  the  struggle 
for  authority  in  the  new  composite  state  will  take  on  added 
severity.  Historically  it  is  apt  to  centre  about  the  rivalry 
of  different  languages  for  official  recognition. 


1 6  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

Part  IV. 

Part  IV  treats  of  the  influence  of  the  group  on  the  indi- 
vidual. The  processes  involved  and  the  laws  are  those 
specifically  called  psycho-social. 

SECTION  i.  The  historical  antithesis  between  individualism 
and  collectivism  disappears  upon  substituting  social  or  socie- 
tary  egoism  and  sympathy  instead  of  the  alleged  individual 
egoism  and  sympathy  of  current  philosophy. 

SEC.  2.  To  establish  the  claims  of  a  socialistic  philosophy 
over  the  individualistic  the  author  notes,  first,  that  the 
source  of  thought  is  in  the  group  and  not  in  the  individual. 
The  influence  of  environment  on  the  individual  is  of  funda- 
mental and  not  simply  of  secondary  importance;  but  the 
individual's  environment  is  almost  exclusively  his  group, 
and  the  power  that  is  admittedly  strong  enough  to  change 
his  physiognomy  is  a  fortiori  strong  enough  to  change  his 
mind.  The  type  produced  is  not  anthropological  but  social; 
and  the  factor  producing  it  is  social  also.  Social  thoughts 
and  efforts  produce  the  type;  but  it  is  the  social  life,  varying 
with  the  habitat,  that  produces  these.  Hence  also  the 
variety  of  social  types. 

SEC.  3.  Pre-eminently  it  is  the  economic  status  which 
gives  character  to  the  social  type,  making  the  nobility  and 
peasantry  conservative  and  the  merchant  class  progressive 
and  giving  to  each  of  the  differentiated  classes  also  a  type 
appropriate  to  its  peculiar  interests.  But  the  individual 
is  affected  through  his  moral  nature;  the  transforming  force 
is  moral. 

The  tenacity  and  permanence  of  the  type  is  directly 
related  to  the  solidarity  of  the  group  which  is  a  function  of 
the  group-making  factors. 

SEC.  4.  The  first  factor  in  morals  is  habit  and  acquired 
manner  of  life;  the  second  is  the  conviction  implanted  by  the 
group  in  the  individual  that  the  manner  of  life  which  it 
imposes  upon  him  is  proper.  Thus  morals  grow  out  of  the 
relations  of  the  group  to  its  members.  But  when  different 
groups  are  united  different  moral  codes  contend;  all  are 
useless  because  no  one  is  acknowledged  by  every  individual 
and  a  new  code  has  to  be  formed  and  enforced  by  the  state, 
called  a  code  of  rights.  Thus  rights  grow  out  of  the  union 
of  different  social  elements. 

There  will  be  important  conflicts  between  the  code  of 
rights  enforced  by  the  state  and  the  moral  code  growing  up 


THE  OUTLINES  OP  SOCIOLOGY.  17 

in  the  complex  community  on  the  one  hand  and  the  moral 
codes  of  the  more  compact  circles  comprised  within  it  on  the 
other.  The  supreme  purpose  of  the  state  must  be  to  build 
up  a  moral  code  for  the  state  as  a  whole;  indeed  the  ideal 
code  is  international. 

SEC.  5.  There  are  two  elements  in  morals,  the  natural 
and  the  human,  the  former  changeless,  the  latter  changing. 
Though  man  acts  as  natural  forces  compel  him  to,  it  is  his 
nature  to  reflect  on  his  acts  and  to  believe  that  he  acts  freely. 
When  his  behavior  finally  becomes  such  as  the  long  experi- 
ence of  his  social  group  proves  to  be  best  he  calls  it  moral, 
but  seeks  a  higher  sanction  for  his  moral  ideas  by  ascribing 
events  to  mythical  and  generally  to  anthropomorphic  ori- 
gins. Truth  and  fiction  thus  grow  up  together  until  it 
seems  impossible  to  sustain  morals  without  maintaining  the 
truth  of  what  is  really  supposititious.  Thus  the  conflict  of 
ignorance  fighting  in  the  name  of  morality  begins. 

But  morals  is  the  ripened  fruit  of  the  actual  development 
of  civilization;  natural  science  is  the  basis  of  morals,  and 
whatever  promotes  scientific  knowledge  promotes  moral 
science  also.  Man's  only  standard  is  the  visible  tendency, 
the  assumed  will  of  nature. 

SEC.  6.  Rights  are  social  creations,  formed  by  the  conflict 
of  unlike  social  groups  of  unequal  power.  But  correspond- 
ing to  each  right  is  a  duty  or  obligation. 

SEC.  7.  The  theory  of  ' '  natural  rights ' '  is  untenable. 
Rights  arise  in  the  state  only;  and  though  there  is  much 
unavoidable  evil  in  the  state,  the  alternative,  anarchy,  is 
worse. 

Neither  is  justice  the  source  of  rights.  On  the  contrary, 
it  is  simply  an  abstraction  from  political  rights  and  increases 
in  perfection  with  time.  But  because  rights  are  relatively 
fixed  in  the  form  of  written  law  and  deep  seated  usage, 
while  political  relations  and  the  corresponding  sense  of  jus- 
tice suffer  continuous  change,  rights  fall  into  formal  antithe- 
sis to  justice  at  times. 

SEC.  8.  Considering  the  nature  and  form  of  morals  and 
rights  it  is  not  difficult  to  explain  the  cases  where  morals 
have  conformed  to  rights,  and  where  rights,  becoming  formal 
merely,  have  yielded  to  well-grounded  morals  and  new 
rights. 

Though  morals  are  thus  changeable  the  individual  treats 
them  as  unchanging;  for  his  starting  point  in  morals,  though 
socially  caused,  is  subjective  and  relatively  fixed. 


1 8  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

NOTE  TO  6,  7  AND  8.  Private  rights  depend  on  the  truth 
and  merits  of  the  claims  of  the  contending  parties;  public 
rights  on  their  relative  power,  on  their  might.  The  one 
relates  to  individuals,  the  other  to  the  state.  Much  confusion 
has  arisen  from  trying  to  apply  the  principles  of  private 
rights  to  political  affairs.  [After  the  author's  presentation 
of  the  omnipotence  and  omnipresence  of  social  influences, 
what  sphere  is  left  for  private  rights  as  distinct  from  political 
(social)  rights?  In  the  relations,  it  must  be  replied,  regu- 
lating the  conduct  of  individuals  within  a  homogeneous  class 
or  group.  As  the  tendency  of  the  state  is  to  unity  and 
solidarity  in  some  respects  at  least,  the  sphere  of  private 
rights  is  doubtless  not  small.  So  a  part  of  the  conflict 
between  individual  and  social  codes  is  due,  not  so  much  to 
the  false  ideas  of  free  will  as  to  the  tendency  to  apply  by 
analogy  the  rules  suited  to  one  set  of  relations  to  another 
and  different  set.  The  author  has  not  made  as  much  of  the 
rules  of  behavior  governing  the  relations  of  individuals  in 
the  unitary  horde  as  they  deserve.] 

SEC.  9.  Man's  impotency  in  the  contest  with  social  neces- 
sities is  illustrated  by  the  antithesis  between  his  desire  to 
preserve  and  nature's  tendency  toward  change  and  decay. 
Though  men  admire  the  ascetic  who  defies  nature  and 
despise  those  who  follow  natural  necessity,  human  freedom 
in  science  and  philosophy,  in  legislation,  statecraft  and 
diplomacy  is  shown  to  be  merely  the  necessary  oscillation  of 
human  choices  back  and  forth  across  the  line  of  necessity. 
Only  those  which  coincide  with  necessity  are  fortunate;  but 
as  oscillation  is  a  necessity,  not  all  can  coincide,  resignation 
to  necessity  is  impossible  and  happiness  is  always  less  than 
the  maximum. 

Some  amelioration  is  possible,  especially  by  learning  not 
to  overrate  the  value  of  human  life.  But  the  greatest  suc- 
cess is  in  technology,  science  and  art,  in  which  the  object  is 
to  learn  what  is  natural  and  to  copy  it  or  adapt  one's  self 
to  it. 

Part   V. 

Part  V  treats  briefly  of  the  history  of  mankind  as  the  life 
of  a  species  sociologically  organized. 

SECTION  i.  The  task  of  sociology  is  to  investigate  human 
group-making;  not  to  give  the  history  of  every  group,  which 
would  be  impossible,  but  to  show  conformity  to  law  in  the 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  19 

process  and  to  study  and  describe  the  manner  of  social 
evolution . 

SEC.  2.  Conformity  to  law  is  admitted  almost  without  con- 
tradiction in  the  development  of  art  and  science ;  but,  if  it 
is  true  in  these  domains,  it  must  be  admitted  even  by  those 
who  have  hitherto  denied  it  to  be  equally  true  of  political 
history  in  general;  and  if  true  of  the  great  general  results 
it  must  be  true  of  the  individuals  and  of  the  social  structures, 
for  there  is  a  close  causal  connection  between  mental  de- 
velopment and  social,  political  and  economic  conditions. 

SEC.  3.  The  evolution  of  mankind  must  be  conceived  of 
not  as  unitary  and  not  as  polygenetic,  not  as  genealogical 
nor  even  as  having  a  beginning.  But  the  same  things  take 
place  according  to  the  same  laws  whenever  the  same  con- 
ditions arise.  We  must  conceive  of  evolution  as  running  its 
course  and  stopping  when  energy  is  no  longer  generated. 
This  suggests  cyclical  development. 

SEC.  4.  Cyclical  development  follows  from  man's  unfree- 
dom  and  dependence  on  physical  wants.  According  to  the 
Malthusian  law,  in  some  groups  population  increases  under 
favorable  conditions  wihtout  the  group  making  progress  in 
any  other  particular  or  gaining  any  strength.  Such  groups 
easily  fall  prey  to  more  developed  communities.  The  states 
thus  formed  by  conquest  will  enjoy  general  progress,  in  the 
lower  as  well  as  in  the  higher  classes.  Then  population 
may  stagnate  or  even  decline.  Being  numerically  weak, 
the  states  will  fall  prey  to  some  barbarian,  whether  external 
horde  or  internal  proletariat. 

SEC.  5.  There  is  of  course  progress  in  particular  countries 
and  in  particular  periods  of  the  cyclical  process,  but  there  is 
no  progress  in  the  course  of  history  taken  as  a  whole. 
History  simply  repeats  itself.  There  is  of  course  progress 
in  invention  and  discovery;  but  it  is  not  to  be  explained  as 
the  result  of  a  perfected  human  intellect.  Intellects  of  the 
same  general  range  of  power  have  replaced  with  interest  the 
accumulations  of  earlier  generations.  But  even  these  accu- 
mulations are  reduced  by  recurrent  catastrophes  of  wide 
reach.  The  same  is  true  of  morals  and  philosophy. 

SEC.  6.  The  current  conceptions  of  justice  consider  man 
as  its  object,  and,  owing  to  the  belief  in  human  free  will 
and  to  the  anthropomorphic  conception  of  deity,  men  try  to 
judge  historical  and  natural  events  by  the  standards  of 
human  justice.  This  is  as  wrong  as  it  is  harmful,  for  the 


2O  ANNAivS  OP  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

individual  is  never  considered  in  these  phenomena,  only  the 
mass,  and  there  is  no  criterion  of  his  worth.  Fate  strikes 
individuals  in  proportion  not  to  their  own  merits,  but  to  the 
merits  of  the  group.  This  is  historic  justice;  and  the  crown 
of  sociology  is  to  recognize  in  human  history  a  natural 
process. 


PREFACE. 

Two  years  ago  I  published  some  of  my  "sociological 
investigations,"  under  the  title  of  "Der  Rassenkampf," 
diffidently  offering  them  as  the  ' '  first  lispings  of  a  great 
science  of  the  future,  sociology."  The  favorable  reception 
accorded  them  by  competent  authorities  at  home  and  abroad 
has  encouraged  me  to  present  the  following  ' '  Outlines  of 
Sociology."  From  the  attention  universally  accorded  to 
sociological  problems  it  is  evident  that  sociology  is  not  an 
ephemeral  idea,  but  is  actually  coming  to  be  a  science.  I 
succeeded,  as  I  believe,  in  laying  down  a  few  of  its  principles 
in  liDer  Rassenkampf."  In  the  present  "  Outlines,"  I 
have  earnestly  striven  to  project  a  complete  and  unitary 
plan  of  the  science;  to  show  the  distinction  between  it  and 
other  sciences,  and  to  call  attention  to  the  most  impor- 
tant questions  which  must  hereafter  be  subjected  to  socio- 
logical investigation.  May  this  book  meet  with  the  same 
tolerant  criticism  as  its  predecessor. 

THE  AUTHOR. 

GRATZ,  April,  1885. 


I.    SKETCH  OF  SOCIOLOGICAL  LITERATURE. 

It  is  usual  before  proceeding  to  the  systematic  presenta- 
tion of  a  science  to  give  a  sketch  of  its  literature.  A  biblio- 
graphical introduction  informs  the  reader  how  much  effort 
has  been  expended  on  the  science,  how  it  has  progressed, 
and  what  stage  of  development  it  has  reached.  If  the 
sketch  is  also  critical,  and  it  can  hardly  fail  to  be  so, 
the  reader  is  also  informed  of  the  new  writer's  attitude 
toward  the  work  of  his  predecessors.  Such  an  intro- 
duction gives  a  comprehensive  view.  But  it  involves  dis- 
advantages of  a  technical  nature.  If  every  system  should 
be  described  in  detail,  the  introductory  sketch  would  become 
a  history  of  the  science.  The  reader  would  have  to  wander 
through  system  after  system,  each  one  represented  to  be 
more  or  lessf  alse,  before  learning  how  the  writer  would  cor- 
rect them;  which  is  not  practicable.  Or  should  the  writer 
make  and  substantiate  his  criticisms  in  the  introduction 
itself,  he  would  anticipate  his  own  system;  whatever  fol- 
lowed woula  be  merely  tiresome  repetition.  This  too  would 
be  impracticable;  especially  since  the  refuting  arguments  can 
be  used  much  more  effectively  as  the  author  proceeds  to 
unfold  his  own  views.  Then  he  is  not  bound  by  historical 
sequence  nor  need  he  present  the  older  systems  entire. 

Accordingly  we  shall  mention  only  the  most  important 
pioneers  in  the  domain  of  sociology  noting,  with  all  possible 
brevity,  the  most  prominent  and  most  general  points  of  view 
in  their  systems  and  deferring  criticism  and  refutation  niitil 
we  present  our  own  system. 

Young  and  imperfect  as  the  science  of  sociology  still  is,  a 
history  of  its  literature  has  already  been  written.*  But  its 
author  makes  the  "  socialistic  "  doctrines  his  starting  point, 
and  his  failure  to  distinguish  clearly  between  socialism  and 
sociology  greatly  diminishes  the  value  of  the  work.  Further 
bibliographical  material  may  be  found  in  the  literature  upon 
the  development  of  constitutional  law,  politics,  political 
economy,  and  the  philosophy  of  history. f 

*"  Die  Spcialurissenschaften."  A  guide  to  the  modern  schools  of  social  sci- 
ence, by  Friedrich  v.  Baerenbach,  Leipzig,  1882. 

t  Beside  the  well-known  works  of  Raumer  and  Bluntschli,  Rocholl's  "Philosophy 
of  History,"  (Philosophic  der  Geschichte),  may  be  mentioned. 

(22) 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  23 

Probably  the  first  author  to  cherish  presentiments  of  a 
"  science  of  the  common  nature  of  nations"*  was  Giam- 
battista  Vico.  But  he  adhered  to  Biblical  tradition  and  did 
not  emancipate  himself  from  the  contemporary  theories  of 
natural  rights.  Neither  should  we  expect  to  find  in  St. 
Simon,  the  world  reformer,  an  objective  science  of  society. 
Full  justice  has  been  done  him  when  it  is  recognized  that  it 
was  from  him  that  Comte  received  his  inspiration. 

To  Auguste  Comte  unquestionably  belongs  the  honor  of 
having  been  the  first  to  recognize  the  real  character  of  soci- 
ology. In  his  "  Positive  Philosophy"  he  declared  repeat- 
edly, plainly  and  correctly  what  this  science  should  be. 
"  All  that  can  be  rationally  proposed  in  our  day,"  he  says 
in  one  place,  "  is  to  recognize  the  character  of  positivity  in 
social  as  in  all  other  science,  and  to  ascertain  the  chief  bases 
on  which  it  is  founded."  f  The  scientific  character  of  the 
future  sociology  is  thus  indicated.  Further,  ' '  it  is  the  exclu- 
sive property  of  the  positive  principle  to  recognize  the  fund- 
amental law  of  continuous  human  development,  represent- 
ing the  existing  evolution  as  the  necessary  result  of  the 
gradual  series  of  former  transformations. ' '  J  Thus  Comte  con- 
ceived mankind  to  be  subject  to  the  law  of  evolution  and  the 
present  to  be  the  necessary  consequence  of  the  past. 
Though  his  conception  of  mankind  was  erroneous,  as  will 
be  shown  later,  still  both  ideas  are  true  and  important;  and 
the  general  principle  has  been  maintained  firmly  in  sociology 
ever  since.  Moreover,  an  admonition  of  broad  scientific 
application  was  added:  "  True  resignation,  that  is,  a  perma- 
nent disposition  to  endure  steadily  and  without  hope  of 
compensation  all  inevitable  evils,  can  proceed  only  from  a 
deep  sense  of  the  connection  of  all  kinds  of  natural  phe- 
nomena with  invariable  laws. "  1 1  Without  such  resignation, 
there  can  be  no  sociology. 

*  "  Principii  di  una  Scienza  nuova  d'intorno  alia  commune  Natura  delle  Nazioni," 
by  Giambattista  Vico.  Secundo  Edizione  del  1725  pubblicati  con  Note  da  Giuseppe 
Ferrari e  la  Vita  dell"  Autore.  Milan,  1836. 

t"The  Positive  Philosophy  of  Auguste  Comte,"  freely  translated  by  Harriet 
Martineau.  Ix>ndon,  1875.  Two  volumes.  Vol.  ii,  bk.  vi,  cap.  i. 

"  Cpurs  de  Philosophic  positive"  by  Auguste  Comte.  Paris,  1839.  Four  volumes. 
Vol.  iv,  lee.  46. 

"La  Philosophie  positive"  by  Auguste  Comte,  Resume  by  Jules  Rig.  Paris,  1881. 
Two  volumes  Vol.  ii,  lee.  46. 

[Generally  the  quotations  are  cited  in  the  words  of  Miss  Martineau.  But  this  has 
not  always  been  possible,  as  the  author's  quotations  are  from  the  r6sum£  of  Jules 
Rig.  (J.  K  Rtgolage).] 

\  Martineau,  op.  tit.,  Vol.  ii,  bk.  vi,  cap.  i;  Comte,  op.  tit.,  Vol.  iv,  lee.  46;  Rig.  op. 
tit..  Vol.  ii,  lee,  46. 

||  Ibid. 


24  ANNAI£  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

"If  there  are  (as  I  doubt  not  there  are)  political  evils  which,  like 
some  personal  sufferings,  cannot  be  remedied  by  science,"  he  went  on, 
"science at  least  proves  to  us  that  they  are  incurable,  so  as  to  calm 
our  restlessness  under  pain  by  the  conviction  that  it  is  by  natural 
causes  that  they  are  rendered  insurmountable."* 

Would  that  he  had  acted  upon  this  wise  principle  himself. 
But  he  violated  it  by  suggesting  plans  for  the  ' '  practical 
amelioration"  of  "the  condition  of  the  lower  classes."  f 
The  error  is  one  for  which  his  master,  St.  Simon,  is  to 
blame.  It  finally  forced  him  out  of  the  path  of  objective 
science  and  into  the  false  ways  of  subjective  politics. 

How  clear  and  precise  his  statement  of  the  task  of  so- 
ciology in  contrast  with  the  older  doctrines  of  the  philosophy 
of  history! 

' '  Social  science  could  not  exist, ' '  he  says,  ' '  so  long  as  men  were 
ignorant  concerning  what  constitutes  development;  for  this  science 
studies  the  laws  of  development.  "J 

Yet  he  himself  failed  to  apprehend  its  true  nature, 
for  he  accepted  Pascal's  "admirable  aphorism  "  that  "  the 
entire  succession  of  men,  through  the  whole  course  of  ages, 
must  be  regarded  as  one  man  always  living,' '  1 1  and  he  miscon- 
ceived the  result  of  sociology  most  egregiously,  saying  ' '  that 
this  science  fulfills  the  famous  suggestion  of  Pascal  by  repre- 
senting the  whole  human  race  past,  present  and  future,  as 
constituting  a  vast  and  eternal  social  unit  whose  different 
organs  concur  in  their  various  modes  and  degrees  in  the 
evolution  of  humanity."  §  But  it  is  false  to  conceive  man- 
kind to  be  a  unit  as  we  shall  show  hereafter.  It  led  Comte 
into  a  thousand  and  one  errors. 

In  his  time,  it  is  true,  historical  and  ethnographical  ma- 
terial was  very  meagre.  His  personal  knowledge  of  man- 
kind was  limited;  and  his  investigations  into  the  laws  of 
human  development  were  restricted  to  the  Teutonic  and  the 
Latin  races  of  Europe.  Indeed,  France  was  often  his  sole 
example;  the  "  great  revolution  "  was  to  his  mind  the  over- 
turning of  all  humanity,  whereas  far  the  greater  part  of 

*  Ibid. 
t  Ibid. 

\  Rig.  op.  eft.,  Vol.  ii,  lee.  47  ;  Comte,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  iv,  lee.  47  ;  Martineau,  op.  eft., 
Vol.  ii,  bfc.  vi,  cap.  ii. 

li  Ibid.     Cf.  Pascal's  "Penstes,"    Part  i,  art  i. 

^  Martineau,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  ii,  bk.  vi,  cap.  iii ;  Comte,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  iv,  lee.  48  ;  Rig. 
op.  cit.,  Vol.  ii,  lee.  48. 


THE;  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  25 

mankind  was  not  influenced  at  all  by  this  local  European 
event. 

Not  only  were  his  ' '  laws  of  human  development ' '  based 
on  this  narrow  experience;  they  were  also  so  distorted  by 
personal  predilections  that  they  possess  little  value.  The 
historical  and  ethnographical  horizon  of  his  time  was  far  too 
narrow.  His  sociology  was  a  failure  from  utter  lack  of 
material.  The  epoch- making  character  of  his  work  is  solely 
due  to  the  brilliant  generalizations  {geniale  Principieri)  upon 
which  he  founded  it.  They  are  the  basis,  as  we  shall  see, 
of  all  the  sociological  efforts  from  his  day  to  ours. 

The  prospect  of  verifying  his  laws  of  human  development 
by  means  of  numerical  calculations  must  have  been  all  the 
more  enticing,  to  a  mathematician  like  Quetelet,  from  the 
fact  that  Comte  himself  seemed  directly  to  suggest  it.* 
Quetelet' s  interest  centred  in  the  "Natural  History  of 
Society,"  i.  <?.,  in  sociology.  Even  his  earlier  work  on 
"  Man  "  has  the  sub-title  "  Social  Physics,"  and  he  states 
that  "  it  is  the  body  social  that  we  propose  to  study,  "f 

His  task  is  obviousl}"  allied  to  that  of  Comte's  sociology. 
But  the  ' '  law  of  the  great  number  ' '  \  which  he  relied  on  to 
discover  the  laws  of  social  development  was  ineffectual.  His 
statistical  works  afford  m  aterial  for  the  theory  of  ' '  man  ' ' 
and  the  thralldom  of  human  will  only.  For  sociology  they 
could  do  nothing.  He  made  no  distinction  between  ' '  man- 
kind "  and  the  unclear  concept  "society;"  and  many  of 
his  investigations  begin  with  errors  current  in  the  social 
science  of  his  day.  He  assumes,  for  instance,  that  ' '  the 
simplest  and  most  natural  social  union  among  men  is  the 
family,  which  is  found  in  all  ages  and  among  all  peoples.  "|| 
He  did  not  know  that  the  family,  in  the  modern  signification 

*  "It  is  clear  that  this  education  [the  preliminary  sociological  training]  must  rest 
on  a  basis  of  mathematical  philosophy  even  apart  from  the  necessity  of  mathe- 
matics to  the  study  of  inorganic  philosophy.  It  is  only  in  the  region  of  mathema- 
tics that  sociologists,  or  anybody  else,  can  obtain  a  true  sense  of  scientific  evidence 
and  form  the  habit  of  rapid  ana  decisive  argumentation;  can  in  short  learn  to  ful- 
fill the  logical  conditions  of  all  positive  speculation  by  studying  universal  positiv- 
ism at  its  source;"  Martineau,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  ii,  bk.  vi,  cap.  iv  ;  Comte  op.  ctt.,  Vol. 
iv,  lee.  49  ;  Rig.  op.  ctt.,  Vol.  ii,  lee.  49.  However,  Comte  warns  against  applying 
mathematical  laws  to  the  "  complicated  speculations  of  sociology." 

1["Surr  Homnte  et  le  D&veloppement  de  ses  Facultts,  ou  Essaz  de  Physique  sociale," 
by  A.  Quetelet,  Paris,  1835.  Introduction  sec.  3. 

t  Quetelet,  op.  cit.,  Introduction    sees.  2  and  3. 

|  "  Natural  History  of  Society."  Comte  makes  the  same  statement:  "  The  family 
presents  the  true  germ  of  the  various  characteristics  of  the  social  organism.  Such 
a  conception  is  intermediate  between  the  idea  of  the  individual  and  that  of  the 
species  or  society."  Martineau,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  ii,  bk.  vi,  cap.  v;  Comte,  op.  cit., Vol. 
iv.  lee.  50;  Rig.,  op.  cit..  Vol.  ii,  lee.  50. 


26  ANNAI.S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

of  the  word  and  the  sense  in  which  he  uses  it,  is  a  very  late 
social  institution  and  an  adaptation  to  political  ends.  Equally 
ingenuous  is  his  idea  that  a  ' '  nation  "  "  is  a  body  composed 
of  homogeneous  elements  performing  their  functions  in  uni- 
son and  inspired  with  the  same  life  principle;"*  whereas,  in 
truth,  every-  nation  consists  of  unlike  elements  performing 
complementary  functions  under  compulsion.  His  theory 
was  that  social  unions  originate  in  the  ' '  preponderance  of 
the  force  of  attraction  impelling  individuals  to  associate." 
He  frankly  conceded,  however,  that  ' '  a  nation  is  not  always 
composed  of  elements  of  one  sort.  Indeed  it  is  quite  often 
the  result  of  invasion  and  the  fusion  of  conqueror  and  con- 
quered."! But  this  is  the  "exception;"  his  theory  is  not 
based  upon  it.  No  wonder  that  he  failed  to  get  a  clear 
conception  of  the  laws  of  social  development.  Phenomena 
as  common  as  the  struggles  of  nation  with  nation  seem  to 
him  against  nature;  and  he  concludes  his  "  History  of  Man- 
kind "  with  the  enthusiasm  of  an  Elihu  Burritt,  saying: 

"  To  the  credit  of  mankind  be  it  told,  the  nineteenth  century  is  on 
the  point  of  striking  into  a  new  path.  It  is  recognized  that  there  must 
be  laws  and  tribunals  for  nations  also;  and  that  crimes  practiced  on  a 
large  scale  by  one  people  against  another  are  just  as  much  to  be  hated 
as  crimes  of  man  against  man."  J 

These  are  beautiful  effusions;  but  they  attest  the  scantiness 
of  Quetelet's  sociological  information.  Since  he  wrote  them 
the  nineteenth  century  has  witnessed,  even  in  Europe  alone, 
a  half  dozen  wars:  the  Crimean  and  the  Austro-Italian;  the 
war  of  Prussia  and  Austria  against  Denmark;  the  Austro- 
Prussian,  the  Franco-Prussian  and  the  Russo-Turkish.  Ac- 
cording to  him  the}'-  were  all  downright  "  crimes."  Yet  the 
victorious  nations  inscribed  them  in  their  annals  in  letters 
of  gold,  and  succeeding  generations  exult  at  the  thought  of 
them.  His  "  new  path  "  is  still  a  good  way  off.  Is  it  not 
sociology  that  should  take  a  new  course? 

Herbert  Spencer's  words  on  this  point  are  of  inestimable 
importance: 

"Thought  and  feeling  cannot  be  completely  dissociated.  Each 
emotion  has  a  more  or  less  distinct  framework  of  ideas;  and  each 
group  of  ideas  is  more  or  less  suffused  with  emotion.  There  are,  how- 
ever, great  differences  between  their  degrees  of  combination  under 
both  of  these  aspects.  We  have  some  feelings  which  are  vague  from 

*  "  Natural  History  of  Society." 

Mbid. 

I  Ibid. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  27 

lack  of  intellectual  definition;  and  others  to  which  clear  shapes  are 
given  by  the  associated  conceptions.  At  one  time  our  thoughts  are 
distorted  by  the  passion  running  through  them;  and  at  another  time 
it  is  difficult  to  detect  in  them  a  trace  of  liking  or  disliking.  Mani- 
festly, too,  in  each  particular  case  these  components  of  the  mental 
state  may  be  varied  in  their  proportions.  The  ideas  being  the  same, 
the  emotion  joined  with  them  may  be  greater  or  less;  and  it  is  a 
familiar  truth  that  the  correctness  of  the  judgment  formed,  depends, 
if  not  on  the  absence  of  emotion,  still,  on  that  balance  of  emotions 
which  negatives  excess  of  any  one. 

"  Especially  is  this  so  in  matters  concerning  human  life.  There  are 
two  ways  in  which  men's  actions,  individual  or  social,  may  be 
regarded.  We  may  consider  them  as  groups  of  phenomena  to  be 
analyzed,  and  the  laws  of  their  dependence  ascertained;  or,  consider- 
ing them  as  causing  pleasures  or  pains,  we  may  associate  with  them 
approbation  or  reprobation.  Dealing  with  its  problems  intellectu- 
ally, we  may  regard  conduct  as  always  the  result  of  certain  forces;  or, 
dealing  with  its  problems  morally,  and  recognizing  its  outcome  as  in 
this  case  good  and  in  that  case  bad,  we  may  allow  now  admiration 
and  now  indignation  to  fill  our  consciousness.  Obviously,  it  must 
make  a  great  difference  in  our  conclusions  whether,  as  in  the  one 
case,  we  study  men's  doings  as  those  of  alien  creatures,  which  it 
merely  concerns  us  to  understand;  or  whether,  as  in  the  other  case,  we 
contemplate  them  as  the  doings  of  creatures  like  ourselves,  with 
whose  lives  our  own  lives  are  bound  up,  and  whose  behavior  arouses 
in  us,  directly  and  sympathetically,  feelings  of  love  or  hate." 

"  Here  let  me  emphasize  the  conclusion  that  in  pursuing  our  socio- 
logical inquiries,  and  especially  those  on  which  we  are  now  entering 
[political  institutions],  we  must,  as  much  as  possible,  exclude  what- 
ever emotions  the  facts  are  calculated  to  excite,  and  attend  solely  to 
the  interpretation  of  the  facts.  There  are  several  groups  of  phenomena 
in  contemplating  which  either  contempt,  or  disgust,  or  indignation, 
t«»nds  to  arise  but  must  be  restrained.  "* 

As  the  English  statesman  cries  ' '  hands  off "  to  the 
onlookers  in  political  quarrels,  so  Spencer  cries  "  away  with 
sentiment,"  whenever  a  sociological  investigation  is  under- 
taken. On  the  portal  of  this  science  he  writes:  "  All  senti- 
ment, abandon  ye  who  enter  here."  This  is  not  merely  a 
practical  admonition,  it  is  a  conditio  sine  qua  nony  a  stipula- 
tion indispensable  in  sociology,  and  which  moreover  forestalls 
objections  raised  on  moral  grounds. 

Fortunately  Spencer  is  in  full  agreement  with  Comte  in 
recognizing  ' '  the  character  of  positivity  in  social  as  in  all 
other  science. "  It  is  to  him  the  first  principle  of  method- 
ology, or  rather  it  precedes  methodology.  But  in  accepting 
the  fundamental  similarity  of  sociology  and  biology  he  made 
a  well-nigh  fatal  blunder. 

*  Spencer,  "  Principles  of  Sociology,"  Vol.  ii,  sec.  434. 


28  ANNAI<S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

Comte  affirmed  emphatically  that  this  similarity  was  an 
essential  sociological  principle. 

"  The  necessity, "  he  says,  "  of  founding  sociology  upon  the  whole 
of  biology  is  obvious."  "The  subordination  of  social  science  to 
biology  is  so  evident,"  he  continues,  "  that  nobody  denies  it  in  state- 
ment however  it  may  be  neglected  in  fact."  "Biology  will  be  seen 
to  afford  the  starting  point  of  all  social  speculation,  in  accordance 
with  the  analysis  of  the  social  faculties  of  man,  and  of  the  organic 
conditions  which  determine  its  character.  But,  moreover,  as  we  can 
scarcely  at  all  investigate  the  most  elementary  terms  of  the  social 
series,  we  must  construct  them  by  applying  the  positive  theory  of 
human  nature  to  the  aggregate  of  corresponding  circumstances. 
....  When  the  social  condition  has  advanced  so  far  as  to  exclude 
this  kind  of  deduction,  the  second  aspect  presents  itself;  and  the 
biological  theory  of  man  is  implicated  with  the  sociological  in  a  less 
direct  and  special  manner.  The  whole  social  evolution  of  the  race 
must  proceed  in  entire  accordance  with  biological  laws."* 

The  whole  ' '  theory  of  the  organic  state  ' '  which  flourished 
so  luxuriantly  in  Germany  from  Rohmer  and  Bluntschli  to 
Schaeffle  and  his  "  Structure  and  Life  of  the  Social  Body," 
should  probably  be  traced  back  to  Comte  directly  or  in- 
directly; and  Spencer  seemed  about  to  follow  him  too. 
' '  Setting  out  then  with  this  general  principle,  that  the  proper- 
ties of  the  units  [which  it  is  the  province  of  biology  to  treat] 
determine  the  properties  of  the  aggregate,"  he  also  con- 
cludes 

"that  there  must  be  a  social  science  expressing  the  relations  between 
the  two,  with  as  much  definiteness  as  the  nature  of  the  phenomena 
permits;" 

and  that 

"in  every  case  [social  science]  has  for  its  subject-matter  the  growth, 
development,  structure  and  functions  of  the  social  aggregate,  as 
brought  about  by  the  mutual  actions  of  individuals."! 

He  is  an  individualist  and  endeavors  to  derive  knowledge 
of  social  events  from  the  individual  and  his  nature.  If  this 
were  possible  sociology  must  be  a  higher  order  of  biology, 
since  we  get  our  knowledge  of  the  individual  through  the 
latter.  But  we  may  state  here  that  the  social  commu- 
nities are  the  sociological  units  or  elements,  and  that  it 
is  not  possible  to  ascertain  their  mutual  relations  from  the 
properties  of  their  constituent  parts,  i.  e. ,  from  the  proper- 
ties of  individuals.  No  one  starting  from  the  latter  can 

•  Martineau,  op.  cii.,  Vol.  ii,  bk.  vi,  cap.  iv;  Comte,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  iv,  lee.  49;  Rig., 
of.  cit.,  Vol.  ii,  lee.  49. 

t"  The  Study  of  Sociology,"  pp.  52,  53. 


THE;  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  29 

reach  the  nature  of  the  group.     Hence  biological  analogies 
are  worthless  in  sociology  except  as  illustrations. 

Without  saying  so  in  words  or  even  becoming  clearly  con- 
scious of  it,  the  English  philosopher  seems  to  have  felt  this. 
At  least  his  scientific  instincts  have  preserved  him  from  such 
obvious  exaggerations  as  others  have  made  in  consequence 
of  false  analogies  between  biology  and  sociology.  Although 
he  even  affirmed  such  analogies  in  principle,  he  never  based 
anything  essential  upon  them,  he  never  went  so  far  but  that 
the  core  of  his  sociology  remained  sound.  Whenever  he 
used  biological  terms,  he  treated  them  as  similes  rather 
than  as  analogies.  Notice,  for  example,  how  he  describes 
the  peaceful  differentiation  of  authority  in  a  primitive  horde: 

"  Setting  out  with  an  unorganized  horde,  including  both  sexes  and 
all  ages,  let  us  ask, ' '  he  says,  ' '  what  must  happen  when  some  public 
question,  as  that  of  migration,  or  of  defence  against  enemies,  has  to  be 
decided.  The  assembled  individuals  will  fall,  more  or  less  clearly,  into 
two  divisions.  The  elder,  the  stronger,  and  those  whose  sagacity  and 
courage  have  been  proved  by  experience,  will  form  the  smaller  part. 
who  carry  on  the  discussion;  while  the  larger  part,  formed  of  the 
young,  the  weak,  and  the  undistinguished,  will  be  listeners,  who 
usually  do  no  more  than  express  from  time  to  time  assent  or  dissent. 
A  further  inference  may  safely  be  drawn.  In  the  cluster  of  leading 
men  there  is  sure  to  be  one  whose  weight  is  greater  than  that  of  any 
other — some  aged  hunter,  some  distinguished  warrior,  some  cunning 
medicine-man,  who  will  have  more  than  his  individual  share  in  form- 
ing the  resolution  finally  acted  upon.  That  is  to  say,  the  entire 
assemblage  will  resolve  itself  into  three  parts.  To  use  a  biological 
metaphor,  there  will,  out  of  the  general  mass,  be  differentiated  a 
nucleus  and  a  nucleolus."* 

The  passage  quoted  is  typical.  Spencer  uses  biological 
principles  only  to  a  very  limited  extent  in  investigating 
sociological  laws.  Social  facts  and  phenomena  keep  remind- 
ing him  of  similar  biological  facts,  as  is  proper;  but  he 
always  connects  the  two  distinct  species  by  a  plain  ' '  similarly 
it  happens,"  without  identifying  them  at  all.  It  is  this 
quiet  objectivity  which  makes  him  so  superior  to  other 
sociologists.  Schaeffle  and  I^ilienfeld,  for  example,  took 
these  analogies  seriously.  They  followed  these  will-o'-the- 
wisps  over  treacherous  ground.  But  Spencer  does  not  con- 
fuse the  nature  of  social  and  organic  phenomena  for  an  in- 
stant, notwithstanding  any  thing  which  the  title  '  'Society  is  an 
Organism' '  might  imply  .f  Every  fact  presented  as  common 

*  Spencer,  "  Principles  of  Sociology,"  Vol.  ii,  sec.  464. 
id.,  Vol.  i,  pt.  ii,  cap.  ii. 


30  ANNAiyS  OF  THE;  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

to  both  classes  of  phenomena  is  so  general  that  we  may 
concede  it  without  detracting  from  the  lucidity  of  the  thought. 
He  finds  that  societies  grow  as  truly  as  living  organisms  do; 
though  this  comparison  holds  only  because  we  have  but  one 
expression  (growth,  Wachstum)  for  two  ideas,  organic 
growth  and  social  enlargement.  If  there  were  a  special 
expression  for  each  there  would  be  no  temptation  falsely  to 
compare  or  identify  them.  Likewise,  nothing  but  want  of 
verbal  precision  makes  it  possible  to  say  that  both  an 
organism  and  a  society  increase  in  ' '  structure  ' '  at  the  same 
time  that  they  increase  in  scope.  The  word  ' '  structure ' ' 
is  biological  and  should  be  only  metaphorically  applied  to 
the  development  of  social  classes,  departments  of  govern- 
ment, and  the  like.  In  that  case,  there  would  not  appear 
to  be  any  common  quality.  The  same  criticism  is  true  of 
Spencer's  third  comparison,  that  both  in  an  organism  and 
in  society,  "progressive  differentiation  of  structures  is 
accompanied  by  progressive  differentiation  of  functions."* 
The  thought  is  perfectly  clear,  if  we  interpret  the  words 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  respective  phenomena.  His 
comparisons  with  biological  processes,  therefore,  do  not 
make  our  ideas  of  social  processes  less  precise. 

Although  such  comparisons  are  frequent  the  positive 
inductive  method  of  natural  science  is  not  a  mere  phrase 
with  Spencer.  He  really  applies  it  in  the  domain  of  soci- 
ology; whereas  Schaeffle  and  Lilienfeld,  as  we  shall  see, 
misled  by  biological  analogies,  deduce  sociological  laws 
from  a  priori  biological  laws,  regardless  of  consequences. 
For  the  real  subject-matter  of  sociology  their  method  sub- 
stituted a  spurious  organism  from  another  domain  of 
knowledge.! 

But  Spencer  attacks  social  phenomena  directly,  examines 
them  calmly,  with  no  predilections  whatever,  and  formulates 
his  results  in  sound  doctrines  and  general  laws.  His  method  is 
correct,  but  still  his  results  were  only  partial.  He  could  not 
cut  loose  from  the  unitary  conception  of  mankind,  the  fable 
convenue,  the  old  conventional  assumption  of  all  former 

*Ibid.,  sec.  216. 

fin  the  chapters  of  Spencer's  "Sociology,"  treating  of  "Social  Structures," 
"  Social  Functions,"  "  Systems  of  Organs,"  etc.  (Part  II),  the  phenomena  of  organic 
life  are  always  presented  first,  then  those  from  social  life  are  described.  But  the 
two  sorts  are  kept  distinct.  There  is  no  confusion.  If  the  reader  should  omit  the 
biological  similes,  the  presentation  of  the  sociological  phenomena  would  be  all  the 
clearer.  In  the  works  of  Schaeffle  and  Lilienfeld  the  two  sorts  cannot  be  sepa- 
rated, for  they  are  made  identical.  Consequently  the  description  of  the  sociological 
phenomena  suffers  materially. 


THE  OUTLINES  OP  SOCIOLOGY.  31 

sociologists  and  philosophers,  although  ofteu  after  a  cairn 
examination  he  is  fairly  compelled  by  the  logic  of  facts  to 
attribute  the  beginning  of  social  development  to  the  mutual 
effects  of  unlike  (heterogeri}  ethnical  elements.  The  "  first 
internal  cohesion  "  of  "  small  hordes  of  primitive  men  ' '  is 
due,  he  notes,  to  their  "  combined  resistance  to  external 
foes."  *  Of  the  "rudiments  of  political  organization,"  he 
says: 

"While  there  exist  only  small,  wandering,  unorganized  hordes,  the 
conflicts  of  these  with  one  another  work  no  permanent  changes  of 
arrangement  in  them.  But  when  there  have  arisen  the  definite  chief- 
tainships which  frequent  conflicts  tend  to  initiate,  and  especially  when 
the  conflicts  have  ended  in  subjugations,  there  arise  the  rudiments  of 
political  organizations."! 

And  he  adduces  ethnological  facts  to  illustrate  every  social 
phenomenon  arising  from  the  contact  of  social  groups.  But 
when  he  wishes  to  attribute  phenomena  to  the  mutual  effects 
of  the  individuals  of  a  group,  he  is  forced  to  fall  back  on 
loose  logical  reasoning  and  biological  similes.  Had  he  ap- 
preciated this  himself  perhaps  he  would  have  given  up 
attempting  individualistic  explanations  and  would  have, 
from  the  beginning,  accepted  the  plurality  of  human  hordes 
as  not  susceptible  of  further  sociological  analysis.^  But  as 
it  is,  there  is  a  perpetual  contradiction  throughout  his  socio- 
logical investigations.  On  the  one  hand  he  tacitly  assumes  a 
unitary  mankind  descended  from  a  common  origin;  on 
the  other,  where  he  really  explains  social  phenomena, 
he  goes  back  to  a  "  plurality  of  primitive  hordes. ' '  As  we 
have  demonstrated  in  "Der  Rassenkampf"  the  assumption 
of  primitive  plurality  of  human  hordes  is  the  only  possible 
rational  basis;  the  only  one  upon  which  all  social  phenomena 
can  be  satisfactorily  explained.  We  have  elsewhere  made 
it  sufficiently  clear  that  this  assumption  does  not  contradict 
Darwin's  theories. §  Primitive  plurality  is  often  the  only 

*  "  Principles  of  Sociology,"  sec.  250,  et  seq. 

t  Ibid.,  sec.  n. 

j  Though  Spencer  does  not  affirm  plurality  of  primitive  hordes  to  be  the  first 
natural  fact  in  sociology,  he  does  note  incidentally  that  "  social  evolution  begins 
with  small  simple  aggregates."— Ibid.,  sec.  257. 

?[  A  part  of  Section  14  of  "Der  Rassenkampf  "  reads  as  follows:  "Darwinism  is  so 
fully  occupied  with  the  questions  of  evolution  and  natural  selection  that  no  oppor- 
tunity is  found  to  consider  the  question  of  single  or  plural  descent  carefully.  Yet, 
not  only  must  Darwin's  theory  assume  one  line,  but,  naturally  and  logically,  it 
must  admit  a  number  of  parallel  lines  of  evolution.  Otherwise  it  must  be  assumed 
that  at  the  moment  when  organic  cell  life  began  there  was  only  one  cell  from 
which  the  whole  animal  world  has  developed  by  successive  changes.  Such  a  silly 
assumption  is  foreign  to  Darwinism]  indeed,  it  has  been  expressly  emphasized 
that  reference.is  made  only  to  the  '  original  forms  '  under  which  existence  began, 
and  that  the  question  whether  there  were  one  or  more  individual  forms  was  con- 
sidered unessential."] 


32  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

possible  explanation  and  we  shall  adopt  it  exclusively,  thus 
sparing  ourselves  the  vacillation  between  the  unitary  and 
the  plural  conceptions  of  mankind  from  which  Spencer 
suffers.  Had  he  followed  it  consistently,  he  could  have 
still  more  easily  applied  his  formula  of  evolution,  of  which 
we  shall  speak  later,  to  the  development  of  social  phe- 
nomena. His  universal  law  is  so  ill-adapted  to  the  develop- 
ment of  mankind  as  a  unit  that  the  insufficiency  of  this 
assumption  is  manifest  at  every  step.  Fortunately  the 
importance  of  his  work  is  not  due  to  the  formulas  which 
he  superposes  upon  the  facts;  but  to  his  acute  observa- 
tions and  his  method  of  treating  them.  He  has  com- 
mand of  more  material  than  any  one  save  Bastian; 
and  he  is  enough  of  a  positivist  to  test  its  complicated  mass 
objectively,  calmly,  without  prejudice,  drawing  conclusions 
regardless  of  metaphysical  prepossessions.  This  has  made 
Spencer  the  real  founder  of  sociology  and  he  will  long  remain 
its  most  powerful  champion.  Next  to  him  stands  Bastian; 
his  superior,  perhaps,  in  knowledge  and  in  calmness  of 
observation,  but  less  skillful  in  presenting  scientific  conclu- 
sions. But  before  turning  to  this  phenomenal  scholar  and 
investigator,  we  wish  to  mention  several  other  attempts  at 
sociology. 

Monism  is  the  thought  underlying  all  of  them.  They 
culminate  in  the  endeavor  to  find  a  universal  law  for  events 
in  the  whole  domain  of  nature.  They  all  fail  to  distinguish 
between  universal  and  social  laws,  seeking  to  explain  social 
events  by  universal  laws — which  is  impossible.  They 
revive  the  old  dispute  between  spiritualists  and  materialists. 
The  former  attribute  everything  to  the  mind's  efficiency; 
the  latter,  to  the  effective  force  of  matter.  The  first  grand 
attempt  to  explain  all  events,  natural,  human  and  social,  by 
a  single  universal  law  of  matter,  was  Holbach's  ' '  System  of 
Nature."  The  author  is  a  skillful  reasoner;  so  we  find  the 
demonstration  complete  in  every  detail,  showing  how  those 
two  primordial  forces,  attraction  and  repulsion,  not  only 
sustain  the  heavenly  bodies  in  their  paths  and  regulate  all 
life  and  motion  on  our  planet,  but  also  help  to  establish  the 
relations  between  man  and  man  and  build  up  every  social 
community.  Indeed  there  would  seem  to  be  nothing  that 
attraction  and  repulsion  do  not  accomplish.*  Molecules 

*  "  The  System  of  Nature  or  Laws  of  the  Moral  and  Physical  World,"  by  Baron 
d'Holbach.  A  new  and  approved  edition  with  notes  by  Diderot,  translated  by  H. 
D.  Robinson.  Two  volumes  in  one.  Boston,  1877.  Bk.  i,  cap.  iv. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  33 

attract  one  another  and  bodies  are  formed;  they  repel  one 
another  and  bodies  are  dissolved;  by  the  process  of  accumu- 
lation plants  and  metals,  animals  and  man  are  made; 

"  in  short  never  to  separate  physical  from  moral  laws — it  is  thus  that 
men,  mutually  attracted  to  each  other  by  their  reciprocal  wants,  form 
those  unions  which  we  designate  by  the  terms  marriage,  families, 
societies,  friendships,  connections."* 

' '  In  all  the  phenomena  man  presents, "  it  is  said,  ' '  from  the  moment 
he  quits  the  womb  of  his  mother,  to  that  wherein  he  becomes  the  in- 
habitant of  the  silent  tomb,  he  perceives  nothing  but  a  succession  of 
necessary  causes  and  effects,  which  are  strictly  conformable  to  those 
laws  common  to  all  the  beings  in  nature.  All  his  modes  of  action — 
all  his  sensations — all  his  ideas — every  act  of  his  will — every  impulse 
he  either  gives  or  receives,  are  the  necessary  consequences  of  his  own 
peculiar  properties,  and  those  which  he  finds  in  the  various  beings  by 
whom  he  is  moved.  Everything  he  does — everything  that  passes 
within  himself,  are  the  effects  of  inert  force—of  self-gravitation — of 
the  attractive  or  repulsive  powers  contained  in  his  machine — of  the 
tendency  he  has,  in  common  with  other  beings,  to  his  own  individual 
preservation;  in  short,  of  that  energy  which  is  the  common  property 
of  everything  he  beholds.  Nature,  in  man,  does  nothing  more  than 
show,  in  a  decided  manner,  what  belongs  to  the  peculiar  nature  by 
which  he  is  distinguished  from  the  beings  of  a  different  system  or 
order."  f 

The  idea  of  explaining  all  human  and  natural  phenomena 
by  the  law  of  attraction  and  repulsion  has  repeatedly  reap- 
peared since  Holbach's  day;  and  we  shall  meet  it  again  in 
Schaeffle. 

Comte  and  Spencer,  as  we  have  seen,  derived  sociological 
laws  from  the  less  remote  domain  of  biology.  The  ' '  theory 
of  the  organic  state,"  so-called,  which  was  current  in  Ger- 
many for  decades,  was  based  on  Comte' s  ideas  until,  finally, 
Schaeffle  combined  it  with  Holbach's  thought.  Everybody 
will  acknowledge  Schaeffle's  great  intellectual  power  and 
scholarly  ability.  But  the  fundamental  thought  of  his  sys- 
tem, the  alleged  analogy  between  the  state  and  an  animal 
organism,  is  baleful,  and  all  must  regret  that  talent  and 
experience  were  spent  in  elaborating  an  idea  so  extravagant. 
It  is  impossible  to  go  into  the  details  of  his  comprehensive 
work  here,  and  it  must  suffice  to  quote  the  leading  thought 
in  the  author's  own  words: 

"  We  have  repeatedly  observed  that  not  only  nature  as  a  whole,  but 
also  the  several  organic  and  inorganic  bodies  in  it,  seem  to  be  great 
societies  or  systems  whose  parts,  in  turn,  are  either  simple  or  more  or 
less  composite.  Then,  according  to  what  has  preceded,  attraction  and 

*Ibid. 
\Ibid. 


34  ANNAI^S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

repulsion  between  the  elements  and  the  outside  world  would  impart 
motion  to  these  atomic  kingdoms.  Under  such  circumstances,  can  it 
be  a  misinterpretation  to  assume  that  the  social  body,  which  is  the 
realm  of  persons  and  the  most  universal  and  spiritual  realm  of  experi- 
ence, cannot  accomplish  the  ends  of  its  existence  without  the  mani- 
festation of  the  same  double  force  in  each  of  its  personal  elements  ? 
Some  parts  would  appear  to  be  centripetal  in  virtue  of  one  force,  while 
others,  obeying  the  other,  would  seem  to  assert  their  independence  of 
the  whole.  But,  as  the  units  of  the  body-social  are  neither  simple  nor 
irrational,  we  ought  not  to  consider  the  two  fundamental  impulses 
either  simple  or  irrational;  but  we  can  and  we  must  explain  the  total 
life  of  the  body-social  as  the  product  of  the  multiform,  reciprocal 
effects  of  all  the  active  social  elements,  of  all  the  subjects  endowed 
with  volition,  of  all  persons  and  institutional  groups  of  persons  in  a 
state  of  attraction  and  repulsion.  For  ethical  movement  is  not  im- 
parted to  the  body-social  by  anything  outside;  but  we  see  it  arise 
within  from  the  discharge  of  ethical  forces  between  the  constituent 
parts,  both  individual  and  collective. ' '  * 

This  language,  though  not  quite  clear,  is  not  the  mystical 
language  of  Kantian  metaphysics,  beneath  which  clear 
thoughts  lie,  for  the  illustrations  are  inapt.  Schaeffle  analyzes 
the  "body-social,"  but  he  leaves  us  in  doubt  whether  this 
mystical  expression  denotes  mankind  as  a  whole,  or  only  as 
a  state  or  folk.  It  is  unclear  and  intangible  as  Quetelet's 
' '  society. ' '  The  latter  uses  the  ' '  great  number ' '  to  explain 
his  meaning;  the  former  demonstrates  that  there  are  social 
cells,  tissues,  bones,  nerves,  etc.,  which  makes  the  matter 
worse.  It  needs  a  very  lively  imagination  to  connect 
Schaeffle' s  lengthy  excerpts  from  anatomy,  physiology  and 
psychology  with  social  phenomena  and  social  development. 
Sober  reason  turns  in  despair  from  the  endless  limping  com- 
parisons. If  they  contain  a  kernel  of  truth  derived  from 
experience  and  acute  observation,  as  often  happens,  it  is 
tedious  to  find  it  in  the  confusion  of  metaphors  and  analogies. 

Of  Lilienfeld,  we  can,  on  the  whole,  say  no  more  than  has 
been  said  of  Schaeffle.  He  has  the  same  erudition  and 
equally  great  intellectual  power  and  inventiveness;  and  he 
displays  the  same  degree  of  industry  in  executing  a  plan 
which  is  fundamentally  wrong  and  in  defending  a  cause 
which  is  lost  from  the  start. 

The  fundamental  thought  of  his  ponderous  work  is 
expressed  in  these  words: 

•  Schaeffle,  "  Sau  und  Leben  des  Socialen  Koerpers."  Tubingen,  1875.  Vol.  i,  pt. 
5,  cap.  2,  concerning  "the  two  principal  kinds  of  effects  of  reciprocally  acting 
ethical  forces,  fellowship  and  self-dependence,  love  and  hate."  [The  passage 
quoted  does  not  appear  in  the  second  edition.] 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  35 

"There  is  only  one  way  to  make  human  society  the  subject-matter 
of  a  positive  science.  It  must  necessarily  (?)  be  classed  (!)  among 
organic  beings  and  regarded  as  an  organism  as  much  above  man  as 
man  is  above  all  other  organisms  in  nature.  On  no  other  condition 
is  it  possible  to  treat  human  society  inductively  and  to  conceive  of  it 
as  an  inseparable  part  of  nature.  On  no  other  condition  can  dogmatic 
social  science  become  positive.  But  on  this  condition  it  obtains  a 
basis  as  real  as  that  of  natural  science."* 

The  reverse  of  all  this  is  true.  Social  science  can  never 
' '  obtain  a  basis  as  real  as  that  of  natural  science  ' '  until  the 
fantastic  view  that  ' '  society  "  is  an  "  organism  ' '  has  been 
thrown  overboard  and  all  biological  analogies  have  been 
cleared  away. 

Ijlienfeld's  query  whether  ' '  social  organisms  do  not  obey 
the  same  laws  as  all  other  beings ' '  must  be  emphatically 
answered  in  the  negative.  The  distinction  between  social 
organisms  and  organic  beings  is  something  more  than  a 
simple  ' '  preponderance  of  the  principle  of  adaptation  in  the 
former  and  of  the  principle  of  causality  in  the  latter. ' '  They 
are  distinct  species  of  phenomena  and  different  laws  control 
them.  Laws  of  organic  development  and  laws  of  social 
development  are  toto  genere  unlike  and  ought  not  to  be  con- 
founded. When  L,ilienfeld  further  inquires  whether  ' '  in 
relation  to  us,  the  whole  of  mankind  does  not  constitute  an 
organic  being  uniting  in  itself  all  social  groups  and  related  to 
them  as  the  whole  is  to  its  parts,"  we  may  be  sure  that  we 
are  confronted  with  a  wretched  scientific  blunder.  After 
mankind  has  been  declared  to  be  an  "  organic  being, "  what 
can  be  expected  from  any  further  investigation  ? 

Yet  in  the  next  chapter,  on  ' '  Human  Society  as  Real 
Being, ' '  he  solemnly  protests  that  he 

"conceives  the  analogy  to  be  something  more  than  an  allegorical 
parallel."  "  If  we  had  considered  all  the  current  scientific  and  popu- 
lar expressions  which  point  to  a  relationship  between  natural  and 
social  phenomena  to  be  mere  rhetorical  figures,  we  should  have  trod- 
den in  the  footsteps  of  all  the  doctrinaires  and  metaphysicians ;  we 
should  have  been  working  over  the  same  barren  soil  on  which  in  the 
course  of  centuries  so  many  capable  natural  scientists  have  sacrificed 
their  powers  with  no  sociological  results  save  doubts  and  contradic- 
tions." 

Nobly  said.  But  it  must  be  laid  to  his  charge  that  in  spite 
of  all  he  was  no  more  fortunate  than  they. 

He  seems  to  think  that  a  metaphor  can  be  made  real  by 

*  Paul  von  lyilienfeld.     "Gedanken  ueber  erne  Socialwissenschaft  der  Zukunft." 
"Vol.  i,  p.  25. 


36  ANNAI<S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

"conceiving"  it  to  be  real.  "We  must  win  the  convic- 
tion, ' '  he  says,  ' '  that  this  or  that  social  group,  this  or  that 
state,  is  a  real  living  organism  like  every  other  in  nature." 
He  expects  a  great  deal  of  the  reflecting  reader.  We  have 
not  been  able  to  win  this  conviction  even  after  a  most  earnest 
study  of  his  five  volumes.  There  are  many  true  and  deep 
thoughts,  but  nothing  to  enforce  this  conviction.  In  one 
place  he  trenchantry  criticises  ' '  metapolitics,  which  is  busied 
with  generalizing  from  allegories,  i.  «?.,  from  data  that  are 
themselves  once  removed  from  reality."  "Double  non- 
sense ' '  he  calls  it.  We  frankly  confess  that  between  it  and 
his  methods  we  see  no  difference.  As  of  SchaefHe,  so  we 
must  say  of  L,ilienfeld,  that  his  work  contains  incidentally 
admirable  observations;  but  his  elaborate  system  is  built  on 
a  false  foundation  and  can  be  of  small  profit  to  science."* 

All  in  all,  de  Roberty  is  right  when  he  laments  that,  not- 
'withstanding  Schaeffle  and  Ijlienfeld,  "  social  science  still 
lias  its  proper  course  to  seek."f  The  period  of  progress, 
since  Comte  clearly  outlined  the  social  problem,  was  only 
one  of  incipiency,  important  though  it  be.  Among  other 
errors  of  this  period,  de  Roberty  specially  mentions  ' '  setting 
the  phantom  light  of  general  analogies  to  guide  the  science. ' ' 
He  recommends  above  all  that  the  "natural  history  of 
society  "  be  made  the  basis  of  sociology,  saying  that  on  it 
alone  could  an  abstract  social  science  be  built,  but  his  work 
is  occupied  with  the  preparatory  questions  of  methodology. 
As  propaedeutics  of  sociology  it  has  fulfilled  its  mission; 
he  does  not  claim  more  for  it.  The  task  which  he  refers  to 
sociology,  the  construction  of  a  science  of  "  society,"  based 
on  its  natural  history,  has  since  been  undertaken  with  great 
success  by  a  German  ethnographer,  Bastian. 

We  have  already  called  Bastian  a  phenomenal  character. 
He  has  done  more  for  the  "  natural  history  of  society,"  as 
de  Roberty  called  it,  than  all  his  predecessors  together.  The 
scope  of  his  labors  is  great  and  his  plentitude  of  deep  and 
excellent  thoughts  is  beyond  any  man's  power  to  reckon 
to-day.  We  can  only  make  a  few  fragmentary  observations 

*  I,llienfeld's  first  volume  appeared  in  1873  and  Schaeffle's  in  1875.  Although  the 
latter  knew  of  Lilienfeld's  work  before  his  own  was  published,  it  is  our  opinion 
that  the  two  systems  were  independently  conceived.  Without  doubt,  however, 
both  writers  were  influenced  by  the  theoryof  the  "organic"  state  then  prevalent 
in  Germany  and  very  forcibly  stated  in  the  popular  works  of  Bluntschli  and 
Ahrens. 

t"  La  Sociologie,  Eisai  de  Philosophic  sociologique,"  by  B.  de  Roberty.  Paris, 
1881. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  37 

upon  them,  being  wholly  unable  suitably  to  exploit  the 
sociological  treasures  he  has  stored  up. 

Bastian  could  never  succeed  in  systematizing  his  knowl- 
edge; it  was  too  great.  ^Whenever  he  made  the  attempt, 
even  in  his  early  work  on  "  Man  in  History,"  his  system 
was  broken  down  at  its  very  inception  and  swept  away  by 
the  flood  tide  of  his  information.  Significant,  however,  is 
the  thought  contained  in  the  sub-title  to  this  work:  "  Con- 
tribution to  a  Psychological  Conception  of  the  World." 
It  recurs  in  all  his  works,  and  is  the  great  philosopher's 
pole-star  on  the  immeasurable  ocean  of  knowledge,  his 
inspiration  in  all  his  labors. 

Probably  this  thought  dates  from  the  time  when  ' '  race- 
psychology  "  first  flourished  in  Berlin.  For  in  his  preface 
he  says: 

"Psychology  ought  not  to  be  limited  as  heretofore  to  individual 
self-observation  and  the  pathological  evidence  afforded  by  schools  and 
insane  asylums.  Man,  as  political  animal,  attains  full  development 
only  in  society.  Mankind,  than  which  there  is  no  higher  concept, 
must  be  made  the  starting  point;  mankind  is  the  unitary  whole  in 
which  the  individual  figures  as  an  integral  part."* 

He  searches  "mankind  "  far  and  wide  for  manifestations 
of  "  thought."  He  considers  his  task  to  be  psychological. 
His  object  is  to  disclose  the  soul  of  the  races,  which  are  the 
parts,  and  so  finally  to  disclose  the  soul  of  mankind,  the 
whole.  In  the  later  works,  he  calls  these  psychical  mani- 
festations ' '  race-thoughts  ' '  (  Voelkergedanke] . 

So  he  is  really  not  a  sociologist;  he  lays  little  or  no  stress 
on  the  process  of  social  development.  Still  the  material 
which  he  gathers  from  every  nook  and  cranny  to  demon- 
strate "race-thoughts,"  illustrates  social  development  also. 
Bastian  wanted  to  be  a  race-psychologist;  but  the  problem 
he  set  himself  was  falsely  proposed  and  impossible,  and  the 
force  of  facts  drove  him  into  another  course;  he  became  an 
ethnographer  and  built  up  a  system  of  ethnology. 

Some  passages  may  be  cited  to  show  his  views.  He  is  a 
realist  from  the  first  and  occupies  the  only  correct  realistic 
ground,  materialism  and  idealism  combined. 

"If  so-called  materialists  have  hitherto  vainly  attempted  to  con- 
struct new  systems,"  says  Bastian,  "  if  they  have  been  unable  to  satisfy 
public  expectations  and  have  found  no  surcease  for  that  longing  of 
the  human  heart  which  has  always  hovered  over  the  earthly  horizon 

*"  Der  Mensch  in  der  Geschichte.  Zur  Begrundung  einer  psychologischen  Weltan- 
schauung," by  Adolf  Bastian,  Leipzig,  1860,  Vol.  i,  p.  x. 


38  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

of  all  races  like  the  promise  of  dawn,  it  was  because  they  neglected 
psychology,  not  knowing  how  to  rescue  it  from  the  hands  of  dialectic 
speculation  and  to  claim  it  as  their  own  province.  They  opposed  the 
idealist  on  party  lines,  instead  of  drawing  his  objects  also  within  the 
sphere  of  scientific  investigation.  True  science  recognizes  neither 
materialism  nor  idealism,  for  it  includes  both.  Psychology,  '  race- 
psychology,'  based  on  ethnographical  studies,  had  to  wait  until  the 
other  natural  sciences  developed,  because  it  must  build  on  them.  But 
now  that  the  preliminary  work  is  done,  it  joins  them,  proposing  to 
swing  a  bridge  from  the  narrow  circle  of  sense  to  the  endless  realm  of 
ideas."* 

What,  then,  is  his  attitude  toward  the  facts  of  the  social 
world  ? 

"No  judicious  investigator,"  he  says,  "will  give  further  heed  to 
enthusiastic  utopists  and  reformers.  As  soon  as  we  learn  that  recog- 
nition of  the  causes  proves  development  to  be  according  to  law,  we 
accept  whatever  is  as  right,  because  it  has  become  what  it  is.f" 

He  is  equipped  with  all  the  requirements  of  true  objective 
science.  He  wishes  to  ' '  gather  up  evidence ' '  and  ' '  collect 
psychological  statistics"  in  order  "to  acquaint  the  reader 
with  the  course  of  thought  peculiar  to  the  various  races  of 
mankind."  Unfortunately  (or  perhaps  fortunately  for  the 
future  science)  Bastian  plans  a  task  immeasurabl}-  greater 
than  he  can  manage.  His  plan  is  nothing  more  nor  less 
than  ' '  to  show  by  statistics  that  exactly  the  same  number  of 
original  psychological  elements  have  coursed  regularly 
through  the  heads  of  all  races  in  all  ages  of  history. ' '  A 
quarter  of  a  century  has  passed  since  this  was  written  and 
the  tireless  statistician  of  race- thoughts  has  never  suspended 
his  labors.  That  his  mind  is  still  fresh  and  clear  is  proof 
of  its  extraordinary  strength ;  for  his  ' '  statistics ' '  have 
become  impenetrable  forests  wherein  ordinary  mortals  lose 
their  way  and  become  bewildered. 

Future  science  will  be  able  some  day  to  utilize  his 
labors  and  will  find  them  invaluable.  But  it  seems  to  us 
that  the  laws  of  the  ' '  regular ' '  course  of  thought  might 
have  been  made  intelligible  at  once  if  he  had  been  a  sociol- 
ogist rather  than  a  race-psychologist.  The  fundamental 
characteristic  of  Bastian' s  investigations  is  the  endeavor  to 
attribute  all  social  phenomena  to  human  thought.  He 
accumulates  inexhaustible  stores  of  social  facts  in  order  to 
unriddle  man's  thoughts  from  them  and  then  to  discover  the 
thoughts,  the  soul,  of  the  races.  With  him  thoughts  are 

*Ibid.,  p.  x. 

f  Ibid.,  pp.  xvii,  zviii. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  39 

always  primary  and  deeds  are  an  emanation  from  them; 
thought  arises  only  under  the  influence  of  external  natural 
phenomena,  and  the  social  world  emanates  from  thought. 
The  scheme  of  his  system  is:  (a)  nature,  (£)  man  and 
thought,  (V)  society  and  social  thought.  His  scientific 
structure  culminates  in  the  latter;  his  ultimate  object  is 
race-psychology.  In  sociology  the  point  of  view  and  the 
object  must  be  totally  different.  The  social  process  must 
precede;  the  social  fact  is  primary.  Man  disappears  from 
the  foreground  of  consideration  since  he  receives  his  thought, 
his  soul,  from  the  social  fact.  Social  thought,  the  concept 
of  social  facts,  appears  in  the  individual  human  mind  only 
by  reflection. 

Hence,  in  distinction  from  Bastian's  system,  sociology 
includes:  («)  social  elements,  swarms,  hordes,  groups,  etc., 
(£)  man,  their  product,  both  in  body  and  mind,  (c)  the 
social  process  and  its  products,  (d )  the  ethico-social  prod- 
ucts of  the  reciprocal  action  of  society  and  the  individual. 
The  social  phenomenon  is  always  primary;  the  thought  of 
the  individual  and  the  ethico-social  products,  such  as 
religion,  rights,  morals,  etc.,  are  derived.  An  undigested 
remnant  of  idealism  still  troubles  Bastian  and  he  continues 
to  be  a  pronounced  individualist  (atomist),  i.  e.,  he  uses  the 
individual  and  his  nature  to  explain  the  nature  and  develop- 
ment of  the  whole. 

The  first  volume  of  his  ' '  Man  in  History, ' '  treats  of 
psychology  (i.  e.,  the  psychology  of  the  individual)  as 
natural  science;*  the  second  is  on  psychology  and  mythology, 
and  treats  of  the  relation  of  the  individual  to  nature ;  and  the 
third  is  occupied  with  "political  psychology,"  concluding 
with  a  description  of  society.  But  this  does  not  seem  to  us 
the  right  method  for  sociology.  It  has  had  little  success  in 
political  science  and  has  fallen  into  disrepute  as  ' '  idealism  ' ' 
and  "  atomism."  Yet  he  even  attributes  "  property,"  in  the 
traditional  way,  to  the  primitive  possessory  act  of  the  savage 
seizing  the  "  fruit  from  the  tree  "  to  still  his  hunger,  f  and 
he  adheres  to  the  old  idealistic  phrase  that  property  is  ' '  the 
necessary  extension  of  the  sphere  of  personality  in  society." 

Likewise  the  state,  to  cite  only  one  more  example,  is  derived 

*["  Als  Naturwissenschaft"  though  a  part  of  the  title,  is  omitted  by  Professor 
Gumplowicz.] 

t  Ibid.,  Vol.  iii,  p.  217. 


40  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

from  the  family,  which  has  gradually  "become  a  race.* 
But  in  the  later  works  every  suggestion  of  idealism  and  the 
whole  rationalistic  theory  of  the  state  is  omitted.  He  studies 
the  "natural  history  of  society  "  more  and  more  objectivelj1- 
and  finally  gives  the  most  striking  expression  to  this  ten- 
dency in  a  "system  "  of  ethnology. 

In  the  ethnographical  works, f  also,  here  and  there  in 
masses  of  descriptive  matter  which  is  invaluable  for  its  own 
sake,  reflections  crop  out  that  are  not  only  the  results  of 
acute  observation  and  clear  reasoning,  but  are  besides  really 
epoch-making  in  social  science.  As  example  we  will  cite  the 
discussion  of  the  ' '  ethnological  conception  of  descent  and 
relationship ' '  in  the  introduction  to  his  ' '  Ethnological 
Investigations, ' '  for  we  shall  often  have  occasion  to  refer  to 
it  in  presenting  social  development. 

The  current  use  of  the  terms  ' '  native  race ' '  and  ' '  rela- 
tionship ' '  is  criticised  very  sharply.  It  is  shown  that  in  the 
nature  of  the  case  they  are  only  relative.  If  we  know  any 
of  the  circumstances  at  all  our  knowledge  reaches  back  such 
a  little  way  that  we  can  never  use  these  words  in  their 
rightful  acceptation. 

"  When  historical  analysis  is  not  able  to  go  further  the  last  race  may 
provisionally  be  called  native.  Although  classical  authors  described 
some  races  as  earth-born  autochthons  which  were  not  known  to  have 
had  an  earlier  dwelling-place,  in  general  they  applied  the  term  regard- 
less of  historical  considerations.  Indeed  some  races  called  aboriginal 
were  notoriously  immigrants,  and  were  on  that  account  connected  with 
the  mountains  in  etymology." 

No  criticism  could  be  more  destructive  of  the  Biblical 
theory  of  descent  underlying  every  system  of  political  and 
social  science  than  that  of  Bastian.  He  shows  that 

"every  race  tries  to  find  the  'first  man,'  as  the  redskins  call  him;  the 
ancestor  of  man,  or  father  of  the  race.  For,  as  examples  from  Asia, 
Australia,  America  and  elsewhere  show,  the  name  of  the  race  always 
coincides  with  the  general  name  for  man."  "No  difference  of  origin 
is  allowed  for,"  he  continues,  "  except  that  the  former  race  is  said  to 
have  sprung  from  the  ground,  into  which  it  withdrew  again  before 
conquerors  born  of  birds  and  wild  animals;  or,  being  the  offspring  of 
trees  and  vines,  was  not  adopted  into  the  family  of  the  proud  heaven- 
descended  heroes.  ...  In  Grecian  tradition  Laos  sprang  from  the 
stones,  and  in  German  the  Saxons  from  a  rock.  Assyrian  traditions 

*  Ibid.,  Vol.  iii,  p.  265. 

t  "  Voelker  des  oestlichen  Asiens,"  1867;  "Ethnologische  Forschungen,"  1872; 
"Rechtsverhaeltnisse  der  Voelker^  1872,  etc. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  41 

are  revolutionary;  the  Lybian  repeat  the  myth  of  the  Moxos,*  aud  in 
Scandinavian  story  the  first-begotten  were  divided  into  classes.  But 
since  Christianity  and  Islatnism  made  the  Semitic  legend  prepon- 
derant over  large  portions  of  Europe  and  Asia  all  racial  diversity  is 
referred  to  the  three  patriarchs  who  survived  the  flood  with  their 
father." 

The  passage  is  typical  of  Bastian's  ability  to  upset  false 
ideas.  By  citing  notions  that  recur  the  world  over,  so  as  to 
show  that  they  are  only  a  form  of  human  thought,  he  thor- 
oughly destroys  the  delusion  that  they  ever  contained  any 
truth. 

Next  to  the  Biblical  explanation  of  man's  origin  nothing 
is  so  fatal  to  sociology  as  the  false  views  of  tribal  descent 
and  kinship.  By  correcting  them  Bastian  rendered  sociology 
another  very  great  service. 

"Kinship  and  descent,  like  so  many  other  words,  have  a  figurative 
as  well  as  a  real  signification,  whereas  they  ought  to  be  employed  in 
the  inductive  sciences  as  technical  terms  with  one  well-defined  mean- 
ing. Descent  from  a  common  ancestor  implies  kiuship,  but  kinship 
may  also  arise  from  a  union  of  races  and  is  therefore  the  broader 
term.  Strictly,  descent  should  be  traced  through  a  limited  number  of 
generations,  beyond  which  it  is  preferable  to  speak  of  kinship.  The 
limit  might  be  somewhat  extended  where  endogamic  marriages  are  the 
rule,  as  among  the  Incas,  Achimenides  and  Wanes,  and  in  the  aristo- 
cratic circles  of  certain  mountain  peoples.  But  this  practice  is  extra- 
ordinarily rare,  whereas  the  marriage  regulations  among  the  Australians, 
Chinese,  Abipones  and  many  others  must  lead  to  the  incessant  crossing 
of  families;  for  the  degrees  of  relationship  within  which  they  prohibit 
marriage  are  even  remoter  than  those  the  pope  once  had  much  diffi- 
culty in  enforcing  in  Bavaria.  The  term  '  descent '  should  be  avoided 
as  much  as  possible  in  ethnology,  unless  one  wants  to  grapple  with 
the  fruitless  problem  of  ultimate  origin.  And  yet  many  an  historical 
clue  is  afforded  by  mythical  traditions  of  descent,  whether  confined 
to  the  Teutons,  as  those  given  by  Tacitus,  or  made  to  embrace  a  wider 
field,  whether  Celts,  Scythians  and  Illyrians  are  grouped  under  one 
common  ancestor  or  the  equally  incongruous  Galla,  Waknafi  and 
Wakamba,  whose  languages  even  are  unlike,  under  another;  or 
whether  Grecian  eponyms  are  represented  to  be  brothers,  or  genea- 
logical tables  are  projected  for  the  known  and  presumptively  the 
whole  world  at  once. ' '  f 

"In  general,  the  more  definitely  a  particular  locality  is  circum- 
scribed the  broader  is  the  sense  in  which  kinship  may  be  used.  The 
recurrence  of  the  same  kabong,  or  brotherhoods,  throughout  the  whole 
Australian  continent  gives  a  clue  to  the  general  similarity  of  type 
which  continual  crossing  produces  among  savages  at  the  same  time 
that  it  prevents  individualities  from  becoming  constant." 

*[  The  Moxos  were  a  tribe  of  Bolivian  Indians  who  believed  that  they  originated 
oil  the  spot,  and  who  were  restrained  from  migration  by  a  superstitious  fear  of 
the  mountains,  rivers,  etc.] 

t"  Ethnologische  Forschungen,"  Vol.  i,  p.  viii. 


42  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

It  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  how  relative  the  ideas 
"  kindred"  and  "  autochthonous  "  are,  but  it  is  equally  so 
to  have  an  objective  conception  of  race  and  stem. 

"Nationality,"  says  Bastian,  "grows  out  of  similarity  of  interests 
and  views;  it  is  furthered  by  religious  and  political  union,  and  espe- 
cially by  the  assimilation  of  language,  and  attains  its  greatest  perfec- 
tion within  an  area  enclosed  by  natural  boundaries." 

According  to  Bastian,  the  earliest  precursor  of  the  nation 
is  the  race  or  stem,  which  is  "earlier  than  the  folk,"  since 
the  ' '  incorporation ' '  of  races  ' '  into  folk  is  determined  by 
political  boundaries."  Important  also  is  Bastian's  confirma- 
tion of  the  fact  that  ' '  the  most  favored  regions  of  civilization 
are  those  in  which  several  streams  of  foreign  immigration 
meet,"  which  amounts  to  saying  that  civilization  is  promoted 
by  their  union.  Admirable  also  is  his  explanation  of  how 
the  resulting  civilization  or,  what  is  nearly  the  same  thing, 
how  the  ' '  national  type ' '  is  related  to  the  local  conditions, 
i.  e . ,  to  "  the  local  ethnological  type, ' '  to  the  ' '  anthropo- 
logical province, ' '  to  use  his  own  words. 

"A  great  variety  of  inhabitants,"  he  says,  "  may  exist  in  every 
geographical  province.  The  range  of  conditions  within  which  life  is 
possible  is  wide,  and  circumstances  may  cause  very  great  differences 
to  arise  even  between  adjacent  varieties.  Hence  the  dispute  over 
stability  and  mutability  of  races  is,  for  the  most  part,  factitious,  for 
both  views  are  supported  by  examples,  but  the  conditions  which  pro- 
duce them  respectively  are  not  accurately  distinguished.  How  far 
the  national  type  produced  by  one  cause  or  another  shall  approximate 
to  the  ethnological  or  territorial  type  will  depend  on  circumstances. 
A  native  stock,  though  capable  of  improvement  in  various  ways,  will 
never  change  much.  Even  if  there  should  be  an  influx  of  strangers 
indigenous  to  another  climate  and  permanent  political  changes  should 
result,  the  influence  of  environment  would  still  tend  to  mould  the  type 
into  harmony  with  itself.  But  for  centuries  there  might  be  a  multiple 
series  of  transitional  phases;  and  when  growth  finally  ceased,  the 
resultant  type,  while  bearing  the  impress  of  historical  and  geograph- 
ical environment,  might  differ  widely  from  the  autochthonous  type, 
which  was  wholly  or  principally  the  product  of  the  geographical 
province,  as  the  modern  Frenchman  differs  from  the  Gaul  and  the  pre- 
Gallic  Kelt,  or  the  Spaniard  from  the  Hispanian,  etc." 

But,  by  the  ' '  original  autochthons  ' '  we  must  understand 
that  he  means  the  type  which  is  the  earliest  that  historical 
investigation  can  discover,  not  an  absolutely  "original" 
type.  For,  as  Bastian  emphatically  declares  of  the  ' '  original 
representatives  of  the  anthropological  province  of  the 
Celebes,"  the  Alfores,  "our  ignorance  of  any  predecessors 
is  not  sufficient  proof  that  there  were  none. ' '  This  is  the 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  43 

only  worthy  conception  of  anthropological  history,  and 
Bastian  is  consistent  in  contending  that  ' '  questions  of  tribal 
descent  have  no  ethnological  meaning,  since  in  the  course 
of  a  few  generations  consanguineous  relationships  become 
so  extended  and  involved  as  to  obliterate  tribal  lines." 
So  the  ' '  voluminous  question  whether  the  Slavs  descended 
from  the  Illyrians,  the  Sarmates  or  the  Veneti,"  seems  to 
him  "senseless;"  but  the  point  is  to  learn  "the  elements 
composing  the  tribe"  and  the  processes  going  on  in  it. 
Hence,  in  summing  up  the  task  of  this  "ethnological" 
science,  he  says :  "In  the  ethnological  treatment  of  nation- 
ality," by  which,  as  we  know,  he  understands  an  ethnical 
composite, 

"  we  must  not  divert  attention  into  wrong  channels  by  raising  un- 
justifiable questions  about  descent  and  preventing  insight  into  the 
springs  of  life  ;  neither  may  we  begin  the  investigation  with  an 
arbitrary  hypothesis," 

Biblical  tradition,  for  example, 

"  but  we  must  proceed  from  the  given  circumstances  backward, 
separating  out  the  elements  so  long  as  we  have  a  spark  of  historical 
light  left,  or  so  long  as  collateral  proof  still  serves  to  guide  us  through 
the  darkness  of  myth." 

The  outlines  of  the  science  thus  incidentally  sketched  are 
not  the  product  of  a  priori  deductions  and  philosophical 
speculations.  They  developed  part  by  part  as  he  pondered 
over  enormous  piles  of  ethnological  material  collected  in  the 
study  and  on  exploring  expeditions.  He  was  forced  to  pro- 
ceed systematically.  First  of  all,  he  had  to  make  a  critical 
estimate  of  similar  previous  attempts;  thus  he  compiled  his 
"History  of  Ethnology."  Its  logical  successor,  "Race- 
thought  and  the  Science  of  Man ' '  was  probably  intended  to 
be  introductory  to  a  systematic  outline;  but  the  flood  of  facts 
makes  the  forecast  of  a  system  impossible.  Finally,  in  the 
"  General  Principles  of  Ethnology,"  he  is  more  successful, 
as  much  so  as  is  possible  with  his  overflowing  information. 
These  three  late  works*  best  show  his  epoch-making 
importance  in  sociology. 

Just  as  Comte  assigns  sociology  a  place  after  biology  in 
the  hierarchy  of  the  sciences  since  it  is  the  youngest,  the 
future  science  so  Bastian  begins  his  ' '  History  of  Ethnology  ' ' 
by  pointing  out  that  this  science  occupies  the  last  place  in 

*"Die  Vorgeschichteder  Ethnologist  1880;  "Die  Voelkergedanke  im  A  ufbau  einer 
Wissenschaft  vom  Menschen,"  1881 ;  "  Allgemeine  Grundzuege  der  Ethnologie," 
1884. 


44  ANNAI<S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

order  of  development.     This  external  coincidence  of  itself 
suggests  that  perhaps  both  have  the  same  thing  in  mind. 

Indeed,  Bastian  calls  ethnology  the  "science  of  man;  " 
which  would  also  describe  sociology.  But  by  ethnology  he 
means  a  science,  or  better,  that  science  of  man  which  takes 
races  *  and  not  individuals  for  the  subject-matter  of  its  inves- 
tigations. A  good  portion  of  his  scientific  program  is  thus 
comprised  in  the  name.  This  ' '  science  of  man  "  is  to  con- 
sider the  individual  only  as  a  member  of  an  ethnical 
group.  Its  identification  with  sociology  which  considers 
him  as  a  member  of  a  social  group  is  almost  complete. 
Besides,  hear  what  Bastian  says  of  the  present  position  of 
ethnology : 

1 '  Some  inductive  natural  sciences  like  botany  and  chemistry  have 
had  a  plain  and  definite  field  of  observation  before  them;  and  though 
they  could  not  have  arisen  before  the  new  epochal  age  of  discoveries 
dawned  they  have  since  developed  systematically,  rapidly  and  fully; 
whereas  ethnology,  which  as  science  of  man  should  strive  for  ultimate 
conclusions,  was  incapable  of  such  rapid  progress.  It  had  to  wait 
upon  the  others.  First  induction  must  become  fully  established  in 
chemistry  and  physics.  Progressing  from  inorganic  matter  to  organic, 
it  must  reach  the  limits  of  the  corporeal  in  physiology.  After  that, 
continually  supplementing  its  gigantic  powers  by  the  comparative 
method,  it  might  venture  to  invade  the  mental  realm,  transforming 
psychology  into  a  natural  science  and  analyzing  race-thoughts  in  the 
name  of  ethnology." 

Thus  the  object  of  ethnology  in  Bastian 's  sense  is  the 
discovery  of  race-thoughts,  and  the  means  is  ethnography. 
Hence  Bastian  sees  the  germs  of  ethnology  in  the  first  of 
modern  geographical  discoveries,  and  its  continuation  in  the 
ethnographical  and  anthropological  data  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  "Firm  footing  was  first  gained"  with  Adeling's 
"  Mithridates  "  and  Blumenbach's  works.  "  After  that  the 
development  of  the  science  was  only  a  question  of  time." 
It  was  strongly  promoted  by  a  treatise  on  ' '  Ethnology  and 
the  History  of  Primitive  Ages"  and  by  the  founding  of 
ethnological  museums.  Then  Prichard,  writing  in  a 
"religious  sense,"  "to  prove  the  unity  of  mankind  and 
descent  from  one  pair  "  gave  the  science  its  first  handbook,  f 

'  "  The  problem  cannot  be  to  find  a  '  God  in  history  '  until  man  has  been  found 
there.  The  first  problem  concerns  man  in  his  character  of  £uov  TroM.TiK.ov,  political 
animal,  in  the  social  state  ;  whence  it  appears  that  the  race-thought  is  primary  and 
that  the  thought  of  the  individual  is  secondary,  first  becoming  clear  as  an  integral 
partof  the  wholein  the  exchange  of  thought  through  language."—" 
P-  25- 
t"Die  yorgeschichte,"  p.  i,  and  passim. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  45 

Herder,  Rousseau  and  others  contributed  by  discussing 
the  philosophy  of  history.  Men  like  Auguste  and  Aniadee 
Thierry  hastened  to  adopt  the  new  points  of  view.  Interest 
grew  and  ethnological  societies  were  founded  in  Paris  and 
London  and  correspondence  was  opened  with  societies, 
journals  and  museums  abroad.  Bastian  dwells  on  the  sig- 
nificance of  these  steps,  holding  the  energetic  development 
of  ethnological  museums  to  be  indispensable,  a  conditio  sine 
qua  non  for  his  future  science. 

"With  suitable  museums  not  only  will  many  practical  ends  be  real- 
ized but  especially  the  basis  of  induction  will  be  strengthened,  which 
will  be  a  great  advantage  in  psychology  where  theoretical  studies  first 
come  in  contact  with  the  domain  of  philosophy."* 

But  he  does  not  mean  the  psychology  of  Fries,  Herbart, 
Beneke,  Fichte,  Schopenhauer,  Ulrici,  and  Fischer;  nor  any 
"witch's  concoction  before  which  the  philosophers  stand 
dismayed,"  but  the  natural  science  of  psychology.  "In  it 
lies  our  hope;  so  far  as  can  be  seen,  the  last  hope  of  man- 
kind."! 

The  essential  characteristic  of  the  future  psychology, 
which  he  desires  should  go  hand  in  hand  with  ethnology,  is 
that  it  does  not  start  from  the  individual  man.  For  he  "is 
nothing,  at  best  an  idiot ;  only  through  spoken  intercourse 
in  society  does  he  become  conscious  of  thought,  is  his  na- 
ture realized.  The  thought  of  society,  social  thought,  is 
the  primary  result  and  the  thought  of  the  individual  is  won 
by  later  analysis  from  it."|  These  words  are  golden  and  we 
shall  accept  them  as  the  motto  of  sociology.  Bastian  aptly 
criticises  the  current  psychology  by  saying  that  ' '  systems 
of  philosophy  generally  begin  with  the  individual  and  have 
to  patch  social  thought  together  out  of  the  tatters  that  have 
come  into  their  hands  they  know  not  how;  whereas,  if  the 
social  thought  were  looked  upon  as  an  unmutilated  gar- 
ment, each  individual  thought  would  be  found  woven  into 
its  right  place."  Then  he  unfolds  his  ethnological  plan 
"  to  win  from  social  thoughts  sufficient  material  for  psycho- 
logical investigation. ' '  Not  satisfied  with  the  consideration 
of  ' '  the  thought-structures,  or  thought- trees  of  civilized 
races  only,"  he  demands  also  the  assistance  of  the  "  eth- 
nology of  the  savage  races, ' '  of  those 

*  Ibid.,  p.  79. 
t  Ibid.,  p.  83. 
I  Ibid.,  p.  79. 


46  ANNAI<S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

"  cryptogami c  structures,  so  to  speak,  in  which  the  processes  of  cell- 
life  and  growth  may  be  more  easily  observed,  in  order  that  the  laws 
discovered  in  them  may  be  applied  to  phanerogamic  complexes." 
"The  laws  governing  every  organism  are  firmly  fixed  within  it;  even 
ethical  laws  are  unchangeable.  Everywhere  in  the  five  continents, 
we  see  thoughts  springing  forth,  similar  where  the  conditions  are 
similar  or  varying  with  local  differences.  As  the  same  principles 
regulate  the  processes  of  cell-life  in  the  tropic  palm  and  the  arctic  fir; 
as  the  same  plant  may  have  its  leaves  broad,  curled,  or  dwarfed  to 
needles  according  to  its  habutat ;  as  there  are  Asiatic,  African  and 
American  varieties  of  the  lion,  so  the  pantheon  of  the  Indian  national 
mind  differs  from  that  of  the  Grecian  and  the  Scandinavian." 

"In  all  the  psychological  creations  of  society,  whether  religious, 
social  or  aesthetic,  there  are  primitive  elementary  thoughts  indis- 
putably recurring  and  passing  through  the  same  course  of  develop- 
ment, often  with  truly  startling  identity,  like  ghostly  doubles  of  dis- 
tant acquaintances.  The  organic  bond  is  so  close  that  one  with  such 
sharp  eyes  as  Cuvier  had  for  fossils  might  reconstruct  the  whole  circle 
of  ideas  from  the  torn  fragments  and  accidental  traces."* 

Accordingly,  Bastian  proposes  three  specific  ethnological 
problems.  The  first  is 

"to  determine  the  elementary  laws  of  growth  in  race  and  national 
thoughts;  to  get  something  which  will  do  for  these  what  the  cell- 
theory  does  for  plant-physiology The  second  would  be  to 

study  the  local  influences  of  environment,  to  which  Buckle  in  his 

philosophy  yields  a  preponderating  importance The  last 

is  the  investigation  of  what  might  be  compared  to  grafting  or  to  culti- 
vating ornamental  plants  by  artificial  means.  It  is  chiefly  concerned 
with  races  just  beginning  to  develop  a  civilization,  before  they  cross 
the  threshold  of  history.  All  changes  due  to  intercourse  whether 
with  friends  or  foes  fall  under  this  head;  all  such  phenomena  as  were 
formerly  supposed  to  be  borrowed.  For  whenever  similarity  of  ideas 
was  discovered,  historical  hypotheses  were  immediately  recast  accord- 
ing to  that  principle;  whereas,  according  to  the  psychological  axioms 
of  ethnology  and  the  methods  of  comparative  etymology,  the  explana- 
tion should  be  first  sought  in  the  most  general  and  elementary  laws. 
When  there  is  no  longer  possibility  of  finding  it  in  them,  resort  may 
be  had  to  historical  intercourse  so  far  as  it  seems  reasonably  certain. 
.  .  .  .  When  the  work  is  begun  in  earnest,  ethnology  will  have  to 
arrange  its  investigations  according  to  these  three  points  of  view,  "f 

Such  is  Bastian's  ethnological  method.  In  his  "  Race- 
thoughts  ' '  he  worked  zealously  to  prepare  suitable  material 
and  to  arrange  it  properly  according  to  this  plan.  The 
methodological  and  propaedeutic  hints  of  the  ' '  History  ' ' 
come  out  more  clearly.  Carping  criticism  might  complain 
of  the  repetitions;  but  deeper  insight  discovers  here  a  hard 
intellectual  struggle  from  the  darkness  of  intimation  to  the 
light  of  cognition — the  severe  birth-pangs  of  a  new  science. 

*  rbid.,  p.  89. 

t  Ibid.,  pp.  90-91. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  47 

Properly  rejecting  theories  ascribing  "  the  preponderating 
influence  to  environment,"  he  again  lays  it  down  as  the 
problem  of  inductive  ethnology, 

"disregarding  the  somewhat  superficial  local  phenomena  for  which 
an  historical  or  geographical  explanation  must  be  sought  later,  to 
determine  first  of  all  and  permanently  the  uniform  laws  of  the  growth 
of  human  race  thoughts.  It  can  be  done  most  simply  by  the  genetic 
method,  starting  with  uncivilized  peoples  as  the  lowest  and  most 
transparent  organisms.  How  development  proceeds  from  such  germs 
to  the  most  exalted  mental  products,  must  be  discovered  by  comparing 
parallel  series  of  phenomena  according  to  universal  natural  princi- 
ples." 

This  is  not  mere  repetition.  Each  thought  is  more  fully 
developed  and  more  clearly  expressed.  As  he  progresses  he 
approaches  nearer  to  sociology.  He  very  properly  hopes 
' '  by  observing  uncivilized  races  and  gaining  an  insight  into 
the  human  mind's  processes  of  growth  "  to  obtain  a  perfect 
key  to  its  ' '  higher  stages, "  "  even  to  its  full  development 
in  civilized  peoples."*  It  will  not  always  be  possible,  how- 
ever, for 

"  many  primary  ideas  are  so  completely  eliminated  as  civilization 
progresses  that  their  relation  to  current  ideas  is  lost  and  they  have 
only  an  archaic  value.  .  .  .  But  others  .  .  with  their  offshoots, 
still  permeate  modern  conceptions." 

He  has  really  projected  a  complete  science  of  sociology. 
Indeed  in  spite  of  his  peculiar  views,  he  penetrates  right  to 
its  heart  as  we  shall  see. 

"  Of  the  many  series  of  conceptions  touching  the  most  important 
interests  of  life,  not  a  few,"  he  says,  "  concern  the  condition  of  society 
when  it  is  coincident  with  the  state  or  when  it  is  promiscuously  strati- 
fied into  ranks,  castes,  guilds,  parishes,  confederacies,  etc.  But 
before  ethnology  can  expect  to  investigate,  methodically  and  thor- 
oughly, the  ideas  prevalent  under  such  circumstane-s,  it  must  first 
have  comprehended  the  social  organism  within  -\vhich  they  find 
expression." 

This  organism  is  the  state; 

"and  all  depends  on  investigating  its  structure  and  biology;  for, 
considering  man's  immanent  social  nature,  the  question  of  its  origin 
must  be  postponed  temporarily  before  the  fact  of  its  existence.  .  .  . 
Society,  which,  morphologically,  leads  up  to  family,  tribe  and  state, 
and,  biologically,  to  kin,  race  and  nation,  exists  in  greater  or  smaller 
proportion  wherever  man  does;  for  the  conception  of  man  as  a  social 
being  is  real;  but  the  conception  of  him  as  an  individual  is  abstract." 

Thus  Bastian  stands  fully  on  sociological  ground ;  the  in- 
voluntary course  of  his  thought  proves,  better  than  any 
logical  argument  could,  the  intimate  connection  between  his 

*"  Voelkergedanke"  p.  17. 


48     ANNAI^S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY 

ethnology  and  our  sociology.  The  former  is  nothing  but 
the  necessary  basis,  the  latter  is  the  crown  of  the  ethnological 
structure. 

So  great  is  the  power  of  thought  over  man,  that  often  a 
mere  accident  is  sufficient  to  awaken  a  whole  system  of  ideas 
in  the  mind.  Bastian  scarcely  graces  the  portals  of  sociology, 
whereupon  they  open  as  of  themselves;  and  the  whole  com- 
plex mass  of  problems,  overruns  him.  Once  under  the 
influence  of  the  sociological  idea  he  cannot  escape  a  storm 
of  perplexities  and  doubts.  Suddenly  he  notices  that  ' '  in- 
definite terminology  leads  to  various  misconceptions,  as 
when  'race'  (clan,  lineage,  band,  etc.),  is  used  for  tribe 
andplryle  (^^),  curia  and  phratry,  fsvo^  and  gens,  etc."* 
Suddenly  he  sees  clearly  what  he  did  not  see  when  he  wrote 
"Man  in  History,"  that  the  "family,  which  is  the  sub- 
structure of  the  whole  development  under  prevailing  condi- 
tions, must  be  abandoned  in  ethnology,"  i.  e.,  in  sociology. 

"  Since  our  idea  of  the  family  is  abstracted  from  actual  conditions,  it 
is  a  particularly  definite  concept.  .  .  .  We  have  the  schematic 
forms,  family  and  race,  and  think  of  the  latter  as  arising  out  of  the 
former  because  a  race  can  be  analyzed  into  families;  but  an  actual 
unit  first  (?)  appears  in  the  kindred,  "f 

The  adverb  "first,"  seems  objectionable  here.  Sociology 
does  not  "  first "  begin  with  the  kindred  or  horde,  but 
begins  with  it  as  first  natural  fact;  for  it  is  not  and 
cannot  be  known  what  might  have  been  earlier.  He  does 
not  clearly  understand  how  the  state  arises  from  the  first 
"actual  "  or,  as  we  should  say,  "  ultimate  "  unit,  nor  what 
the  process  of  transition  is,  for  he  says  that  "  even  in  the 
kindred  or  phratry  there  are  traces  of  a  half-conscious  inter- 
ference, which  suggest  to  some  the  social  contract  as  the 
origin  of  the  state;  but  the  state  should  be  attributed  to 
^ytf'C,  to  nature. ' '  He  discards  the  social  contract,  as  might 
be  expected,  and  sets  the  kindred  first,  conceding  the  origin 
of  the  state  from  it  problematically.  But  while  emphasiz- 
ing the  natural  origin  of  the  state,  he  gives  no  clear  account 
of  the  transitions  from  kindred  to  state,  which  we  shall  treat 
of  later  in  the  appropriate  place.  However,  when  once  the 
state  has  arisen,  he  understands  its  changes  perfectly,  both 

*  We  have  discussed  the  ambiguous  meaning  of  "  race  "  in  "Das  Philosophische 
Staatsreckt,  "  sec.  8,  and  in  "  Der  Rassenkampf,  "  pp.  186,  200  et  seq. 

^"Voelkergedanke"  p.  21.  We  have  expressed  the  same  thought  more  than 
once,  first  in  "Das  Philosophische  Staalsrecht,'  sec.  8,  and  then  in  "  Rechtsstaat  und 
Socialismus,"  sec.  29. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  49 

as  ethnical  conglomerates  and  as  social  growths.  By  con- 
trasting it  with  the  kindred  as  the  "  actual  unit,"  he  points 
out  that  the 

"ideal  state  is  never  realized;  for  the  boisterously' waking  life  of  the 
race-mind  [better  race  minds]  grows  more  boisterous  still  in  the  effort 
to  unify  and  nationalize  the  currents  of  ethnical  feeling  by  force  of 
political  authority." 

In  view  of  this  deeper  conception  of  the  state,  the  ordinary 
theory  of  political  organizations  and  of  political  rights  had 
to  be  abandoned.*  When  the  Semitic  sphere  of  knowledge 
was  added  to  the  classical,  theocracy  was  added  to  the  chief 
Aristotelian  forms  of  government,  kingdom  or  monarchy, 
aristocracy,  and  city  state  (besides  tyranny,  oligarchy,  and 
democracy  or  ochlocracy).  But  now  that  the  whole  globe 
is  subjected  to  observation  there  are  so  many  modifications 
to  be  noticed  that  the  previous  systems  would  be  radically 
transformed  were  the  types  arranged  comparatively. 

Such  reflections  do  not  belong  in  ethnology.  Without 
observing  it,  Bastian  has  reached  social  and  political  science. 
Later,  in  his  "  Principles  of  Ethnology, "f  he  realizes  it  and 
sets  forth  the  relation  between  ethnology  and  sociology, 
saying  plainly  that  "  ethnology,  as  ethnical  sociology  or 
sociology  under  many  ethnical  forms,  has  to  demonstrate 
the  physiological  laws  of  the  life  of  social  organisms. "  It  is 
in  comparing  savage  races  and  civilized  states  that  he 
develops  his  most  interesting  ideas  and  proves  the  solidarity 
of  ' '  race-thoughts. ' '  But  the  comparison  ought  to  be  con- 
ducted sociologically  and  not  ethnologically.  To  obtain 
positive  results  it  is  necessary  to  treat  the  natural  communi- 
ties as  such.  As  he  says:  "  Within  the  ethnical  horizon  it 
is  the  social  organism  and  not  its  components  that  counts,"! 
be  that  organism  the  most  or  the  least  civilized  race. 

"The  problems  which  agitate  the  life  of  the  most  highly  developed 
races  should  be  apparent  in  embryonic  form  even  among  the  lowest 
savages;  and  since  it  is  so  much  easier  to  note  all  the  characteristic 
points  quickly  and  correctly  in  such  small  and  transparent  organisms, 
they  should  help  us  to  understand  the  more  complicated  wonders  of 
creation  and  to  reduce  legitimate  data  to  law." 

*  Cf.  "Philosophisch.es  Siaatsrecht,"  sec.  13,  14,  where  we  discussed  the  unsatisfac- 
tory nature  of  this  theory,  which  rests  on  a  one-sided  conception  of  the  state. 

•  t  "  Grundzueg'en  der  Ethnologie"  1884. 
J  "  Voelkergedanke,"  p.  71.    See  " Philosophisches  Staatsrecht,"  sec.  7. 


50  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

It  would  be  impossible  to  comprehend  the  intellectual 
genesis  of  the  ' '  more  complicated  wonders  of  creation ' ' 
without  resorting  to  the  ' '  smallest  organisms. ' ' 

"  While  modern  races,  like  crystals  clear  and  polished  and  radiant 
with  beauty,  stand  out  in  history  in  such  definite  proportions  that 
scientific  measurement  is  quite  possible;  in  the  ethnology  of  savage 
races,  we  deal  with  a  chaotic  seething  mass*  which,  however,  applying 
a  chemical  metaphor  to  race -thoughts,  holds  primary  mental  elements 
in  solution." 

These  are  what  Bastian  wants.  To  seek  through  the 
great  variety  of  living  forms  for  the  earliest  germinal  stages 
of  the  ' '  primary  mental  elements ' '  and  to  watch  them 
growing  into  ' '  race-thoughts ' '  is  the  task  of  his  ethnology. 
He  has  a  noble  object  before  him  and,  with  true  and  justifi- 
able enthusiasm,  he  proclaims  the  way,  and  the  grand 
visions  that  will  meet  the  astonished  eye  when  it  is  reached. 

"  After  we  know  the  law  of  development,  it  is  possible  to  take  a  per- 
fected product  and  trace  the  stages  backwards  to  the  starting  point,  the 
relative  beginning.  Many  historical  principles  have  thus  been  estab- 
lished. Microscopical  analysis  may  proceed  even  to  the  cellular  basis 
of  ethnology,  wherein  reliable  facts  may  be  obtained  concerning  the 
conditions  precedent  to  existence,  concerning  the  enigma  of  being  and 
becoming.  Hitherto  the  investigation  has  been  purely  philosophical; 
hereafter  psychological  inductions  will  be  used."  "Diving  into  the 
stream  of  thought,  we  shall  only  raise  the  secrets  of  mysticism  from 
the  dark  depths;  but  having  the  skeleton  race-thoughts  objectively 
before  us,  we  can  handle,  measure  and  study  them  and,  by  sufficient 
analysis,  reason  back  to  the  law  of  development  in  thought  itself."  f 

This  law  should  explain  everything,  but  it  can  be  learned 
only  from  the  ' '  primary  elemental  thoughts  of  savage  races 
and  the  changes  they  undergo. ' ' 

"In  contrast  with  narrow  ideas  of  history  and  the  early  efforts  to 
attribute  religious  and  social  similarities  to  presumed  intercourse  in 
the  past,  the  idea  must  arise,  as  the  geographical  horizon  was  ex- 
tended and  material  increased,  that  the  task  of  ethnology  is  to  go 
back  to  the  elementary  laws  of  development  in  race-psychology;  and 
then  to  make  as  much  allowance  for  the  admitted  causes  and  only  so 
much  as  topographical  reasons  require,  "f 

We  have  perhaps  dwelt  too  long  on  Bastian 's  "  History  " 
and  "Race-thoughts."  Yet  the  fundamental  sociological 
principles  and  methodological  suggestions  contained  in  them 
cannot  be  overvalued.  These  two  works  are  positively 

*  [Et'ne  wuest  und  verworren  gaehrende  Mutterlauge-] 
t  "  Voelkergedanke,"  p.  76. 
\  Ibid.,  p.  119. 


THE  OUTUNES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  51 

epoch-making  in  sociology.  It  might  have  been  expected 
that  he  would  have  carried  out  his  ideas  in  the  ' '  Principles 
of  Ethnology,"  which  soon  appeared;  it  might  have  been 
expected  that,  after  collecting  material  for  thirty  years  and 
after  preparing  himself  by  such  deep  reflections  on  the 
character,  problem  and  object  of  ethnology  and  "ethnical 
sociology,"  he  would  have  given  us  finally  an  elaborate 
presentation  of  the  science.  But  unfortunately  he  has  not 
fulfilled  this  reasonable  expectation .  Our  previous  remark 
is  confirmed.  The  abundance  of  the  material  interferes  to 
prevent  a  clear  and  complete  treatment  of  the  ' '  principles  ' ' 
of  the  science. 

The  most  that  the  later  work  furnishes  seems  scanty 
beside  the  plan  he  projected  in  the  two  former.  Not  that 
the  chapters  seem  deficient  in  form  and  matter;  but  six  (!) 
chapters  treating  six  topics  do  not  comprise  all  the  points 
which  should  at  least  be  enumerated  among  the  ' '  principles ' ' 
of  the  science.  Bastian  treats  in  succession  ( i )  geographi- 
cal provinces,  incidentally  touching  on  the  question  of  the 
unity  of  the  human  race;  (2)  implements,  the  first  vehicle 
of  civilization;  (3)  property,  the  foundation  of  political 
order;  (4)  marriage;  (5)  rights,  and  (6)  religion.  But 
what  of  phenomena  so  essential  to  ' '  ethnical  sociology, ' '  as, 
slavery,  sovereignty,  state  and  society,  political  econ- 
omy, commerce  and  the  like?  Where  is  there  the  least 
intimation  of  the  social  development  in  local  centres  of 
civilization  ?  The  development  of  single  institutions,  like 
property,  gives  no  idea  of  the  development  of  human 
societies  themselves,  which  in  ' '  ethnical  sociology  ' '  is  the 
most  important  thing.  This  is  Bastian' s  weak  point.  He 
is  so  absorbed  with  minutiae  that  he  loses  sight  of  the  object 
as  a  whole.  There  is  also  another  mistake,  mathematical, 
it  might  be  called.  He  states  the  sociological  problem  incor- 
rectly, and  consequently  cannot  obtain  the  correct  solution. 
Starting  "  from  one  given  point,"  which  is  falsely  held  to  be 
the  soul,  he  wants  to  explain  the  social  development  of 
human  societies  as  the  result  of  "thought."  "In  the 
beginning  was  the  thought."  "Thought"  grows  and 
develops;  all  phenomena  are  but  variegated  forms  of  thought, 
changing  with  time  and  circumstances. 

Strange  that  Faust's  misgivings  did  not  warn  him. 


52  ANNAI^S  OF  THE;  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

"  '  In  the  Beginuiug  was  the  thought,' 
This  first  line  let  me  weigh  completely, 
Lest  my  impatient  pen  proceed  too  fleetly, 
It  is  the  thought  which  works,  creates,  indeed  ?  " 

Had  he  taken  to  heart  the  deep  meaning  of  the  poet's 
words : 

"  Mn  the  Beginning  was  the  act,'  "* 

he  would  have  come  closer  to  the  sociological  problem. 

Much  as  he  afterwards  tried,  he  never  succeeded  in  eradi- 
cating idealistic  philosophy  even  from  his  latest  works.  At 
bottom  he  is  always  a  "race-psychologist,"  seeking  the 
cause  of  all  social  phenomena  in  the  ' '  soul ' '  of  each  race, 
but  (we  speak  not  as  combating  idealism  with  narrow  mate- 
rialism) do  we  not  daily  see  that  it  is  always  the  act  which 
excites  reflection  ?  Does  not  the  thought  follow  ?  The  act 
is  produced  by  natural  forces  that  have  no  connection  with 
the  soul.  Man  acts  according  to  natural  law  and  thinks 
humanly  afterwards,  notwithstanding  the  approved  maxim, 
"first  think,  then  act,"  the  worth  of  which  for  the  indi- 
vidual we  would  never  challenge.  But  social  development 
and  the  behavior  of  communities  is  another  thing.  Blind 
natural  forces  prevail;  there  is  no  thought,  no  reflection, 
always  an  onward  tendency  following  eternal  laws  and 
manifested  in  the  form  of  acts.  Then  the  act  creates  the 
thought  which  the  idealist  refers  to  the  ' '  soul ' '  of  the  actor  as 
"  motive  "  of  the  act.  As  the  acts  arising  from  unitary  nat- 
ural laws  are  harmonious  and  regular,  so  are  the  thoughts; 
hence  the  law  of  the  regular  growth  of ' '  race- thoughts, ' '  Bas- 
tian's  "race-psychology."  But  we  would  not  in  the  least 
depricate  Bastian's  services  by  these  criticisms.  For  per- 
haps no  one  human  being  has  done  so  much  for  science  as 
he,  and  we  hope  his  services  may  long  be  continued. 

We  had  to  say  of  him  that,  finding  so  many  trees,  he  fails 
to  see  the  forest  or,  at  least,  does  not  let  us  see  it.  Now  we 
come  to  a  younger  writer,  who  manages  his  material  mas- 
terfully and  works  the  great  array  of  scattered  ethnological 
data  into  great  mosaics.  Julius  I/ippert  always  presents  the 
whole  object  in  broad  lines. 

He  began  with  a  special  department  of  sociology,  com- 
parative religion,  and  has  advanced  in  fact,  if  not  in  name, 
to  sociology  in  the  best  sense  of  the  word.  His  first  two 
books,  on  "Soul  Worship"  and  "Systems  of  Religion," 

*"  Faust."    Part  I,  Scene  Hi.    Taylor's  translation. 


THE  OUTLINES  OK  SOCIOLOGY.  53 

were  thoroughly  reviewed  in  ' '  Der  Rassenkampf. ' '  Let  us 
recall  briefly  that  in  them  he  clearly  and  convincingly  estab- 
lishes a  universal  law  of  the  origin  and  development  of 
religion,  thus  laying  a  totally  new  and  a  sociological 
foundation  for  its  scientific  stud)^.* 

Undisturbed  by  the  ill-natured  criticisms  of  the  Literar- 
isches  Centralblatt ,  this  very  productive  author  has  since 
enriched  science,  and  especially  sociology,  by  two  valuable 
works:  the  "History  of  the  Family,"  and  the  "General 
History  of  the  Priesthood.''!  He  possesses  a  high  degree 
of  talent  for  tracing  the  development  of  social  or  psycho- 
social  institutions  through  the  history  of  all  races  and  ages. 
His  history  of  the  family  is  a  model  of  sociological  compo- 
sition. 

"Every  man  considers  his  family  organization  the  normal  human 
form  and  is  prejudiced  in  favor  of  the  writer  who  thus  treats  it.  But 
that  is  not  looking  at  history  objectively," 

he  says  significantly  in  beginning.  Then  after  gratefully 
recognizing  the  services  of  Bachofen,  the  discoverer 
of  ' '  mother-right, ' '  and  showing  us  the  original  mother- 
family,  "organized  upon  the  basis  of  mother-love,"  he 
goes  on  to  show  the  rising  ' '  father-right ' '  and  the  older 
father- family,  "not  resting  on  the  principle  of  kinship  or 
any  consciousness  of  it,  but  on  the  principle  of  might,  sove- 
reignty and  possession."!  Finally  he  shows  the  latest 
phase  of  development,  the  "younger  father-family,"  "in 
which  the  terms  father  and  son  have  come  to  imply  con- 
sanguineous relationship." 

He  raised  Bachofen' s  theory  of  mother-right,  which  sev- 
eral writers  have  since  accepted,  beyond  all  further  doubt, 
adducing  "rudiments  in  use  and  custom,"  and  "allusions 
in  myth  and  saga. ' '  In  this  way  he  threw  much  light  upon 
primitive  groups  and  the  organization  of  human  societies  in 
which  ' '  stranger  and  enemy  are  synonymous  terms  ' '  and 
' '  all  are  strangers  who  are  not  united  by  ties  of  blood  or 
marriage  to  the  same  small  organization.  "§ 

* " Der  Seele ncutt  in  seinen  Beziehungen  zur  althebraischen  Religion."  Berlin, 
1881  ;  "  Die  Religionen  der  Europaeischen  Culturvoelker."  Berlin,  1881. 

t  "Die  Geschichte  der_  Familie,"  Stuttgart,  1884.  "Allgemeine  Geschichte  des  Prtest- 
erthwms,"  2  vols.,  Berlin,  1883,  1884.  [The  scope  of  this  work  includes  the  study 
of  both  the  priesthood  and  priestcraft.] 

J"  Geschichte  der  Familie"  p.  5.  We  developed  the  same  thought  in  "  Rechtsstaat 
unit  Socialism-its,"  sec.  30. 

g  Cf.  "  Rassenkampf,"  p.  195  et  seq.,  "  Rechtsstaat  und  Socialismus,"  sec.  19. 


54  ANNAI<S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

He  discovers  that  there  was  a  prehistoric  variety  of  the 
family  in  Germany  ' '  later  than  the  one  with  maternal  suc- 
cession," one  in  which  the  man  is  "lord  of  herds  and 
slaves, "  "  the  woman  belongs  to  the  man  as  a  part  of  his 
possessions ' '  and  ' '  her  children  are  his  not  .simply  if  and 
because  he  begat  them,  but  because  the  mother  is  his."* 
This  "  ancient  family  "  goes  hand  in  hand  with  a  ' '  developed 
system  of  slavery,"  for  the  latter  "  proceeds  undeniably 
from  rising  father- right  "  in  the  older  sense,  "f 

He  shows  various  stages  intermediate  between  the  older 
and  the  younger  father-family. 

""  Whether  the  old  union  shall  be  preserved  or  dissolved  into  separate 
families,  depends  on  occupation  and  property -relations  largely;  but 
eventually  the  question  arises  every  where.  "J 
k 

Later,  we  shall  consider  whether  he  has  made  it  perfectly  clear 
that  the  motives  he  alleges  are  sufficient  to  produce  the  change ; 
but  it  must  be  recognized  that  he  was  the  first,  so  far  as  we 
know,  to  prove  that  this  is  the  course  of  development  and 
to  attach  importance  to  it.  He  was  the  first  to  call  attention 
to  the  contrast  between  the  older  family  and  the  younger 
one  in  which  we  live.  This  is  no  ordinary  service,  for  the 
problem  was  a  difficult  one.  ' '  Have  we  any  idea, ' '  he  asks 
justly,  "  we  who  are  wont  to  think  that  family  relations 
are  natural  and  have  always  existed,  have  we  any  idea  by 
what  tortuous,  weary  paths  mankind  reached  this  form  of 
existence  ?"§  He  has  pointed  them  out  with  great  clearness. 
The  task  of  the  future  will  be  to  investigate  each  stage  of 
the  long  way  in  detail. 

Lippert's  third  sociological  problem,  the  priesthood,  sur- 
passes, if  that  were  possible,  both  the  others  in  scope  and 
difficulty;  for  it  is  intimately  connected  with  almost  every- 
thing that  is  important  sociologically.  The  priesthood,  as  a 
body,  has  always  and  everywhere  striven  to  control  all 
spheres  of  social  life  ;  so  that  its  history  necessarily  involves 
consideration  of  the  most  important  of  them  :  religion,  cus- 
tom, rights,  sovereignty,  state  and  society,  etc.  He  did  not 
shrink  before  the  difficulties  of  the  task  but  has  produced  a 

*"  Geschichte  der  Famz'lre,"  p.  95. 
t  Ibid.,  p.  141. 
\Ibid.,  p.  221. 
\  Ibid.,  p.  216. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  55 

significant  sociological  work  which  is  a  pioneer  in  several 
directions. 

He  starts  with  the  same  theory  that  the  root  of  all 
religions  is  in  "  soul- worship  ' '  and  that  religious  ceremonies 
are  derived  from  religious  conceptions. 

"  Especially  is  it  a  fact,"  he  continues,  "  that  the  unseen  is  not 
thought  of  as  a  natural  force,  even  when  manifested  in  a  natural 
effect ;  but  it  is  conceived  to  be  a  personal  spirit  analogous  to  the 
human  soul.  The  savage  is  utterly  unable  to  comprehend  a  natural 
force;  but  as  soon  as  he  begins  to  think  logically  every  death  sug- 

tests  the  idea  of  a  personal  spirit.     It  is  only  by  grasping  this  fact 
rmly  that  we  can  see  how  religious  observances,  however  complex, 
originate  in  human  logic  and  how  the  unity  of  the  latter  explains  the 
essential  similarity  of  the  former  even  to  the  remotest  corners  of  the 
earth."* 

This  citation  indicates  the  plan  of  the  work  and  justifies 
the  method  of  general  treatment  adopted.  At  bottom,  Bas- 
tian's  thought  is  the  same;  but  his  terms,  race-soul  and 
race-thought,  are  less  clear  than  L,ippert's  plain  "unity  of 
human  logic."  Since  human  logic,  when  stimulated  by  one 
and  the  same  fact,  soul-worship,  can  not  conceal  its  char- 
acter even  in  the  complex  texture  of  religious  observances, 
it  must  be  universally  demonstrable  that  the  principle  un- 
derlying them  is  unitary;  and  this  I/ippert  has  succeeded 
in  doing  by  describing  the  life  of  the  groups  individually. 
For  though  soul-worship  originated  everywhere  in  the  most 
primitive  human  logic,  its  development  varied  with  the  kind 
and  degree  of  social  life  in  each  group.  It  would  be  impos- 
sible for  us  here  to  present  the  development  of  the  priesthood 
in  detail,  the  world  over,  as  he  does  or  discuss  the  purely- 
sociological  questions  involved.  But  his  view  on  the  ques- 
tion fundamental  to  all  sociology,  the  origin  of  political 
organizations,  must  be  presented  because  it  differs  essen- 
tially from  that  which  we  have  hitherto  defended  and  upon 
which  we  base  the  present  work.  While  we  hold  that  every 
political  organization,  and  hence  every  developing  civiliza- 
tion, begins  at  the  moment  when  one  horde  permanently 
subjects  another;  and  while  we  do  not  hesitate  to  recognize 
that  the  most  cruel  and  barbarous  conquerors  are  the  blind 
instruments  of  human  progress  and  powerfully  promote 
civilization,  nay  even  found  it;  Lippert  sees  nothing  but 
the  victory  of  ' '  barbarism  ' '  over  ' '  civilization  ' '  in  the  un- 
deniable fact  that  states  are  founded  by  conquest.  He  holds 

*  "Geschichte  des  Priesterthums"  p.  13. 


56  ANNALS  OP  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

that  civilization  begins  and  grows  in  ' '  peaceful ' '  compan- 
ionship within  the  primitive  horde,  defending  the  view 
warmly  and  decrying  the  opposing  view  attributed  to  the 
' '  school-books. ' '  We  are  free  to  confess  that  his  views  en- 
list our  sympathies;  we  would  gladly  accept  them  in  prefer- 
ence to  our  own  if  we  could  be  convinced  of  their  truth. 
But  we  will  reserve  the  discussion  until  later,  simply  citing 
some  of  his  statements  here. 

"Mexican  history,"  he  says,  "is  full  of  tales  of  invasion,  but  in 
every  case  dominion  fell  to  the  rude  sons  of  barbarism;  not  one  of  the 
conquering  races,  Toltecs,  Chichimechs,  and  Aztecs  in  turn,  brought 
civilization  to  the  charming  land  of  Anahuac.  Rather,  the  old  tragedy 
was  oft  repeated.  The  races  which  had  been  hundreds  and  perhaps 
thousands  of  years  in  rearing  a  civilization  in  their  upland  valleys  are 
the  '  good  house-wives  '  of  history,  of  whom  nobody  speaks.  But  the 
Bedouins,  repeatedly  breaking  in  from  the  wilderness  of  barbarism, 
often  beaten  off,  but  finally  victorious,  made  civilized  man  with  all  his 
skill  their  slave,  and  they  are  praised  as  the  creators  of  it  all.  In  the 
school-books  they  are  called  the  founders  of  civilization,  as  if  they  had 
brought  it  from  the  wilderness.  The  sympathizer  with  those  quiet 
and  ceaseless  workers,  the  lineage  of  peace,  must  be  satisfied  if  the 
object  of  his  regard  is  not  accused  of  the  most  profligate  '  corruption ' 
which  a  healthful  breeze  from  the  desert  must  needs  blow  away. 
Fortunately  the  conquerors  do  not  always  want  to  destroy  all  of  it. 
They  are  ready  to  adopt  the  most  serviceable  parts  and  even  to  increase 
and  extend  them  by  the  power  of  organization."* 

lyippert  makes  no  secret  of  the  fact  that  his  judgment  is 
influenced  by  sympathy  with  the  conquered;  which  makes 
his  opinion  the  less  objective.  Moreover,  he  concedes  to 
the  ' '  rude  sons  of  barbarism, "  a  ' '  power  of  organization  ' ' 
sufficient  to  ' '  increase  and  extend  ' '  the  civilization  of  the 
' '  lineage  of  peace. ' '  We  are  thankful  for  both  the  confes- 
sion and  the  concession.  Later  we  shall  have  occasion  to 
show  that  ' '  power  of  organization  "  is  an  invaluable  trait 
of  the  ' '  ntde  sons  of  barbarism ' '  and  that  the  ' '  lineage  of 
peace,"  after  being  powerfully  organized,  will  add  not 
"  sand  upon  sand  "  but  block  upon  block,  "  to  rear  a  civili- 
zation." But  reserving  the  discussion,  let  us  hear  further 
evidence  in  support  of  his  views. 

Historians  have  generally  followed  Garcilasso  de  la  Vega 
in  dating  the  beginning  of  Peruvian  civilization  from  the 


*  Ibid. ,  Vol.  i,  p.  288.     [Xippert  distinguishes  between  the  nomads  and  the  Bedou- 
ins.   As  characteristic  of  the  latter,  he  mentions  "changeable  abode,   irregular 


ny 


auv    null     vv.ull.ii    rtlUJLllel     llcl.n  V-Ulll  Vrl  LCU  ,       HUH    L11C    L 

"  Culturgeschichte,"  Stuttgart,  1886,  Vol.  i,  p.  182.] 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  57 

time  when  the  lucas  conquered  the  ancient  Peruvians  and 
founded  a  kingdom.  I^ippert  discards  this  conception  and 
agrees  with  the  views  of  the  English  traveler  Hutchinson, 
who  is  ' '  convinced  from  personal  inspection  that  we  are 
here  dealing  with  a  civilization  that  began  long  before  the 
time  of  the  Incas  and  progressed  gradually . "  ' '  This  opinion 
will  doubtless  gain  ground,"  says  L/ippert;  and  he  believes 
himself  justified  in  considering  that  the  government  of  the 
Incas,  as  well  as  that  of  the  Toltecs  and  Chichimecs,  was 
' '  the  dominion  of  an  energetic  conqueror  over  races  that  had 
already  founded  a  settled  civilization."  This  may  be  the 
case,  however,  without  justifying  L,ippert's  theory.  Every- 
where we  see  repeated  instances  of  civilized  states  subjected 
by  more  or  less  "  barbarous  "  conquerors;  as  China  was  by 
the  Mongols  and  Roman  Italy  by  the  Goths  and  other  Ger- 
man tribes.  The  Incas  were  not  necessarily  the  first  con- 
querors, the  Anglo-Saxons,  of  Peru;  they  may  have  been  its 
Normans.  This  argument  alone  is  not  sufficient  to  confirm 
Lippert's  theory  of  the  generatio  aquivoca,  the  problematic 
genesis,  of  civilization. 

Again,  ancient  Egypt  is  cited.  "  The  historical  events  " 
seem  to  L,ippert  not  ' '  essentially  different  from  those  which 
welded  the  Peruvian  state  together."  But  they  may  be 
explained  in  more  than  one  way  and,  it  seems  to  us,  justify 
I/ippert's  views  less  than  the  Peruvian  and  Mexican  cases 
cited. 

"  As  there  the  low  country  on  the  holy  lake,  so  here  the  rich  delta 
lands  of  the  holy  river  between  desert  and  wilderness  first  invited  to 
permanent  occupation.  The  races  in  the  delta,  pressed  by  the 
nomadic  hordes  to  the  border  of  the  sea,  had  to  sustain  life  in  perma- 
nent settlements  by  provident  labor;  they  subdued  the  waters  and 
made  the  first  stride  toward  civilization,  learning  to  feel  their  higher 
human  value  in  comparison  with  the  barbarians." 

Let  us  not  forget  that  L,ippert  is  here  speaking  of  the 
"object"  of  his  "sympathy:" 

"  We  may  assume,"  he  continues,  "that  there  was  in  antiquity  a 
like  number  of  small  tribes  leading  a  pastoral  life  and  cultivating  a 

Eiece  of  land  incidentally,  as  many  modern   Africans  do,  yet  never 
saving  a  certain  definite  territory.     The  fertility  of  the  inundated 
lands  permitted   such  an  arrangement  and  the  '  red-land '    of  the 
desert  remained  the  home  of  the  nomads." 

After  this  rather  apodictic  description  of  the  settlement  of 
the  "lineage  of  peace  "  on  the  lowlands  of  the  Nile,  he  goes 
on  somewhat  doubtfully: 


58  ANNAIS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

"  Naturally  we  do  not  know  how  the  lowland  races  of  antiquity 
became  politically  united.  But  the  union  might  very  well  be  due  to 
the  advance  of  the  nomadic  hordes  which  even  to-day  sweep  over  the 
plains  and  neighboring  deserts.  Certain  it  is  that  in  historical  times, 
as  well  as  in  prehistoric  Mexico,  tribes  of  higher  civilization  have 
been  united  politically  under  the  sovereignty  of  tribes  of  younger 
civilization;  among  whom  the  tribes  spreading  over  both  plain  and 
desert  must  doubtless  be  reckoned."* 

However  much  we  may  sympathize  with  Lippert's  theory, 
is  this  statement  of  the  facts  sufficient  to  convince  us  of  its 
correctness  ?  He  is  unable  to  explain  ' '  how  the  prehistoric 
lowland  races  became  united  politically."  We  should 
explain,  though  only  by  analogy  from  historical  experience, 
that  political  union  and  organization  were  in  all  probability 
due  to  subjection  by  the  "  sons  of  barbarism. "  This  is  not 
a  pleasant  explanation  either  to  Ljppert  or  to  us;  but  it 
seems  to  be  the  only  correct  one.  We  hold  that  sociological 
laws  prevail  unchanged  whether  we  have  historical  evidence 
of  the  fact  or  not.  Applying  I,y ell's  geological  methodf  to 
sociology,  we  should  say  that  the  "sovereignty"  of  the 
"rude  sons  of  barbarism  "  was  necessary  to  organize  the 
"  lineage  of  peace  "  and  to  cause  the  succeeding  development 
of  civilization.  As  Lippert  concedes  that  he  knows  no 
explanation,  he  should  not  take  it  amiss  when  we  say  that 
his  theory  is  simply  an  interpretation  of  the  facts  dictated  by 
sympathy  with  one  party  and  consequent  antipathy  toward 
the  other.  But  we  leave  the  question  unsettled.  It  is 
possible  that  in  some  lands  civilization  arose  from  the 
subjection  of  one  tribe  to  another  and  that  in  other  lands  it 
was  autogenetic  in  the  ' '  lineage  of  peace. ' '  However, 
autogenesis  is  contrary  to  the  experience  of  historical  times 
and  needs  to  be  established  beyond  a  doubt. 

This  indication  of  the  contents  of  L,ippert's  work  must 
suffice.  It  is  not  possible  even  to  trace  the  course  of  his 
investigations  into  the  development  of  the  priesthood,  much 
less  to  do  justice  to  the  many  historical  and  sociological 
questions  which  he  treats  from  new  standpoints.  He  is 
master  of  the  art  of  giving  life  and  artistic  shape  to  the 
sociological  material  which  others  have  collected;  with  that 
we  must  stop. 

*  "  Priesterthum"  Vol.  i,  p.  380. 

t  Cf.  "  Der  Rassenkampf''  pp.  172  et  seg.  [Lyell's  "  Principles  of  Geology  "has 
the  sub-title  "An  Attempt  to  Explain  the  Former  Changes  in  the  Earth's  Surface 
by  Reference  to  Causes  now  in  Operation."] 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  59 

Comte,  Spencer,  Bastiau  and  L,ippert  are  the  leaders  ill 
sociology.  What  others  have  done  is  of  secondary  impor- 
tance and  will  be  mentioned  incidentally  as  the  discussion 
proceeds.  But  we  must  speak  of  several  whole  branches  of 
science  which  concern  sociology  more  or  less  intimately  and 
co-operate  to  prepare  the  ground  for  it  in  various  ways. 

First  in  order  are  economics  and  politics,  in  which  it  was 
very  difficult  to  get  an  adequate  conception  of  society.  What 
Mohl,  Gneist  and  Stein  did  in  this  direction,  we  have  duly 
commended  elsewhere ;  *  it  is  only  necessary  to  recall  that  these 
scientists  conceived  society  to  be  preponderantly  economic. 
Especially  Stein  has  only  ' '  economic ' '  groups  of  men  in  mind 
though,  to  be  sure,  he  is  thinking  of  their  relation  to  the  state 
as  political  power  ' '  above  society. ' '  This  simple  economic 
conception  of  society,  partial  as  it  is  in  view  of  social 
questions,  pervades  political  economy  so  thoroughly  as  to 
make  it  in  common  speech  the  "social  science."  Carey's 
"  Principles  of  Social  Science,"  wherein  he  handles  political 
economy  simply,  had  the  same  effect.  Baerenbach,  in  his 
bibliographical  sketch  of  the  "  social  sciences,"  treats  politi- 
cal economists  chiefly,  noting  their  relation  to  the  "social 
questions ' '  in  particular.  Likewise  Menger,  discussing  the 
' '  Method  of  the  Social  Sciences, ' '  treats  the  method  of  po- 
litical economy  alone,  which  he  looks  upon  as  pre-eminently, 
xar'  i^oyyv,  the  social  science.  In  spite  of  this  narrowness, 
the  great  sociological  importance  of  political  economy  should 
not  be  overlooked.  It  was  the  first  science  that  recognized 
that  men's  actions,  which  alone  it  considered,  were  con- 
trolled by  economic  laws.  Seeing  that  the  regular  transi- 
tions from  one  economic  phase  to  another  were  determined 
by  external  factors,  political  economists  were  forced  to  accept 
the  idea  of  development  in  accordance  with  law.  What  is 
still  more  important,  political  economy  had  in  the  nature  of 
the  case  to  treat  not  individuals,  who  might  evade  every  rule 
and  law,  but  social  groups:  landlords,  manufacturers,  mer- 
chants, artisans,  laborers,  agriculturists,  etc.  So  political 
economy  became  the  best  fitting  school  for  sociology;  and 
economic  thought  led  the  way  to  sociological  thought. 

The  connection  between  political  economy  and  sociology 
nowhere  appears  so  prominently  as  in  Carey's  works.  But 
this  is  due  to  this  versatility.  His  field  of  view  extends  far 

*"  Philosophisches  Staatsrecht,''  sec.  12;   "  Rechtsstaat  und  Socialismus,"  sec.  15- 
22,  28. 


60  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

beyond  the  merely  economic  events  of  social  life.  The  man 
who  defended  the  unity  of  science  in  Comte's  sense  and 
strove  to  demonstrate  it  in  all  the  phenomena  of  life,  could 
not  be  content  to  consider  economic  events  exclusively.  He 
made  very  instructive  digressions  on  various  sociological 
matters.* 

The  socialists  also  were  pioneers  in  sociology.  They 
pointed  out  that  the  relations  between  the  laboring  and  the 
property  classes,  between  large  and  small  industries,  etc., 
develop  in  conformity  to  law.f 

Next  to  political  economy,  the  science  of  comparative  law 
has  accumulated  the  most  valuable  sociological  material  and 
awakened  the  most  fundamental  ideas.  Since  every  domain 
of  social  life  fashions  its  own  rights,  this  science  embraces 
the  whole  social  order  and  every  domain  may  be  considered 
from  its  point  of  view. 

Sporadic  attempts  at  scientific  comparison  long  since  dem- 
onstrated that,  among  the  most  various  peoples  of  ancient 
and  modern  times,  similar  rights  rise  and  develop  analo- 
gously to  a  degree  that  is  inadequately  explained  by  assuming 
historical  relationship  and  transfer  of  ideas.  We  have  seen 
how  Bastian  protests  and  offers  instead  an  explanation  based 
on  race-psychology.  In  any  event  reflective  comparison 
must  suggest  that  rights  develop  according  to  law;  and  from 
this  idea  it  is  only  a  step  to  a  "  Natural  Law ' '  and  a 
"Natural  Science  of  Rights, "J  as  Post  called  his  earliest 
writings.  In  them  he  presented  the  physical  idea  that ' '  the 
world's  history  is  the  unfolding  of  material  forces  b}'  the 
specialization  of  universal  types. ' '  But  as  he  worked  at  the 
problem  incessantly  year  after  year  he  emancipated  himself 
from  this  idea  so  that,  in  another  series  of  writings,  he  made 
a  very  objective  compilation  of  interesting  material  for  a 
comparative  science  of  rights.  §  The  subtitles  of  these  works 
are  characteristic  of  the  general  course  of  his  ideas.  While 
the  first,  in  1875  and  1876,  were  introductory  contributions 
to  a  "  universal  comparative  science  of  rights,"  he  offers  in 

*  "  Principles  of  Social  Science,"  Philadelphia,  1857-67,  3  vols.  Cf.  Stoepel's  intro- 
duction to  the  German  translation  of  Carey's  "  Unity  of  Law."  Berlin,  1878. 

t  Cf.  "  Rechtsslaat  und  Socialismus"  bk.  ii. 

\  "  Naturgeschichie  des  Rechts,"  1867;  "  Naturwissenschaft  des  Rechts"  1872.  Cf. 
"  Philosophisches  Staatsrechl,'1'  p  168  et  seq. 

fi  "  Geschlechtsgenossenschaft  der  Urzeit,"  1875.  "Ursprung  des  Rechts."  1876; 
"  An  fang  des  Staats-  und  Rechtslebens,"  1878;  "  Bausteine  fuer  fine  Allgemeine 
Recktswissenschafl,"  1880-81 ;  "Die  Grundlage  des  Rechts  und  die  Grundzuege  seiner 
En  twickelu  ngsgesch  ich  te,"  1 884 . 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  61 

1880-81  material  for  a  "comparative  ethnological  basis" 
for  the  science,  and  in  his  latest  work,  in  1884,  attempts  to 
construct  ' '  a  universal  science  of  rights  on  a  sociological 
basis."  Thus  we  see  that  from  all  sides,  ethnology,  politi- 
cal economy,  and  comparative  law,  scientific  ideas  tend 
toward  sociology  and  help  to  establish  it. 

However,  traces  of  his  ' '  physical ' '  views  of  the  science 
still  appear.  In  most  of  his  works  he  advances  the  idea  of 
' '  species-organism, ' '  an  order  of  structure  higher  than 
natural  organisms.  We  can  not  accept  any  such  idea, 
because  there  is  no  reality  behind  it;  but  we  shall  not  dis- 
pute with  him,  as  he  uses  the  term  less  and  less  frequently 
and  drops  it  altogether  in  his  latest  work. 

With  this  correction,  we  can  accept  his  views  of  the  devel- 
opment of  juridical  and  political  life.  "  There  are  definite 
laws,"  he  writes,  "for  the  development  of  every  organic 
structure  within  the  human  race  and  above  individuals," 
for  the  development  of  human  communities,  we  should  say ; 

"  and  they  can  be  discovered  by  comparing  the  corresponding  periods 
of  development  of  all  the  species-organisms  which  are  living  or  have 
lived  on  the  earth.  It  is  the  first  task  of  the  future  political  and  juri- 
dical science  to  determine  them."* 

He  distinguishes  several  phases  in  the  history  of  the 
"species-organism,"  the  first  of  which  he  calls  a  "  kith  and 
kin, "f  or  "peace"  confederation. 

' '  The  most  primitive  form  of  organization  in  the  life  of  the  human 
species  is  the  confederation  of  kith  and  kin,  a  number  of  men  leagued 
together,  on  the  basis  of  common  blood,  for  (?)  offence  and  defence." 

This  forcibly  recalls  the  "  social  contract."  We  should 
substitute  in  its  stead  the  simple  ' '  primitive  horde  ' '  as  the 
first  natural  recognizable  fact.  It  is  neither  an  "  alliance," 
which  implies  a  previous  state  or  act  of  separation,  nor  an 
"offensive  and  defensive"  alliance,  which  would  imply  a 
"  social  contract."  Yet,  with  a  slight  correction,  the  "  kith 
and  kin  ' '  confederation  might  stand  as  the  most  primitive 
social  formation,  if  Post's  statement  of  its  development  into 
higher  social  forms  could  be  accepted.  But  that  is  difficult, 
for  he  neither  explains  development  nor  shows  on  what  it  is 
based,  but  presents  it  as  spontaneously  following  an  inner 
law. 

*  "  Ursprung  des  Rechts"  p.  7. 

t  [Geschlechtsgenossenschaft=Tsiih  and  kin  con  federation. 1 


62  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

"  Every  form  of  organization,"  he  writes,  "  proceeds  from  this  and 
can  be  traced  back  to  it.  The  kith  and  kin  confederation  is  the  nor- 
mal form  of  organization  in  hunting  and  nomadic  races  and  by  growth 
from  within  outward  is  often  extended  beyond  the  narrow  circle 
originally  included  until  it  has  become  a  system  of  tribes  or  a  race 
with  institutions  considerably  developed." 

This  is  not  clear.  Such  development  never  takes  place  by 
'  'growth from  within  outward. ' '  Besides  Post  takes  no  account 
of  the  motives  and  factors  impelling  it.  "  When  the  kith 
and  kin  confederation  adopts  a  settled  life  its  old  constitution 
decays  to  a  certain  degree. ' '  *  How  it  becomes  settled  does 
not  worry  him.  ' '  It  takes  place, "  "  the  confederation  de- 
cays, ' '  he  says,  content  that  there  is  some  ' '  law  ' '  behind 
the  changes.  But  such  statements  are  unsatisfactory,  to 
the  sociologist  at  least.  Although  Post's  services  in  the 
domain  of  juridical  science  must  be  recognized  and  although 
he  has  industriously  collected  suitable  material  and  tirelessly 
incited  to  sociological  investigations,  his  treatment  of  social 
development  is  not  thorough;  it  shows  that  he  has  no  clear 
idea  of  what  social  development  is.  Even  his  latest  work 
on  the  ' '  Basis  of  Rights  and  the  History  of  their  Develop- 
ment, ' '  though  clearer  and  indicating  progress  in  every  direc- 
tion, is  still  unsatisfactory  on  this  point.  We  can  overlook 
his  old  hobby,  that  ' '  the  human  race,  like  every  organic 
race  on  our  planet,  constitutes  a  biological  organism;"  f  but 
we  must  reproach  him  for  retaining,  even  in  his  latest  work, 
the  fundamentally  false  views  of  social  development  criticised 
above,  especially  as  the  literature  of  the  subject  ought  to 
have  helped  him  to  make  many  corrections.  He  says,  e.  g. , 
that 

"a  number  of  individuals  descended  from  a  common  parent  or 
parents,  affords  a  nucleus  from  which  a  tribe  may  arise.  As  the  off- 
spring grow  up,  the  procreative  process  is  continued  and  the  tribe 
becomes  a  union  of  tribes.  After  a  number  of  generations,  we  speak 
of  a  race,  then  of  a  people,  then  of  allied  peoples." 

But  what  scientific  proof  does  he  offer  ?  The  same  naive 
idea  underlies  the  Biblical  story  and  leads  with  infallible 
logic  back  to  Adam  and  Kve.  Or  is  it  a  scientific  explana- 
tion of  development  to  say  that  ' '  with  the  decay  of  common 
tribal  life  the  mutual  rights  and  duties  of  the  individual 
members  are  differentiated,"  |  and  that  after  the  "gradual 

*  "  Ursprung  des  Rechts"  p.  u. 

f  "  Grundlagen  und  Grundzuege,"  p.  16. 

t  Ibid.,  p.  75. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  63 

decay  of  original  universal  common  life,"*  the  "human  in- 
dividual by  degrees  becomes  endowed  with  rights,  "f  which 
"  slowly  develop  in  times  of  peace."  J  These  are  simply 
vague  propositions  about  unclear  ideas;  consequently  they 
make  nothing  clear.§ 

But  we  must  be  grateful  for  the  material  which  Post  has 
accumulated,  in  spite  of  its  defective  presentation.  He  also 
deserves  full  recognition  for  tirelessly  disseminating  the  idea 
of  a  "  natural  science  of  rights  "of  a  "  comparative  ethno- 
logical science  of  rights,"  and  finally  of  "  social  science." 

He  conceives  the  social  problem  quite  in  Bastiaii's  sense 
however. 

"  The  great  fundamental  thought  of  modern  social  science  is  to  discover 
the  essential  nature  of  the  human  mind  from  what  it  has  deposited  in 
the  several  domains  of  race-life.  Sociological  jurisprudence  searches 
for  the  essential  nature  of  the  human  juridical  consciousness  in  what 
it  has  deposited  in  the  juridical  views  and  institutions  of  all  races  of 
the  earth." 

With  Post  as  with  Bastian,  the  "mind,"  "conscious- 
ness," is  the  primary,  the  world-moving  principle,  so  to 
speak,  the  object  of  all  investigation  ;  and  social  phenomena 
are  only  means  of  exploring  this  inmost  cause  of  all  that 
happens.  We  shall  soon  have  opportunity  to  demonstrate 
our  own  view  that  what  happens  of  natural  necessity  is 
primary  and  emits  ' '  mind  ' '  as  flowers  do  fragrance. 
"Juridical  institutions"  are  not  the  deposit  of  juridical 
consciousness.  On  the  contrary,  the  latter  is  deposited 
from  the  former.  History  begets  the  mind,  not  the  mind 
history. 

Political  economy  and  the  comparative  study  of  rights  and 
religion  concern  particular  domains  of  social  life  and  hence 
anticipate  parts  only  of  sociology.  There  are  other  branches 
of  philosophy,  however,  which  have  treated  the  supreme 
problem  of  sociology  itself,  or  at  least  its  most  important 
principle,  though  not  under  that  name. 

Here  we  will  mention  only  the  philosophy  of  history.  It 
treats  of  the  historical  development  of  mankind;  its  object 
is  to  seek  the  "philosophical  idea."  It  is  clear  how  close 

*Ibid.,  p.  76. 
t  Ibid.,  p.  83. 
\  Ibid.,  p.  87. 


oped  gradually 

done  with  sociology  at  once 


64  ANNAI.S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

it  approaches  to  the  supreme  problem  of  sociology;  and  the 
sociological  importance  of  its  literature  is  apparent  at  once. 

Pretty  much  everything  written  on  this  subject  before 
1876  is  summed  up  in  R.  Rocholl's  prize  essay.  Rocholl 
has  mastered  the  art  of  letting  all  the  philosophers  of  the 
world  speak  through  him,  while  he  betrays  not  a  single 
original  thought  to  the  acutest  reader.  A  whole  volume, 
and  nothing  original !  He  understands  how  prizes  are  won. 
Whoever  is  curious  to  see  all  that  philosophers  would 
interpret  into  the  history  of  mankind  should  read  this  book. 
It  makes  the  reader  dizzy;  or,  he  thinks  that  Rocholl  is 
exhibiting  a  fools'  gallery.  In  fact,  the  philosophy  of  history 
was  an  untimely  birth.  The  ' '  idea  in  human  history ' ' 
was  spoken  of  before  anyone  half  understood  what  human 
history  was.  For,  what  is  the  bit  of  Mediterranean  history 
compared  with  all  the  actual  history  of  man  on  this  planet 
which  the  philosophers  knew  nothing  about  ?  How  childish 
any  opinion  of  the  whole  when  they  knew  only  the  least 
part! 

Yet  the  stimulus  of  their  sociological  ideas  is  considerable. 
The  most  important  difference  between  sociology  and  the 
philosophy  of  history  is  that  the  latter  would  deliver  an 
opinion  on  a  whole  which  it  did  not  know;  whereas  sociology, 
being  aware  that  the  whole  can  never  be  known,  will  judge 
only  of  a  process  which  is  the  same  here  and  everywhere, 
which  transpires  in  the  same  way  to-day  before  our  eyes  as 
it  transpired  thousands  of  years  ago.  Sociology  declines  in 
advance  to  interpret  the  whence  and  the  whither  and  the 
wherefore.  This  is  its  claim  to  decided  pre-eminence  over 
the  philosophy  of  history,  from  the  ill  success  of  which  it 
learns  valuable  lessons. 

The  transition  from  philosophy  of  history  to  sociology 
was  more  direct  in  France  than  elsewhere.  In  Germany 
the  so-called  history  of  civilization  intervened.  The  history 
of  human  civilization  from  its  beginning  to  the  present  day 
is  almost,  at  least  might  easily  become,  sociology.  Kolb, 
Henne  am  Rhyn,  and  especially  Hellwald,  have  accom- 
plished much  in  this  field,  correcting  many  things  that  the 
philosophers  had  spoiled.  They  introduced  a  wholesome 
soberness  into  the  conception  of  human  development.  The 
indefatigable  Hellwald  makes  use  of  all  sorts  of  anthropo- 
logical and  ethnological  material,  extending  the  horizon  of 
the  history  of  civilization  even  to  the  ultimate  beginning  of 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  65 

prehistoric  time.  The  investigations  of  L,ubbock,  Tylor 
and  Caspari  in  this  field  are  especially  helpful;  and  in 
anthropology  and  ethnology  Waitz-Gerland,  Perty  and 
Peschel  have  contributed  their  share  of  valuable  sociological 
material. 

Thus,  there  is  no  lack  of  sociological  material,  and  Comte, 
Spencer,  Bastian  and  lyippert  have  imparted  the  breath  of 
life  to  sociology;  may  it  never  lack  for  disciples  to  labor  in 
it  and  cherish  it  unremittingly.* 

*  [For  a  sketch  of  the  sociological  writings  of  Gustave  le  Bon,  see  Appendix  A.] 


II.  FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTIONS. 

I.    THE  THREE  CLASSES  OF  PHENOMENA. 

It  is  an  old  saying  that  division  and  classification  are 
means  to  knowledge.  The  more  appropriate  the  means, 
the  greater  is  the  profit  that  may  be  expected  from  their  use. 
To  this  end  that  which  has  been  characterized  as  the  ' '  world 
of  phenomena,"  all  the  phenomena  that  surround  us,  has 
been  repeatedly  classified.  But  with  increasing  knowledge, 
the  plan  of  classification  has  to  be  changed  ;  deeper  and 
deeper  grounds  of  division  are  discovered,  approximating 
nearer  and  nearer  to  the  very  essence  of  the  phenomena.  A 
superficial  examination  served  to  distinguish  animate  from  in- 
animate nature.  According  to  another  very  common  classifi- 
cation, the  phenomena  that  were  perceived  by  the  organs  of 
sense  were  put  in  one  class  and  those  that  were  perceived  by 
the  mental  faculties  were  put  in  another;  the  former  were 
called  material,  the  latter  mental  phenomena. 

As  knowledge  advanced,  inanimate  nature  was  divided 
into  inorganic  and  organic.  Then  another  class,  composed 
of  phenomena  which  were  referred  to  the  soul  of  man  as 
source,  was  co-ordinated  with  the  organic  and  characterized 
as  psychic.  Thus  three  classes,  inorganic,  organic,  and 
psychic,*  were  obtained.  It  is  apparent  from  the  termin- 
ology itself  what  phenomena  are  included  under  each  class ; 
and  it  is  just  as  clear  that  this  classification  is  intimately 
connected  with  a  given  stage  of  human  knowledge,  with  the 
knowledge  of  the  distinction  between  inorganic  and  organic 
matter.  It  seemed  desirable  not  to  call  organic  matter 
simply  "inanimate  ;"  for  the  inorganic  inanimate  had  to  be 
distinguished.  But  there  was  also  a  growing  conviction 
that  all  of  man's  actions,  his  whole  behavior,  at  least  all  the 
phenomena  affected  by  him,  have  their  basis  in  a  soul 
(psyche)  which  is  found  in  man  and  is  peculiar  to  him.  If 
convictions  change  on  this  point,  if  it  is  discovered  that 
there  is  no  such  soul,  that  man's  thoughts,  and  the  whole 

*To  cite  one  example  among  thousands,  Ruemelin  in  his  essay  on  the  "Laws 
of  History"  ("Jfeden  und  Aufsaetze,"  neue  Folge,  p.  118)  speaks  of  the"  phenomena 
of  inanimate  nature,  of  the  organic  and  of  the  psychic  world."  We  shall  recur  to 
this  essay  later  in  another  connection. 

(66) 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  67 

of  his  so-called  spiritual  life,  is  only  a  manifestation  of  the 
physiological  functions  of  his  organism,  that  basis  of  classi- 
fication will  be  dropped;  the  psychic  phenomena  will  be 
included  with  the  organic. 

Thus  classification  is  a  means  of  promoting  knowledge; 
and  knowledge  acquired  is,  in  turn,  the  basis  of  new  and 
more  accurate  classifications.  But  it  often  happens  that 
phenomena  are  forced  upon  our  attention  which  we  cannot 
immediately  identify  with  any  class  hitherto  known ;  we  are 
not  sure  how  to  classify  them.  In  such  cases,  we  include 
them  in  some  class  already  constituted,  in  spite  of  the  differ- 
ences, or  we  make  a  sub-class  for  them;  or,  finally,  having 
found  some  characteristic  which  is  peculiar  to  them,  we  pro- 
ceed to  constitute  a  totally  new  class.  A  recent  instance  is 
furnished  by  the  "  social  "  phenomena.  It  was  observed 
that  they  differed  from  other  phenomena;  there  were  many 
reasons  why  they  should  be  recognized  as  a  special  class. 
But  nobody  knew  exactly  what  to  do  with  them.  They 
could  not  be  included  with  either  the  organic  or  the  inor- 
ganic; they  presented  the  characteristics  of  neither  the 
animate  nor  the  inanimate;  they  did  not  seem  to  be  purely 
psychic,  for  they  did  not  emanate  from  the  individual  soul; 
indeed  they  appeared  to  sweep  whole  aggregates  of  men,  in 
spite  of  will  and  consciousness,  along  with  them.  So  they 
presented  a  problem  of  classification,  the  solution  of  which 
was  attempted  in  various  ways. 

It  was  perceived  that  especially  those  phenomena  which 
are  manifested  in  the  state,  political  revolutions,  party  con- 
flicts, political  endeavors,  etc. ,  are  social.  Some  attempted 
to  class  them  all  with  "organic"  phenomena.  It  is  really 
so  comfortable  in  old  quarters,  where  everything  is  familiar, 
that  people  will  cramp  themselves  a  little,  if  necessary,  in 
order  to  avoid  the  trouble  of  moving!  Hence  arose  the 
"  organic  "  theory  of  the  state.  SchaefSe  has  shown  that 
all  the  so-called  social  phenomena  are  in  reality  nothing  but 
"  organic  functions  of  the  social  body,"  which  has  cells,  tissue, 
nerve,  muscle,  flesh,  bones  and  blood,  just  like  every  animal 
organism.  There  are  still  people,  not  only  in  Germany  but 
in  France,  who  accept  this  literally;  we  do  not. 

There  were  others  who  were  less  imaginative  and  more 
reflective,  yet  abhorred  the  overthrow  of  old  and  familiar 
arrangements  no  less  than  the  former.  They  represented 
that  everything  that  takes  place  in  connection  with  the  state 


68  ANNAI^S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

is  manifestly  done  by  man — for  who  else  could  do  it  ?  But 
whatever  man  does  issues  from  the  soul  within  him.  Hence 
social  phenomena  are  psychic.  To  be  sure,  a  social  occur- 
rence is  different  from  an  individual  thought  or  feeling.  But 
the  difference  can  be  disposed  of  by  making  a  sub-class, 
"psychic"  is  "psychic."  Thus  that  estimable  scholar, 
Ruemelin  (again  from  many  examples  citing  the  one  we 
have  first  at  hand) ,  treats  social  phenomena  as  psychic  and 
"social  laws  as  a  special  kind  of  psychic  "  laws.* 

But  we  can  no  more  consent  to  subordinate  social  phe- 
nomena under  the  psychic  than  we  can  to  reckon  them  as 
organic.  Rather  it  seems  to  us  proper  to  divide  the  phe- 
nomena which  we  perceive  into  three  classes:  physical, 
mental  and  social. 

We  classify  social  phenomena  apart  from  all  others 
because  the  ends  of  scientific  investigation  will  be  best  served 
by  treating  them  separatel)*".  They  constitute  a  unique 
group,  distinguished  by  several  fundamental  traits. 

It  is  certain  that  they  cannot  be  perceived  by  the  senses, 
and  there  was  thus  much  reason  for  reckoning  them  with 
mental  phenomena.  But  social  phenomena  happen  only 
through  the  co-operation  of  a  number  of  men,  of  an  aggre- 
gate; whereas  mental  phenomena,  strictly  so-called,  are 
inseparable  from  the  mind  of  the  individual.  They  originate 
in  it  and  are  limited  to  it.  Thus  all  conditions  of  the  soul, 
all  scientific  activity  and  each  artistic  manifestation  of  the 
human  mind,  all  works  in  art  and  science — so  far  as  the 
mind  perceives  them,  all  thoughts  and  ideas  which,  issuing 
from  the  human  mind,  are  perceived  by  the  mind,  are 
mental  phenomena.  But  all  relations  of  men  with  one 
another,  all  their  economic,  political  and  juridical  relations, 
for  example,  are  social.  A  number  or  aggregate  of  men  is 
their  distinguishing  trait.  It  is  not  necessarily  present  in 
mental  phenomena  in  the  real  sense,  but  without  it  a  social 
phenomenon  is  unthinkable. 

As  the  classification  of  phenomena  is  only  an  aid  to 
knowledge,  and  as  the  world  which  envelops  us  is  strictly 
one  and  unitary,  so,  it  is  conceived,  there  is  only  one 
science.  For,  as  we  have  shown  elsewhere,  f  the  object  of 
science  is  to  discover  the  laws  that  control  the  sequence  and 

*  "  Ueber  sociale  Gesetze,"  in  the  Tuebinger  Zeitschrift  fur  die  gesammten  Staats- 
wissenschaften,  1868,  pp.  1341  "8. 

t  "  Philosophisches Slaatsrecht."  Vienna,  1887,  sec.  I.  "  Rechtsstaat  und  Socialis- 
mus."  Innsbruck,  1881.  Part  i,  sec.  i. 


THE  OUTLINES  OP  SOCIOLOGY.  69 

the  development  of  phenomena.  Yet  the  division  of  science 
into  parts  devoted  to  particular  classes  of  phenomena  is 
common  and  has  been  recognized  as  proper.  It  satisfies  the 
need  of  a  division  of  scientific  labor.  The  division  into 
"natural"  sciences  and  "mental"  (or  moral  or  ethico- 
political)  sciences  is  the  best  known  and  the  most  usual.  It 
is  parallel  with  the  classification  of  phenomena  as  physical 
and  mental. 

The  natural  sciences  dealt  with  the  phenomena  of  organic 
and  inorganic  nature  and  with  the  physical  laws  governing 
them.  The  mental  sciences  sought  for  the  laws  controlling 
the  human  mind.  Then,  when  Comte  and  Quetelet  classi- 
fied social  phenomena  apart  for  scientific  study  and  asserted 
that  they  too  were  controlled  by  fixed  laws,  the  question  of 
defining  social  laws  arose.  It  was  not  easy  to  explain  what 
they  were.  Yet,  if  there  is  a  science  of  social  phenomena, 
if  there  is  such  a  thing  as  sociology,  we  must  be  able  to  give 
a  clear  positive  definition  of  social  laws. 

In  order  to  define  them  we  must  recall  what  a  natural  law 
is.  Applying  our  idea  of  a  natural  law  in  general  to  social 
phenomena,  we  shall  get  an  idea  of  what  a  social  natural 
law,  or,  briefly,  a  social  law  is  in  the  abstract.  Finally,  we 
shall  test  the  objections  commonly  raised  to  the  existence 
of  social  laws.  If  they  can  be  refuted  we  may  enter  the 
domain  of  social  science.  For  to  this  we  must  hold  fast: 
without  social  laws  there  can  be  no  social  science. 

When  we  find  the  same  phenomena  time  and  again  occur- 
ring together  or  in  the  same  order,  we  say  that  it  is  due  to 
a  law.  Obviously,  we  are  using  an  analogy.  When  an  act 
of  legislation  directs  how  a  thing  shall  be  done,  it  is  uni- 
formly done  in  the  prescribed  way.  When,  in  nature,  we 
see  a  phenomenon  repeatedly  occurring  in  the  same  form, 
we  conceive  that  it  is  the  result  of  some  higher  will  incorpor- 
ated in  a  "  law,"  and  we  speak  of  the  law  of  the  phenomena 
without  hesitation.  We  thus  acquire  for  a  series  of  phe- 
nomena an  easily  intelligible  expression,  a  simple  formula.* 

The  question  then  arises:  Can  such  laws  be  stated  for 
social  phenomena  also;  in  a  word,  are  there  social  laws? 
We  ought  to  answer  in  the  affirmative  if  there  are  social 
phenomena  which  constantly  occur  together  or  in  the  same 
order,  so  that  we  may  ascribe  them  to  an  hypothetical  higher 
will,  to  a  "law,"  as  we  do  physical  phenomena.  That  the 

*Mill,  "  System  of  Logic,"  Bk.  iii,  cap.  iv. 


70  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

mutual  deportment  of  social  groups,  the  formation  of  social 
communities,  their  development  and  their  decay  so  occur, 
history  and  experience  prove  undeniably.  Hence,  we  may 
direct  investigation  in  the  social  domain  with  a  view  to 
formulating  the  social  laws  of  those  phenomena. 

This  matter  is  so  simple  and  self-evident  that  there  would 
seem  to  be  no  need  of  wasting  any  more  words  over  it. 
But,  unfortunately,  it  is  not  acknowledged  by  everybody. 
The  formulation  of  social  laws,  i.  e. ,  natural  laws  of  social 
development,  is  violently  opposed  by  some  who  are  anxious 
to  maintain  man's  free-will  in  its  integrity.  For  it  is  feared 
that  a  death-blow  would  be  dealt  it,  if  natural  laws  of  social 
development  were  generally  accepted. 

The  struggle  between  these  two  principles,  whether  to 
apply  natural  law  or  free-will  to  social  phenomena,  is  well 
portrayed  by  Ruemelin's  experience.  His  candor  deserves 
special  recognition.  In  his  earlier  years  this  scholar  was 
inclined  to  accept  natural  law  in  social  phenomena  which, 
as  we  have  seen,  he  made  a  sub-class  of  the  psychic.  He 
expressed  this  view  in  an  academic  discourse  ' '  On  the 
Concept  of  Social  Law  "*  in  1868.  After  defining  natural 
law  in  general  to  be  "an  elementary  expression  for  the 
uniform  behavior  of  force  in  each  and  every  case,"  he 
questioned  ' '  whether  this  idea  of  law  which  is  taken  origin- 
ally from  the  processes  of  inanimate  nature  is  also  applicable 
to  the  processes  of  animate  nature,"  and  answered  in  the 
affirmative,  though  with  no  great  assurance. 

"  As  a  result,  we  have  found  three  kinds  of  forces,"  he  said,  "physical, 
organic  and  psychic;  no  other  kind  can  be  conceived  co-ordinate  with 
them.  Social  phenomena  are  a  sub-class  of  the  psychic.  There  are 
two  kinds  of  psychic  phenomena,  the  psychological  and  the  social." 

He  seems  to  concede  almost  without  reserve  that  the  phe- 
nomena of  political  economy  are  social.  Since  this  science 

"starts,  expressly  or  tacitly,  with  the  hypothesis  that  man  hasa  strong 
inclination  to  supply  himself  plentifully  and  at  the  least  possible 
cost  with  the  means  of  satisfying  his  desires,"  it  "  seems  quite  proper 
that  the  fundamental  propositions  concerning  competition,  the  move- 
ments of  prices  and  wages,  and  the  circulation  of  money  should  be 
called  laws.  They  fulfill  the  requirements  exactly.  They  indicate  the 
elementary  and  uniform  behavior  of  psychic  forces  in  a  mass  "  or 
aggregate. 

As  to  whether  the  so-called  statistical  laws  should  be 
recognized  as  social,  Ruemelin  has  serious  doubts. 

*•'  Ueber  den  Begriffeines  socialen  Gesetzes."     Tuebinger  Zeitschrifl,  1868. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  71 

"Psychology,"  he  argues,  "considers  the  psychic  forces  observable 
on  typical  individuals  to  be  characteristic  of  the  class  ;  social  science 
observes  the  same  forces  operating  in  aggregates  of  individuals  and 
notices  the  changes  thus  produced.  Hence  social  laws  should  express 
in  elementary  form  the  behavior  of  psychic  forces  in  aggregates." 

But  he  is  not  certain  that  statistical  laws  satisfy  these  con- 
ditions. Some  weighty  objections  prevent  him  from  recog- 
nizing that  everything  proclaimed  by  the  statisticians  to  be 
law  is  social;  and  he  is  right  perhaps.  He  sees  in  the  rea- 
soning of  the  statistician,  Quetelet,  especially,  "significant 
truths  and  serious  misunderstandings  compactly  woven 
together;"  and  in  that,  too,  we  will  agree  with  him.  He 
closes  his  "Search  for  Social  Laws"  unsatisfied.  "The 
return  was  not  great."  But  that  is  no  occasion  of  reproach. 
4 '  The  youngest  sciences  are  always  the  hardest, "  so  he  com- 
forts the  sociologists.  ' '  They  treat  problems  that  others 
had  quite  overlooked  or  had  not  the  means  to  grapple  with." 
He  has  the  "  highest  opinion  of  the  future  of  statistics,  of 
the  scientific  value  of  a  methodical  observation  of  facts,  if 
continued  and  developed."  In  short,  he  does  not  give  up 
hope  that  real  social  laws  may  thereby  be  discovered,  though 
he  does  not  conceal  his  misgivings.  This  was  in  1868. 

Ten  years  later  he  spoke  again  on  the  ' '  laws  of  history, ' ' 
and  described  the  observations  he  had  made  in  the  mean- 
while. The  riper  scholar's  disappointment  is  undisguised. 
The  hopes  he  had  cherished  a  decade  before  had  been  com- 
pletely dissipated.  The  serious  doubts  he  had  entertained 
had  been  fully  verified. 

"  I  thought  that  there  must  be  "  social  laws,  he  says  almost  sadly, 
"and  that  statistics  would  be  especially  helpful  in  discovering  them. 
I  have  had  the  task  constantly  in  mind  for  many  years  ;  I  have  sought 
for  them  not  simply  in  statistics  and  in  the  theory  of  society,  but  in 
history  and  in  philosophy  too.  I  have  fallen  upon  numerous  cases  of 
uniformity,  upon  rules  of  experience  of  comprehensive  import,  upon 
positive  causal  connections  ;  but  never  upon  any  thing  answering  to 
the  formula  for  a  law,  never  upon  proposition  expressing  the  elemen- 
tary, uniform  behavior  of  psychic  forces  in  an  aggregate." 

Then  he  explains  why  his  search  was  futile.  He  is 
' '  inclined ' '  to  believe  ' '  that  the  problem  was  not  properly 
stated  and  that  what  he  sought  is  not  susceptible  of 
being  found. ' '  The  ultimate  cause  of  failure  he  discovers 
in  the  fact  that  "  physical  and  psychic  phenomena  differ 
from  one  another  even  as  incomparable  quantities." 

"  Between  material  existence  and  motion  in  space  on  the  one  hand, 
and  feeling,  thought  and  volition  on  the  other,  there  is  a  chasm  which 


72  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

cannot  be  filled  and  has  not  yet  been  bridged."     Hence,  "  it  would  be 
strange  if  one  and  the  same  concept  of  law  were  applicable  to  both." 

Thus  we  see  Ruemelin  coming  again  in  his  later  years  full 
sail  into  the  sea  of  dualism;  and  it  ought  not  to  seem  remark- 
able that,  in  following  out  the  fundamental  opposition  be- 
tween mind  and  matter,  he  should  dispute  the  possibility  of 
law  in  the  province  of  the  former  since  "man's  free-will" 
prevails  there.  Then  come  the  old  arguments  on  the  old 
theme. 

"Whoever  denies  freedom  of  the  will  is  bound  to  show  natural  laws 
determining  will  and  excluding  choice.  It  is  said  by  some,  for  ex- 
ample, that  the  strongest  motive  must  of  necessity  determine  the 
human  will.  If  this  were  something  more  than  worthless  tautol- 
ogy (?);  if  it  were  only  explained  what  beside  the  will  could  make  a 
motive  the  strongest!" 

Strange  prepossession!  Why  should  not  external  circum- 
stances make  a  motive  the  strongest  ?  and  how  can  a  deus  ex 
machina  named  "will ' '  strengthen  a  motive,  i.  e. ,  an  external 
factor  ?  The  external  factor  works  with  the  force  inhering 
in  it  in  the  given  conditions  as  the  steam  does  in  the  locomo- 
tive. Must  the  will  still  mediate  that  the  force  of  the 
steam  may  overcome  the  force  of  inertia  ?  No  more  in  the 
case  of  man  is  this  putative  mediation  and  assistance  of 
will  necessary  to  strengthen  a  motive  which  is  in  and  of 
itself  the  stronger  already.  Man  differs  from  the  locomotive 
only  in  having  consciousness,  i.  e. ,  an  inner  sense  which,  like 
an  inner  eye,  sees  the  internal  processes,  becomes  conscious 
of  them,  observes  the  conflict  of  motives,  and  the  victory  of 
the  stronger.  In  common  experience  this  perception  is 
mistaken  for  free-will;  the  coming  consciousness  of  the  over- 
balance of  the  stronger  motive,  for  the  act  of  choice.  All 
this  was  long  since  known;  but  it  will  not  for  a  long  time 
yet  convert  the  adherents  of  dualism  and  free-will.  The 
force  of  mental  inertia  and  conservatism  cannot  be  so  easily 
overcome. 

Those  who  persistently  maintain  the  dualism  of  mind  and 
matter  cannot  possibly  accept  social  laws  in  the  sense  of 
natural  laws  of  social  development.  Hence  Ruemelin  is 
thoroughly  self-consistent  in  discarding  them  and  every 
"law  of  history,"  too.  He  is  perfectly  logical  when  he 
says: 

"  I  must  characterize  the  theory  as  self-contradictory  and  incompre- 
hensible which  imputes  to  the  individual  human  soul  freedom  of  the 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  73 

will,  in  the  sense  of  rational  or  irrational  self-determination  within 
the  broad  scope  of  given  natural  conditions(?),  while  necessity  is 
recognized  in  the  history  of  mankind  or  of  single  ages  and  peoples. 
Psychological  indeterminisin  and  historical  indeterruinisni  stand  and 
fall  together  ...  If  the  complex  aggregate  of  social  relations  into 
which  I  have  been  put  determines  all  my  thinking  and  doing  or  allows 
me  only  the  narrowest  scope  of  individual  independence,  it  is  of  no 
use  to  discuss  freedom  and  accountability  further.  But  if  I  am  able  of 
myself  to  initiate  new  series  of  operations,  to  mould  and  assert  myself 
in  spite  of  the  opinions  and  usages  of  others,  then  no  logic  can  prevent 
a  community  as  a  whole  from  acting  freely  and  striking  into  paths 
which  have  no  causal  connection  with  the  past.  Necessity  will  then 
signify  no  more  than  the  universal  limits  of  human  activity,  will  be 
restricted  to  the  unavoidable  influence  of  the  community  on  the 
individual." 

Persistence  in  the  traditional  dualistic  view  is  also  largely 
due  to  the  mistaken  idea  that  ' '  the  necessity  of  natural  law ' ' 
would  negative  ' '  conscience  ' '  and  all  rational  activity. 

"Or  we  are  told,"  says  Ruemelin,  further,  "that  the  will  is  deter- 
mined by  necessity,  being  the  product  of  two  factors:  the  concrete 
circumstances  and  the  individual  character,  which  is  itself  the  product 
of  inherited  faculties,  training  and  course  of  life.  If  conscience  and 
reason  are  included  among  the  inherited  faculties  and  it  is  conceded 
that  they  co-operate  in  their  way  in  the  act  of  willing,  the  answer  may 
be  accepted.  But  then  it  is  merely  a  quarrel  about  words  to  speak 
of  the  deterministic  character  of  natural  law  and  the  necessity  of 
willing." 

As  if  reason  and  mental  effort  could  not  be,  were  not 
actually  the  product  of  natural  processes!  As  if  we  could 
not  speak  of  the  natural  development  of  reason,  mental 
effort  and  will,  i.  e.y  of  mental  effort  the  product  of  motives! 

After  traversing  such  errors,  Ruemelin  reaches  the 
principle  which,  as  a  true  dualist,  he  believes  he  has 
"  established,"  viz.:  "  that  psychological  and  physical  laws 
are  wholly  different  in  form  and  nature  and  cannot  be 
expressed  by  the  same  formula. ' ' 

As  has  been  said,  the  logic  is  correct;  but  the  premise, 
free-will  and  self-determination,  is  false.  Possibly  Ruemelin 
is  justified  in  saying  that  the  constraint  exercised  by  society 
upon  the  individual  has  not  yet  been  demonstrated  to  him 
by  obvious  proofs. 

"  I  cannot  convince  myself,"  he  says,  "  that  investigation  into  the 
relations  between  society  and  the  individual  has  ever  led  a  single  step 
beyond  showing  an  intimate  and  universal  reciprocation  of  influences, 
in  which  each  is  giving  or  receiving,  active  or  passive,  all  the  time,  in 
varying  degrees." 


74  ANNANS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

But  insufficient  proof  does  not  alter  the  fact  of  unfree-will; 
and  it  would  better  have  -become  a  philosopher  to  take  the 
matter  in  hand  himself  than  to  assume  the  attitude  of 
defence  by  throwing  the  burden  of  proof  on  others. 

Had  Ruemelin  done  so  without  prejudice  (his  dualism 
greatly  embarrassed  him),  he  would  have  given  up  the  false 
premise  of  free-will  and  all  that  it  entails;  and  he  would  not 
have  discoursed  at  length  on  the  way  men  of  genius  make 
the  world's  history.  Such  things  should  never  have  been 
said  at  this  late  day  in  a  German  university,  and  by  a  lay 
professor.  The  standpoint  which  he  occupies  is  purely  and 
simply  theological. 

Dualism  of  mind  and  matter  is  a  fundamental  principle  of 
religion.  Religion  is  a  necessity  to  the  masses;  their  tem- 
perament demands  it.  So  free-will  and  self-determination, 
the  necessary  consequences  of  dualism,  are  integral  compo- 
nents of  every  religious  system;  and  we  have  no  thought  of 
combating  them  here.  Moreover  modern  philosophy  and 
modern  natural  science  have  spared  us  the  trouble  of  estab- 
lishing monism,  which  is  as  correct  and  true  as,  for  the 
temperament  of  most  men,  dualism  is  necessary.  We  are 
not  writing  for  this  majority.  They  may  leave  our  book 
unread.  We  turn  to  the  adherents  of  monism;  our  problem 
is  to  work  out  its  consequences  in  the  social  domain. 

2.    UNIVERSAL  LAWS. 

Modern  natural  science  has  successfully  demonstrated  that 
even  the  "human  mind"  is  subject  to  physical  laws;  that 
the  phenomena  of  the  individual  mind  are  emanations  from 
matter.  But  in  the  domain  of  social  phenomena  unchange- 
able natural  laws  have  not  been  completely  demonstrated. 
Between  "  mental  "  phenomena  subject  to  the  laws  of  mat- 
ter, and  the  social  world  strode  the  conception  of  human 
freedom  to  distract  and  confuse.  It  seemed  to  order  and 
control  social  relations  according  to  its  own  choice.  In  the 
domain  of  mental  phenomena,  in  the  narrower  sense  of  the 
word,  monistic  natural  science  has  in  part  demonstrated  the 
unconditional  sway  of  natural  laws  and  in  part  shown  the 
presence  of  other  factors  to  be  impossible.  Dualism,  driven 
from  this  domain,  has  retired  to  the  domain  of  social 
phenomena,  whence  it  must  be  dislodged.  To  this  task  the 
distinction  which  we  have  drawn  between  mental  and  social 
phenomena  is  essential;  for  it  is  an  old  rule  of  strategy  to 


THK  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  75 

divide  the  enemy  and  grapple  with  the  scattered  sections 
separate!}'.  The  critical  question  concerning  monism  is  the 
existence  of  universal  laws  valid  for  social  as  well  as  for 
physical  and  mental  phenomena.  If  such  laws  exist,  the 
monistic  theory  is  true;  if  such  laws  cannot  be  discovered, 
monism  is  an  unproven  hypothesis,  like  dualism. 

As  we  have  seen,  their  existence  is  hotly  denied;  and 
doubtless  the  earliest  defenders  of  monism  in  the  domain  of 
social  phenomena  gave  occasion  for  the  denial.  For  with 
great  zeal  and  less  discretion  some  thought  it  simply  neces- 
sary to  transfer  to  the  domain  of  social  phenomena  the  laws 
that  had  been  discovered  in  the  domain  of  physical  phe- 
nomena, the  laws  of  attraction  and  repulsion,  of  gravitation 
and  the  like.  Others  seemed  to  see  in  the  shapes  which 
social  phenomena  assumed  structures  similar  to  animal 
organisms  and  they  thought  that  the  laws  valid  for  the 
latter  might  be  accepted  as  valid  for  the  former  also.  We 
have  already  pointed  out  the  impropriety  of  these  assump- 
tions and  we  shall  criticise  them  more  in  detail  hereafter. 

But  in  spite  of  such  errors,  there  are  universal  laws  which 
prevail  alike  in  the  physical,  the  mental  and  the  social 
domain ;  and  the  existence  of  the  science  of  sociology  can  be 
justified  only  by  proving  their  existence  and  validity. 

Before  calling  attention  to  some  of  them,  we  must  answer 
another  question:  How  far,  in  general,  can  we  expect  to  find 
laws  common  to  phenomena  so  unlike  as  physical,  mental 
and  social  phenomena  are  ?  Plainly  we  ought  not  to  go  too 
deeply  into  the  characteristics  of  the  species;  for  where  the 
peculiarities  begin  the  common  traits  end.  Where  the 
physical  nature  commences  the  laws  common  to  the  mental 
and  social  domain  cease  to  apply. 

Of  course  it  may  be  objected  that  the  universal  laws  will 
be  taken  from  such  a  high  sphere  of  abstraction  that  every 
idea  beyond  the  concept  of  mere  existence  will  have  been 
sacrificed.  Such  laws,  though  easily  found,  would  lack 
significance;  and  we  shall  try  to  find  our  universal  laws 
close  to  where  the  three  classes  of  phenomena  become  differ- 
entiated, in  the  sphere  of  the  modalities  of  existence.  Hav- 
ing found  them  here,  we  shall  consider  our  task  complete. 
It  was  the  great  error  of  our  predecessors  that  they  sought 
universal  laws  in  the  lowest  sphere  of  one  class  alone,  even 
among  the  differentiated  physical  phenomena.  We  ought 
not  to  commit  the  same  error;  we  must  not  seek  to  generalize 


76  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

the  physical  laws  of  organic  life  and  extend  them  to  the 
domains  of  psychic  and  social  phenomena  as  they  did.  But 
we  may  and  indeed  must  discover  the  universal  laws  of  the 
modalities  of  existence  of  all  being.  We  must  be  satisfied 
to  possess  in  them  the  keys  which,  to  use  Bastian's  expres- 
sion, "  unlock  in  all  directions. " 

Let  us  now  proceed  to  give  examples  of  such  universal 
laws. 

(a)    The  Law  of  Causation. 

The  law  of  causation  is  just  as  true  of  social  as  it  is  of 
physical  and  mental  phenomena.  Every  social  phenomenon 
is  the  necessary  effect  of  anterior  causes.  No  social  phe- 
nomenon, originates  in  the  nothingness  of  individual  whims. 
The  principle  of  sufficient  cause  is  true  also.  Every  social 
phenomenon  whether  political,  juridical  or  economic,  must 
have  a  sufficient  cause  in  one  or  more  social  agencies.  The 
effects  must  also  be  equal  or  at  least  proportional  to  the 
energy  of  the  causes  alike  in  the  social,  the  physical  and  the 
mental  domain.  The  deed  of  an  individual  will  never  create 
a  social  condition  nor  change  it,  however  much  appearances 
may  deceive  us.  One  social  condition  is  produced  by 
another.  The  task  which  falls  to  the  writer  of  pragmatic 
history  is  to  point  out  the  true  connection  in  each  case. 

(U)  The  Law  of  Development. 

Parallel  with  and  perhaps  emanating  from  the  law  of 
causation  is  the  law  of  development.  Each  social  phenome- 
non is  a  momentary  phase  in  a  period  of  development; 
though  often  the  end  of  the  period  may  be  beyond  the 
reach  of  calculation.  Every  political  organization,  all  rights, 
every  economic  relation  suffers  change.  We  can  distinguish 
the  beginning,  the  process  of  growth  and  often  the  decline 
and  decay. 

But  of  course  manifestations  of  the  law  in  the  social  and 
in  the  physical  domain  must  not  be  confounded.  Cells, 
germs,  stalks  and  fruit;  or  eggs,  embryo,  lungs  and  digestive 
organs  can  not  be  found  in  social  formations.  Such  analo- 
gies lead  away  from  the  truth;  they  becloud  scientific  vision 
and  give  incorrect  results.  The  order  of  development  in 
the  social  domain  is  from  one  social  phenomenon  to  another. 

If  we  would  obtain  reliable  scientific  results  in  sociology, 
this  distinction  must  be  observed  rigorously.  No  digression 
to  manifestations  of  the  law  in  other  domains  can  be  allowed. 


THE  OUTLINES  OP  SOCIOLOGY.  77 

(c)  Regularity  of  Development. 

Development  does  not  in  and  of  itself  involve  the  idea  of 
regularity;  the  sequence  of  like  or  similar  phases  might  or 
might  not  be  uniform  in  all  cases.  But  actually  progress  is 
regular;  it  conforms  to  law  everywhere.  We  admire  the 
regularity  of  development  in  the  whole  compass  of  physical 
nature.  It  dominates  mental  phenomena.  It  is  found  to 
be  true  of  the  state,  of  rights,  of  political  economy,  and  of 
language  which  must  also  be  included  with  the  social 
sciences  since,  according  to  the  definition  given  above, 
language  is  a  social  phenomenon.  The  great  honor  of  dis- 
covering it  in  the  domain  of  social  phenomena  is  shared  by 
the  historical  schools  in  the  several  departments. 

(</)    The  Law  of  Periodicity. 

In  all  domains  of  phenomena,  regularity  of  development 
passes  into  periodicity.  Wherever  we  can  watch  the  whole 
process,  we  find  a  period  of  existence  extending  from  the 
origin  through  the  phases  of  growth  and  perfection  to  decline 
and  fall.  Of  course  the  manifestation  is  different  for  each 
class  of  phenomena.  Sap  flows,  the  trunk  grows  strong, 
the  organs  develop,  etc. ;  or,  thought  arises,  is  confirmed,  is 
spread  abroad  and  gains  consideration — then  loses  influence 
and  is  recognized  as  nothing;  or,  a  social  relation  arises  in 
small  proportions,  is  extended  over  larger  aggregates,  pro- 
cures ever  greater  recognition,  exercises  decisive  influence 
on  great  masses,  is  then  broken  up  and  supplanted  by  other 
relations  and  disappears  leaving  no  trace.  It  is  one  law 
valid  everywhere  and  universal. 

(tf)    The  Law  of  Complexity. 

In  physical  nature  we  always  find  the  elements  in  combi- 
nation, never  single.  Likewise  in  the  mental  domain  we 
meet  with  combinations  only.  Our  conceptions,  our 
thoughts  and  our  mental  powers,  too,  are  complex.  So 
also  are  all  the  social  phenomena  about  us.  They  are  struc- 
tures composed  of  simpler  parts.  Every  state,  every  peo- 
ple, every  tribe  is  complex  in  a  great  many  respects. 
Bvery  principle  of  right  is  a  composite  of  views,  concep- 
tions, ideas  and  principles.  Every  common  economic 
interest  is  made  up  of  conditions,  activities,  relations.  In 
every  language  there  is  an  endless  variety  of  philological 
elements. 


78  ANNAI<S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

But  further,  what  is  complex  may  be  analyzed.  Analysis 
of  physical  phenomena  will  give  the  elements  of  matter. 
Analysis  of  mental  phenomena  will  disclose  ultimate  con- 
cepts and  the  simplest  mental  functions.  In  the  social 
domain  it  leads  to  the  simplest  social  structures  thinkable, 
from  state  and  people  to  primitive  horde;  from  developed 
institutional  rights  to  the  beginning  of  actual  relations;  from 
the  most  complex  economic  interests  of  the  community  to 
the  satisfaction  of  the  simplest  needs;  from  a  literature  in 
the  fullness  of  bloom  to  the  simplest  expression  of  thought 
by  sound  and  gesture. 

(/")  Reciprocal  Action  of  Foreign  (heterogeri}  Elements. 

Another  result  of  complexity  is  that  phenomena  of  every 
class  show  the  reciprocal  action  of  foreign  (heterogeri) 
reacting  elements.  Although  there  is  an  endless  variety  of 
cases  in  each  particular  domain,  yet  the  law  seems  to  express 
the  first  and  most  important  impulse  to  development  in  each 
and  every  one  of  them.  The  significance  of  this  force  in 
social  processes  was  surmised  long  ago,  but  it  was  erro- 
neously interpreted  by  individualists  and  atomists  as  the 
reaction  of  man  upon  man  and  was  designated  as  love  or 
hate,  as  sociability  or  mutual  hostility  (bellum  omnium 
contra  omnes) .  The  error  in  this  conception  will  appear  as 
we  proceed.  Specific  reciprocal  influence  of  man  upon  man 
cannot  be  affirmed  in  a  universal  law.  What  holds  true 
between  man  and  man  in  one  group  is  not  necessarily  true 
in  another  group.  Here  it  may  be  love  and  sociability  and 
there  hate  and  thirst  for  strife.  First  one  and  then  the  other 
relation  was  assumed  to  be  normal  according  as  attention 
was  confined  to  one  group  or  directed  to  the  deportment  of 
group  toward  group;  but  neither  assumption  was  correct, 
because  neither  was  universal.  To  find  a  law  valid  in  all 
times  and  places  for  the  reciprocal  forces  inherent  in  social 
phenomena  we  must  take,  not  the  individuals,  but  the  social 
groups  as  the  elements.  Thus  the  law  of  the  reciprocal 
action  of  foreign  (heterogen)  elements  will  be  found  uni- 
versal. Social  groups  exhibit  reciprocal  effects  which  are 
fundamentally  the  same  always  and  everywhere;  they  arise 
from  the  same  exciting  causes  and  obey  the  same  law, 
though  manifested  in  various  forms  and  ways  according  to 
time,  circumstances  and  the  peculiar  qualities  of  each. 

A  more  specific  expression  for  the  universal  action  of 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  79 

foreign  (heterogeri)  bodies  upon  each  other  might  seem  desir- 
able, but  there  would  be  danger  of  getting  entangled  in 
empty  analogies  and  of  falsely  generalizing  formulas  valid 
only  in  special  domains  of  phenomena. 

Suppose  we  desired  to  speak  of  the  ' '  absorption  ' '  of  for- 
eign {heterogeri)  elements  as  a  general  principle.  Perhaps 
the  universal  law  is  manifested  in  this  way  on  much  of  the 
physical  domain.  But  it  is  not  so  manifested  in  social  phe- 
nomena. Applied  to  them  the  statement  would  be  an  empty 
analogy.  On  the  other  hand,  the  manifestation  of  this  law 
on  the  physical  domain,  especially  in  inorganic  and  vegetable 
phenomena,  has  been  described  as  a  ' '  struggle  for  exist- 
ence." Obviously  this  is  an  illustration  borrowed  from 
animal  and  social  phenomena.  It  does  not  describe  physical 
phenomena.  So  if  we  would  have  a  law  common  to  all 
domains  of  phenomena  we  must  modestly  be  content  to 
speak  of  the  reciprocal  action  of  foreign  (keterogen)  ele- 
ments. The  more  precise  statement  of  its  manifestation  on 
the  respective  domains  must  be  left  to  special  formulas. 

(£•)  Adaptation  to  an  Obvious  End. 

One  thing  might  be  affirmed  to  characterize  this  law  more 
precisely,  and  that  is  universal  adaptation  to  an  end, — 
though  in  a  very  definite,  technical  sense.  For  the  univer- 
sal effect  of  the  reciprocal  action  of  foreign  (heterogeri) 
bodies  is  to  favor  further  development  of  the  phenomena 
concerned;  which  ma3r  be  expressed  by  saying  that,  univer- 
sally, phenomena  in  this  state  are  adapted  to  the  end  of 
further  development. 

This  law  has  been  abundantly  demonstrated  throughout 
the  physical  domain.  The  botanist  knows  "  to  what  end  " 
the  leaves  serve  the  plant.  The  zoologist  knows  ' '  why  ' ' 
the  respiratory  organs  of  birds  and,  in  general,  "why" 
all  animal  organs  have  their  peculiar  qualities.  Among 
mental  phenomena,  also,  the  adaptation  of  means  to  the 
ends  produced  has  been  recognized  in  many  cases.  On  the 
social  domain,  to  be  sure,  the  law  is  much  questioned.  The 
more  warmly  it  is  defended  by  conservatives,  Manchester 
men,  and  optimists,  the  more  violently  is  it  opposed  by 
revolutionists,  socialists  and  pessimists.  But  on  one  point, 
at  least,  there  seems  to  be  no  dispute;  every  social  growth, 
every  social  entity,  serves  a  definite  end,  however  much  its 
worth  and  morality  may  be  questioned.  For  the  universal 


8o  ANNAI<S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

law  of  adaptation  signifies  simply  that  no  expenditure  of 
effort,  no  change  of  condition,  is  purposeless  on  any  domain 
of  phenomena.  Hence  the  inherent  reasonableness  of  all 
social  facts  and  conditions  must  be  conceded. 

(A)  Identity  of  Forces. 

The  reciprocal  action  of  foreign  (heterogeri)  elements  obvi- 
ously proceeds  from  forces  immanent  in  them  or  arising 
from  their  contact.  These  forces  never  change  their  char- 
acter. They  are  identical,  as  we  wish  to  say.  Those 
operating  in  the  domain  of  physical  phenomena  have  always 
been  the  same  that  they  are  now.  So  of  mental  forces; 
thought,  feeling,  volition,  each  has  moved  man  and  con- 
trolled his  actions  in  the  same  way  always.  Likewise  the 
social  forces,  the  causes  which  we  must  conclude  from  the 
effects  that  follow  on  the  social  domain,  have  ever  been  the 
same.  Thus  the  identity  of  forces  is  a  universal  law.  We 
encounter  it  in  every  domain  of  phenomena. 

(z)  Similarity  of  Events* 

A  necessary  consequence  of  the  last  law  is  the  perpetual 
similarity  of  events  on  all  domains  of  phenomena.  It  has 
long  been  recognized  of  physical  phenomena.  Nobody 
doubts  that  the  sun's  warming  powers  acting  on  moist 
ground  age  after  age  have  produced  and  always  will  produce 
the  same  effects  in  vegetation  that  they  produce  now. 
Nobody  doubts  that  ocean  waves  breaking  on  a  rocky  coast 
have  always  produced  the  same  effects  that  we  see  to-day. 
So,  too,  nobody  doubts  that  man's  mental  faculties  have  pro- 
duced the  same  effects  in  all  times  and  climes.  Always  and 
everywhere  men  feel  and  think  and  plan;  even  the  sensible 
products  of  these  mental  processes  are  the  same.  They 
differ  only  in  form  with  changing  time  and  circumstances. 
The  Kamtschatkan  sings  his  native  song,  and  so  does  the 
Frenchman;  thousands  of  years  ago  the  Chinese  thinker 
philosophized  just  as  did  more  recently  the  sage  of  Koenigs- 
berg;  the  architect  of  the  pyramids  projected  his  artistic 
plans  and  so  do  the  modern  European  artists.  Thus  the  per- 
petual similarity  of  events  in  the  mental  domain  is  obvious. 
But  people  are  much  less  conscious  of  similarity  in  the  social 
domain,  though  it  is  no  less  a  fact.  The  identity  of  social 
forces  could  not  be  discovered  because  individuals  instead  of 

*  Cf.  "Der  Rassenkampf,"  pp.  172  et  seq. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  81 

natural  social  groups  were  taken  to  be  the  true  elements  of 
social  phenomena.  But  when  the  true  social  forces  are 
recognized,  the  perpetual  similarity  of  social  events  must 
also  be  apparent.  Rights,  states,  languages,  religion,  etc., 
have  always  and  everywhere  arisen  in  ways  essentially  alike. 
Economic  events  are  controlled  by  the  same  forces;  they 
have  always  been  alike  in  essence,  though  often  differing  in 
form. 

(_/)  Law  of  Parallelism. 

In  every  domain  we  find  some  phenomena  which  are 
similar  but  we  do  not  know  the  ultimate  cause  of  their 
similarity.  In  the  physical  domain  such  phenomena  are 
ascribed  to  identical  forces  directly.  But  in  the  mental 
domain  the  tendency  is  rather  to  attribute  the  similarity  to 
some  alleged  connection  between  them;  and  in  social 
phenomena  it  is  considered  the  result  of  consanguinity  or 
of  some  historic  relationship.  But  actually  there  is  some- 
thing fundamental  at  the  bottom  of  all  these  similarities 
which  we  must  refer  temporarily  to  a  law  of  parallelism, 
since  we  do  not  know  more  precisely  what  it  is.  By  resort- 
ing to  this  law  we  guard  ourselves  against  obviously  false 
and  erroneous  explanations.* 

The  reason  why  parallel  physical  phenomena  are  referred 
without  question  to  identical  forces,  whereas  such  an  explan- 
ation of  parallel  mental  and  social  phenomena  is  anxiously 
avoided  as  long  as  possible,  is  partly  found  in  the  widely 
accepted  theory  of  monogenism.  The  descent  of  all  men 
from  Adam  and  Kve  afforded  a  very  plausible  explanation. 
But  if  it  is  rejected  as  too  absurd,  the  only  course  left  is  to 
refer  the  countless  mental  and  social  parallels  also  directly 
to  a  law  of  parallelism  common  to  all  domains  of  phenomena. 

The  existence  of  universal  laws  is  one  of  the  most  con- 
vincing proofs  that  the  whole  world  of  phenomena  rests  upon 
a  single  simple  principle.  It  is  a  weighty  argument  for  mon- 
ism, a  thorough  refutation  of  dualism.  Consideration  of 
these  laws  shows  how  untenable  it  is  to  refer  phenomena  to 
two  principles,  matter  and  mind,  since  the  modalities  of 

*"  According  to  the  psychological  axioms  of  ethnology,  when  cases  exhibitiug 
similarities  occur,  the  strictly  universal  and  elementary  laws  are  first  applied. 
When  there  is  no  further  possibility  of  finding  the  explanation  in  them  recourse 
is  had  to  such  historic  relationships  as  can  be  established.  But  the  daily  swell- 


, 
sckichte  der  Ethnologic"  p.  91. 


82  ANNAI^S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

existence  are  the  same  for  all  and  point  to  one  simple  prin- 
ciple only.  Whether  it  be  called  nature,  or  God,  or  the 
great  unknown  world-moving  principle  matters  not.  We 
have  presentiments  that  it  is  omnipotent,  omnipresent,  per- 
haps even  omniscient.  But  we  are  not  in  condition  to 
know  its  essence.  Since,  however,  there  are  laws  which 
are  universally  prevalent  and  valid,  we  must  conclude  that 
this  one  principle  pursues,  so  to  say,  a  consequent  and  self- 
consistent  policy;  that  it  reveals  itself  always  and  every- 
where in  the  same  form  and  in  the  same  character  for  all 
kinds  of  phenomena.  This  necessary  conclusion  is  of 
unending  significance  to  science. 

3.    CONCEPT,    FUNCTION,    SCOPE   AND    IMPORTANCE  OP 
SOCIOLOGY. 

It  is  almost  unnecessary  to  remark  that  universal  laws 
like  these  are  not  a  priori  cognitions  but  the  result  of  an 
exhaustive  examination  of  all  spheres  of  phenomena,  induc- 
tions obtained  by  long  mental  exertion.  In  propounding 
them  at  the  beginning  of  our  discussion,  we  are  reversing 
the  natural  order  of  cognition,  to  be  sure;  but  this  provi- 
sional anticipation  of  the  results  of  an  investigation  is  simply 
didactic  strategy. 

These  universal  laws  govern  phenomena  of  all  kinds,  it 
has  been  said.  But  for  each  particular  kind  they  are 
manifested  in  a  particular  way.  We  might  call  this  quality 
of  special  adaptation  their  "  specific  energy."  An  example 
will  make  the  thought  clear.  Adaptation  to  an  obvious  end 
is  a  universal  law.  It  is  manifested  in  plants  by  the  equip- 
ment of  the  several  organs  and  the  manner  of  their  growth; 
and  the  botanist  is  able  to  formulate  a  whole  series  of 
special  laws  for  plants.  In  the  social  domain  the  same  law 
will  be  manifested  differently.  For  example,  a  horde,  before 
starting  on  a  raid,  will  organize  by  choosing  a  leader;  and 
other  illustrations  may  be  given.  Hence  the  sociologist  may 
speak  of  special  social  laws  to  designate  the  adjustment  of 
universal  laws  to  the  peculiar  nature  and  conditions  of  social 
phenomena.  Obviously  special  laws  will  be  more  numerous 
than  universal;  for  the  latter  generalize  the  conditions 
common  to  all  phenomena,  whereas  the  former  take  account 
of  those  common  to  small  numbers  of  phenomena. 

The  function  of  sociology  consists  in  showing  that 
universal  laws  apply  to  social  phenomena;  in  pointing  out 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  83 

the  peculiar  effects  produced  by  them  in  the  social  domain, 
and  finally  in  formulating  the  special  social  laws. 

As  we  have  to  deal  with  social  phenomena  exclusively  in 
what  follows,  we  must  get  a  clear  idea  of  what  they  are;  we 
must  distinguish  the  domain  of  social  phenomena  from  every 
other;  we  must  explore  it  and  learn  the  most  important 
groups  upon  it.  In  so  doing  we  shall  come  in  contact  with 
the  special  sciences  which  are  occupied  with  the  special 
groups  and  which  are  very  properly  designated  the  "  social 
sciences  "  in  general. 

By  social  phenomena  we  mean  the  phenomena  which 
appear  through  the  operation  of  groups  and  aggregates  of 
men  on  one  another.  The  aggregates  are  the  social  elements. 
We  must  assume  that  the  simplest  and  the  original  social 
elements  were  primitive  hordes,  of  which,  for  reasons  that 
have  been  explained  elsewhere,*  there  must  have  been  a 
great  number  in  remote  antiquity. 

The  combinations  of  the  simple  social  elements  into  greater 
associations:  tribes,  communities,  peoples,  states  and  nations, 
are  just  so  many  social  phenomena.  There  are  also  psycho- 
social  phenomena,  such  as  language,  customs,  rights, 
religion,  etc.,  arising  from  the  action  of  social  elements 
with  or  upon  the  individual  mind. 

The  province  of  sociology  embraces  them  all.  Sociology 
must  investigate  them  and  show  the  social  laws  of  their 
development.  Many  groups,  it  is  true,  have  been  isolated 
and  made  the  subject-matter  of  independent  sciences.  But 
that  should  not  hinder  sociology  from  subjecting  them  to  a 
new  examination  from  the  standpoint  of  social  science, 
especially  since  they  have  generally  been  studied  from  an 
individualistic  standpoint.  Sociology  should  make  their 
social  origin  and  development  perfectly  clear. 

It  has  just  been  said  that  mankind  is  the  substratum  of  all 
social  phenomena;  hence,  it  is  the  real  subject-matter  of 
sociology.  But  it  is  clear  that  the  character  of  the  science 
will  be  determined  ultimately  by  our  conception  of  the 
natural  history  of  mankind.  According  as  our  conception 
is  correct  or  false  will  sociology  be  a  success  or  a  failure. 
The  smallest  mistake  in  the  beginning  will  avenge  itself  in 
hundred  and  thousand  fold  greater  errors  in  the  end. 

Hitherto  a  very  gross  misconception  has  prevailed  in 
social  science  concerning  the  natural  history  of  mankind. 

*  Cf.  "  Der  Rassenkampf,''  p.  56  et  seq. 


84  ANNAIvS   OF   THE   AMERICAN    ACADEMY. 

The  character  of  human  phenomena  has  been  completely 
falsified  by  conceiving  mankind  to  be  genealogically  a 
unitary  genus,  by  supposing  lineal  descent  from  a  common 
stock,  and  explaining  varieties  of  race  and  type  as  successive 
offshoots  from  it.  This  fundamental  misconception  set  the 
whole  social  science  on  the  wrong  track.  Not  only  were  all 
right  points  of  view,  resulting  from  the  fact  of  original 
plurality  and  variety  of  races,  lost  from  consideration,  but 
many  false  ones  were  presented  which  produced  nothing  but 
errors. 

Closely  connected  with  this,  indeed  resulting  from  it,  is 
another  error.  It  was  conceived  that  culture  and  social 
relations  generally,  whether  of  mankind  or  of  particular 
peoples,  develop  spontaneously  as  a  plant  or  animal  develops. 
It  was  conceived  that  one  and  the  same  group  passed  through 
different  stages  of  culture,  from  the  hunting  stage  to  the 
pastoral,  to  the  agricultural,  to  warrior  life  and  so  on  down 
to  industrialism  by  simple  transitions  in  virtue  of  an  inner 
law  and  tendency  to  develop.  But  the  law  of  persistence 
applies  to  social  groups  as  much  as  it  does  to  anything  else 
in  nature.  Social  groups  persist  in  their  actual  social  condi- 
tion and  cannot  be  made  to  ' '  pass  ' '  into  another  without 
adequate  social  cause. 

Therefore,  we  must  remember  not  only  that  contiguous 
groups  are  diverse  in  origin,  but  also  that  they  have  been 
undergoing  different  courses  of  development.  We  must 
also  remember  that  every  social  group  persists  in  a  given 
condition  until  forced  out  of  it  and  into  another  through  the 
action  of  some  other  group,  and  such  action  is  pre-eminently 
called  social. 

In  other  words,  each  alteration  in  the  social  condition  of 
a  group  must  always  have  a  sufficient  social  cause,  which  is 
always  the  influence  of  another  group.*  This  is  a  law,  and 
can  be  amply  illustrated  from  history  and  experience.  An 
important  proposition  for  the  methodology  of  sociology 
follows  from  it,  viz. ,  whenever  an  alteration  in  the  condition 
of  a  group  is  perceived  we  should  inquire  what  influences 
exerted  by  another  group  produced  it.  It  follows,  also, 
that  a  rapid  and  varied  development  and  frequent  social 
changes  occur  only  under  the  continual  reciprocal  influence 
of  many  foreign  (heterogen)  groups,  that  is,  in  states  and 
systems  of  states. 

*[Und  ein  solcher  [zureichender  Grand]  liegt  immer  in  der_  Einwirkung  seittns 
einer  anderen  Gruppe,  f.  e.,  the  influence  of  another  group  is  the  only  sufficient 
social  cause. 1 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  85 

This  brings  us  very  close  to  the  definition  of  a  social 
event  or  process.  When  two  or  more  distinct  {heterogen} 
groups  come  in  contact,  when  each  enters  the  sphere  of  the 
other's  operations,  a  social  process  always  ensues.  So 
long  as  one  unitary,  homogeneous  group  is  not  influenced  by 
or  does  not  exert  an  influence  upon  another  it  persists  in 
the  original  primitive  state.  Hence,  in  distant  quarters 
of  the  globe,  shut  off  from  the  world,  we  find  hordes  in  a 
state  as  primitive,  probably,  as  that  of  their  forefathers  a 
million  years  ago.  Here,  very  likely,  we  are  dealing  with 
an  elementary,  primitive,  social  phenomenon  or,  better,  with 
a  social  element,  but  not  with  a  social  process  nor  with 
social  change. 

But  as  soon  as  one  group  is  exposed  to  the  influence  of 
another,  the  interplay  of  mutual  forces  ensues  inevitably  and 
the  social  process  begins.  When  two  distinct  (Jietcrogen} 
groups  come  together,  the  natural  tendency  of  each  is  to  exploit 
the  other,  to  use  the  most  general  expression.  This,  indeed, 
is  what  gives  the  first  impulse  to  the  social  process.  This 
tendency  is  so  inherent  in  every  human  group,  so  natural 
and  indomitable,  that  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  of  groups 
coming  together  without  displaying  it,  without  generating 
the  social  process. 

The  course  of  the  process  depends  upon  the  natural  con- 
stitution of  ' '  mankind  ' '  and  the  tendencies  peculiar  to  all 
human  hordes  and  social  communities.  Since  these  factors 
differ  only  as  one  individual  or,  at  most,  one  species  from 
another  and  everywhere  exhibit  the  same  generic  character- 
istics the  process  is  essentially  the  same  everywhere. 

True,  the  human  race  is  composed  of  an  endless  variety 
of  species;  the  different  hordes  and  tribes  are  combined  in 
many  ways  and  produce  a  variety  of  social  formations  or 
collective  entities  which  in  turn  act  upon  one  another;  even 
the  influence  of  time  and  place  yields  a  diversity  of  effects: 
so  that  the  social  process  nevertheless  presents  endless 
variety  and  individuality  of  development.  But  the  differ- 
ences are  transient  and  local.  It  is  the  task  of  sociology — 
and  by  no  means  an  easy  one — in  the  midst  of  diversity  to 
find  the  controlling  social  laws,  to  explain  the  miscellaneous 
variety  of  social  development  by  the  simplest  forces  in  opera- 
tion and  to  reduce  the  countless  shapes  it  assumes  to  a 
simple  common  denominator. 

All  social  laws,  indeed  all  universal  laws  as  well,  have  one 
characteristic  in  common:  they  explain  the  becoming,  but 


86  ANNAI,S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

never  the  beginning  of  things,  the  ultimate  origin.  This 
limitation  must  be  insisted  upon  the  more  emphatically  since 
the  human  mind  is  given  to  inquiring  after  the  genesis  of 
things.  It  desires  knowledge  of  the  first  arising,  the  ulti- 
mate origin — a  tendency  fatal  to  science;  whereas  with  all 
the  laws  cognizable  it  can  apprehend  only  the  perpetual 
becoming. 

Hence  none  of  the  questions  about  the  ultimate  origin  of 
human  associations  belong  in  sociology,  if  indeed  they 
belong  in  any  science  whatever  !  Sociology  begins  with  the 
countless  different  social  groups  of  which,  as  can  be  irrefut- 
ably proven,  mankind  is  constituted.  The  question  how 
they  came  to  be  does  not  belong  within  its  forum. 

As  we  begin  by  limiting  sociological  discussion  to  the 
becoming  of  things,  excluding  discussion  of  ultimate  origin, 
may  we  be  allowed  to  point  out  that  the  discoveries  which 
are  recognized  as  the  greatest  achievements  of  science  all  lie 
in  the  same  field.  The  Copernican  discovery  applies  only 
to  the  motion  of  the  planets  in  their  orbits,  without  inquiring 
how  they  came  to  exist.  Harvey  discovered  the  circulation 
of  the  blood,  a  process  continually  going  on  under  our 
observation.  And  we  certainly  do  the  great  Englishman  no 
wrong  in  expressing  the  opinion  that  when,  centuries  later,  the 
problem  of  the  ' '  origin  of  man ' '  shall  have  long  since  been 
laid  aside,  his  investigation  into  the  laws  of  the  becoming, 
into  the  ' '  struggle  for  existence, "  ' '  adaptation ' '  and  ' '  hered- 
ity," must  still  be  lauded  as  an  imperishable  service  to 
science. 

We  are  unwilling  to  close  this  section  without  emphasiz- 
ing the  importance  of  the  knowledge  of  social  laws  to 
historians  and  statesmen. 

The  view  that  history  can  be  raised  to  the  level  of  a  science 
only  by  taking  account  of  the  natural  and  social  laws  of 
development  is  still  violently  opposed  though  the  reasons  for 
it  have  been  presented  many  times.  We  could  cite  innu- 
merable examples  to  show  how  very  much  history  has 
suffered  from  ignorance  of  social  laws  on  the  part  of  the 
most  eminent  historians.  The  most  common  error,  one  into 
which  almost  every  historian  has  fallen,  especially  if  he  is 
treating  of  a  single  nation,  is  to  regard  the  phenomena  as 
peculiar  to  one  people;  whereas  did  he  know  social  laws  he 
would  recognize  that  they  are  more  general. 

How  long  is  it  since  in  every  history  of  Germany,  in  every 


THE;  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  87 

treatise  on  the  philosophy  of  German  history,  political  par- 
ticularism was  ascribed  to  an  individualizing  tendency  inher- 
ent in  the  German  people  ?  Particularism  was  considered  a 
virtue  in  its  day.  But  Prince  Bismarck  has  thoroughly 
counteracted  the  tendency  and  violently  disputes  its  virtue.* 
If  the  writers  were  not  so  absorbed  in  one  aspect  of  their 
subject,  if  they  considered  the  laws  governing  all  historical 
changes,  they  would  recognize  that,  as  a  universal  fact, 
periods  of  disintegration  and  particularization  alternate  with 
periods  of  integration.  If  they  recognized  that  periodicity 
of  development  is  a  natural,  necessary  and  universal  law 
they  would  come  nearer  to  the  truth  of  many  matters, 
their  results  would  gain  in  scientific  value. 

Or  what  shall  be  said  when  a  distinguished  historian  like 
Curtius  writes:  "The  acquisitive  impulse  deeply  inherent 
by  nature  in  the  Greeks,  excited  them  at  an  early  period  to 
a  many  sided  activity."f  Is  this  tendency  natural  to  the 
"Greeks  "  alone?  What  of  the  "Semites,"  of  whom  Cur- 
tius relates  that  ' '  the  Greeks  cherished  a  national  hatred 
against  them! ''I  Was  the  "acquisitive  tendency"  less 
' '  deeply  inherent  by  nature  ' '  in  them  ?  or  had  it  ' '  excited/ ' 
them  less  "  to  a  many  sided  activity?"  Or  why  did  the 
Spaniards  go  to  America,  the  English  and  Dutch  to  India, 
if  not  to  "get  gain?"  Have  we  not  here  a  general  social 
phenomenon  and  a  general  social  law?  and  is  it  not  a  scien- 
tific error  to  consider  general  social  phenomena  peculiar  to  the 
people  among  whom  they  have  been  accidentally  recognized  ? 

Take  another  example  from  Curtius: 

"According  to  the  usual  conception  of  the  Greeks,  who  felt  the  need 
of  assuming  an  author  for  every  great  historical  work,  without  caring 
to  distinguish  what  had  previously  existed  from  what  subsequently 
ensued,  the  whole  political  system  was  regarded  as  the  legislation 
of  lyycurgus.  "§ 

But  to  ascribe  to  a  single  legislator  the  creation  of  a  body 
of  juridical  and  political  regulations  which  have  been 
accumulating  for  centuries  is  not  peculiar  to  the  Greeks. 
It  is  a  psycho-social  phenomenon  common  to  all  peoples ; 
and  will  not  truth  and  science  suffer  if  no  account  is  taken 
of  the  fact  ? 

*  \Nun,  Fuerst  Bismarck  hatdiesen.  .  .  Individualisirungstricb  gruendlich  ausgc- 
trieben  (sic)  und gehtihm  noch  immer  gewaltig  an  den  Lezb.] 

t"The  History  of  Greece."  Translated  by  Ward.  Bk.  i,  p.  15;  Cf.  "Griech- 
ische  Geschichte."  6th  Edition,  Vol.  i,  p.  123. 

I  Curtius- Ward,  op.  cit.,  p.  59  ;   Cf.   Curtius,  op.  cii.,  Vol.  i,  p.  44. 

g  Curtius-Ward,  op.  cit.,  Bk.  i,  p.  208  ;   Curtius,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  i,  p.  44. 


88  ANNAI<S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

How  much  the  science  of  history  will  improve  when  his- 
torians discern  that  all  the  alleged  individual  peculiarities  of 
the  peoples  they  describe  are  manifestations  of  general  social 
and  psycho-social  laws !  Similar  examples  of  false  and 
narrow  views  could  be  cited  without  number  from  the  best 
historians.  But  we  prefer  to  give  in  precise  terms  the  general 
cause  of  error  in  the  conception  of  historical  phenomena. 

It  is  asserted  that 

"history,  however  it  may  be  defined  and  classified,  will  never  be 
reduced  to  a  bare  natural  science  or  sociological  discipline.  For  it  is 
not  simply  the  product  of  telluric  and  anthropological  natural  forces 
and  the  momentum  of  social  masses.  There  is  a  third  factor,  the 
power  of  individuality,  which  is  not  susceptible  of  calculation  by  the 
rules  of  either  natural  science  or  sociology."* 

In  so  far  as  individuals  are  concerned,  to  be  sure,  history 
can  proceed  "neither  like  natural  science  nor  sociology." 
But  in  so  far  as  history  portrays  the  individual  it  is  pure 
art.  For  art  deals  only  with  individuals,  in  contrast  with 
science  which  deals  with  what  is  universal,  what  accords 
with  law  and  is  schematic.  The  individual  might  be 
typical;  nevertheless  the  historian  is  generally  in  error  if 
he  thinks  that  he  finds  anything  individualistic  in  the  his- 
tory of  a  people,  a  nation  or  a  tribe,  or  in  the  actions  of 
social  groups,  however  considered.  Only  single  personali- 
ties are  properly  individualistic;  when  treating  them  the 
historian  may  yield  to  his  artistic  impulses.  But  when  he 
has  collective  wholes  to  present,  where  he  has  to  show  how 
they  live  and  move,  the  effort  to  "  individualize  "  is  short- 
sighted and  erroneous;  the  science  of  history  can  and  should 
"proceed  according  to  the  rules  of  both  natural  science  and 
sociology."  For  the  behavior  of  collective  entities  is  deter- 
mined by  ' '  natural  and  sociological ' '  laws  and  not  by  the 
motives  and  natural  qualities  of  individuals. f  It  will  be 
some  time  before  this  is  realized;  but  the  recognition  will 
come  only  through  sociology. 

Important  as  sociology  is  for  historians,  its  significance  in 
politics  is  greater  still.  For  though  hitherto  politics  has 
not  been  reckoned  a  science  at  all  sociology  will  give  it  a 
scientific  character. 

•I  may  certainly  be  allowed  to  cite  as  typical  of  the  opinion  of  historians  in 
general  the  objections  made  to  "history  as  a  natural  science"  bv  the  distinguished 
R.  von  Krones,  in  reviewing  "Der  Rassenkampf."  The  prevalent  conception  of 
the  task  of  historical  composition  could  not  be  defended  more  forcibly  than  it  is 
done  in  the  words  quoted. 

t  \Individuelle  Motive  und  BeschaffienkeiUn.'} 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  89 

At  present  politics  is  strife  after  power.  Each  state,  party 
and  faction,  every  man  even,  is  striving  after  power  with  all 
the  means  at  command.  Material  means  are  supplemented 
with  as  cogent  reasons  as  possible.  Such  reasons  and  argu- 
ments are  called  the  theory  of  politics.  But  where  is  the 
criterion  of  their  correctness  ?  From  the  standpoint  of  suc- 
cess, when  the  fact  has  been  accomplished,  the  policy  which 
succeeded  is  recognized  as  right.  Yet  it  is  not  so  much  ideas 
and  arguments  as  greater  might  that  makes  the  project  pros- 
perous. So  ultimately ,  greater  might  is  the  better  policy — 
as  things  stand  now. 

Sociology  must  give  quite  another  turn  to  politics;  though, 
indeed,  it  will  develop  political  science  rather  than  practical 
politics.  That  is  to  say,  the  social  laws  which  sociology  is 
to  formulate  from  its  observations  on  the  processes  of  history 
include  also  the  laws  of  the  development  of  political  life. 
When  they  shall  have  been  correctly  formulated  from  the 
past,  they  must  be  verified  in  the  present  and  the  future. 
They  must  control  the  course  of  political  development  now 
and  hereafter  as  unequivocally  as  they  have  hitherto.  But 
when  reliable  laws  have  been  formulated,  political  machina- 
tions, tavern  politics  and  ignorant  gossip  will  give  place  to 
political  foresight  and  sober  calculation  based  upon  positive 
sociological  knowledge. 

These  words  will  provoke  a  sceptical  smile — and  certainly 
not  without  some  reason.  Similar  promises  have  often 
proved  to  be  vain  talk  if  not  charlatanry  even;  and  iisually 
people  who  talk  of  calculating  future  politics  scientifically 
are  not  taken  seriously,  Did  not  Auguste  Comte  speak  of 
a  politique  positive,  a  positive  science  of  politics,  which, 
"  instead  of  pronouncing  absolute  judgment  and  suggesting 
ameliorations,"  should  rather  create  "a  body  of  scientific 
conceptions  such  as  has  never  been  outlined  nor  even  sus- 
pected by  any  philosopher  before?"  Yet  how  many  false 
and  erroneous  notions  he  held !  And  Thomas  Buckle!  How 
little  he  recognized  the  truth  about  the  development  of 
political  relations  in  modern  times!  Claiming  to  have 
obtained  final  cognition  of  the  "laws  of  history,"  he 
prophesied  cessation  of  war  and  universal  perpetual  peace, 
yet  how  has  his  prophecy  been  verified  ? 

In  one  point,  however,  the  old  sociologists  were  clearly 
right.  With  presentient  mind  they  suspected  the  existence 
of  social  laws  and  asserted  the  possibility  of  a  social  science. 


90  ANNAI^  OP  THE;  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

It  is  true  they  did  not  pass  the  point  of  conjecture.  They 
never  advanced  to  the  true  principles  of  the  science,  much 
less  to  a  knowledge  of  social  laws.  Nay !  they  did  not  even 
find  the  starting  point  of  the  way  which  leads  to  the  princi- 
ples. The  point  of  departure  is  polygenism.  The  way  is 
the  investigation  of  the  natural  relations  of  distinct  (hetero- 
geri)  groups  of  men  to  one  another.  We  entered  upon  it  in 
"Der  Rassenkampf"  and  we  wish  to  continue  in  it  here.* 

Being  the  science  of  human  society  and  social  laws,  soci- 
ology is  obviously  the  basis  of  all  the  special  sciences  treat- 
ing of  parts  of  human  society,  or  of  particular  manifestations 
of  associative  life.  Anthropology,  the  science  of  man  as  an 
individual  being,  falls  within  the  scope  of  the  universal  science 
of  society  as  a  species  within  the  genus.  So  do  ethnography, 
embracing  the  description  and  comparison  of  existing  tribes 
and  peoples;  political  science,  the  science  of  the  state, 
treating  of  social  communities  which  are  the  result  of  dis- 
ciplinary organization;  comparative  linguistics,  or  philology; 
the  comparative  study  of  religion,  rights,  art,  etc., — sciences 
of  social  institutions  which  satisfy  the  psycho-social  wants  of 
man;  finally  political  economy  and  other  sciences  treating 
of  institutions  which  the  material  wants  of  man  as  a  social 
unit  have  produced.  It  is  perfectly  natural  that  all  these 
sciences  should  have  taken  shape  long  before  the  science  in 
which  they  should  afterward  find  their  basis.  This  is  the 
normal  course  of  man's  developing  knowledge. 

It  was  so  in  natural  science  in  the  narrow  sense  of  the 
word.  Botany,  zoology  and  mineralogy  took  shape  before 
geology  and  paleontology ,  though  the  latter  are  the  foundation 

*  It  gives  me  great  satisfaction  to  observe  that  the  reviewers  have  recognized 
the  great  importance  of  my  starting  point  and  have  declared  it  at  all  events 
worthy  of  note.  Alfred  Koenigsberg  writes  in  the  Neue  Freie  Presse,  Vienna, 
August  9,  1869:  "  His  hypothesis  that  mankind  is  descended  from  many  pairs  is  the 
egg  of  Columbus.  It  explains  almost  every  historical  event  in  the  simplest  and 
most  unconstrained  way,  especially  that  primitive  phenomenon,  the  conquest  of 
a  weaker  tribe  by  a  stronger;  and  the  organization  of  society  with  division  of 
labor.  It  suggests  what  Stephenson.the  father  of  railroads,  said  up_on  inspecting 
a  good  locomotive:  '  how  hard  it  must  have  been  to  hit  upon  it;  it  is  so  simple!'" 
The  reviewer  for  the  Rassegna  Crtlica,  Naples,  1883,  No.  9,  says:  "  There  are  two 
points  in  this  book  which  especially  deserve  praise  ....  to  wit,  the  unquali- 
fied assertion  of  naturalism  and  the  fact  that,  contrary  to  custom,  neither  the  indi- 
vidual nor  the  psychology  of  the  individual,  but  the  social  group,  is  made  the 
element  in  the  interpretation  of  history."  Similar  notices  of  approval  appeared 
in  Globus,  1884,  No.  4;  Ausland,  1884,  No.  2;  Journal des  Economistes,  October,  1883; 
Ribot's  Revue  Philosophique^  May,  1884,  and  in  many  other  critical  period- 
icals. These  critics  have  caught  the  idea  of  my  book  and  it  cannot  be  my  fault 
that  Professor  Alfred  Kirchhoff,  in  Zarncke's  LUerarisches  Centralblatt,  Leipzig, 
complains  that  he  does  not  understand  what  I  mean.  However,  Professor 
Kirchhoff  is  a  geographer,  appears  never  to  have  meddled  with  sociology,  and  is 
conversant  with  neither  the  literature  of  the  subject  nor  the  questions  here  under 
discussion.  Judging  from  the-  fact  that  he  notices  the  book  under  the  rubric 
"ethnology,"  he  considers  sociology  a  geographical  discipline. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  91 

of  the  former.  Similarly  the  art  of  healing  is  earlier  than 
physiologjr. 

The  explanation  is  very  simple.  Things,  institutions, 
relations  encountered  in  concrete  form  are  the  first  objects 
observed  and  investigated.  The  most  convenient  hypothesis 
or  crudest  explanation  suffices  for  a  time  to  account  for  their 
origin.  For  instance  we  live  under  laws  constituting  a  body 
of  rights.  The  nature  of  the  phenomenon  is  investigated; 
the  rights  are  explained,  interpreted,  compared  with  others, 
and  their  history  is  traced  out.  But  provisionally  their 
source  and  origin  was  satisfactorily  explained  by  saying  that 
the  lawgiver  proclaimed  them.  Similarly  the  explanation 
of  the  origin  of  religion  is  that  God  revealed  it  to  His 
prophet,  the  founder. 

With  the  progress  of  knowledge  and  reflection,  ideas  con- 
cerning the  origin  of  the  subjects-matter  of  the  respective 
sciences  undergo  changes.  The  new  conclusions  come  in 
conflict  with  the  earlier  explanations.  Thus  the  compara- 
tive study  of  law  showed  that  rights  arise  historically  in  the 
collective  or  "  folk"  mind;  and  religion,  similarly  studied, 
was  found  to  emanate  from  exigencies  of  man's  spiritual 
nature,  and  so  on. 

Moreover  as  knowledge  broadened  the  germs  of  all  the 
psycho-social  institutions  were  eventually  found  to  be  in 
close  proximity  to  one  another  and  the  different  social 
sciences  met  on  a  common  ground — though  the  common 
designation  was  not  at  once  applied.  The  subject-matter  of 
each  science  in  turn  was  discovered  existing  in  every  people 
in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  and  in  a  more  or  less  forward 
state  of  development.  Consequently  men  were  forced  to 
regard  the  differences  in  psycho-social  phenomena  among 
various  peoples  and  to  compare  psycho-social  products. 

The  first  step  was  the  comparative  study  of  law,  especially 
of  customary  law,  then  of  religion,  language,  art  and  phil- 
osophy. This  prompted  and  aided  investigation  of  the 
common  ground  whence  the  fountains  of  all  the  sciences 
seemed  to  spring.  This  common  ground  was  at  first  desig- 
nated history  of  civilization,  ethnography,  or  ethnology, 
Bastian's  term.  But  in  fact  it  may  most  suitably  be  called 
social  science. 

It  discloses  the  true  source  of  all  those  psycho-social  pro- 
ducts that  had  previously  become  subjects-matter  of  special 
sciences.  But  it  does  this  only  because  it  comprehends  the 


92  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

substance  of  human  societies.  Hence  we  must  recognize  in 
sociology  the  philosophical  basis  of  all  the  sciences  claiming 
to  be  "social;"  and  it  will  fall  to  the  lot  of  sociology  to 
demonstrate  the  relation  of  each  of  them  to  their  common 
basis,  and  their  connection  with  each  other  upon  it. 

4.    THE  SUBSTRATUM   OF  SOCIAL   LAWS. 

Laws  are  revealed  objectively.  Substrata  are  necessarily 
presupposed.  It  is  by  the  forms  in  which  bodies  appear,  or 
in  which  forces  manifest  themselves  in  and  on  bodies,  that  we 
are  able  to  discover  laws.  The  law  of  gravitation  cannot  be 
conceived  apart  from  a  body  which  falls — on  which  the  force 
of  gravitation  manifests  itself.  To  speak  of  attraction  is  to 
call  to  mind  the  bodies  on  which  attraction  acts. 

So  the  question  arises:  What  are  the  substrata  of  social 
laws  ?  What  are  the  media  through  which  force  is  mani- 
fested when  we  infer  social  laws  from  its  behavior  ?  Obvi- 
ously the  medium  is  not  the  individual,  on  whom  a  psychical 
or  a  physical  law  may  be  manifested,  but  not  a  social.  It 
has  sometimes  been  thought  that  ' '  mankind  ' '  was  the  sub- 
stratum; but  erroneously,  for  there  must  be  heterogeneous 
(heterogen)  elements  wherever  reciprocal  action  and  an 
interplay  of  forces  is  expected. 

If  mankind  is  conceived  to  be  a  unit,  the  condition  neces- 
sary for  the  action  of  opposing  forces  is  by  supposition 
absent.  Besides,  nowhere  on  the  earth,  and  at  no  time 
either  in  the  present  age  or  in  remotest  antiquity  has  man- 
kind been  found  to  be  a  simple  substance.  It  always  consists 
in  a  countless  number  of  distinct  (Jieterogeri)  ethnical  ele- 
ments. Hence  I  was  led  to  seek  the  starting  point  of  soci- 
ological investigation  in  the  hypothesis  that  there  was 
originally  an  indefinitely  large  number  of  distinct  (heterogen) 
ethnical  elements;*  and  it  gives  me  satisfaction  to  note  that 
good  authorities  consider  the  polygenetic  hypothesis  estab- 
lished. Indeed,  Bastian,  the  highest  authority  in  this  matter, 
declares  that  "it  is  self-evident,"  and  that  my  efforts,  in 
"Der  RassenkampJ ',"  to  "reconcile  it  with  Darwinism," 
were  superfluous. 

*"The  concept  of  force,"  says  Caspari,  correctly,  "presupposes  relations  to 
another  foreign  opposing  force  which  is  called  resistance.  Force  apart  from 
resistance  of  every  sort  were  a  forceless  force,  unthinkable  nothing.  Whoever 
speaks  of  force  must  at  the  same  time  conceive  of  mechanical  resistance  or  he 
contradicts  himself.  Hence  every  philosophical  investigator  who  had  been  edu- 
cated in  natural  science,  and  had  studied  mechanics,  understood  that  we  must 
continually  suppose  an  original  plurality  of  discrete  force-media,  force-centres, 
or  force-atoms  (Democritus),  monads  (Leibnitz),  reals  (Herbart),  dynamides 
(Redtenbacher),  etc." — "Jfosmos,"  Vol.  i,  p.  9. 


THE;  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  93 

But  since  the  hypothesis  is  so  fundamental  to  the  whole 
system  of  sociology  it  is  not  enough  to  state  what  authori- 
ties accept  it.  I  must  also  take  pains  to  bring  before  the 
reader  as  much  scientific  material  as  possible  in  support  of  it. 

First  of  all  may  I  be  allowed  to  cite  Carl  Vogt,  another 
authority  of  the  first  rank  in  natural  science,  to  vouch  for 
the  ' '  original  plurality  ' '  and  the  ' '  constancy  ' '  of  human 
races: * 

"No  man  would  certainly  have  doubted  the  specific  difference  in 
mankind  "  says  this  investigator  in  his  "Lectures  on  Man,"  "if  the 
unity  of  the  human  species  had  not  to  be  defended  at  any  price,  if  a 
tradition  had  not  to  be  supported  in  opposition  to  the  plainest  facts — 
a  tradition  which  has  been  the  more  venerated  because  it  runs  counter 
to  positive  science. ' '  | 

"As  far  as  our  traditions  go,  however  far  back  they  reach  into  the 
remotest  antiquity,  we  observe  that  wherever  peoples  migrated  and 
discovered  unknown  countries,  they  found  human  beings,  who 
appeared  to  them,  not  less  strange  than  the  animals  and  plants  they 
met  with.  .  .  .  The  larger  islands,  as  well  as  all  parts  of  the  con- 
tinents under  the  hottest  and  coldest  climates,  were  by  navigators  or 
conquerors  always  found  inhabited." 

Then  Vogt  reminds  his  readers  that 

"  even  religious  legends,  which  have  for  their  object  the  origin  of 
mankind  and  the  history  of  a  privileged  race,  even  these  legends  indi- 
cate that  at  the  creation  of  the  first  pair  the  world  was  already  peo- 
pled, an  indication  given  even  in  the  Bible.  .  .  .  The  only  fact 
from  which  we  can  start  is  that  of  the  original  dispersion  of  mankind 
upon  the  earth,  and  the  original  difference  of  races  spread  over  the 
surface  of  the  earth.  However  much  we  may  indulge  in  theoretical 
speculations  on  the  origin  and  differences  of  mankind,  however 
weighty  proofs  may  be  adduced  for  the  original  unity  of  the  human 
species,  this  much  is  certain,  that  no  historical  nor,  as  we  have  shown, 
geological  data  can  establish  this  dream  of  unity.  However  far  back 
our  eye  reaches  we  find  different  species  of  men  spread  over  different 
parts  of  the  earth. ' ' 

"  Not  merely  the  difference  of  races,  but  also  their  constancy  in  the 
course  of  time,  is  perfectly  established.  We  have  endeavored  to  show 
that  these  characters  may  be  traced  back  beyond  the  historical  period 
up  to  the  pile-works,  the  stone-period,  and  the  diluvial  formations. 
The  Egyptian  monuments  show  that  already  under  the  twelfth 
dynasty,  about  2300  years  before  Christ,  negroes  had  been  imported 

*It  may  be  added  that  among  the  earlier  natural  scientists  the  following 
accepted  polygenism :  Cuvier,  Buffon,  Lace'pdde  and  Burdach.  The  philosopher 
Whewell  in  "  Traces  of  Divinity"  holds  the  negroes  to  be  a  distinct  race,  of  differ- 
ent extraction  from  the  other  races  of  men.  Bory  and  Vierey  also  accepted  poly- 
genism and  Perty  says  :  "  The  far  greater  probability  is  that  men  of  diverse 
natural  capacities  have  arisen  in  different  parts  of  the  earth  and  at  various  times, 
all  very  remote  from  ours." — "  Ethnographic,"  p.  386  (1859). 

t  "  Lectures  on  Man  :   His  Place  in  Creation  and  in  the  History  of  the  Earth." 
By  Dr.  Carl  Vogt.     Edited  by  James  Hunt.     London  :    1864.     Lecture  viii,  p.  222, 
"Vorlesungen  uebfr  den  Menschen  ;  seine  Steliung  in  der  Schoepfung  und   in  der 
Geschichte  der  Erde."      By  Carl  Vogt.     2  vols.,  Giessen:    1863.     Vol.  i,  p.  284. 


94  ANNAIVS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

into  Egypt;  that  slave  hunts  had,  as  now,  taken  place  under  several 
dynasties,  as  proved  by  the  triumphal  processions  of  Thothmes  IV., 
about  1700  B.  C.,  and  Rameses  III.,  about  1300  B.  C.  There  are  seen 
long  processions  of  negroes,  whose  features  and  color  are  faithfully 
rendered;  there  are  seen  Egyptian  scribes  registering  slaves  with  their 
wives  and  children;  even  the  down  growing  in  bunches  upon  the 
heads  of  the  latter  may  be  distinguished.  There  are  also  seen  many 
heads  presenting  the  characters  of  negro  tribes  inhabiting  the  south  of 
Egypt,  and  which  the  artist  distinguishes  as  such  by  the  superadded 
lotus-stalk.  But  not  only  the  negroes,  but  also  the  Nubians  and  the 
Berbers,  as  well  as  the  old  Egyptians,  are  always  depicted  with  those 
characteristic  peculiarities  which  have  been  preserved  to  this  day." 

Vogt  also  cites  the  conclusions  of  Broca,  Morton  and 
Jomard,  who  identify  the  modern  Fellah-type  with  the 
Egyptians  of  the  time  of  the  Pharaohs,  and  then  he  con- 
tinues: 

_"The  same  constancy  of  characters  can  be  traced  in  the  other  races 
with  which  the  Egyptians  came  in  contact.  The  Jews  are  as  easily 
recognizable  as  the  Tartars  and  Scythians  with  whom  Rameses  III. 
was  at  war. 

"  In  the  same  way  we  observe  upon  the  Assyrian  and  Indian  monu- 
ments the  characters  of  such  races  as  still  inhabit  these  regions,  so 
that  the  constancy  of  race  characters  is  everywhere  rendered  evident.  "* 

Though  Vogt  concedes  a  ' '  certain  flexibility  ' '  to  the 
' '  natural  races  ' '  of  mankind  in  virtue  of  which  they  ' '  show 
certain  changes  when  transplanted  into  different  media," 
yet  the  change  never  exceeds  a  very  small  maximum  and 
does  not  obliterate  the  essential  race-marks.  Hence  Darwin 
is  not  justified  in  concluding  from  single  demonstrable 
examples  of  unimportant  alterations  due  to  change  of 
environment  that  they  will  continue  until  eventually  the 
essential  traits  have  been  lost  and  the  race  has  been  changed. 

"We  thus  infer  that  all  instances  which  have  been  cited  of  change 
in  races  of  pure  descent  by  the  mere  influence  of  changed  media, 
immigration  into  foreign  countries,  etc.,  are  insignificant  and  do  not 
affect  the  essential  race-characters.  These  modifications,  therefore, 
which  we  by  no  means  entirely  deny,  do  not  in  any  way  explain  the 
differences  in  the  human  species.  .  .  .  In  accordance  with  the  facts," 
says  Vogt  finally,  "  we  must  assume  a  fundamental  difference  of  races 
as  our  starting-point,  "f 

We  must  confine  ourselves  to  these  quotations  from  Vogt. 
It  would  lead  us  too  far  should  we  follow  the  forcible  argu- 
ment in  which  he  not  only  shows  the  harmony  between 
Darwin's  theory  and  polygenism  but  also  demonstrates  that 
the  latter  follows  necessarily  from  the  former. 

*  "  Lectures  on  Man,"  I,ec.  15,  pp.  423-26. 
t /*«?.,  Lee.  15,  pp.  435-36. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  95 

His  two  most  important  theses,  the  constancy  and  the 
original  "plurality  and  diversity"  of  human  races,  have 
found  striking  confirmation  in  the  progress  that  has  since 
been  made  in  anthropological  and  craniological  investigation. 

Kfforts  were  made  to  find  the  types  of  all  the  known  races. 
It  had  been  assumed  upon  superficial  examination,  that 
each  race  represented  a  genealogical  unit  in  which  a  fixed 
anthropological  type  was  transmitted  from  generation  to 
generation.  But  when  scientists  undertook  to  determine 
the  typical  peculiarities  exactly,  it  was  found  impossible  to 
assign  a  single  type  exclusively  to  any  one  historical  race 
whatever.  The  investigators  would  then  have  been  content 
with  a  "mean  type"  for  each  race.  But,  says  Virchow, 
' '  such  a  variety  of  individual  differences  was  accumulated 
among  the  civilized  peoples  of  Europe  that  to  many  it  seemed 
impossible  to  set  up  even  a  mean  type  for  each."* 

In  his  embarrassment  he  proclaimed,  a  decade  ago,  that 
' '  science  demanded  ' '  that  the  ' '  original  type  ' '  of  each  race 
be  discovered;  and  he  spared  neither  labor  nor  pains  in  the 
search.  If  after  all  he  did  not  find  it  among  the  Germans, 
where  he  looked  first,  it  was  not  his  fault.  The  simple  fact 
is  that  not  a  single  historical  race  ever  consisted  in  a  genea- 
logical unit. 

After  laborious  and  unsuccessful  investigation  he  concludes 
that 

"the  assumption  of  a  simple  original  Germanic  type  is  as  yet  entirely 
arbitrary.  Nobody  has  proved  that  all  Germans  once  had  the  same 
shaped  skull,  or,  otherwise  expressed,  that  they  were  from  the  begin- 
ning one  nation  (!),  the  Suevi  and  Franks  being  its  purest  types.  If 
Germans  and  Slavs  belong  to  the  same  Indo-Germanic  stock,  if 
Slavic  brachycephaly  and  Germanic  dolichocephaly  do  not  prevent 
assuming  the  common  descent  (?)  of  Slavs  and  Germans,  it  might 
seem  that  mesocephaly  and  even  brachycephaly  among  the  admittedly 
pure  Germans  would  be  a  favorable  circumstance.  The  great  hiatus 
becomes  filled  and  original  relationship  is  more  easily  comprehended 
after  actual  intermediate  members  have  been  discovered.  If  the 
Germanic  nation  once  had  a  common  fatherland  in  the  far  East,  it  is 
very  probable  that  these  differences  were  brought  thence  into  the 
later  home." 

We  see  with  what  reserve  and  reluctance  Virchow  notes 
that  the  German  race  lacks  anthropological  unity.  He 
demands  further  investigation. 

"  Perhaps  it  will  appear  that,  as  the  measurements  in  our  schools  in 
my  judgment  indicate,  different  Germanic  stocks  have  in  fact  existed 

*  "  Beitraege  zur  physischen  Anthropologie  der  Deutschen,''  1877. 


g6  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

here  in  Germany  for  ages,  moving  side  by  side  from  east  to  west,  and 
spreading  out  towards  the  west." 

To  the  sociologist  the  ''different  stocks"  which  the 
anthropologist's  craniological  material  leads  him  to  conjec- 
ture seem  plain  and  natural  from  the  beginning.  To  call 
them  "Germanic"  is  simply  national  prejudice.  There 
were  many  different  stocks  all  about;  and  in  time  a  "Ger- 
manic ' '  unit  arose  as  they  came  into  closer  contact  and  took 
on  a  common  civilization. 

But  the  anthropologist's  concession  that  "the  common 
type ' '  of  the  Germans  ' '  is  not  so  simple  as  it  has  hitherto 
been  assumed  to  be  "  is  of  value  to  us. 

The  farther  craniological  investigations  were  pursued,  the 
stronger  grew  the  conviction  that  there  was  nothing  which 
could  be  called  a  ' '  unitary  type, ' '  even  in  the  remotest 
tribes,  whom  the  current  of  migration  does  not  touch,  who 
have  no  intercourse  with  others,  and  who  are  apparently 
beyond  the  reach  of  every  other  agitating  force  of  history. 
Among  the  old  Frisians,  even,  there  are  several  types;  and 
Virchow  is  forced  to  assume  that  ' '  possibly  other  tribes 
were  there  before  them,  whom  they  subjected  and  whose 
blood  was  mingled  with  theirs. ' '  Whether  the  craniologist 
examines  modern  Finns  and  Lapps,  or  wild  Veddas  from 
the  interior  of  Ceylon,  or  the  skulls  from  old  Trojan  graves, 
the  fact  of  intermixture  appears  with  equal  clearness.* 

But  while  Virchow,  who  started  to  find  an  original  uni- 
tary type,  reluctantly  notes  that  there  is  none  and,  with 
disillusioned  resignation,  concedes  an  original  plurality  of 
types  for  all  the  tribes  he  has  investigated,  the  distinguished 
craniologist,  Kollmann,  has  proved  with  scientific  certainty 
that  original  plurality  is  universal. 

As  early  as  1883  it  was  apparent  to  him  that  "  traces  of 
different  anthropological  elements  can  be  shown  in  every 
race.  Many  centuries  have  elapsed  since  the  peoples  of 
Europe  were  racial  units,  and  now  no  dale,  however  remote, 
contains  a  pure  race. ' '  But  the  latest  results  prove  abund- 
antly that  racial  differences  are  not  due  to  a  later  process 
of  differentiation.  It  has  existed  unchanged  since  diluvial 
times. 

"An  extended  comparison  of  diluvial  and  modern  skulls,"  writes 
Kollmann,  "shows  that  osteological  race  characteristics  have  not 

*  Virchow.     "  IVeddes  und  Altlrojanische  Schaedel  und  Graeder." 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  97 

changed.  Siiice  diluvial  times  the  influence  of  natural  selection  has 
not  caused  man  to  '  vary  '  in  the  Darwinian  sense.  His  race-marks 
have  withstood  external  influences  with  great  tenacity,  persisting  in 
spite  of  them.  These  important  conclusions  contradict  the  current 
view  that  man  is  undergoing  a  continuous  process  of  change.  But  it 
must  be  conceded  upon  closer  examination  that  the  evidence  I  have 
adduced  admits  of  the  construction  I  have  given  it,  to  say  the  least." 

Then  lie  cites  the  opinions  of  prominent  naturalists  to 
show  that  not  only  do  many  animals  have  permanent  types, 
but  unquestionably  the  men  of  the  Nile  valley  also,  according 
to  Cuvier,  and  even  mankind  since  the  flood,  according  to 
Ruetimeyer. 

"All  the  evidence  man  has  left  in  his  burial  places,"  he  continues, 
"  shows  that  he  belongs  to  the  latter  class  of  beings,  having  a  perma- 
nent type.  The  osteological  characteristics  of  race  and  even  of  variety 
have  not  changed  in  all  the  time  he  has  wandered  over  Europe.  . 
The  universality  of  this  rule  is  forcibly  illustrated  by  the  difference 
between  Papuans  and  Malays,  to  mention  only  one  example.  Since 
time  immemorial  they  have  lived  side  by  side  in  similar  regions  with- 
out change  of  habitat.  Yet  they  are  different  still.  As  for  Europe, 
both  prehistoric  and  modern,  it  can  be  shown  that  the  number  of  differ- 
ent races  has  always  been  rather  large  and  that  they  have  always  been 
intermixed."  "Owing  to  penetration,"  says  Kollmann,  "representa- 
tives of  many  races  live  and,  for  thousands  of  years  have  lived,  side 
by  side  everywhere  in  Europe.  Hence,  each  people  and  state  contains 
different  races  in  different  proportions.  This  conclusion  I  drew  after 
comparing  more  than  3000  European  skulls. ' ' 

Indeed  craniologists  who  are  moved  to  defend  the  unity 
and  "purity"  of  their  own  races  cannot  withstand  the 
undeniable  facts.  Hoelder,  for  example  concedes  five 
different  "types"  within  the  "Germanic  stock."  That 
is,  he  finds  five  among  his  specimens  to-day.  It  is  not 
impossible  therefore  that  once  there  was  a  greater  number 
and  that  other  investigators  may  be  able  to  recover  more  of 
them.* 

"  Hiss  and  Ruetimeyer,  using  rigorous  scientific  methods,  have 
shown  that  at  least  three  different  races  have  lived  in  Switzerland 
since  the  period  of  the  lake-dwellers  began,  "t 

*  To  social  science  it  is  a  matter  of  indifference  that  craniologists  like  Koll- 
mann compromise  with  the  alleged  Darwinian  doctrine  of  unitary  descent  by 
granting  that  a  period  of  dispersion  and  of  differentiation  from  a  "  common 
stock  "  may  have  "  occurred  in  pre-glacial  times."  It  is  enough  for  social  science 
to  start  with  the  facts  of  the  post-diluvial  period.  It  gladly  leaves  the  pre-glacial 
hypothesis  to  the  defenders  of  an  alleged  Darwinian  standpoint— to  save  the 
"  common  stock." 


Ar 

Schools,        ...  . 

Value  of  Pithecoidal  Forms  and  the  Effect  of  Correlation  on  the   Face  of  the 

Human  Skull,"  1883. 


98  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

These  same  ' '  anthropological  differences, ' '  to  use  Koll- 
mann's  term,  may  also  be  noted  among  the  American 
aborigines. 

"Formerly  it  was  believed  that  a  single  race  extended  over  the 
whole  continent  from  Cape  Horn  to  the  great  northern  lakes.  .  .  . 
Decisive  facts  to  the  contrary  were  first  adduced  by  Andreas  Retzius. 
.  .  .  He  showed  that  there  were  two  different  races  in  America,  a 
brachycephalic  in  the  west  and  a  dolichocephalic  in  the  east." 

In  Virchow's  opinion,  also,  the  evidence  shows  "  that  the 
autochthonous  population  of  America  is  not  a  racial  unit. ' ' 
Kollmann  showed  from  his  investigations  on  American 
skulls  that 

"the  various  cephalic  indices,  from  extreme  dolichocephaly  to 
extreme  brachycephaly,  are  scattered  ever  the  whole  continent.  .  .  . 
The  autochthonous  population,  north  and  south,  is  composed  of  the 
same  races,  though  their  relative  proportions  differ.  .  .  .  Hence 
we  must  speak  of  American  races.  .  .  . 

"  I  will  add  that  there  is  no  prospect  of  finding  racial  unity  even 
within  a  smaller  region.  It  might  be  thought  that  individual  tribes 
in  the  north  or  the  south  would  consist  of  dolichocephalic  or  brachy- 
cephalic persons  only.  .  .  .  But  the  Mound-builders  and  Cliff- 
dwellers  in  their  day  were  composed  of  the  same  races  that  occur 
later.  Even  they  consisted  of  several  races,  like  the  men  of  the 
first  diluvial  period  in  Europe,  or  the  Reindeer-hunters,  Lake- 
dwellers,  Germans  and  Celts." 

Kollmann 's  theory  of  "penetration"  is  thoroughly  con- 
firmed by  the  observation  of  his  disciple  Passavant  in  west 
Africa.*  The  first  place  he  visited  on  the  African  continent 
was  the  French  possession  of  Goree,  the  black  population 
of  which  belongs  to  the  Seres  and  Joloff  tribes. 

"  It  is  extremely  hard  for  the  beginner  to  distinguish  the  blacks  by 
their  physiognomies, "  writes  Passavant  of  his  first  experience  there. 
"At  first  all  the  faces  appeared  alike.  Only  after  several  weeks  of 
practice  did  I  really  succeed  in  taking  account  of  individual  differ- 
ences." 

This  accords  with  the  well-known  fact  that  the  countless 
differences  really  to  be  found  in  men  escape  superficial 
observation  almost  completely.  It  also  explains  the  whole 
previous  history  of  anthropology,  especially  the  circum- 
stance that  mankind  was  at  first  divided  into  only  three  or 
four  races,  distinguished  by  the  crudest,  most  striking 
traits,  such  as  the  color  of  the  skin,  whereas,  after  a  more 
intimate  acquaintance,  we  become  conscious  of  countless 
differences. 

*  "  Craniologische  Untersuchungen  der  Neger  und  Negervoelker." 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  99 

Cuvier,  as  is  well  known,  divided  mankind  into  three 
races:  Mongolians,  Negroes  and  Caucasians.  Blumenbach 
distinguished  five  types  and  made  five  races  to  correspond. 
Lacepede  and  Dumerit  added  a  sixth.  Bory  discovered 
fifteen  races  even  and  Desmoulins  sixteen.  But  Waitz  found 
this  number  insufficient  and  declared  that  theoretically  there 
ought  to  be  no  division  into  races  lest  he  be  compelled,  in 
spite  of  ethical  scruples,  to  recognize  a  great  number — 
several  hundred  in  fact.  Fortunately  the  American  investi- 
gators were  not  influenced  by  such  insipid  considerations. 
They  carried  the  subdivision  courageously  forward  uncon- 
cerned about  the  Bible  and  Kuropean  ethics. 

The  catalogue  of  human  races  accepted  by  Morton,  Nott 
and  Gliddon  ran  into  the  hundreds  without  being  complete; 
there  is  nothing  to  prevent  the  increase  of  the  number  as 
anthropological  knowledge  increases.  Passavant's  investi- 
gations among  the  negroes  afford  further  proof  that  this  may 
be  expected  in  the  nature  of  the  case. 

The  first  subdivision  of  the  African  Negroes  into  four 
grand  races:  Negritos,  Congo  Negroes,  Kaffirs  and  Hotten- 
tots, he  says 

"is  the  fruit  of  our  exploring  expeditions;  it  is  connected  with  the 
progress  of  ethnographic  knowledge."  "  Undaunted  explorers  have 
gradually  brought  a  population  which  may  be  estimated  at  151 
millions  so  far  within  our  knowledge  that  we  can  now  distinguish 
several  large  ethnical  groups." 

There  are  "  at  least  three  Negro  races  "  in  Africa,  he  says, 
besides  the  Berbers  and  the  Bedjas  or  Ethiopians. 

"  There  are,  besides,  some  tribes  intermediate  between  the  Negroes  on 
the  one  hand  and  the  Berbers  and  Bedjas  on  the  other.  There  are  some 
also  in  which  different  stocks  and  types  are  so  mingled  that  they  can- 
not longer  be  ascribed  to  any  one  in  particular." 

According  to  Passavant,  instead  of  the  one  black  race,  we 
should  have  seven  ethnical  groups  in  Africa.  But  what  of 
the  material  of  each  group  ?  The  Negritos  ' '  differ  so  among 
themselves,"  says  Hartmann,  "  that  the  current  conception 
of  the  negro  with  woolly  hair,  flat  nose,  thick  lips  and  raven 
black  skin  must  be  entirely  disregarded. ' ' 

Endless  differences  still  !  But  it  is  well  understood  what 
they  consist  in  and  why  closer  observation  makes  it  necessary 
to  increase  the  number  of  ' '  races. "  "  Racial  characteristics 
are  pre-eminently  anatomical,"  says  Kollmann.  "...  Physi- 
cal or  material  traits  must  be  apparent  on  the  bones." 


ioo  ANNALS  OP  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

Relatively  few  races  were  recognized  by  scientists  because 
' '  laborious  investigation  is  needed  in  order  to  show  specific 
characteristics  on  the  bony  framework  of  the  skull. ' '  * 

But  is  it  worth  the  trouble  ?  Are  not  all  these  ' '  differ- 
ences ' '  capricious  sports  of  nature,  endless  and  ever  changing, 
without  rule  or  law  ?  Modern  craniology  answers  the  ques- 
tion decisively. 

"  The  skeleton,"  says  Ruetimeyer,  "  seems  to  preserve  its  acquired 
shape  more  tenaciously  than  any  other  organ;  so  much  so  that  a  cross 
does  not  produce  a  third  form,  but  the  two  elements  persist  side  by 
side.  The  effect  of  crossing  on  the  skeleton  might  be  called  mechani- 
cal rather  than  chemical." 

Vogt  also  maintains  that  race  characteristics  are  perma- 
nent on  the  skeleton,  and  Passavant  considers  the  "shape 
of  the  skull  to  be  a  constant  and  inheritable  race-character- 
istic." 

"  There  is  a  mass  of  evidence,"  he  says,  "showing  that  race-types 
are  maintained  continuously  or  reappear  by  reversion." 

"  If  the  characteristics  of  different  varieties  did  not  resist  external 
influences  with  such  extraordinary  obstinacy,"  says  Kollmann  perti- 
nently, "  complete  uniformity  must  have  long  since  prevailed  among 
men  everywhere;  for  intermixture  has  been  continuous  and  prolific. 
But  craniological  evidence  shows  that  there  is  no  uniformity  and  every 
unprejudiced  observer  confirms  it." 

Elswhere  he  says: 

"  Life  in  the  drawing-room  may  reduce  the  ligaments  and  the  mus- 
cular strength  and  make  the  hands  and  feet  small;  but  the  character- 
istics of  his  race,  which  the  individual  bears  in  himself  as  heir  to  an 
ancient  heritage,  remain  undisturbed  in  spite  of  tall  hat  and  patent 
leathers." 

If,  then,  race-characteristics  are  constant  and  the  number 
of  human  races  or  varieties  is  still  undetermined,  it  follows 
obviously  that  when  man's  existence  on  earth  began  and 
before  races  had  mingled  and  "penetrated,"  there  were 
countless  distinct  (heterogen)  human  swarms,  severally  repre- 
senting the  various  race-characteristics  which  have  persisted 
unchanged  in  penetration. 

The  conclusion  is  imperative.  If  race-characteristics  pass 
from  generation  to  generation  only  by  inheritance;  if  no  new 
ones  arise  and  only  the  old  ones  appear  over  and  over  again ; 
if  they  are  countless  to-day  and  penetration  and  inheritance 
are  still  spreading  them  (though  many  may  have  disappeared 
forever) ;  if  they  prove  to  be  as  permanent  and  ancient  as  the 

*  "Craniologische  Graeberfunde  in  der  Schweiz,"  1883. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  101 

tombs;  must  we  not  conclude  that  there  was  in  the  beginning 
a  countless  number  of  distinct  human  hordes,  each  one  an 
individual  race  or  society  ?  Only  a  mind  warped  by  Biblical 
traditions  and  modern  conceptions  of  the  family  would  insist 
on  substituting  first  ' '  pairs  ' '  instead  of  hordes. 

It  may  be  said  that  it  is  exaggeration  to  speak  of  count- 
less hordes  since  even  the  anthropologists  and  craniologists 
who  accept  polygenism  use  modest  numbers.  But  to  how 
few  traits  they  limit  themselves  or  are  confined  by  necessity ! 
Who  will  believe  that  the  race-characteristics  are  all  confined 
to  the  skull  and  the  skeleton  though  that  is  almost  the  only 
place  where  anthropologists  may  look  ? 

Obviously  there  should  be  corresponding  differences  even 
in  the  finest  features  of  the  face  and  in  the  minutest  convo- 
lutions of  the  brain,  which  are  as  yet  wholly  unknown. 
Some  are  entirely  inaccessible  to  such  investigations  as  we 
apply  to  the  bones;  others  are  too  delicate  for  our  sense- 
perceptions;  others  still  are  on  organs  and  parts  of  the  body, 
like  the  nose  and  ears,  which  suffer  complete  decay  so  that  no 
comparison  can  be  made  with  the  past.  Yet  nobody  doubts 
that  the  racial  differences  in  these  members  are  important. 
So  it  is  not  too  rash  to  suppose  that  a  far  greater  number  of 
human  varieties  now  exists  and,  since  types  are  permanent, 
always  has  existed  than  anthropology  has  any  means  of 
knowing.  These  considerations,  we  hope,  will  still  further 
justify  us  in  starting  upon  our  sociological  investigations 
with  the  polygenetic  hypothesis.* 

5.    CONCEPT  AND  ESSENCE  OP  SOCIAL  LAW. 

The  facts  cited  show  plainly  that  existing  "races"  are 
not  simple  and  mutually  exclusive  in  the  anthropological 
sense;  moreover  every  means  of  investigation  fails  to  dis- 
close racial  purity  in  prehistoric  times.  Yet,  reasoning 
deductively  from  the  mixed  to  the  unmixed  and  from  the 
composite  to  the  simple,  we  must  infer  that  races  once  were 
pure.  The  logical  conclusion  must  be  accepted  as  the  work- 
ing hypothesis,  at  least,  of  a  scientific  investigation.  But 
anthropological  changes  have  not  affected  the  social  relations 

*  It  has  already  been  stated  that  Bastian  considers  such  a  justification  super- 
fluous since  polygenism  is  "self-evident."  But  the  fact  that  Alfred  Kirchhoff,  a 
professor  of  geography  who  calls  himself  a  "wicked  Darwinian,"  writing  in  the 
Literarisches  Centralblatt,  declares  this  theory  irreconcilable  with  Darwinism, 

K  roves  that  the  correct  conception  of  Darwin's  theory  has  not  been  so  widely  dif- 
jsed  as  could  be  wished.    Hence  the  above  explanation  seems  to  me  still  neces- 
sary. 


102  ANNAIvS   OF  THE   AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

of  either  the  ancient  or  the  modern  human  groups  of  which 
we  treat.  Sociologically  they  are  distinct  groups  still. 
Sociological  dissimilarities  are  independent  of  the  structure 
of  the  bones  and  skull.  They  consist  in  very  different  fac- 
tors. Once  the  distinction  between  native  and  alien  may 
have  answered  to  differences  purely  anthropological.  But 
ever  since  the  dawn  of  history  the  native  has  been  distin- 
guished from  the  alien  simply  by  social  status  and  relations 
which  he  and  everybody  else  recognizes  as  necessarily  cor- 
relative with  and  consequent  upon  sociological  or,  really, 
social  factors. 

Birth  and  training  are  social  factors.  The  latter,  espe- 
cially, imparts  the  language,  morals,  ideas,  religion  and 
usages  of  the  group  and  causes  the  individual  to  appear  to 
himself  and  to  others  to  belong  to  it.  All  together  bind  the 
members  to  each  other  by  a  common  interest,  which  is 
patriotism  in  its  earliest  form. 

The  simple  syngenetic  groups  are  affected  by  a  great 
variety  of  interests,  political,  economical,  national  and 
intellectual  in  such  ways  that  several  elementary  groups 
become  united  in  one;  primary  social  complexes  are  fol- 
lowed by  secondary  and  these  by  others  of  successively 
higher  orders.  The  same  regular  processes  which  took 
place  in  the  simple  groups  in  virtue  of  their  social  nature 
occur  in  all  the  others;  combinations  and  cultural  changes 
only  modify  or  complicate  them.  These  processes,  which 
we  shall  call  social  since  their  source  is  in  social  elements, 
are  the  content,  as  the  groups,  simple  and  compound,  are 
the  agents  of  social  history. 

Social  processes  exhibit  great  uniformity.  Though  time 
and  circumstances  modify  them  they  remain  essentially  the 
same.  So  for  each  instance  of  uniformity  in  the  social 
domain,  as  elsewhere,  we  formulate  a  law  of  the  cause  and 
call  the  law  social.*  Hence  a  social  law  is  an  inference 
from  concrete  social  occurrences  presenting  the  norm  of  the 

*  De  Tocqueville  was  impressed  by  the  thought  that  peoples,  however  distant  and 
unrelated,  must  develop  according  to  some  law.  "  When  I  perceive  the  resem- 
blance,'1 he  says,  "  which  exists  between  the  political  institutions  of  our  ancestors, 
the  Teutons,  and  the  wandering  tribes  of  North  America, — between  the  customs 
described  by  Tacitus,  and  those  of  which  I  have  sometimes  been  the  witness, — I 
cannot  help  thinking  that  the  same  cause  has  brought  about  the  same  results  in 
both  hemispheres;  and  that,  in  the  midst  of  the  apparent  diversity  of  human 
affairs,  certain  primary  facts  may  be  discovered,  from  which  all  the  others  are 
derived."—"  Democracy  in  America,"  translated  by  Henry  Reeve,  edited  by 
Francis  Bowen,  Cambridge.  1862.  Cap.  xviii,  pp.  441-42.— The  ethnographical  hon- 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  103 

development  and  reciprocal  influence  of  social  elements,  i.  e., 
of  the  syngenetic  groups. 

The  only  way  to  prosecute  social  science  is  to  discover 
social  laws  where  ethnical  or  social  elements  come  in  contact 
and  to  demonstrate  their  validity.  So  long  as  the  investiga- 
tion was  conducted  in  any  other  way,  no  attempt  to  discover 
or  found  a  social  science  could  succeed. 

It  was  recognized  that  there  must  be  regularity  of  develop- 
ment and  that  the  laws  of  development  must  be  demon- 
strated, were  a  philosophy  of  history  or  a  social  science  to  be 
founded.  Comte  and  Carey  insisted  upon  this  repeatedly.  But 
no  one  knew  where  to  look  for  conformity  to  law.  Some, 
like  Voltaire,  sought  for  laws  of  the  development  of  man- 
kind. But  if  mankind  is  taken  as  a  unit,  it  is  obvious  that 
development  must  be  either  upward  or  downward;  that 
there  must  be  either  progression  or  retrogression.  Rous- 
seau and  others  accepted  the  latter  alternative.  Assum- 
ing a  primitive  happy  state  of  nature,  they  w7ent  on  to  prove 
man's  growth  in  corruption.  But  the  greater  part,  including 
nearly  every  writer  on  the  history  of  civilization,  taught  the 
contrary,  laboring  to  show  upward  progression  from  original 
savagery  to  successively  higher  forms  of  civilization.  Both 
parties  were  wrong;  both  erred  in  treating  "mankind"  as 
a  unit  of  development.  The  mistake  was  general;  but  the 
position  cannot  be  maintained  unless  the  field  of  view  is 
materially  limited.  Generally  it  is  confined  to  the  narrow 
stream  of  European  civilization  running  through  Greece 
and  Rome  to  France  or  Germany.  The  development  dis- 
covered here  is  attributed  to  mankind  as  a  whole.  Comte, 
for  instance,  locates  a  period  of  polytheism  between  primitive 
fetichism  and  modern(!)  monotheism  and  asserts  that  "  it 
was  under  its  reign  that  mankind(!)  rose  to  settled  monog- 
amy. "  *  It  is  clear  what  a  tiny  fraction  of  mankind  the 
statement  applies  to.  Comte  took  no  thought  of  the  rest; 
it  would  have  vitiated  the  orderly  development  of  ' '  man- 
kind "  and  its  elevation  to  monogamy. 

But  a  few  sagacious  statisticians  led  by  Quetelet  escaped 
the  self-deception.  Unsatisfied  by  this  fancied  regularity, 
they  sought  to  discover  laws  of  orderly  development  by 

— Ausland,  No.  4,  1881,  "  that  certain  phenomena  of  associative  life  are  perfectly 
similar  among  peoples  who  are  entirely  unlike  and  who  have  never  been  related 
in  any  demonstrable  way  whatever.  Hence  .  .  .  the  nature  of  the  human  race 
(species)  is  manifestly  one  and  universal  in  spite  of  all  differences." 

* Comte-Martineau,  op.  cit.,Vo\.  ii,  p.  195;    Comte,  op,  cit.,  Vol.  v,   p   220;    Conite- 
Rig.,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  ii,  p.  230. 


104  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

other  means.  Quetelet  is  conscious  that  there  can  be  no 
science  of  man  unless  man's  whole  conduct  depends  on  fixed 
laws  just  as  the  phenomena  of  natural  science  do;  and  he 
regrets  that  philosophers  have  never  perceived  it. 

"Either  from  a  distrust  in  their  own  strength,"  he  says,  "  or  a 
repugnance  in  supposing  it  possible  to  reduce  to  fixed  laws  what 
seemed  to  flow  from  the  most  capricious  of  causes,  it  has  hitherto  been 
deemed  expedient  by  learned  men  to  abandon  the  line  of  inquiry 
employed  in  the  investigation  of  the  other  laws  of  nature  as  soon  as 
the  moral  phenomena  of  mankind  become  the  object  of  research."* 

He  also  surmises  correctly  that  if  we  would  discover  the 
laws  controlling  man's  behavior  we  must  disregard  the 
individual. 

"  It  is  of  primary  importance  to  keep  out  of  view  man  as  he  exists 
in  an  insulated,  separate,  or  in  an  individual  state,  and  to  regard  him 
only  as  a  fraction  of  the  species.  In  thus  setting  aside  his  individual 
nature,  we  get  quit  of  all  which  is  accidental,  and  the  individual 
peculiarities,  which  exercise  scarcely  any  influence  over  the  mass, 
become  effaced  of  their  own  accord,  allowing  the  observer  to  seize 
the  general  results." 

After  giving  the  well-known  illustration  of  the  particles 
of  chalk-dust  which  form  a  circle  only  when  seen  from  a 
distance,  he  continues:  "it  is  in  this  way  that  we  propose 
studying  the  laws  which  relate  to  the  human  species:  for,  by 
examining  them  too  closely,"  by  examining  the  individuals, 
he  means,  ' '  it  becomes  impossible  to  apprehend  them 
correctly,  and  the  observer  sees  only  individual  peculiarities, 
which  are  infinity,  "f  That  is,  in  place  of  the  false  and 
discarded  subject-matter,  the  individual,  he  substitutes  a 
vague  and  incomprehensible  "human  species,"  "society," 
or  ' '  social  body. ' '  This  is  his  error.  He  never  discovered 
what  the  real  subject-matter  of  observation  should  be;  and 
consequently  all  his  efforts  to  found  a  science  were  a  failure, 
as  we  shall  see. 

How  could  Quetelet  discover  conformity  to  law  ?  His 
concept  suggests  nothing  concrete,  nor  even  anything  meas- 
urable. But  every  concrete  object  in  nature  is  limited,  and 
none  but  limited  objects  can  be  observed  scientifically.  His 
terms  suggest  something  unlimited,  undefinable,  as  unfit  for 
concrete  observations — the  foundation  of  all  science — as  time 

*  "  A  Treatise  on  Man  and  the  Development  of  His  Faculties."    Edinburgh,  1842, 
P.  5- 
f/Wrf. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  105 

and  space.  It  must  be  resolved  into  concrete  units  first.  He 
wisely  discarded  the  "  individual,"  but  he  failed  to  find  the 
real  unit. 

He  had  recourse  to  the  "  great  number,"  as  has  been  said. 
It  is  the  magician's  wand  with  which  he  conjures  a  finely 
plastic  scientific  subject-matter  out  of  the  unyielding 
"  human  species,"  "  society, "  or  "  social  system."  Using 
a  "  great  number  "  of  cases,  he  finds  laws  prevalent  where 
formerly  blind  confusion  reigned.  The  operation  is  very 
simple;  if  it  were  only  as  sound  ! 

Any  convenient  phenomenon  may  be  observed  and  a 
record  made  of  the  frequency  of  its  recurrence  in  equal 
periods  of  time.  If  the  several  totals  are  compared,  either 
they  will  seem  to  conform  to  law  or  they  will  not,  one  or  the 
other.  In  the  former  event,  the  statisticians  proclaim  the 
"  law  of  the  great  number;"  in  the  latter  they  keep  silence. 
Generally  some  law  is  discoverable;  for  everything  in  the 
world  is  amenable  to  number.  Anything  can  be  counted. 
At  some  limit,  which  must  eventually  be  attained,  numbers 
always  give  certain  proportions;  and  this  property  of  num- 
bers seems  to  have  been  communicated  to  the  enumerated 
articles. 

Take  any  rare  occurrence  in  ordinary  life.  Say  a  lunatic 
climbs  a  tower  and  jumps  to  the  street.  Within  the  memory 
of  man  the  like  had  not  happened  in  that  locality.  It 
stands  alone.  No  law  can  be  discovered  on  it.  If  it  is  never 
repeated  it  eludes  all  statistical  treatment.  But  possibly  it 
may  re-occur.  If  we  could  find  only  one  other  instance  in  a 
long  series  of  years,  even  that  would  be  enough  to  show 
"conformity  to  law;"  the  event  will  occur  once  in  so  and  so 
many  years. 

Obviously  the  opportunity  for  making  ratios  is  far  greater 
when  the  events  enumerated  occur  daily  and  hourly,  as 
many  in  human  life  do.  Births,  marriages,  deaths,  in  fact 
the  majority  of  demographical  phenomena  must  occur  with 
great  regularity;  and  statistics  win  an  easy  triumph.  But 
have  the  laws  governing  natural  phenomena  been  explained 
when  the  regularity  of  their  occurrence  is  confirmed  ?  Here 
number  is  an  indication  or  proof  that  there  is  conformity  to 
some  law;  and  that  is  all. 

Statistical  results  are  wholly  insufficient  for  formulating 
and  explaining  the  least  law  of  "mankind,"  "society," 
' '  the  social  system. "  In  a  word  the  ' '  law  of  the  great 


106  ANNAIvS   OF  THE   AMERICAN   ACADEMY. 

number  "  is  a  law  of  number  and  not  of  the  phenomena 
enumerated;  whereas  social  science  wishes  especially  to  learn 
the  laws  of  social  phenomena.  Granted  that  statistics  are  a 
very  important  means  of  investigation;  yet  counting  phe- 
nomena and  computing  ratios  is  a  process  purely  arithmetical. 
It  has  no  identity  with  the  discovery  and  explanation  of  the 
laws  of  the  behavior  of  phenomena. 

Quetelet 's  statistical  investigations  are  a  great  boon  to 
science.  But  he  did  not  demonstrate  social  laws  as  he  pro- 
posed. He  mistook  the  laws  of  number  for  the  laws  of  social 
phenomena.  His  self-deception  originated  in  his  unclear 
concept  of  the  subject-matter  of  social  science.  His  indefi- 
nite and  incomprehensible  ' '  mankind  ' '  could  not  be  sub- 
jected  to  rigid  and  exact  scientific  treatment. 

In  one  of  his  later  works,  the  ' '  Natural  History  of 
Society,"  he  tried  to  improve  by  distinguishing  several 
social  communities  from  one  another.  But  he  got  no  clear 
idea  of  "race,"  " nation, "  and  "  state. "  On  the  contrary 
he  did  what  would  not  have  been  expected  of  him:  he 
assumed  the  individual  to  be  their  source  and  so  prevented 
apprehension  of  their  true  substance  as  effectually  as  the 
individualistic  and  atomistic  tendency  in  politics  does. 

Spencer's  philosophy  and  sociology  is,  as  we  have  said,  a 
significant  advance  upon  Quetelet,  Comte  and  the  historical 
philosophers.  He  too  argues  that  social  science  is  both 
necessary  and  possible.  *  But  he  does  not  insist,  as  Comte 
does,  that  the  subject-matter  of  social  laws  is  mankind  de- 
veloping as  a  unit;  rather  he  always  speaks  of  the  develop- 
ment of  social  aggregates.  Nor  does  he,  like  Quetelet,  use 
the  ' '  great  number ' '  to  solve  the  problem  of  regular 
development.  He  thinks  he  has  found  the  solution  in  his 
formula  of  evolution. 

As  evolution  stands  in  a  certain  though  distant  relation 
to  social  phenomena,  it  might  be  accepted  as  a  "  universal 
law."  But  we  cannot  accept  it  as  a  "social  law."  In 
every  science,  according  to  Spencer's  theory,  if  we  trace 
the  history  of  particular  things  backward  we  shall  find  that 
their  constituent  parts  were  once  in  a  state  of  diffusion.  And 
if  we  trace  their  history  forward  from  any  point  we  shall 
find  concentrated  conditions  instead  of  diffuse.  Hence  he 
concludes  that  the  formula  for  the  law  of  evolution  must 
include  both  processes,  concentration  and  diffusion.  Every 

*  Spencer,   "  Study  of  Sociology."     International  Science  Series,  caps  ii-iii. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  107 

perceivable  thing,  as  he  states  it,  is  in  a  state  of  continuous 
change;  it  is  either  becoming  or  passing  away.  The  former 
state  consists  in  the  integration  or  concentration  of  matter 
and  the  dissipation  of  motion,  which  he  calls  evolution. 
The  latter  consists  in  the  disintegration  of  matter  and  the 
absorption  of  motion,  which  he  calls  dissolution.* 

He  demonstrates  its  validity  for  all  classes  of  phenomena 
with  great  acumen.  But  the  connection  between  the  univer- 
sal formula  and  the  concrete  phenomena  is  so  loose  that  we 
gain  no  explanation  of  them  from  it.  Applying  to  every- 
thing it  explains  nothing.  It  is  not  really  a  law  of  the 
phenomena.  It  says  no  more,  at  bottom,  than  that  motion 
is  universal  without  disclosing  why. 

In  the  social  domain,  especially,  the  defect  is  glaring. 
The  formula  fits  the  social  processes  in  a  certain  figurative 
sense,  but  does  not  explain  them. 

"  While  there  exist  nothing  but  small,  wandering  assemblages  of 
men,  devoid  of  organization,"  he  says  for  instance,  "the  conflicts  of 
these  assemblages  with  one  another  cannot  work  changes  in  structure. 
But  when  once  there  have  arisen  the  definite  chieftainships  which 
these  conflicts  themselves  tend  to  initiate,  and  especially  when  the 
conflicts  have  ended  in  permanent  subjugations,  then  arise  the  rudi- 
ments of  political  organization."! 

The  process  uniting  social  aggregates  into  political  organ- 
izations is  remotely  analogous  to  his  law  of  evolution  to  be 
sure;  but  we  must  still  have  recourse  to  the  law  that  ' '  solici- 
tude for  the  means  of  subsistence' '  J  forces  each  social  aggre- 
gate to  try  to  make  every  other  social  aggregate  coming 
within  its  reach  serve  that  supreme  end.  This  law  fully 
explains  why  the  stronger  of  the  ' '  small  wandering  hordes  ' ' 
aim  to  subject  the  weaker  and  get  their  services;  and  it 
shows  the  necessity  for  all  the  ' '  structures  ' '  or  variety  of 
organization  which  culminate  in  the  ' '  state. ' '  The  ' '  uni- 
versal law"  of  evolution  applies  to  the  process;  but  Spencer 
fails  to  emphasize  the  ' '  social  law  ' '  which  explains  it. 

But  Spencer  offers  many  just  observations  upon  social 
phenomena  and  processes.  The  formula  of  evolution  does 
not  prevent  a  correct  conception  of  them  and  in  so  far  it  is 
harmless  and  superior  to  other  universal  formulas.  The 
most  significant  part  of  Spencer's  sociology  however  is  his 
demonstration  that  psycho-social  phenomena  develop  with 

*  "  First  Principles,"  sees.  94,  97. 

t  "  The  Principles  of  Sociology."  Vol.  i,  sec.  n. 

I  [Lebensfuersorge.—  *  Solicitude  for  the  means  of  subsistence."] 


io8  ANNAI<S  OF  THE;  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

regularity.  Herein  he  displays  a  natural  talent  and  master- 
ship unequaled  save  by  Bastian.  I^et  us  notice  this  feature 
of  his  social  psychology  briefly. 

Ethnographical  and  prehistoric  investigations  conducted 
in  all  climates  and  regions  of  the  earth  have  established  the 
remarkable  fact  that  changes  in  social  phenomena  from 
period  to  period  are  consequent  and  logical,  in  a  word,  are 
evolutionary.  Thus  the  investigation  of  the  prehistoric 
material  showed  a  developing  series  of  utensils  from  bone  to 
stone,  to  bronze  and  to  iron.  The  entire  series  could  not  be 
illustrated  in  the  history  of  one  people  but  had  to  be  con- 
structed out  of  the  relics  of  peoples  from  all  regions  of  the 
globe.  Many  groups,  moreover,  had  continued  permanently 
on  some  one  stage  without  any  development  whatever.  In 
all  the  domain  of  social  life,  religious,  moral,  juridical  or 
cultural,  it  is  the  same. 

The  philosophizing  human  mind  finds  a  logical  and 
strictly  regular  development  from  fetichism  through  anthro- 
pomorphism, polytheism,  monotheism  to  the  atheism  of 
free  thinkers.  But  scarcely  would  any  one  group  illustrate 
the  whole  series;  and  how  many  groups  still  pray  to  fetiches, 
conceive  their  God  in  human  form,  people  their  heaven  with 
throngs  of  deities  or  recognize  only  one  Jahve  as  they  did 
thousands  of  years  ago!  while,  on  the  other  hand,  there 
were  occasional  free-thinkers  and  atheists  even  in  antiquity. 

Spencer's  sociological  and  Bastian's  "ethnological" 
works  abound  in  examples  of  apparent  psycho-social  develop- 
ment reconstructed  out  of  the  contributions  of  various 
peoples,  times  and  lands.  The  first  available  explanation 
might  seem  to  be  the  hypothesis  that  mankind  is  a  unit; 
and  this  explanation  has  often  been  offered.  But  man's 
actual  condition  is  unlike  the  constructed  development. 
Take  any  series  of  psycho-social  phenomena  whatever  and 
the  several  phases  prevail  as  generally  to-day  as  at  any  time 
in  the  past.  Yet  how  inviting  it  is  to  a  nineteenth  century 
European  to  construct  a  ' '  social  development ' '  from  the 
condition  of  unregulated  "free  love"  to  polyandry,  poly- 
gamy and,  finally,  to  the  "  most  beautiful  flower  of  human 
development,"  monoganry. 

Not  only  is  this  method  relied  upon  by  Spencer  repeatedly 
and  used  by  Bastian  in  compiling  his  "manifestations  of 
race-thoughts;"  even  IJppert  uses  it  in  his  thoughtful  pre- 
sentation of  the  family  and  the  priesthood,  etc.  Indisputably 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  109 

such  series  exhibit  logical  sequence  and  (logical  !)  "  con- 
formity to  law."  But  the  development  is  not  social  and 
must  not  be  taken  for  it.  The  development  of  social  institu- 
tions ought  not  to  be  confounded  with  the  development  of 
mankind  itself,  with  social  development  in  the  stricter  sense. 
Psycho-social  progress  never  takes  place  uniformly  through- 
out mankind.  Rather  there  is  always  such  a  great  variety 
of  human  conditions  that  types  may  always  be  found  for  a 
logical  series.  Not  only  thousands  of  years  ago  but  to-day 
there  are  communities  living  in  unregulated  free  love, 
and  tribes  and  races  in  which  polyandry,  polygamy  and 
monogamy  did  and  do  prevail.  Bastian  wants  to  found  a 
' '  science  of  man  ' '  upon  a  law  of  the  manifestation  of  ' '  race- 
thought,"  upon  a  case  of  psycho-social  development,  as  we 
should  call  it;  and  Spencer  constructs  his  sociology  out  of 
similar  cases.*  To  a  certain  extent  they  are  justified. 
Psycho-social  investigation  furnishes  valuable  material. 
The  ' '  examination  of  the  mental  creations  of  aggregates  to 
find  the  laws  of  the  human  mind's  growth,"  may  be  con- 
sidered an  integral  part  of  sociology,  or  ethnology,  the  word 
Bastian  prefers.  "Whenever  the  local  surface  colorations 
are  penetrated  and  analysis  is  vigorously  prosecuted,  uni- 
form fundamental  conceptions  are  disclosed,  "f  But  sociol- 
ogy, the  "  science  of  man,"  is  something  more.  Social  and 
psycho-social  must  be  sharply  distinguished.  The  former 
comprehends  the  relations  between  groups  and  communities 
of  men.  The  latter  the  manifestations  of  "race-thought" 
in  the  domain  of  religion,  morals,  rights  and  civilization. 
Only  the  laws  of  the  relations  of  distinct  aggregates  of 
human  material  to  each  other  are  social.  In  distinction, 
the  laws  of  the  "mental  creations  of  aggregates,"  to  use 
Bastian' slanguage,  may  be  suitably  designated  psycho-social. 

*  Bastian,  "  Der  Voelkergedankc  "  passim,  especially  the  conclusion, 
t  Ibid.,  p.  178. 


III.     SOCIAL  ELEMENTS  AND  THEIR 
COMBINATIONS. 

THE  PRIMITIVE  HORDE.  {Promiscuity ,    Mother-right, 

Marriage  by  Capture,  Paternal  Family, 

Property,  Sovereignty?) 

As  individual  consciousness,  long  dormant,  does  not 
awaken  until  the  mind  has  passed  through  the  early  stages 
of  development,  so  also  political  reflection  is  not  aroused 
until  after  stock  and  folk  and  other  complex  social  phe- 
nomena have  been  developed.  In  natural  science  we  are 
confronted  at  the  outset  with  composites  which  have  to  be 
analyzed,  and  so,  too,  modern  social  science  has  to  work 
laboriously  back  to  the  primitive  horde,  reconstructing  the 
originals  of  modern  social  communities  out  of  scattered  ves- 
tiges in  traditions  and  survivals,  but  deriving  great  assistance 
from  living  examples  of  wild,  "  uncivilized  "  hordes.* 

The  so-called  "  mother-right"  is  an  instance.  There  are 
vestiges  of  it  still  among  civilized  peoples,  and  its  former 
diffusion  is  confirmed  by  its  presence  among  contemporary 
uncivilized  races.  It  is  the  Ariadne's  thread  of  sociology, 
leading  through  the  complex  social  communities  of  present 
and  historic  times  back  to  the  primitive  horde. 

The  type  of  "family"  presided  over  by  the  "father" 
existed  in  Europe  even  at  the  dawn  of  history.  The  Greeks 
and  the  Romans  considered  it  the  primeval  form,  established 
by  nature,  the  true  germ  of  all  later  social  forms.  They 
followed  the  tradition  of  the  Asiatic  races  and  European 
science  accepted  the  current  view. 

Only  recently  has  ripened  reflection  and  acute  observation 
discovered  that  the  ' '  father-family ' '  was  preceded  by  a 
period  in  which  a  very  narrow  consanguineous  group  flocked 
about  the  mother  as  its  founder.  The  evidence  collected  by 

*  Darwin  _gives  the  foltowing  graphic  picture,  from  personal  observation,  of  a 
horde  politically  unorganized  :  "  The  astonishment  which  I  felt,  as  I  first  saw  a 
troop  of  Terra-del-Fuegians  on  a  wild  and  rugged  coast,  I  shall  never  forget ;  for 
the  thought  flashed  through  my  mind  at  once  :  Thus  were  our  forefathers.  These 
men  were  absolutely  naked  of  clothing  and  covered  only  with  paint.  Their  long 
hair  was  twisted  together,  their  mouths  bedriveled  from  excitement,  and  their 
expression  wild,  amazed  and  suspicious.  They  possessed  scarcely  any  skill  at  all, 
and  lived  like  wild  beasts' on  whatever  they  could  catch.  They  had  no  govern- 
ment, and  had  no  mercy  toward  those  not  of  their  own  race." — "  Descent  of  Man," 
Vol.  II,  p.  356.  Cf.  "  Rassenkampf,"  p.  195  et  seq. 

(HO) 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  in 

Bachofen,  Giraud-Teulon,  McLennan,*  and  more  recently 
by  Lippert,  Dargun  and  Wilken,  must  be  considered  con- 
clusive. Even  in  the  Germanic  law  Dargun  has  recently 
shown  undoubted  traces  of  a  former  ' '  mother-right. ' ' 

Hitherto  it  has  sufficed  to  prove  that  historically,  or  rather 
prehistorically,  there  was  a  "  mother- family  "  and  result- 
ing ' '  mother-rights, ' '  which  survived  for  centuries.  But  it 
is  more  important,  in  our  opinion,  to  show  that  the 
' '  mother-family  ' '  is  the  necessary  consequence  of  the  con- 
stitution of  an  earlier  group.  Not  only  is  this  necessary  to 
a  proper  conception  of  the  "mother-family,"  it  will  also 
help  us  to  understand  the  nature  of  what  for  the  present  we 
must  assume  to  have  been  the  primitive  horde.  The  very 
fact  that  the  former  existed  confirms  the  existence  of  the 
latter. 

Such  a  horde  cannot  be  conceived  of  simply  as  new,  or  as 
proceeding  directly  from  the  hands  of  "  a  creator; ' '  for  in  dis- 
tant parts  of  the  world  there  are  hordes  that  are  primitive 
still.  It  is  a  group  of  men  who  are  still  dependent  upon 
the  simplest  animal  impulses,  whose  conditions  of  life  and 
social  constitution  show  no  social  change.  Its  life  moves 
upon  the  plane  of  the  simplest  and  most  common  impulses 
inherent  in  man. 

The  satisfaction  of  hunger  and  thirst,  the  first  necessity, 
engages  the  men  of  the  primitive  horde  and  constitutes  a 
great  part  of  their  life  work.  The  satisfaction  of  the  sexual 
impulses  is  the  next  strongest  factor. 

The  simplest  form  of  sexual  relations  is  promiscuity, 
transient  connection  within  the  horde  according  to  accidental 
encounter  or  stronger  momentary  attraction.  It  is  still 
exemplified  in  the  conduct  of  contemporary  uncivilized 
tribes,  f 

No  fathers  are  recognized  because,  as  a  rule,  they  are 
unknown.  The  bond  of  kinship  between  the  men  and  their 
own  children  is  lacking  and  the  only  tie  of  blood  other  than 
kinship  with  the  common  stock,  which  binds  the  whole 
horde  together,  is  through  the  mother.  Under  this  primi- 
tive system  there  could  be  no  other  family  than  the  "mother- 
family. "  The  children  were  hers;  she  exercised  authority 
over  them  and  over  the  "  family  " — hence  "  mother-rule  " 
and  ' '  mother-right. ' ' 

*  "  Kinship  in  Old  Greece." 

t  For  historical  cases  see  Post,  "  Geschlechts-Genossenschaft  der  Urseit,"  pp.  16  et 
seq.,  where  the  earlier  literature  on  this  subject  is  cited. 


ii2          ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

This  type  of  family  organization  had  nearly  disappeared 
at  the  dawn  of  history.  But  numerous  traces  of  it  persist- 
ing in  tradition  have  been  collected;  and  further  proof  is 
furnished  by  the  aetiological  explanation  of  the  subordinate 
position  of  woman  where  the  opposite  system  prevails. 

A  conspicuous  case  is  the  Biblical  narrative,  which  treats 
the  woman  as  a  secondary  creation  of  God  since  she  was 
made  of  the  rib  of  the  man;  a  circumstance  tending  to 
justify  his  authority. 

This  is  perhaps  one  of  the  earliest  examples  showing  that 
no  actual  ruler  is  ever  at  a  loss  for  a  theoretical  explanation 
of  his  "right."  When  woman  lost  her  authority,  she  also 
had  to  make  the  best  of  a  descent  from  the  insignificant  rib 
of  a  man,  as  the  political  philosophers  in  the  new  order  of 
society  alleged.  They  who  suffer  the  injury  must  also 
endure  the  ridicule.  L,ater  the  subject  classes  were  traced 
to  an  inferior  descendant  of  Noah;  while  the  ruling  classes 
were  called  the  descendants  of  his  privileged,  first-born,  son. 
These  are  all  genealogical  tricks  and  aetiological  lies  of  the 
historian. 

It  is  recognized  that  mother-rule  everywhere  gave  place  to 
father-rule;  but  the  natural  forces  which  produced  this  revo- 
lution in  the  original  constitution  of  society  have  never  been 
pointed  out  so  far  as  we  know.  Yet  marriage  by  capture  or, 
more  exactly,  exogamic  connection  explains  it  fully. 

The  universality  of  woman-stealing  both  in  the  present 
and  in  the  past  is  fully  established,  and  the  custom  has 
been  well  described  by  ethnologists.  But  too  little  weight 
has  been  given  to  the  circumstance  which  constitutes  its  real 
essence:  the  wife  must  always  be  stolen  from  another  horde. 

This  is  self-evident  when  we  consider  the  condition  of  a 
horde  living  in  primitive  promiscuity.  Within  the  horde 
woman-stealing  is  impossible.  It  must  be  from  without;  and 
to  this  form  of  it  the  gynecocratic  constitution  gives 
abundant  incentive. 

In  the  raids  of  unrelated  hordes  the  woman  has  been  and 
in  many  cases  still  is  more  valuable  than  cattle  or  any  other 
form  of  food-supply.  In  the  gynecocratic  horde  an  excep- 
tional position  can  be  claimed  for  her,  for  the  captor  can  hold 
her  as  his  individual  property ;  whereas  the  native  women  are 
common  and  occupy  a  ruling  position  protected  by  custom. 

The  foreign  woman  has  no  share  in  their  privileges; 
belonging  exclusively  to  her  "lord,"  she  must  serve  as  his 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  113 

slave.  This  is  greatly  to  his  advantage;  it  was  the  begin- 
ning of  his  ' '  emancipation  ' '  in  the  primitive  horde.  No 
wonder  that  the  advantages  which  this  innovation  secured 
caused  it  to  spread  so  that,  when  the  historical  period 
opened,  traditions  of  woman-stealing  are  universal.  Recol- 
lect, for  example,  the  rape  of  the  Grecian  Helen  by  a  prince 
from  Asia  Minor,  with  which  Grecian  history  begins;  and 
the  rape  of  the  Sabine  women,  from  which  Roman  history 
starts.  Herodotus,  the  father  of  European  historiography, 
begins  characteristically  by  reciting  the  rape  of  Asiatic 
women  by  the  Greeks,  and  of  Grecian  women  by  the 
inhabitants  of  Asia. 

Woman-stealing  readily  developed  into  the  institution  of 
marriage  by  capture,  the  universality  of  which  is  fully 
attested  by  the  countless  survivals  still  persisting.* 

But  as  the  custom  spread  the  mother-family  and  mother- 
right  necessarily  declined;  the  native  women  could  not 
maintain  their  position  in  competition  with  the  foreign. 
The  charm  of  the  new  and  strange  alone  would  have 
assured  the  latter  a  certain  preference;  but  it  also  afforded 
the  man  an  opportunity,  certainly  not  unwelcome,  to  escape 
from  a  condition  which  had  become  unnecessary,  burden- 
some and  "unreasonable,"  though  the  innovation  must  have 
been  a  rude  offence  against  old  and  sacred  customs. 

Thus  mother-rule  was  overthrown,  and  with  it  fell 
mother-right  and  the  mother- family,  while  the  sovereignty 
of  the  men  was  extended  over  the  native  women  also.  They 
had  to  adapt  themselves  to  the  inevitable;  the  good  old 
custom  disappeared  and  a  new  ethico-legal  institution  pre- 
vailed: father-hood,  father- family,  father-right. 

But  its  significance  for  the  social  development  of  mankind 
was  increased  by  one  of  the  attending  circumstances,  the 
mingling  of  unlike  [heterogen]  ethnical  groups.  The  process 
has  been  continuous  and  universal  and  the  intermixtures 
are  interminable  in  number,  variety  and  degree.  Together 
with  political,  judicial  and  other  institutions,  they  have  pro- 
duced an  endless  number  of  differentiated  social  unities. 

However,  rape  was  not  the  only  occasion  of  early  inter- 
tribal hostilities;  the  plunder  of  property  must  also  have 
been  an  incentive  just  as  it  always  has  been  and  still  is,  not 
among  the  uncivilized  tribes  alone. 

Simple  plundering  raids  are  carried  on  at  irregular  intervals 

*Post  op.  ctt.,  p.  54  et  seq.     Dargun,  "  Mutterrecht  und  Raubehe,"  p.  78  et  seq. 


ii4          ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

as  necessity  dictates  and  circumstances  allow.  But  they 
generally  lead  to  expeditions  for  the  permanent  subjec- 
tion of  the  foreign  horde  and  the  acquisition  of  territory.* 

These  latter  conditions  are  the  most  favorable  for  the 
development  of  civilization,  as  has  been  explained  else- 
where.f  Yet  the  proximate  basis  of  the  evolution  is  the 
institution  of  property  which  develops  in  connection  with 
them  also. 

We  have  already  seen  that  property  developed  concur- 
rently with  the  control  of  one  group  of  men  over  another 
and,  in  fact,  as  a  means  to  uphold  it.f  But  a  few  remarks 
must  be  added  here,  partly  for  the  sake  of  greater  clearness, 
and  partly  because  of  some  recent  works  which  were  writ- 
ten in  ignorance  of  our  explanation. 

In  the  first  place  property  in  land  is,  in  our  opinion,  the 
only  form  which  serves  as  an  instrument  of  control.  "Prop- 
erty "  in  movable  goods  should  be  distinguished  from 
property  in  immovable  goods.  What  is  there  in  common 
between  the  unlimited  possession  and  free  disposal  of  chat- 
tels and  that  juridical  relation  in  virtue  of  which  a  person 
may  keep  a  piece  of  land  exclusively  for  his  own  benefit? 
Yet  for  these  fundamentally  different  conceptions  the  Euro- 
pean languages  use  but  one  term,  with  consequent  indistinct- 
ness and  confusion  of  ideas  in  science. 

Common  property  {Eigentum,  proprium)  is  a  contradic- 
tion in  terms;  yet  even  separate  or  private  "  property  "  has 
been  discussed  as  a  simple  concept  and  what  might  be  true 
of  property  in  movable  goods  has  been  applied  without  dis- 
tinction to  property  in  land,  a  very  different  thing.  This  is 
certainly  a  great  mistake. 

To  justify  private  property  as  the  natural  right  of  the 
individual  to  the  fruit  of  his  own  exertions  sufficiently 
explains  property  in  movable  goods,  including  the  product 
of  the  land  which  a  man's  own  labor  has  tilled,  but  does  not 
explain  property  in  land  or  in  the  fruit  of  another's 
labor;  while  to  trace  its  origin  to  the  actual  possession  of 
weapons,  ornaments,  etc.,  an  attempt  which  Dargun  has 

*  Some  idea  of  the  behavior  of  primitive  stocks  can  be  gotten  from  the  modern 
Bedouins  who,  however,  have  made  considerable  progress.  A  recent  French 
traveler  writes  :  "  To  fall  upon  caravans  of  strangers,  to  drive  off  flocks,  capture 
goods,  kill  and  massacre  the  defenders,  especially  if  they  are  inhabitants  of  cities, 
such  are  the  virtues  which  he  rates  highest.  All  these  ignoble  heroes  of  Bedouin 
legend  we  would  send  to  the  galleys  as  highway  robbers."  Gabriel  Charms, 
"  Voyage  en  Syrie."  Revue  des  deux  Mondes,  August  15,  1881. 

r     Der  Rassenkatupf,"  p.  231. 

j  "  Rechtsstaat  una  Socialismus,"  p.  344. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  115 

recently  renewed,  leaves  a  gap  between  movable  goods  and 
immovable  which  no  analogy  can  bridge  over,  for  they  are 
totally  different.  No  doubt  individual  property  in  movable 
goods  has  always  existed,  for  the  conditions  of  human  life 
require  it.  But  the  conditions  of  property  in  land  are  quite 
different.  L,and  is  not  the  product  of  human  labor,  and  its 
use  is  temporary;  it  can  be  occupied,  detained  or  possessed 
only  in  a  limited  and  figurative  sense;  it  might  be  possible  to 
defend  a  small  portion  of  land  against  trespassers;  but  it 
would  be  impossible  to  defend  the  larger  tracts  which  alone 
are  under  consideration  here.  Property  in  land  is  not  a 
physical  fact  and  cannot  be  explained  by  physical  facts: 
occupation,  labor,  etc.  To  say  that  land  is  occupied  or  pos- 
sessed, as  is  currently  done,  is  to  use  a  metaphor  or  a  legal 
fiction.  Land,  by  its  nature,  admits  of  only  one  relation  to 
man,  the  enjoyment  of  its  use,  the  common  enjoyment  of 
many. 

Hence  the  first  form  of  property  in  land  must  have  been 
its  common  use,  and  further,  it  must  have  been  used  by  such 
a  group  or  horde  as  we  meet  with  everywhere  in  the  begin- 
ning of  social  evolution.  The  evidence  supporting  this 
conclusion  is  abundant.  Even  the  primitive  hordes  of 
modern  times  use  land  in  common.* 

Thus,  in  the  nature  of  the  cases,  common  property  in 
movable  goods  is  impossible,  but  so-called  common  property 
in  land  is  real  and  original.  What  is  commonly  called 
private  property  in  land  is  never  real,  much  less  original;  it 
is  purely  a  legal  relation ;  presupposing  a  complicated  social 
organization.  It  presupposes,  first  of  all,  an  organized  con- 
trol, with  power  to  compel  obedience.  This  is  necessary 
that  the  individuals  of  the  ruling  class  may  procure  from  the 
subject  class  the  labor  power  to  till  their  lands  and  make 
them  useful;  thus  they  prove  their  property.  Without  power 
to  dispose  of  the  labor  force  of  others  it  would  be  merely  a 
name,  with  that  power  it  becomes  valuable. 

A  second  presupposition  is  the  possibility  of  excluding 
some  from  the  enjoyment  of  the  product  in  favor  of  others. 
The  organized  whole  must  protect  the  movable  goods  thus 
acquired;  for  if  they  were  left  exposed  to  every  aggressor 
it  would  not  be  worth  while  to  raise  them.  In  a  word, 
property  in  land  is  a  legal  relation  which  necessarily  presup- 

*"Man  does  not  have  property  in  immovable  things  upon  this  stage."— Lip- 
pert,  "  Prtesterthum,"  vol.  i,  p.  35. 


n6  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

poses  governmental  organization  and  the  guarantee  of  legal 
protection. 

Thus  the  ' '  common  property  ' '  which  the  primitive  horde 
is  said  to  enjoy  in  the  land  on  which  it  has  settled  is  simply 
common  use  and  not  real  ownership,  for  the  word  "own" 
contains  originally  the  idea  of  separateness.  Laying  aside 
our  complex,  advanced  legal  relations,  and  speaking  of 
primitive  conditions,  we  must  take  ' '  ownership  "  to  be 
separate  ownership  and  its  antithesis  is  uuseparated,  not- 
own,  i.  e.,  common.  It  was  a  much  later  and  over-refined 
jurisprudence  which  transferred  the  idea  of  separate  owner- 
ship to  a  juristic  person  composed  of  a  number  of  natural 
persons,  and  it  would  be  an  unseemly  transfer  of  modern 
legal  conceptions  to  speak  of  the  common  property  of  the 
primitive  horde. 

Passing  on  from  the  use  of  the  land  in  common,  we  first 
recognize  the  beginnings  of  separate  immovable  property 
when  one  horde  has  overpowered  another  and  uses  its  labor 
force.  As  soon  as  there  are  subjects  who  are  excluded  from 
the  enjoyment  of  certain  goods  which  their  own  labor  con- 
tributed to  produce,  in  favor  of  the  ruling  class,  and  when 
the  members  of  the  ruling  class  are  protected  in  their  enjoy- 
ment of  them  by  the  well-organized  whole,  then  there  arises 
separate  or  private  property  in  immovable  goods.  Not  only 
did  this  form  of  property  arise  with  the  organization  of  con- 
trol and  by  means  of  it,  it  was  at  first  the  sole  object  of  the 
organization,  which,  moreover,  contains  the  germ  of  the 
state.  So  long  as  the  organization  continues  in  a  nomadic 
condition,  and  lords  and  slaves  alike  have  no  abiding  place, 
we  do  not  call  it  a  state.  We  apply  that  term  only  when  a 
permanent  dwelling  place  has  been  adopted  and  the  organi- 
zation asserts  its  sovereign  right  of  property  over  the  land 
it  occupies  against  all  other  social  communities. 

THE  STATE. 

The  state  is  a  social  phenomenon  consisting  of  social 
elements  behaving  according  to  social  laws.  The  first  step  is 
the  subjection  of  one  social  group  by  another  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  sovereignty;  and  the  sovereign  body  is  always 
the  less  numerous.  But  numerical  inferiority  is  supple- 
mented by  mental  superiority  and  greater  military  disci- 
pline. There  is  a  double  life  in  the  state;  we  can  clearly 
distinguish  the  activities  of  the  state  as  a  whole,  as  a  single 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.       117 

social  structure,  from  those  emanating  from  the  social 
elements. 

The  activities  of  the  state  as  a  whole  originate  in  the 
sovereign  class  which  acts  with  the  assistance  or  with  the 
compulsory  acquiescence  of  the  subject  class.  The  move- 
ment is  from  within  out;  it  is  directed  against  other  states 
and  social  groups.  Its  object  is  always  defence  against 
attacks,  increase  of  power  and  territory,  that  is,  conquest  in 
one  form  or  another;  and  its  motive,  in  the  ultimate  analysis, 
lies  in  human  providence,  in  the  impulse  to  secure  condi- 
tions favorable  for  existence  [in  Lebensfuersorge\  to  use 
Uppert's  apt  expression. 

The  activities  within  the  state  are  seen  in  the  several 
social  elements  and  arise  naturally  from  the  positions  which 
they  occupy  in  the  state  and  to  each  other. 

The  motive  of  each  is  essentially  the  same  as  that  which 
animates  the  state  as  a  whole.  They  seek  conditions  favor- 
able to  existence  and  therefore  endeavor  to  increase  their 
power.  In  particular,  the  superior  class  seeks  to  make  the 
most  productive  use  of  the  subject  classes;  as  a  rule  this 
leads  to  oppression  and  can  always  be  considered  as  exploit- 
ation. The  subject  classes  strive  for  greater  powers  of 
resistance  in  order  to  lessen  their  dependence. 

These  are  the  simplest  and  most  fundamental  efforts  and 
they  account  for  the  internal  and  external  development 
of  the  state;  while  differences  in  the  history  of  different 
states  are  due  to  different  local  and  ethnical  conditions. 

As  the  commonest  things  of  life  are  often  the  most  diffi- 
cult to  understand,  so  it  is  that  political  scientists  to  this 
day  have  no  clear  conception  of  the  state;  each  has  his  own 
definition  and  scarcely  one  is  correct. 

Modern  scholasticism  has  made  the  theory  of  the  state 
endless  and  fruitless.  "Volume  I"  of  a  work  on  the 
definition  of  the  state  has  appeared  in  Berlin  *  already  and 
there  is  a  "history"  and  a  methodology  of  the  subject. 
Who  will  write  a  theory  of  the  theory  of  the  state  ?  Some 
use  general  terms,  calling  the  state  a  "  politically  organized 
national  person  "f  or  the  "highest  form  of  personality,"  or 
the  "  organism  of  freedom."  Others  solve  the  problem  by 
using  a  metaphor,  by  calling  it  a  "  living  being, "  an"  organ- 
ism,' '  etc.  But  Knies  justly  remarks  that  "  it  is  a  sad  proof 

*  Von  Rotenburg,  "Ueber  den  Begrijff des  Staates." 

fBluntschli,  "  The  Theory  of  the  State."  (Clarendon  Press)  bk.  i,  cap.  i,  p.  23. 


n8  ANNAI.S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

of  unclear  thinking  to  discuss  scientific  conceptions  in  meta- 
phors. ' '  *  Schulze  made  great  progress  in  the  method  of 
defining  the  state  by  insisting  that  ' '  it  is  a  question  of 
separating  the  essential  from  the  unessential  in  the  pleni- 
tude of  social  phenomena;" f  and  after  methodically 
searching  for  its  historical  characteristics  he  concluded  that 
it  is  the  ' '  association  of  a  settled  folk  in  an  organic 
community  under  a  sovereign  power  and  a  definite  constitu- 
tion for  the  purpose  of  securing  all  the  common  ends  of  a 
folk's  existence,  above  all  for  the  establishment  of  law  and 
order.  J 

But  his  definition  can  be  improved  by  eliminating  super- 
fluous parts.  The  idea  by  no  means  clearly  expressed  in 
the  words  ' '  an  organic  community  ' '  is  included  in  the  pre- 
ceding phrase;  for  a  "  folk,"  and  much  more,  a  "settled 
folk,"  is  "an  organic  community."  Indeed  a  "settled 
folk  "  is  a  state;  no  further  ' '  association  "  is  needed  to  make 
it  one.  It  is  superfluous  also  to  mention  a  "  constitution," 
for  a  written  constitution  is  not  essential  and  an  unwritten 
constitution  is  a  prerequisite  of  a  "  settled  folk." 

If  nothing  but  the  universal  and  essential  characteristics 
of  every  state  were  incorporated  into  the  definition,  an 
agreement  could  be  easily  reached  for  there  are  but  two. 
First,  there  are  certain  institutions  directed  to  securing  the 
sovereignty  of  some  over  the  others;  secondly,  the  sove- 
reignty is  always  exercised  by  a  minority.  A  state,  there- 
fore, is  the  organized  control  of  the  minority  over  the 
majority.  This  is  the  only  true  and  universal  definition;  it 
is  apt  in  every  case.§ 

But  many  definitions  of  the  state  predicate  its  end, 
declaring  it  to  be  a  union  or  community  for  securing  the 
common  weal,  for  realizing  justice,  etc.  All  this  is  wholly 
inadmissible.  No  state  was  ever  founded  with  one  of  these 

*Knies,  "  Statistik  als  Wissenschaft,'"  1850,  p.  90. 

t  Schulze,  "Einleiung  in  das  Deutsche  Staatsrecht"  1865,  p.  116,  sec.  25. 

\Ibid,  sec.  32. 

\  Elsewhere  in  his  book  Schulze  gives  almost  the  same  definition.  In  section  41  he 
says  that  "  it  is  observable  that  in  all  actual  states  men  are  subject  to  a  sovereign 
power  and  that,  as  members  of  the  body  politic,  they  are  even  held  by  physical 
compulsion  to  certain  lines  of  activity."  And  in  section  49  :  "The  presence  of_a 
supreme  controlling  power  is  essential  to  the  notion  of  a  state."  Von  Ihering,  in 
"Zweck  im  Recht,"  Vol.  I,  p.  130,  defines  the  state  to  be  "  society  as  possessor  of  an 
orderly  and  disciplined  power  of  compulsion."  But  he  tries  to  define  the  "  state  " 
by  the  less  clear  term  "  society  "  and,  besides,  adopts  the  untenable  French  view 
of  "  popular  sovereignty."  Continuing  the  argument,  he  again  defines  the  state 
as  "organized  social  compulsion."  Properly  understood  this  is  nearly  correct. 
But  we  had  already  (" Philosophisches  Staatsrecht,"  1876)  defined  the  state  to  be 
"the  organized  sovereignty  of  some  over  the  others;"  and  as  "  sovereignty  "  is 
more  specific  than  "compulsion,"  our  definition  is  the  clearer  of  the  two. 


THE;  OUTLINES  OP  SOCIOLOGY.  119 

ends  in  view;  and  there  are  many  which  are  states  though 
they  have  never  exhibited  even  a  trace  of  such  a  purpose. 
The  truth  is  that  in  the  course  of  time  under  favorable  con- 
ditions every  sovereign  organization  necessarily  acts  in 
harmony  with  these  ends;  thus  any  state  may  serve  them, 
indeed  after  reaching  a  certain  stage  of  development  every 
state  does  endeavor  to  advance  justice,  welfare,  etc.  But 
the  definition  must  not  be  confined  to  states  at  one  stage  of 
development  only;  it  must  apply  regardless  of  the  stage 
which  has  been  or  ever  will  be  attained.  Moreover,  the 
affirmation  of  such  ends  conceals  the  fact  that  the  single 
object  in  organizing  a  state  was  to  establish  the  sovereignty 
of  some  over  the  others,  and  that  the  results  which  neces- 
sarily followed  were  not  foreseen,  much  less  intended;  they 
cannot  be  referred  to  the  intention  of  the  founders  who  fol- 
lowed their  own  immediate  advantage,  as  all  men  do.  High 
above  egoistic  human  efforts  social  development  is  the  prod- 
uct of  natural  law. 

There  is  still  another  universal  characteristic  of  the  state, 
although  it  has  hitherto  been  wholly  overlooked;  there  are 
always  ethnical  differences  between  the  ruling  class  and 
the  ruled. 

We  called  attention  to  it  for  the  first  time  in  our  former 
publications;  "authorities  in  political  science"  solemnly 
ignored  it;  but  they  could  not  refute  it.  The  world  moves, 
nevertheless.*  States  have  never  arisen  except  through  the 
subjection  of  one  stock  by  another,  or  by  several  others  in 
alliance. 

This  is  not  accidental;  it  is  essential,  as  we  have  already 
proven.  No  state  has  arisen  without  original  ethnical  hete- 
rogeneity [Hetetogeneitaei] ;  its  unity  is  the  product  of  social 
development. 

Spencer  without  specially  emphasizing  ethnical  hetero- 
geneity confirms  our  position  when  he  says  that  ' '  no  tribe 
becomes  a  nation  by  simple  growth."  Instead  of  the  naive 
conception  that  a  family  gradually  grows  to  be  a  tribe  and 
the  tribe  becomes  a  folk,  he  holds  that  there  must  be  a  com- 
bination of  several  tribes;  to  which  we  add  that,  with  per- 
haps a  few  unknown  exceptions,  tribes  are  united  only  by 
the  forcible  subjection  of  one  to  the  other.  Spencer  also 
goes  on  to  say  that  "  no  great  society  (nation)  is  formed  by 

[*  Playing  on  the  words  attributed  to  Galileo  while  under  ecclesiastical  sentence 
for  his  astronomical  views. — E pur  si  tnuove.] 


I2O          ANNAI.S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

the  direct  union  of  the  smallest  societies  ;  "  *  by  which  he 
evidently  means  that  a  great  nation  necessarily  comprises 
several  smaller  ones  and  includes  a  multitude  of  ethnically 
compound  groups;  it  is  a  group  of  the  nth  power,  so  to 
speak. 

I/et  us  observe  the  necessary  result  of  founding  a  state, 
i.  e.t  of  subjecting  one  community  to  another  or  to  a  union 
of  several  others.  It  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  it  is 
due  to  the  effort  to  secure  conditions  favorable  for  existence. 
But  the  efforts  which  men  naturally  make  to  better  their 
condition  require  the  services  of  other  men;  if  this  were  not 
so,  states  would  never  have  been  founded  and  mankind 
would  have  developed  along  quite  different  lines  or  not  at  all. 
It  will  be  readily  conceded  that  civilized  men  cannot  live 
without  the  services  of  others.  But  there  is  no  man 
known  to  history  nor  can  any  be  thought  of  so  uncivilized  as 
to  be  able  to  renounce  the  co-operation  of  his  kind. 

The  services  which  are  needed  are  not  easy;  and  the 
farther  back  we  go  the  heavier  they  necessarily  were.  Their 
alleviation  is  an  infallible  characteristic  of  progressing  civil- 
ization; we  can  observe  it  in  the  development  of  current 
industrial  relations,  and  the  struggle  for  it  is  the  real  subject- 
matter  of  so-called  social  legislation  (Social  poliHk) .  How 
men  must  have  had  to  labor  and  indeed  must  still  labor 
without  the  knowledge  and  the  means  of  civilization!  f 

Many  governments  still  commute  death  sentences  to  labor 
in  the  mines  expecting  to  profit  by  this  act  of  grace;  and 
once  the  conquered  were  similarly  condemned  to  slave-labor 
in  the  interest  of  the  victors.  Men  never  have  treated  their 
fellow-men  (using  that  word  in  its  most  primitive  sense)  so 
severely;  and  why  should  they  do  violence  to  their  natural 
feelings  when  strangers  have  never  been  lacking  whom  it 
has  always  been  meritorious  to  prey  upon.  United  under 
the  leadership  of  the  eldest  and  the  mightiest  they  have 
imposed  the  yoke  of  servitude  upon  the  stranger  in  hard- 
fought  battle. 

*  "  Principles  of  Sociology."    Vol.  i,  sees.  257,  260.  456;  cf.  sees.  448,  451. 

fThe  naval  captain,  PanteroPantera,  said  of  labor  in  the  galleys  in  "ISArmata 
Navale,"  1614:  "  High  wages  will  supply  a  galley  with  soldiers  and  sailors,  but  free- 
men cannot  be  persuaded  to  submit  to  service  at  the  oars,  to  be  fastened  to  the 
chain  _and  to  take  without  possibility  of  resistance  the  bastinading  and  other 
inflictions  incident  to  labor  in  the  galleys."  Yet,  if  the  galley  was  to  move  with 

Erecision,  the  rowing  must  be  controlled  by  chain,  bastinado  and  all.    Therefore 
e  advised  that  convicted  criminals  be  sentenced  to  this  slave's  work.    Such  was 
labor  in  the  galleys  even  so  late  as  the  seventeenth  century.  "Za  Fin  tfune  grande 
Marine,"  by  Jurien  de  la  Graviere,  "Revue  des  Deux  Afondes,"  November  i,  1884. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  121 

Thus  nature  laid  the  foundation  of  ethnically  composite 
states  in  human  necessities  and  sentiments.  Human  labor 
being  necessary,  sympathy  with  kindred  and  tribe  and 
deadly  hatred  of  strangers  led  to  foreign  wars.  So  conquest 
and  the  satisfaction  of  needs  through  the  labor  of  the  con- 
quered, essentially  the  same  though  differing  in  form,  is  the 
great  theme  of  human  history  from  prehistoric  times  to  the 
latest  plan  for  a  Congo  state. 

Notice  the  condition  thus  established.  The  one  party 
commands;  the  other  labors  and  accommodates  itself  to 
superior  force.  As  every  war  must  cease  raging  and  the 
weaker  party  must  give  up  fruitless  opposition,  so  nature 
helps  to  make  the  situation  peaceful  and  lasting.  But  peace 
and  permanence  are  the  elements  of  order,  out  of  which 
come  habit,  custom,  rights. 

The  hostile  contact  of  different  \heterog eri\  social  elements 
of  unlike  strength  is  the  first  condition  for  the  creation  of 
rights ;  the  conditions  established  by  force  and  accepted  in 
weakness,  if  peaceably  continued,  become  rightful.  Inequal- 
ity of  power  is  essential,  for  contestants  of  equal  strength 
would  wear  themselves  out  in  mutual  conflict  or,  more  natu- 
rally,  would  unite  and  subject  a  weaker.  Moreover  inequality 
is  stamped  on  every  right;  the  husband  orders  his  wife,  the 
parent  in  the  strength  of  his  years  commands  his  minor 
children,  the  owner  excludes  all  others  from  enjoying  the 
fruit  of  his  property:  all  these  are  rights  expressing  the 
orderly  relations  of  unequals.  It  is  an  error  and  a  delu- 
sion to  think  that  rights  have  been  or  can  be  equally 
distributed.  They  arise  only  in  the  relations  which 
exist  in  the  state;  they  express  them  and  measure  their 
inequality. 

Let  us  now  examine  more  closely  the  nature  of  political 
relations.  Universally  there  is  a  ruling  minority  and  a  sub- 
ject majority,  this  is  the  essence  of  the  state  as  it  is  the 
essence  of  sovereignty. 

But  what  is  the  ruling  minority  disposed  to  do  ?  There  is 
but  one  thing  it  can  wish,  viz.:  to  live  in  better  circum- 
stances with  the  services  of  the  subject  majority  than  it  could 
without  them.  The  result  is  a  common  industrial  enter- 
prise conducted  under  compulsion  in  which  the  greater 
burden,  all  the  unfree  service,  falls  upon  the  subject  class 
though  the  rulers  freely  contribute  their  no  less  valu- 
able share  in  support  of  the  political  community.  Thus 


122  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

compulsory  labor  is  organized  through  the  organization  of 
sovereignty  and  the  whole  body  of  rights. 

The  kind  of  industrial  labor  depends  upon  the  nature  of 
the  soil,  the  climate  and  the  material  resources  of  the  state. 
If  the  subjected  population  was  roving  over  rich  agricultural 
lands  it  will  be  compelled  to  till  the  soil  and  the  conquerors 
will  settle  among  them  so  as  to  exploit  both  land  and  people 
to  the  best  advantage.  The  agricultural  states  of  Europe 
still  bear  traces  of  such  a  compulsory  organization  of  labor 
wherever  an  exclusive  nobility  has  settled  among  a  numer- 
ous agricultural  population,  spreading  itself  like  a  net  over 
the  whole  land. 

But  a  huge  swarm  inhabiting  an  extended  prairie  and 
pasture  land  will  adopt  a  different  social  organization.  The 
captives  taken  on  many  a  plundering  raid  will  be  distributed 
among  the  members  to  perform  the  heavier  work  of  tending 
cattle,  transporting  tents  and  the  like.  The  nomadic  state 
thus  organized  will  fulfill  its  political  functions  as  truly  as 
the  settled  state  of  the  large  property  owners.  In  the  latter 
case  the  lord  upon  his  manor  or  in  his  castle  manages  the 
peasants  ?nd  vassals  settled  about  him,  satisfying  their  simple 
necessities  from  the  produce  of  the  fields  and  reserving  the 
surplus  for  himself.  In  the  nomadic  state  the  master  from 
his  chieftain's  tent  rules  over  his  numerous  following,  who 
tend  his  herds  and  enjoy  a  simple  subsistence  out  of  the 
increase;  the  rest  of  which,  after  the  richer  subsistence  of 
his  family  is  deducted,  is  added  to  his  accumulated  wealth 
and  capital. 

The  organization  will  be  different  still  where  a  narrow 
strip  of  coast  like  Phoenicia,  or  a  group  of  islands  like 
Venice,  make  agricultural  or  pastoral  pursuits  impossible. 
The  superior  speculative  talent  of  the  ruling  class  must 
suggest  another  method  of  utilizing  the  services  of  the  sub- 
ject class;  they  will  be  put  to  ship-building  and  employed 
as  sailors,  so  that  the  rulers  may  seek  distant  coasts  and  win 
wealth  and  power  in  navigation  and  foreign  trade. 

Labor  must  always  be  organized  under  compulsion;  the 
training  and  the  discipline  of  the  state  are  necessary.  It 
demands  of  the  laboring  class,  in  the  beginning  at  least, 
untold  sacrifice  of  life  and  health;  but  finally  in  a  rising  civil- 
ization they  become  participants  in  the  material  and  moral 
possessions. 

The  life  of  the  state  is  summed  up  in  this  common  though 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  123 

unequal  labor.  In  it  the  state  performs  its  task  and  fulfills 
its  mission,  if  task  and  mission  can  be  spoken  of  where 
blind  impulse  rules  on  every  hand;  out  of  it  comes  the  highest 
moral  possession  of  mankind,  civilization.* 

THE  STATE  AS  INDUSTRIAL  ORGANIZATION. 

The  motive  force  in  the  establishment  of  primitive  politi- 
cal relations  was  economic  as  has  been  seen;  higher  material 
welfare  was  sought.  But  this  force  never  fails;  the  inner- 
most nature  of  man  keeps  it  in  ceaseless  operation,  promot- 
ing the  development  of  the  state  as  it  laid  its  foundation. 
Investigate  the  cause  of  any  political  revolution  and  the 
result  will  prove  that  social  progress  is  always  produced  by 
economic  causes.  Indeed  it  cannot  be  otherwise  since  man's 
material  need  is  the  prime  motive  of  his  conduct. f 

This  necessity  incited  men  to  exploit  the  services  of  their 
fellows,  and  nature  supplied  a  great  many  different  groups 
whose  natural  antagonism  is  still  an  important  factor  in 
developing  political  relations;  for  human  labor  could  not  be 
exploited  without  violence,  and  ethnical  and  social  contrasts 
promote  the  disregard  of  all  human  considerations,  facilitat- 
ing the  satisfaction  of  human  needs  and  maintaining  the 
everlasting  struggle.  Thus  the  two  fundamental  social 
processes  are  satisfaction  of  needs  and  exploitation  of  the 
services  {Dienstbarmachung)  of  foreigners,  two  apparently 
unimportant  means  with  which  nature  accomplishes  so  much. 
Moreover  the  evolution  cannot  cease;  for  nature  has  pro- 
vided that  man's  needs  shall  not  stand  still;  higher  and 
"  nobler  "  wants  are  constantly  awakened;  while  at  the 
point  where  natural  ethnical  distinctions  \Heter ogen£it(Bten\ 
would  disappear  artificial  ' '  social ' '  distinctions  arise  to  per- 
petuate the  antagonism  of  human  groups.  Human  desires 
never  fail  and  there  are  groups  differing  in  stature,  color  and 
odor,  in  diet,  morals  and  religion,  or  in  possessions,  condi- 
tions, calling,  occupations  and  interests. 

Only  in  the  course  of  social  development  they  rise  to 
higher  stages  and  meet  us  in  new  forms  as  the  need  for 
the  bare  means  of  subsistence  with  the  most  primitive  is  trans- 
formed in  the  higher  stages  into  the  necessity  for  satisfying 

*  In  addition  see  "  Organized  Sovereignty  and  Civilization."  "Der  Rassenkampf," 
pp.  231  et  seq. 

f  "  The  real  motive  force  is  the  actual  need.  The  only  reason  for  formulating  it 
in  fixed  law  is  to  give  it  recognized  legal  basis,"  says  Bruns  on  the  Development 
of  the  Roman  Law,  in  Holtzendorff  's  "  Encyclopesdie,"  p.  91. 


124          ANNAI<S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

ambition,  love  of  glory,  the  interests  of  a  dynasty  and 
various  other  ideals;  and  the  life  and  death  struggle  between 
hordes  anthropologically  different  \heterogen\  becomes  a  con- 
test between  social  groups,  classes,  estates  and  political  par- 
ties. The  great  sociological  difficulty  in  describing  the  course 
of  development  arises  from  the  fact  that  there  can  be  no 
leaps.  Though  social  development  like  every  other  case  of 
evolution  is  gradual,  the  transitional  phases  are  innumerable 
and  imperceptible  and  overtax  the  resources  of  science.  The 
only  alternative  is  to  treat  a  small  number  of  examples 
chosen  more  or  less  arbitrarily,  which  is  all  we  can  endeavor 
to  do  here. 

It  must  riot  be  forgotten  that  here,  as  elsewhere,  the  same 
phenomena  are  found  sometimes  contemporaneously,  some- 
times in  sequence.  There  is  a  social  development  in  time 
from  the  simplest  satisfaction  of  necessities  and  the  rudest 
struggle  for  existence  up  to  the  highest  needs  of  a  refined 
civilization  and  the  system  of  rights  developed  in  political 
strife;  while  its  counterpart  with  all  the  imperceptible  gra- 
dations and  vivid  contrasts  can  be  seen  in  the  cross-section, 
so  to  speak,  of  a  state  on  the  highest  plane  of  development; 
for  if  we  look  at  its  inner  structure  we  see  the  proletarian 
toiling  for  his  daily  bread  in  the  sweat  of  his  brow,  and  all 
the  countless  stages  to  the  uppermost  rung  of  society,  to  the 
statesman  struggling  for  position  or  for  principle.  Moreover, 
what  is  true  of  the  desires  is  true  also  of  the  means  of 
satisfying  them. 

This  in  passing.  I^et  us  now  turn  to  a  closer  analysis  of 
the  social  evolution  founded  upon  and  promoted  by  organ- 
ized sovereignty.  Equality  prevails  only  in  the  most  primi- 
tive hordes.  In  them  alone  are  needs  satisfied  without  the 
subordination  of  one  man's  labor  to  another's  ends;  in  them 
alone  there  is  neither  command  nor  obedience,  lordship  nor 
dependence, chieftain  nor  subject.  Equal  misery  is  the  lot  of 
all. 

' '  When  Rink  asked  the  Nicobarians  who  among  them  was 
the  chief  they  replied,  laughing,  how  could  he  believe  that 
one  could  have  power  against  so  many  ?  ' '  And  there  are 
many  similar  examples.  Among  the  Haidahs  ' '  the  people 
seemed  all  equal;"  Among  the  California  tribes  "each 
individual  does  as  he  likes;  "  among  the  Navajos,  •''  each  is 
sovereign  in  his  own  right. ' '  * 

*  [Add  "as  warrior."]    See  Spencer,  "  Principles  of  Sociology,"  Vol.  il<  sec.  471 
and  sec.  466. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  125 

"  Groups  of  Esquimaux,  of  Australians,  of  Bushmen,  of  Fuegians, 
are  without  even  that  primary  contrast  of  parts  implied  by  settled 
chieftainship.  Their  members  are  subject  to  no  control  but  such  as  is 
temporarily  acquired  by  the  stronger,  or  more  cunning,  or  more  expe- 
rienced, not  even  a  permanent  nucleus  is  present."  * 

Plainly  the  subjection  of  some  to  the  service  of  others  is 
opposed  to  the  feeling  of  equality,  of  solidarity,  of  consan- 
guineous relationships.  Even  the  ruling  classes  of  Europe 
exhibit  the  same  feeling.  ' '  The  nobleman  in  a  peasant's 
cottage  is  the  peer  of  the  commander  of  the  Palatine's  army" 
( ' '  Szalchcic  na  zagrodzie  rbwny  wojewodzie  "  ) ,  say  the  Poles. 
This  is  the  equality  of  the  syngenetic  group,  f 

The  primitive  horde  emerges  from  this  condition  of  uni- 
form independence  and  uniform  misery  only  when  a  strange 
horde  comes  within  its  reach  as  the  result  generally  of 
migration  or  a  plundering  raid.  If  it  subjects  the  strangers 
its  wants  are  more  easily  satisfied  and  its  economic  life  is 
raised  above  the  primitive  condition;  the  "extra"  labor  of 
some  for  others  begins. 

If  the  rulers  should  remain  content  with  the  higher  stage 
of  economic  life;  if  they  could  isolate  their  state  from 
external  influences,  development  would  cease.  But  Lycur- 
gian  plans  can  never  be  realized;  states  can  never  be  "iso- 
lated "  even  with  Chinese  walls  about  them. 

Stagnation  in  development  is  prevented  by  the  steady 
growth  of  the  wants  of  both  rulers  and  subjects,  for  the  law 
that  wants  increase  with  the  opportunity  to  satisfy  them  is 
universal,  and  the  isolated  state  is  also  an  object  of  desire  to 
its  neighbors  near  and  remote,  so  that  as  they  grow  power- 
ful it  must  increase  its  means  of  offence  and  defence.  Even 
the  least  aggressive  state  will  be  drawn  in  spite  of  itself  into 
the  stream  of  "history;"  evolution  cannot  stop.  As  wants 
increase,  the  state,  which  was  called  into  being  to  satisfy 
them,  is  driven  to  further  conquests  of  territory  and  power. 
But  the  same  tendency  which  animates  the  state  as  a  whole 
animates  also  each  social  division  within  it.  The  only  dif- 
ference is  that  its  manifestation  is  confined  by  established 
political  relations  to  a  struggle  for  control  by  peaceful 
means;  while  outside  the  state  it  breaks  out  in  bloody  and 
destructive  wars. 

But,  however  unavoidable  war  may  be,  it  cannot  last 
always;  for  it  produces  physical  and  mental  exhaustion; 

*  Spencer,  "Principles  of  Sociology."    Vol.  i,  sec.  228;  Vol.  ii,  sec.  456. 
tSee  "  Der  Rassenkampf"  p.  40. 


126        ANNALS  OP  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

and  if  it  becomes  chronic  the  end  for  which  it  is  undertaken 
is  thereby  defeated. 

Peace  is  as  necessary  as  occasional  war,  for  both  are  the 
result  of  a  natural  law  of  strife;  and  so  it  was  possible  to 
establish  states,  since  otherwise  the  more  powerful  must 
have  had  to  exterminate  the  weaker.  But  peace  is  useless 
without  the  opportunity  to  satisfy  the  wants  which  war  was 
undertaken  to  secure.  However,  only  one  party  can  be 
victor;  one  party  secures  the  better  satisfaction  of  its  wants; 
and  the  other  is  circumscribed  and  oppressed.  Some  force 
is  necessary  to  maintain  the  unequal  condition  in  peace; 
suitable  institutions  must  be  set  up  and  sedulously  sus- 
tained. This  the  ruling  and  possessing  class  does  while  the 
other  class  accommodates  itself  to  the  law  of  the  victors. 
But  it  jealously  guards  the  established  limits,  now  staking 
everything  on  preventing  any  further  circumscription,  now 
striving  to  enlarge  them. 

So  apparent  peace  is  only  a  continuous  latent  struggle. 
What  is  its  object  ?  What  are  the  means  employed  ?  What 
is  its  essential  characteristic  ?  The  immediate  object  of 
dispute  is  the  body  of  reciprocal  rights.  The  less  privileged 
oppose  every  limitation  whatever  asserted  in  the  interest  of 
sovereignty:  restricted  connubial  rights,  exclusion  from 
office  and  positions  of  honor,  incapacity  for  holding  landed 
property  and  others  only  relatively  less  important  and  less 
common.  Sovereignty  cannot  be  maintained  without  them, 
and  the  peaceful  struggle  of  the  unprivileged  is  directed  to 
breaking  them  down  and  removing  them  eventually. 

In  the  common  interest,  the  subject  class  must  be  assigned 
some  privileges  and  functions,  for  Spartan  severity  cannot 
be  rigorously  enforced.  Even  the  superfluous  Helot  popu- 
lation was  not  always  exterminated;  neither  do  the  Aus- 
tralian colonists  hunt  down  the  natives  everywhere.  In 
Sparta,  to  be  sure,  the  contest  of  the  Helots  could  not  be 
conducted  by  peaceable  means,  but  the  sovereignty  over 
them  was  not  shortlived  on  that  account;  it  succumbed  to 
another  course  of  development. 

But  wherever  in  the  interest  of  the  whole  the  least  con- 
cession is  made  to  the  subject  class  it  serves  as  a  lever  to 
enlarge  their  privileges.  Two  conditions,  however,  are  neces- 
sary to  success:  well-being  and  enlightenment.  When  the 
ruling  class  is  well  off  the  condition  of  the  subject  class  will 
necessarily  rise  too;  otherwise  the  desires  of  the  sovereign 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  127 

class  cannot  be  fully  satisfied.  But  appetite  comes  with 
eating  and  the  first  progress  creates  the  desire  for  more. 

Thoughts  cannot  be  hermetically  sealed,  and  as  social  facts 
even  more  than  any  other  facts  provoke  reflection,  the  sub- 
ject class,  if  relieved  from  external  press ue  and  direct  need, 
will  experience  mental  growth.  The  ruling  class  is  influ- 
enced less  by  the  outside  world  and  by  the  social  relations; 
their  life  is  easier  and  they  are  lulled  to  sleep  mentally.  But 
it  is  otherwise  down  in  the  seething  mass  of  the  ' '  people. ' ' 
Huge  numbers  of  them  may  succumb  to  the  hard  conditions 
of  life  and  languish  in  ignorance  and  stupidity;  but  if  the 
pressure  ever  relaxes,  or  if  it  falls  on  unusually  strong 
natures,  the  mental  reaction  is  all  the  more  violent.  On  the 
whole  the  life  of  the  subject  classes  is  more  fruitful  in  ideas. 

Some  degree  of  well-being  and  some  ideas  is  the  neces- 
sary leaven,  as  even  Aristotle  knew.  It  only  needs  a  favor- 
able opportunity,  an  external  danger  or  defeat,  a  permitted 
popular  gathering,  a  tumult  of  unusual  dimensions,  to  make 
the  first  breach ;  further  development  in  the  market-place 
and  on  the  forum  is  unavoidable.  The  same  factors  are  active; 
the  method  is  the  same;  the  result  is  the  same.  Woe  to  the 
conquered,  was  the  cry  in  the  beginning  and  woe  to  the  con- 
quered is  often  the  cry  to  the  last. 

DEVELOPMENT  OF    RANK   AND   POLITICAL 
ORGANIZATION . 

But  the  social  struggle  is  not  so  simple  as  it  is  here  repre- 
sented. Economic  development  and  historical  facts  create 
a  multitude  of  classes  equally  endowed  with  political  tend- 
encies and  the  result  is  a  complexity  of  political  rights. 
Intermediate  classes  intervene  between  the  master  and  the 
slave  which  may  hold  the  lower  classes  in  dependence  and  be  in 
subjection  to  the  upper,  or  be  superior  to  all  in  certain  spheres 
of  activity  and  dependent  in  others.  They  may  be  both 
rulers  and  ruled. 

The  simplest  political  organization  consisting  of  lords  and 
vassals,  the  simple civitas  of  the  Romans,  receives  the  first  fatal 
shock  from  the  foreign  merchants.  The  effect  of  their  visits 
upon  the  primitive  political  constitution  is  vividly  portrayed 
by  Caesar  in  his  ' '  Commentaries. ' '  The  Belgians  were  the 
bravest  of  all  the  Gallic  tribes,  he  says,  ' '  because  they  are 
farthest  removed  from  the  civilization  and  culture  of  the  Prov- 
ince and  the  merchants  visit  them  least  often  bringing 


128  ANNAI3   OF  THE   AMERICAN   ACADEMY. 

things  which  tend  to  effeminate. ' '  The  merchants  seeking 
gain  penetrate  the  primitive  political  organization  and  dis- 
turb its  monotonous  course,  for  their  "fine  articles  "  charm 
the  uncultivated  man. 

But  these  ' '  missionaries  of  commerce ' '  are  the  pioneers 
of  culture.  They  visit  the  most  inhospitable  shores  and 
impenetrable  regions  of  unknown  lands,  staking  both  prop- 
erty and  life;  and  the  thousands  who  fall  are  followed  by 
other  thousands  fearless  of  death — all  for  the  sake  of  ' '  busi- 
ness. ' '  This  is  a  universal  fact,  attested  by  classical  witnesses, 
by  the  history  of  European  colonization  in  all  quarters  of 
the  globe,  and,  above  all,  by  the  living  present.  The  clever 
Hansa-man,  the  trader  with  his  wares  seeking  gain,  is  the  first 
to  enter  the  Congo  and  the  Niger  valleys,  braving  the  diffi- 
culties of  the  dark  continent  and  visiting  tribes  who  receive 
the  stranger  as  they  would  a  wild  beast;  then,  if  his  venture 
succeeds,  come  the  "  chivalrous  lords  "  and  "  patriotic  states- 
men." 

The  merchant,  coming  as  guest  and  offering  his  wares  for 
sale,  is  personally  free  and  knows  how  to  maintain  his  free- 
dom. Identified  neither  with  the  lords  nor  with  their  vassals, 
he  soon  becomes  necessary  to  both,  for  the  "  articles  "  which 
he  brings  from  a  distance  delight  them  and  awaken  new 
desires  which  must  be  satisfied.  The  one  class  labors  more, 
the  other  saves  more  in  order  to  get  the  new  means  of  satis- 
fying the  new  wants.  They  begin  to  grow  "  effeminate;" 
but  it  must  be  added  that  they  also  grow  in  "  civilization  " 
and  "  culture."  * 

They  learn  to  value  and  to  tolerate  the  stranger,  and  he 
in  turn  discovers  the  virgin  treasures  of  the  land.  Things 
are  gladly  given  to  him  which  before  his  time  had  no  worth 
and  without  him  would  still  have  none.  Occasional  visits 
are  followed  by  permanent  settlements  and  the  first  settlers 
are  followed  by  more  numerous  followers.  A  middle  class 
forces  itself  in  between  lords  and  vassals;  personally  free  and 
having  no  direct  share  in  the  government;  instituting  its 
own  corporation  in  its  own  quarter — the  later  city;  by  com- 
promise with  the  lords  creating  for  itself  rights  within  an 
assured  sphere  limited  and  defined  both  from  above  and 

*  Tacitus  also  understood  that  civilization  is  promoted  by  trade;  and  it  is  clear 
that  he  meant  trade  with  foreigners.  Thomas  Aquinas  speaks  of  the  merchants 
as  strangers  in  the  state.  He  considered  it  desirable  that  the  citizens  should 
refrain  from  mercantile  pursuits  leaving  them  to  ' '  foreigners  "  lest ' '  by  the  prac- 
tice of  trade  "  they  "  grow  covetous."  Thomas  d'Aquin.  "  Opusculac  Vemtiis" 
1587,  p.  298.  ("  De  Regemine  Prina'pum.") 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  129 

below.*  Thus  a  new  factor  arises  in  political  evolution  and 
social  strife.  Changes  proceed  more  rapidly  than  before; 
foreign  commerce  makes  domestic  labor  more  productive  and 
awakens  handicraft  and  industry,  while  those  who  follow 
the  new  branches  of  economic  labor  are  consolidated  by  their 
common  interests  into  compact  groups  demanding  their 
rights. 

But  such  rights  are  only  the  realization,  the  unhindered 
exercise  of  acquired  power,  i.  e.>  supremacy  within  politi- 
cally recognized  limits,  which,  however  various  the  means 
of  acquiring  it,  consists  essentially  in  the  free  and  disposable 
possession  of  whatever  will  satisfy  human  wants. 

Prominent  in  the  list  is  the  possession,  or  better,  the  dis- 
posal of  human  energy  and  labor.  Without  human  services 
every  other  possession  is  valueless  unless  indeed  by  means 
of  it  human  labor  can  be  instantly  secured,  which  reduces 
to  the  same  thing.  The  power  varies  in  greatness  with  the 
coefficient  of  disposable  human  energies  and  not  with  the 
amount  of  other  possessions,  though  generally  the  former  is 
proportional  to  the  latter. 

There  is  one  method  of  utilizing  human  services  directly, 
that  is  without  the  intervention  of  other  possessions;  it  is 
the  one  by  which  the  founders  of  political  order  assure 
themselves  of  the  services  of  their  vassals  and  slaves.  They 
rely  upon  physical  and  mental  superiority,  strict  military  or- 
ganization and  discipline  and  innate  tact  in  governing.  Power 
thus  acquired  may  be  strengthened  by  various  material  and 
moral  means;  or  it  may  fall  into  decay  through  weakness, 
lack  of  discipline  and  energetic  opposition. 

Other  means  of  facilitating  and  assuring  the  uninterrupted 
application  of  human  services  is  the  possession  of  supplies 
and  of  institutions  for  promoting  production.  But  the  most 
powerful  moral  means  is  a  purely  natural  factor,  habit. 
Having  elsewhere  f  emphasized  its  overwhelming  power  in 
political  and  legal  relations,  it  is  a  great  satisfaction  to  us  to 
find  our  views  confirmed  in  a  recent  work.  J 

"The  power  of  habit  is  mysterious  as  witchery,"  it  is  said.  "It 
sways  the  insignificant  life  of  the  individual  and  the  great  history  of 
mankind.  The  dark  impulse  of  all  material  things  is  in  the  midst  of 
change  to  pause;  in  the  midst  of  ceaseless  motion  to  become  stable  for 

*  For  historical  evidence  that  the  European  merchant  class  began  in  this  way, 
see  "  Der  Rassenkampf."  p.  332. 

J"  Das  Philosopkische  Staatsrechi,"  sec.  23. 
"  Gegen  die  Freiheitsstrafen,"  by  Mittelstaedt. 


130          ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

a  moment;  by  the  pendulum's  uniform  swing  to  give  to  constant 
vibration  the  appearance  of  regular  motion;  and  essentially  the  same 
impulse  gives  equipoise  to  all  the  mental  activities  of  our  race.  First 
the  natural  inclination  to  repeat  the  same  act,  then  the  incorporation 
of  the  repetitions  in  regular  habit:  how  much  conscious  thinking  and 
willing  thus  gradually  becomes  the  unconscious  function  of  an  un- 
thinking machine  !  .  .  .  .  Rule  and  order  and  custom  and  law 
transmitting  civilization  from  generation  to  generation  would  be  unin- 
telligible without  the  incessant  action  of  this  mysterious  force," 

Thus  nature  itself  is  the  strongest  ally  of  the  rulers. 
Habit  becomes  an  element  of  their  power  and  its  incessant 
action  produces  the  other  moral  factors,  order,  custom, 
rights,  and  also  the  moral  bonds  that  unite  men  of  the  same 
language  and  religion.  For  however  unlike  the  rulers  and 
ruled  in  these  respects  the  former  have  understood  how  to 
adapt  themselves  to  the  latter,  at  least  outwardly,  in  both 
respects — an  end  to  which,  moreover,  the  force  of  circum- 
stances directly  tends.* 

Thus  do  the  founders  of  sovereignty  sustain  their  power, 
but  the  power  of  the  new  middle  class  is  built  up  differently. 
It  starts  from  the  possession  of  material  goods  and  the  more 
necessary  they  are  the  greater  is  the  equivalent  offered  for 
the  surrender  of  them  whether  in  labor,  services  and  goods 
or  in  the  right  to  demand  services.  In  any  case  the  equiva- 
lent can  be  reduced  to  terms  of  human  labor;  and  so  the 
middle  class  also  acquires  political  power.  By  labor, 
industry,  inventiveness,  speculation  and  thrift  it  can  even 
attain  to  the  balance  of  power  in  the  state. 

That  the  possession  of  material  goods  can  be  a  source  of 
power  only  in  the  state  is  so  self-evident  as  scarcely  to  need 
mentioning;  for  where  club-law  and  anarchy  prevailed  they 
would  fall  to  the  physically  superior;  no  power-producing 
energy  is  inherent  in  them.  Within  the  state  however  the 
purely  economic  power,  as  we  may  briefly  call  it,  has  se- 
cured recognition  and  has  its  part  in  sovereignty. 

I^et  us  consider  how  the  middle  class  exercises  its  authority ; 
who  perform  the  services  to  which  their  authority,  like  every 
other,  may  eventually  be  reduced.  The  rulers  as  a  class  do 
not  perform  them;  they  must  be  performed  either  by  the 
subjects  as  a  class  or  by  wage-laborers  drawn  from  other 
sources.  The  rulers  therefore  cannot  recompense  the  mid- 
dle class  directly  by  them.  They  offer  treasures  of  the  land 
over  which  they  exercise  "eminent  domain,"  products  of 

*  For  the  process  of  assimilation,  see  "Der  Rassenkampf;*  p.  253. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  131 

the  fauna  which  are  also  the  "  lord's  property,"  agricultural 
products  produced  by  the  labor  of  the  subject  people,  and 
finally  the  concession  of  rights  to  have  the  exclusive  sale  of 
articles  of  universal  necessity,  to  hold  markets,  to  claim 
certain  services  from  the  unfree,  etc.  In  so  far  as  the  lords 
must  acquiesce  as  a  class  and  each  can  be  compelled  by  law 
and  right,  it  is  proper  to  speak  of  the  power  of  the  middle 
class  over  the  rulers,  although  up  to  a  certain  point  in 
political  evolution  the  balance  of  privileges,  prerogatives  and 
power  is  decidedly  with  the  latter.  The  power  of  both  can  be 
expressed  in  services  of  the  ruled  class  which,  being  superior 
in  numbers,  represents  the  greatest  amount  of  human  energy 
in  the  state  and  is  the  great  reservoir  from  which  the  whole 
political  apparatus  is  fed.  In  a  word  the  whole  state  is 
supported  by  its  lowest  and  most  numerous  stratum. 

L,ater  we  shall  inquire  whether  the  burden  becomes 
greater  as  the  classes  increase  in  number  and  variety;  at 
present  we  must  consider  the  course  of  political  evolution. 
Though  material  wants  created  the  middle  class,  even  in  the 
very  beginning  of  social  life  wants  of  quite  another  character 
laid  the  foundation  for  another  class  which  should  some 
time  mightily  affect  the  evolution  of  the  state. 

We  have  elsewhere  shown  how  the  human  temperament, 
worried  by  the  riddle  of  its  own  existence,  peremptorily 
demands  pacification;  how  this  is  found  in  religious  ideas; 
and  how  these  lead  to  religious  ceremonies.*  We  will  not 
here  enlarge  upon  the  psycho- social  process  involved  ;f  but 
it  is  a  fact  that  universally  these  religious  needs  sooner  or 
later  produce  a  priestly  caste  inspired  with  the  desire  to  sus- 
tain and  increase  its  power. 

Now  its  power  also  must  consist  in  the  ability  to  com- 
mand men's  services.  The  only  difference  is  in  the  form  of 
the  power  and  the  manner  of  securing  it  corresponding  to 
its  peculiar  means  of  satisfying  human  wants. 

While  the  nobility  commands  human  services  immedi- 
ately by  its  superiority;  while  by  establishing  an  organiza- 
tion it  confers  an  undeniable  benefit  upon  the  whole;  while 
further  the  merchant  brings  material  goods  to  both  the  lords 
and  the  subject  receiving  an  equivalent  from  both:  the 
priestly  caste  conducts  the  religious  ceremonies,  thereby 
satisfying  a  peremptory  need  of  human  nature,  and  fortifies 

*  "  Der  Rassenkampf"  p.  137  et  seq. 

t  "  Cf.  I,ippert's  "  Geschichte  des  Priesterthums." 


132  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

its  position  by  acquiring  material  goods  and  human  ser- 
vices. 

The  classes  differ  only  in  their  functions;  the  equivalents 
received  by  all  can  be  reduced  to  the  same  terms:  a  greater 
or  less  sum  of  human  services  rendered  in  kind  or  in  goods 
or  in  the  grant  of  privileges,  rights  and  "  royalties." 

The  rationalist  might  object  that  the  services  of  the 
priest  are  imaginary  and  no  real  equivalent  for  what  the 
recipient  of  them  gives  in  the  sweat  of  his  brow.  The 
same  might  also  be  said  of  the  services  of  the  ruling  class. 
But  what  are  these  objections  against  the  fact  that  men's 
religious  wants  are  as  peremptory  as  their  material,  and  that 
the  ruling  class  also  fulfills  its  function  in  social  economy 
and  has  no  substitute  ! 

Besides  sociology  must  avoid  criticising  nature.  It  is 
interested  only  in  facts  and  the  laws  of  their  behavior  and 
it  cannot  raise  the  question  whether  the  thing  could  not  be 
accomplished  differently  or  better.  Social  phenomena  follow 
necessarily  from  and  must  be  the  requirements  of  the  nature 
of  men  and  their  relations. 

Sociology  is  coming  to  recognize  that  there  would  be  no 
rulers  if  there  were  no  servants;  no  priests  if  there  were  no 
believers;  no  traders  if  they  could  find  no  buyers.  The 
phenomenon  of  class-building  can  be  referred  to  a  universal 
law:  each  want  produces  its  own  means  of  satisfaction.  In 
so  far  as  a  class  is  able  to  satisfy  a  social  want  it  first  is 
indispensable,  and,  secondly,  receives  an  equivalent  which 
can  be  expressed  in  terms  of  human  services,  the  instrument 
of  power.  But  in  exercising  its  acquired  power  it  partici- 
pates in  government. 

As  new  wants  produce  new  professional  classes  and  castes, 
the  more  progressive  a  state  is  and  the  higher  its  civiliza- 
tion the  more  numerous  they  are  and  the  more  complex 
must  be  the  mutual  dependence  of  the  several  social  circles 
which  jointly  possess  the  elements  of  power. 

Material  and  intellectual  (moral)  wants,  it  has  been  seen, 
are  rooted  and  grounded  in  human  nature;  they  might  be 
called  primary.  But  civilization  keeps  on  developing 
others  which  may  be  called  secondary,  such  as  the  unciv- 
ilized and  those  on  lower  stages  of  culture  do  not  feel; 
such  as  men  become  sensible  of  only  as  a  result  of  their 
higher  culture. 

On  a  low  stage  of  culture,  for  instance,  the  priest  is  at 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  133 

the  same  time  medicine-man,  and  no  need  of  a  lay 
(weltlich)  physician  is  felt.  By  a  process  which  might  be 
called  a  differentiation  of  wants,  there  arises  out  of  the  reli- 
gious needs  a  demand  for  medical  care  and  treatment  which, 
on  the  higher  stages  of  culture,  is  supplied  by  the  medical 
profession  which  is  organized,  has  social  standing  and 
enjoys  legal  protection. 

The  necessity  of  legal  assistance  has  grown  out  of  the 
intercourse  and  the  legal  relations  of  men  in  the  civilized 
state.  It  is  well  known  what  great  influence  the  legal  profes- 
sion wields  in  the  modern  state.  But  its  power  is  no  greater 
than  the  great  and  universal  need  it  satisfies. 

The  necessity  for  an  administrative  department  as  the  state 
becomes  large,  for  distributing  governmental  duties  among 
a  number  of  functionaries  and  maintaining  facility  of  com- 
munication between  them  and  the  people  has  produced  the 
official  class,  which  has  its  own  interests,  possesses  power 
and  exerts  a  controlling  influence  in  its  own  sphere. 

The  trading  and  industrial  class  has  been  subdivided  into 
very  many  different  classes  and  callings,  because  a  division 
of  labor  became  necessary  as  the  demand  increased  for 
many  products  which  commerce  brought  to  hand  or  trade 
and  industry  supplied. 

In  the  modern  civilized  state  large  industries  are  opposed 
to  the  small,  the  laboring  class  to  the  capitalist  and  the  under- 
taking classes,  agriculture  to  manufactures,  and  so  forth. 
Each  has  its  own  interest  which  it  represents,  its  own  power 
which  it  strives  to  increase,  and  each  bears  down  upon  the 
others  according  to  its  strength  and  their  resistance.  In 
other  words  each  participates  in  sovereignty  solely  and 
exactly  in  proportion  to  its  power.  Wherein  this  power 
consists  we  have  already  seen. 

Just  as  the  middle  class  was  subdivided  to  correspond  with 
the  division  of  labor  and  the  development  of  specialties  so 
also  a  military  class  was  differentiated  from  the  simple  ruling 
class  as  the  method  of  warfare  changed.  It  assimilated  por- 
tions of  other  classes  and  developed  into  the  modern  military 
profession,  and  though  in  deference  to  passing  doctrines, 
some  efforts  have  been  made  to  sink  this  independent  pro- 
fession in  the  universal  obligation  of  all  citizens  to  bear  arms 
it  is  a  question  whether  they  can  succeed,  whether  nature 
will  not  prove  stronger  than  doctrine,  finally  producing  in 
spite  of  them  a  separate  military  class. 


134  ANNAIvS  OF  THE   AMERICAN   ACADEMY. 


We  have  seen  that  some  classes,  the  ruling,  the  peasant 
and  the  merchant  classes  for  instance,  arose  from  the  union 
\Zusammentreffen\  of  different  \heterog  eri\  ethnological 
elements;  that  their  characteristic  differences  are  original. 
Such  classes  antedate  the  state  and  are  the  more  easily  main- 
tained in  it  because  their  differences  are  both  anthropological 
and  moral. 

But  there  are  others,  as  we  have  seen,  the  priesthood,  large 
industry  as  contrasted  with  small,  scholars,  jurists,  officials 
and  so  forth,  which  arise  from  the  others  by  a  process  of 
differentiation.  When  they  have  become  fully  separated 
they  in  turn  devote  their  whole  conduct  both  active  and 
passive  to  guarding  their  peculiar  interests  and  take  on  the 
nature  of  the  original  classes. 

These  phenomena  depend  upon  a  universal  law  which  we 
must  explain  before  we  can  show  its  application  in  the  social 
domain.  Corollary  to  the  distinction  between  original  and 
derived  classes  is  that  between  heredity  and  adaptation. 
Organic  types  seem  to  arise  in  two  distinct  ways  and  the 
solution  of  the  whole  anthropological  problem  depends  upon 
setting  aside  the  one  or  harmonizing  the  two.  Is  the  principle 
of  perpetual  growth  in  organic  bodies  heredity,  or  adapta- 
tion, or  what? 

The  wisdom  of  the  ages  which  must  not  be  despised  an- 
swers heredity;  radical  modern  materialism  answers  adapta- 
tion: ' '  The  man  is  what  he  eats; ' '  Darwinism  to  reconcile 
the  difference  says:  Both.  Let  us  see  which  answer  is  nearest 
the  truth.  A  superficial  glance  at  organic  structures  is 
enough  to  show  that  heredity  is  the  mightiest  principle  of 
their  growth.  It  is  clearly  the  rule  that  such  structures  are 
as  their  progenitors  were.  However  there  are  some  excep- 
tions, for  which  the  cleverest  and  at  present  the  most  widely 
accepted  explanation  is  Darwin's  theory  of  adaptation;  what 
cannot  be  explained  by  heredity  must  be  referred  to  the  prop- 
erty of  adaptation  to  external  conditions,  which  organisms 
possess  and  to  which  the  struggle  for  existence  forces  them 
to  resort. 

This  theory  would  scarcely  have  found  acceptance  if 
Darwin's  genius  had  not  pointed  out  many  cases  which 
show  that  organisms  do  adapt  themselves  to  external  condi- 
tions in  their  growth  and  so  change  the  hereditary  type, 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  135 

though  he  was  less  successful  in  showing  that  changes  pro- 
duced by  adaptation  would  become  hereditary. 

So  the  law  of  adaptation  is  still  an  hypothesis  in  spite 
of  the  particular  instances  cited  in  support  of  it,  though 
the  law  of  heredity  is  established  beyond  a  doubt,  we 
believe. 

It  is  a  fact  however  that  natural  structures  arise  in  two 
ways;  they  are  either  primary  or  secondary.  There  are  two 
universal  and  so  to  speak  opposing  tendencies  in  nature: 
one  we  might  call  originality,  the  other  imitation.  That  is 
to  say,  what  nature  made  originally  in  some  unknown, 
"creative"  way,  is  also  frequently  produced  under  the 
influence  of  external  circumstances  which  may  be  easily 
comprehended.  The  latter  origin  is  called  by  Darwin's 
school  evolutionary.* 

Autogenesis  and  evolution  always  co-operate;  and  we  are 
often  in  doubt  whether  a  particular  organism  is  genetic  or 
evolutionary;  while  in  many  cases  in  fact  it  may  be  either. 

Nature's  processes  are  after  all  one  and  the  same,  like  those 
by  which  an  artist  produces  an  original  and  a  replica.  As  it 
is  not  impossible  for  a  painter  to  produce  an  original  because 
he  has  made  copies  so  it  is  a  fallacy  to  conclude  with  the 
Darwinians  that  the  many  instances  of  evolution  prove  all 
organisms  to  have  originated  in  that  way. 

Some  human  types  originated  in  adaptation  and  evolution; 
but  not  necessarily  all.  If  the  geographical  character  of  the 
habitat  is  sufficient  still  to  modify  a  type  of  organism  how 
much  greater  must  its  influence  have  been  upon  the  origin 
of  varieties,  for  once  it  produced,  so  to  speak,  genetic  differ- 
ences, but  though  still  active  the  original  genetic  effect 
proves  to  be  more  permanent.  This  might  seem  to  justify 
one  argument  used  in  support  of  evolution,  viz. ,  that  if  the 
period  be  indefinitely  extended  the  supposition  of  an  original 
method  becomes  superfluous.  But  this  is  only  arithmeti- 
cally correct,  it  is  insufficient  to  refute  the  supposition  of  an 
original  genetic  origin  when  so  many  other  considerations 
support  it. 

Both  forms  of  origin,  the  primary  and  the  secondary,  the 
genetic  and  the  evolutionary,  are  common  in  social  as  well 

*  We  are  able  to  comprehend  the  secondary  or  evolutionary  origin  while  that 
which  is  original  in  the  realm  of  organic  nature  is  incomprehensible  to  our  facul- 
ties. Accordingly  we  are  always  inclined  to  prefer  the  former  process;  as  Darwin 
and  Haeckel  do  in  the  domain  of  organic  and  the  sociologists  in  the  domain  of 
social  phenomena.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  because  this  is  the  only  way  we  can 
explain  there  is  no  other. 


136          ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

as  in  organic  phenomena.  Social  inequality  arises  origi- 
nally from  the  union  \zusammentreffen\  of  distinct  \hetero- 
%eri\  ethnical  elements  of  unlike  power;  and  it  also  arises  by 
evolution,  by  the  slow  development  of  some  elements  at  the 
cost  of  others  which  sink  in  power  owing  to  unfavorable 
conditions. 

Though  the  original  method  of  forming  states  is  by  sub- 
jugation, it  might  happen  (?)  as  an  exception  that  a  period 
of  peaceful  development  should  result  in  the  differentiation 
of  the  population  into  classes,  the  stronger  gradually  sepa- 
rating themselves  from  those  who  were  weaker  and  needed 
protection.  Asa  rule  classes  rise  original!)',  i.  e.,  out  of 
different  \heterogen\  ethnical  elements,  or  by  the  permanent 
organization  of  such  as  are  at  different  stages  of  development 
at  the  time  of  their  union.  But  there  are  instances  of  sec- 
ondary origin  also;  since  as  we  have  seen  some  turn  to  this 
calling,  some  to  that,  according  to  conditions  and  inclina- 
tions; and  those  of  each  calling  congregate  in  a  class. 

But  whether  a  social  group  arise  in  one  way  or  the  other, 
its  character  as  a  group,  as  a  factor  in  social  development,  is 
not  affected.  It  tends  in  the  direction  of  its  own  interests, 
it  tries  to  protect  and  further  them,  to  increase  its  power  and 
to  acquire  a  corresponding  influence  in  the  state. 

These  efforts  are  always  the  same  and  all  groups  neces- 
sarily had  to  adopt  the  same  policy  respecting  them.  The 
natural  differences  between  the  original  classes  and  the 
syngenetic  coherence  within  them  helped  in  maintaining  and 
extending  their  power;  and  the  secondary  groups  in  turn 
must  needs  acquire  like  differences  and  coherences.  Hence 
comes  the  strong  tendency  to  divide  into  classes  and  to 
maintain  the  power  of  each  by  endogamy;  or  by  celibacy  to 
sunder  all  connection  with  other  social  groups  and  prevent 
the  weakening  of  power  by  division. 

SOCIETY. 

The  great  number  and  variety  of  mutually  related  groups 
within  the  state  considered  as  a  whole  is  called  society  in 
contrast  with  the  state.  In  this  wider  sense  society  is  not 
different  from  the  state;  it  is  the  same  thing  viewed  from 
another  point.  But  in  the  narrower  and  more  accurate 
sense  of  the  word  each  group  centering  about  some  one  or 
more  common  interests  is  a  society.  This  double  meaning 
often  leads  to  confusion  which  is  made  worse  because  social 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  137 

groups  are  not  always  separated  by  a  hard  and  fast  line. 
The}7  overlap  and  intertwine  so  that  the  same  men  are 
bound  to  one  group  by  one  set  of  interests  and  to  another 
by  another  set.  Thus  a  government  official  may  own  a 
large  estate,  be  a  zealous  adherent  of  a  religious  sect,  and 
be  a  sugar  manufacturer  also.  In  the  social  struggles  over 
material  and  moral  questions  his  position  will  be  finally 
determined  by  his  relative  interests. 

On  the  other  hand  with  the  development  of  civilization, 
certain  interests  have  become  broader  than  the  borders  of  a 
single  state  and  some  societies  embrace  the  subjects  of 
several  states.  Religious  beliefs,  the  ties  of  kindred,  social- 
ism, e.  g.>  have  produced  international  groups. 

Until  these  relations  are  thoroughly  and  scientifically 
analyzed  the  notion  of  a  society  will  remain  confused.  Such 
unclear  Hegelian  definitions  as  von  Ihering  offers  explain 
nothing. 

"Society,"  he  says,  "  may  be  defined  as  the  actual  organization  of 
Mfe  on  the  plan  of  mutual  assistance;  and  since  the  individual  is  at 
his  best  only  through  the  others  it  is  at  once  indispensable  per  se  and 
in  reality  the  universal  form  of  human  life. ' '  * 

For  society  substitute  state,  political  economy  or  anything 
else  and  the  definition  is  equally  good  and  equally  bad;  in 
fact  the  state  has  actually  been  called  ' '  the  form  "  or  "  the 
organization  of  human  life:"  general  phrases  fitting  any- 
thing and  explaining  nothing.  Ihering's  use  of  them  is 
not  surprising  perhaps  for  instead  of  seriously  studying  the 
phenomena  themselves  he  inquires,  as  Romanist,  what  the 
Roman  jurists  say  about  them  and  frames  his  definition  to 
correspond.  His  meaningless  definition  of  society  is  derived 
from  sodetas.  But  others  have  failed  without  this  excuse. 

How  helpful  in  contrast  is  Spencer's  clear  explanation  of 
society  considered  as  a  unit. 

"It  is  the  permanence  of  the  relations  among  component  parts," 
he  says,  "which  constitutes  the  individuality  of  a  whole  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  individualities  of  its  parts."  f 

The  "permanent  relations"  between  men  unite  them 
into  a  society,  and  since  there  are  different  kinds  of  rela- 
tions there  are  different  kinds  of  societies  and  a  man  may  be 
bound  to  several  at  once,  as  we  have  seen. 


*  von  Ihering,  "Zweck  im  Recht,"  Vol.  1,  p.  95. 

t  Spencer,  "Principles  of  Sociology,"  Vol.  i,  sec.  212. 


138          ANNAI£  OP  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

Much  would  be  gained  if  we  could  use  ' '  society  ' '  simply 
to  designate  a  concrete  number  of  men  united  by  ' '  perma- 
nent relations,  ' '  for  it  is  perfectly  clear.  The  broader  use 
suggests  nothing  real;  it  is  only  another  way  of  looking  at 
folk-life.  Schaeffle,  who  calls  these  narrower  social  circles 
"  cohesive  masses  or  tissue  "  {Massenzusammenhcenge  oder 
Bindegewebe),  remarks  that  it  is 

"  singular  that  social  philosophy  has  as  yet  been  unable  to  assign  even 
the  most  insignificant  place  in  its  system  to  these  elementary  tissues 
which  are  neutral  (?)  as  a  rule,  but  at  certain  times  extremely  sensi- 
tive. They  are  thrown  with  much  other  rubbish  into  a  heap  called 
'society,'  which  is  alleged  to  lie  midway  between  the  state  and  the 
individual.  In  reality  no  such  miscellaneous  society  exists. ' '  * 

He  fails  to  note  that  a  "  society,"  something  less  than  the 
State  and  more  than  the  individual,  had  necessarily  to  be 
assumed  as  the  starting  point  of  a  social  philosophy  which 
began  with  Schloezer's  and  Hegel's  "  society  of  burghers," 
and  later  was  powerfully  influenced  by  the  broader  concep- 
tions advanced  by  Mohl,  Stein  and  Gneist.f  But  nowa- 
days when  people  ought  to  know  that  there  is  no  concrete 
reality  behind  the  idea  the  use  of  the  word  in  its  broader 
signification  has  no  further  justification.  If  it  should  be 
objected  that  all  the  social  groups  in  the  state  are  united  by 
"  permanent  relations,"  such  as  those  of  common  territory, 
government,  etc. ,  and  hence  in  turn  form  one  ' '  society, ' '  we 
reply  that  the  word  ' '  folk "  is  a  sufficient  designation. 
There  is  no  further  use  for  this  expression  in  its  wider  sig- 
nification. It  should  only  be  applied  to  the  simple  social 
groups  in  the  state  or  to  those  united  by  interests  which 
transcend  state  limits. 

SOCIETIES. 

We  cannot  be  expected  to  enumerate  all  the  societies 
which  occur  in  the  state  and  still  less  to  discuss  the  histori- 
cal development  of  each.  Lippert  in  his  ' '  History  of  the 
Priesthood  "  has  described  one  successfully;  to  do  as  much 
for  every  other  would  take  us  far  outside  the  limits  of  this 
sketch.  We  can  only  explain  the  social  "  relations  "  which 
bind  the  members  of  the  several  groups  together  and  the  gen- 
eral principles  underlying  their  power  in  the  state,  for  here 

*  Schaeffle,  "  Bau  und  Leben,"  Vol.  i,  p.  292,  jier  Hauptabschmtt,  zte  Abtheilung, 
I"DieJormlosen  Zusammenheenge  oder  Bindegewebe." 

t  "  Philosophisches  Staatsrecht,"  sec.  12;  "  Rechlsstaat  und  Soctalismus,"  pp.  158 
et  seq. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  139 

also  the  description  of  what  is  individual  must  be  reserved  for 
history;  sociology  can  only  state  the  general  modes  of  be- 
havior, the  laws  of  the  phenomena.  It  is  clear  that  the 
societies  both  in  their  origin  and  in  their  development  are 
controlled  by  ' '  laws  ' '  since  human  nature  is  the  same 
everywhere  and  social  differentiation  corresponds  to  the 
growth  and  development  of  human  wants  as  we  have  seen. 
Social  structures  thus  arising  from  a  common  basis  must  be 
the  same  in  essence;  must  have  the  same  life-principle,  make 
the  same  efforts  and  have  the  same  aspirations.  Whether 
they  shall  develop  power  and  sovereignty  depends  simply 
on  the  greater  or  less  resources  they  have  at  the  beginning 
or  acquire  later.  They  differ  in  degree;  they  are  alike  in 
plan  and  tendency. 

To  discover  what  ties  bind  a  number  of  men  into  a  society 
we  must  start,  as  elsewhere  in  sociology,  with  an  original  or 
primary  condition,  one  which  we  cannot  analyze  further, 
the  origin  of  which  we  cannot  observe.  Such  a  bond  is 
association  in  the  horde  .*  It  seems  to  be  natural  and,  in 
contrast,  all  others  are  evolutionary  arising  with  social 
development.  Of  course  they  are  natural  too  in  a  sense; 
the  difference  is  that  we  know  their  origin  and  do  not  know 
that  of  the  former. t  To  those  who  feel  this  bond  it  suggests 
a  contrast  with  the  "  stranger;"  later  reflection  based  on 
experience  adds  the  aetiological  explanation  of  common 
descent  from  some  god  or  hero. 

Analysis  shows  that  the  positive  binding  force  is  associa- 
tion and  simple  consanguinity  with  the  resultant  community 
of  language,  religious  ideas,  customs  and  mode  of  life, 
while  the  contrast  with  the  stranger  lies  in  his  lack  of  par- 
ticipation in  them. 

In  reality  all  the  social  binding  forces  are  represented  in 
the  primitive  horde:  association  and  consanguinity,  similar 
material  and  intellectual  needs  and  similar  interests  in 
satisfying  them;  and  there  are  no  social  contrasts  which 
cannot  be  referred  to  dissimilarity  in  one  or  more  of  these 
respects. 

Social  development  presupposes  the  junction  of  hetero- 
geneous or  the  differentiation  of  homogeneous  elements.  In 

*  Spencer  too  has  recognized  the  necessity  of  this  point  of  departure  in  socio- 
logical studies;  for  he  says  that:  "Social  evolution  begins  with  the  small  simple 
aggregates."  "Principles  of  Sociology,"  Vol.  i,  sec.  257. 

•f  For  the  distinction  between  "natural"  and  "  artificial  "  social  institutions, 
see  "  Rechtsstaat  und  Soctalismus,"  p.  329. 


140  ANNAI<S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

the  former  case  the  combining  elements  are  united  by  com- 
mon interests  and  fall  into  social  opposition  for  lack  of  them. 
In  the  latter  the  differentiating  group  develops  certain 
common  interests  which  hold  it  together  and  separate  it 
from  the  rest.  The  first  is  the  case  when  political  re- 
lations are  established  between  foreign  elements  or  a 
middle  class  is  gradually  developed;  the  latter,  when  the 
various  priestly,  military  and  professional  classes  slowly 
appear. 

The  establishment  of  the  first  political  relations  calls  two 
social  classes  into  existence  at  once:  the  lords  and  the  slaves 
or  serfs.  The  social  bonds  which  unified  each  group  and 
created  feelings  of  tribal  loyalty  will  be  strengthened  by 
the  common  interest  of  rulers  and  the  common  lot  of 
subjects  respectively.  Class  feeling  will  be  added  to  tribal; 
but  it  does  not  follow  that  mutual  opposition  will  be  intensi- 
fied. The  centrifugal  factors  will  be  offset  by  local  associa- 
tion and  all  the  ties  which  habit  and  adaptation  develop 
under  such  circumstances.  The  psycho-social  functions: 
language,  customs,  religious  ideas  and  ceremonies  will 
gradually  become  assimilated. 

The  subject  class  may  even  acquire  a  feeling  of  respect 
for  the  other;  and  all  the  factors  together  may  be  strong 
enough  to  make  the  two  classes  at  times  appear  as  one  in 
contrast  with  outsiders.  But  the  difference  in  rank,  the 
separate  consanguineous  circles  (while  intermarriage  is 
prohibited),  and  the  difference  in  political  interests  will 
keep  them  permanently  apart. 

So  when  a  foreign  merchant  class  takes  its  place  beside  the 
others  all  are  strangers  at  first  in  every  respect.  Language, 
customs,  religion,  descent,  every  thing  which  binds  the  mem- 
bers of  one  group  together  separates  it  from  the  others. 
Some  of  the  dissociating  factors  may  disappear  in  time;  local 
association  may  develop  love  of  home  and  folk;  and  assimi- 
lation of  language,  customs  and  ideas  may  follow.  But  in 
spite  of  all  and  in  addition  to  differences  in  descent,  rank, 
customs,  and  class  ethics,  the  interest  of  the  traders  will  be 
permanently  opposed  to  the  interests  of  the  other  classes. 

When  classes  are  differentiated  from  a  homogeneous  ele- 
ment the  course  of  events  is  different.  There  is  simply 
some  one  interest  which  distinguishes  the  dissociating  class 
from  all  the  others  and  brings  its  members  together.  Besides, 
such  classes  are  not  composed  of  the  members  of  one  class 


THE;  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  141 

exclusively  but  generally  attract  members  from  different 
sources.  The  sacerdotal,  military,  official  and  learned 
classes  are  recruited  from  the  older  classes  indiscriminately 
for  the  inclination,  fitness  and  capacity  for  such  callings  is 
not  distributed  with  regularity. 

Though  the  peculiar  interest  of  one  calling  distinguishes 
all  who  follow  it  from  all  others,  still  the  individuals  stand  in 
the  greatest  variety  of  relations  to  the  classes  whence  they 
sprang.  Hence  new  complications  arise  and  social  classes 
become  curiously  involved,  crossing  or  coinciding  in  part,  or 
becoming  wholly  exclusive.  These  conditions  often  exert  a 
decisive  influence  upon  their  position  and  power  in  the  state; 
upon  the  results  of  the  social  struggle. 

THE    GROUP-MAKING   FACTORS. 

Let  us  now  attempt  a  scheme  of  the  forces  or  ' '  relations  ' ' 
which  classify  and  unite  men  in  societies.  On  a  former 
occasion*  I  distinguished  "  three  natural  "  bonds:  consan- 
guinity,local  association  and  common  interests.  They  are  very 
comprehensive,  especially  the  last;  but  I  now  think  a  double 
classification  according  to  fundamental  principles  and  per- 
manency is  plainer  and  more  to  the  point. 

According  to  fundamental  principles  they  may  be 
divided  into  material,  economic  and  moral.  The  material 
factors  are  common  place  of  residence,  sociableness  or 
common  social  life,  consanguinity  and  relationship.  The 
economic  factors  are  similar  and  equal  possessions  and  like 
callings:  agriculture  on  large  or  on  small  estates,  tenancy, 
manufacturing,  skilled  trades,  commerce  and  so  forth.  The 
grouping  into  nobility,  burghers,  priests,  artists,  scholars, 
writers,  etc.,  is  partly  economic  and  partly  moral;  that  ac- 
cording to  language,  religion,  political  allegiance,  nativity, 
citizenship  and  nationality  wholly  moral.  Accidentally 
sharing  the  same  fate,  as  in  a  common  migration,  is  a 
moral  factor  also. 

But  most  of  these  factors  are  of  varying  duration  and 
their  permanency  must  be  considered.  The  influence  of  a 
common  place  of  residence  may  continue  from  generation  to 
generation  or  no  longer  than  a  visit  at  a  watering-place  and 
its  effects  vary  accordingly.  The  effect  of  common  re- 
ligious views  is  different  according  as  they  have  been 

*  "Das  Philosophische  Staatsrecht.'" 


1 42 


ANNALS  OP  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 


inherited  generation  after  generation  or  are  the  result  of 
recent  proselyting. 

The  following  table  illustrates  the  double  classification 
showing  that  each  relation  enumerated  may  endure  for  a 
longer  or  shorter  period: 


•I 

.2^° 
O 


MATERIAL. 


ECONOMIC. 


MORAI,. 


^Common  place  of  residence  (in  immediate  or  re- 
mote neighborhood). 
Common  social  life. 
Consanguinity. 
Relationship. 

Rank — Nobility. 
Burghers. 
Peasantry. 
Priesthood,  etc. 
'Possessions — In  the  country. 

In  the  city. 

Occupation — Landowners,  Tenants. 
Manufacturers. 
Merchants. 
Artisans,  etc. 

Language. 

Religion. 

Science. 

Art. 

Accidental  fate  (emigrants,  etc.). 


The  greater  the  number  of  group-making  factors  binding 
men  together  the  more  intimate  is  the  social  bond  and  the 
greater  its  cohesive  force  and  power  of  resistance.  Strongest 
of  all  is  a  community  united  by  permanent  material,  eco- 
nomic and  moral  forces.  It  is  a  unitary  race,  and  in  the 
struggle  for  existence  is  superior  to  all  lesser  social  combina- 
tions in  endurance  if  not  in  power. 

In  the  primitive  horde,  in  the  "  small  simple  aggregates  " 
with  which,  according  to  Spencer,  social  evolution  begins, 
we  find  all  three  classes  of  factors  permanently  acting: 
common  place  of  residence,  common  blood,  common  means 
of  subsistence,  common  language,  religion,  and  customs 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  143 

generation  after  generation.  When  such  social  groups  are 
politically  organized  they  retain  their  compactness  and 
cohesion.  But  the  union  grows  weaker  as  language, 
religion  and  other  factors  became  common  to  several  social 
groups.  Membership  in  the  same  political  system  is  sure  to 
produce  this  result  in  the  course  of  time. 

Without  doubt  consanguinity  is  the  strongest  group- 
making  factor.  The  consanguineous  social  group  always 
retains  something  of  the  elemental  power  of  primitive 
hordes,  treating  all  strangers  as  hostile  beings.  The  divi- 
sion of  European  nations  into  lords,  middle  class  and 
peasants  would  not  have  produced  such  rigid  social  dis- 
tinctions if  the  three  classes  had  not,  generally  speaking, 
represented  distinct  consanguineous  groups,  for  economic 
differences  would  have  been  counteracted  by  the  assimilation 
of  language  and  religion.  However  it  is  also  the  tendency 
of  each  economic  group  to  become  a  consanguineous  unit. 

THE  SOCIAL  CIRCLES   IN   THE  SOCIAL    STRUGGLE. 

It  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  it  is  not  the  size  of 
the  social  group  which  determines  its  power.  The  lords  were 
always  in  a  minority,  and  in  modern  states  with  millions 
of  inhabitants  the  power  rests  with  the  ' '  upper  ten  thousand. ' ' 
The  intimacy  of  the  union  and  the  resultant  organization 
and  discipline  together  with  mental  superiority  complement 
numerical  inferiority  giving  the  minority  the  preponderancy. 
The  minority  applies  the  strategical  maxim:  march  as  indi- 
viduals, strike  as  one.  The  masses  always  lack  unity  and 
organization  as  the  result  partly  of  their  great  bulk,  partly 
of  indolence.  Since  the  result  of  the  social  struggle  depends 
on  discipline  the  minority  has  the  advantage  because  it  is 
small.  Besides  there  will  be  greater  intimacy  and  more 
common  interests;  the  group-making  factors  will  be  more 
numerous,  more  intense  and  more  permanent. 

The  more  indolent  a  man  is  the  less  appreciation  he  has 
for  the  ideal  goods  of  life.  As  he  has  fewer  wants  he  has 
fewer  interests  in  common  with  other  men  and  is  less  ener- 
getic in  defending  them. 

The  power  of  a  social  group  increases  with  the  number  of 
common  interests  among  its  members  irrespective  of  its  size. 
When  success  depends  on  numbers  it  relies  on  uniting  with 
other  social  groups.  This  is  very  important;  it  is  the  key 


144          ANNAI.S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

to  social  politics.  The  number  of  common  interests  necessa- 
rily varies  inversely  with  the  number  of  individuals  in  the 
social  group.  For  though  the  number  of  interests  increases 
as  conditions  improve,  it  is  the  condition  of  the  minority 
especially  that  improves  since  the  majority  must  labor  and 
serve  to  produce  it. 

Prosperity  is  the  natural  lot  of  the  minority;  with  im- 
proved conditions  the  number  of  interests  increases;  with 
these  the  intensity  of  social  cohesion;  and  this  gives  more 
social  power. 

In  the  final  analysis  the  intensity  of  the  union  depends 
upon  the  personal  character  of  the  individuals.  But  as  their 
mutual  intercourse  is  made  easier  by  custom,  and  as  good 
customs  grow  with  common  welfare  and  culture  the  union  is 
strengthened  too. 

The  highest  and  smallest  aristocratic  circles  are  mightier 
than  all  the  other  social  groups  in  the  state  though  a  thou- 
sand times  larger.  The  masters  united  in  a  guild  are  stronger 
than  the  journeymen  and  laborers. 

In  times  of  revolution  everything  may  depend  on  numeri- 
cal strength  and  then  the  small  groups  are  at  a  disadvantage. 
Their  power  can  be  realized  only  under  normal  conditions  of 
political  organization.  But  this  must  be  considered  the 
normal  condition  of  civilized  man. 

Each  group  exerts  whatever  power  it  normally  possesses 
and  tries  to  have  its  relative  position  recognized  in  the  state 
in  the  form  of  rights.  But  every  right  is  made  the  basis  of 
renewed  efforts.  Human  desires  are  constantly  growing  and 
no  social  group  ever  rested  content  with  what  it  had  obtained; 
on  the  contrary  present  attainments  are  used  to  increase 
power  and  satisfy  new  desires. 

From  this  fundamental  law  the  conduct  of  each  social 
group  can  be  definitely  predicted  in  every  case.  It  will 
strive,  like  the  state,  to  increase  its  power.  But  the  result 
of  the  struggle  does  not  depend  on  the  individual.  Though 
there  are  always  individuals  who  deviate  first  one  way 
and  then  the  other,  they,  like  meteoric  stones  which  are 
loosened  from  their  planet  and  fly  off  in  all  directions,  are 
abnormal,  and  do  not  influence  the  behavior  of  the  group 
as  a  whole. 

In  its  political  actions  each  social  group  is  a  perfect  unit. 
It  opposes  other  social  groups  in  behalf  of  its  own  interest 
solely  and  knows  no  standard  of  conduct  but  success. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  145 

The  struggle  between  social  groups,  the  component  parts 
of  the  state,  is  as  inexorable  as  that  between  hordes  or  states. 
The  only  motive  is  self-interest.  In  "  Der  Rassenkampf" 
we  described  the  conflict  as  a  "  race- war  ' '  for  such  is  its 
inexorable  animosity  that  each  group  that  is  able  tends  to 
become  exclusive  like  a  caste,  to  form  a  consanguineous 
circle,  in  short  to  become  a  race. 

What  is  the  character  of  the  struggle  between  the  social 
groups  ?  What  are  the  methods  and  the  means  ?  No  general 
answer  can  be  given;  for  they  differ  with  the  position  which 
the  groups  occupy  in  the  state,  with  the  amount  of  power 
and  the  instruments  which  they  possess. 

The  refusal  to  perform  religious  rites  is  an  instrument  in 
the  hands  of  the  priesthood.  The  higher  nobility  can  make 
certain  lucrative  and  influential  offices  exclusive.  The 
guild- masters  require  ' '  proof  of  competency. ' '  Attorneys 
restrict  the  privileges  of  practicing  law.  Manufacturers 
insist  on  free  trade  in  grain.  Laborers  strike,  etc.,  etc. 
The  social  struggle  consists  in  establishing  appropriate  insti- 
tutions for  increasing  the  power  of  one  social  group  at  the 
expense  of  the  others.  However  it  may  be  with  the  indi- 
vidual the  society  never  errs  in  seizing  and  applying  the 
right  means;  its  instincts  are  always  right. 

If  this  seems  to  be  a  contradiction  consider  the  actual 
experience  of  history.  At  every  step  it  shows  the  mistakes 
of  even  the  cleverest  individuals  and  the  demoniaca?! 
cleverness  of  society  infallible  as  natural  law.*  Theories 
and  passions  often  confuse  the  individual;  but  society  never 
fails  for  it  never  reflects  and  never  chooses  but  naturally 
follows  the  powerful  attraction  of  its  own  interests. 

THE   FIELD   OF  COMBAT. 

It  is  a  peculiarity  of  the  social  struggle  that  it  must  be  con- 
ducted by  a  collective  whole.  Previous  organization  into 
assemblages  is  necessary,  and  every  society  must  secure  some 
suitable  organ  for  conducting  the  social  struggle.  Thus  the 
ruling  classes  through  their  parliaments  exercise  the  legis- 
lative power  and  are  able  by  legal  institutions  to  further 
their  own  interests  at  the  cost  of  others. 

In  the  cities  the  middle  class  very  early  resorted  to  the  use 

*See  below.    Part  iv,  sec.  ix,  "  Individual  Efforts  and  Social  Necessity." 


146  ANNAIvS   OF   THE   AMERICAN   ACADEMY. 

of  guilds  and  representatives.  The  priesthood  also  organ- 
ized into  hierarchies  and  created  synods  and  councils,  con- 
sultative and  representative  bodies.  The  fact  that  the  great 
mass  of  the  people  in  the  very  nature  of  the  case  could  not 
thus  organize  made  the  conduct  of  the  struggle  in  their 
interest  more  difficult.  It  is  in  consequence  of  having 
entered  upon  this  struggle  that  laborers  now  organize  and 
wily  agitators  even  found  peasant  unions;  the  procedure  is 
logical. 

Yet  the  difference  must  not  be  overlooked.  The  prosper- 
ous and  property-holding  classes  perfect  their  organization 
more  easily  because  the  greater  number  and  intensity  of  their 
common  interests  make  it  easier  to  unite  and  act  as  a  body  or 
by  representatives.  The  weaker  social  connection  of  the 
masses  prevents  a  sound  and  strong  organization.  Such  as 
occurs  is  generally  the  ephemeral  artificial  work  of  selfish 
leaders  seeking  selfish  ends.  But  this  much  is  certain: 
without  organization,  without  united  collective  action  the 
social  struggle  is  impossible. 

The  proximate  end  of  organization  is  to  establish  a  legal 
norm  for  the  mutual  relations  of  the  groups,  to  confirm  by 
right  the  commanding  position  which  has  been  acquired  or 
is  striven  for.  Hence  it  is  clear  that  the  society  which  has 
already  acquired  the  right  of  legislation  in  the  state  occupies 
the  most  powerful  position,  and  that  it  is  the  aim  of  every 
other  society  to  participate  in  the  same  right. 

It  is  well  known  that  the  history  of  European  politics 
generally  turns  upon  the  struggle  of  the  lower  classes  for 
participation  in  legislation;  that  it  has  been  partly  successful, 
and  that  it  is  still  in  progress.  Indeed,  it  can  never  end, 
for  after  the  third  estate  comes  the  fourth.  The  real  object 
is  to  be  able  to  conduct  the  social  struggle  with  equal 
weapons. 

THE   MORAL   CHARACTER   OF  THE    STRUGGLE. 

Nothing  impresses  thinking  men  so  seriously  as  the  con- 
templation of  the  social  struggle,  for  its  immorality  offends 
their  moral  feelings  deeply.  Individuals  can  consider 
ethical  requirements,  they  have  consciences,  but  societies 
have  none.  They  overfall  their  victims  like  avalanches 
with  irresistible  destroying  power.  All  societies,  large  and 
small,  retain  the  character  of  wild  hordes  in  considering 
every  means  good  which  succeeds.  Who  would  look  for 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  147 

fidelity,  veracity  and  conscience  in  the  intercourse  of  the 
' '  most  civilized  ' '  states  of  the  world  ?  Lying  and  deceit, 
breach  of  confidence  and  betrayal  is  on  every  page  of  their 
history;  and  saddest  of  all,  no  one  can  foresee  whether  it 
will  ever  be  different,  though  the  noblest  men  may  stand  at 
the  head  of  affairs,  with  the  highest  intentions.  What  self- 
deception  it  is  to  believe  that  monarchs  rule  the  social  world ! 
They  are  not  responsible  for  all  the  moral  lapses  that  occur 
daily  in  politics. 

How  trivial  are  royal  assurances  that  the  friendliest  rela- 
tions exist  with  all  the  neighboring  states!  Often  they  have 
scarcely  been  uttered  before  bloody  war  breaks  out.  They 
were  not  really  perfidious.  The  current  of  history,  the 
rivalry  of  states,  is  not  under  the  arbitrary  control  of 
rulers. 

However  cordial  the  personal  relations  of  the  monarchs 
not  one  will  cease  arming.  It  is  felt  instinctively  that  with 
the  first  favorable  opportunity  any  state  will  pounce  like  a 
wild  beast  upon  a  defenceless  victim.  Indeed,  it  is  gene- 
rally recognized  that  states  oppose  each  other  like  savage 
hordes;  that  they  follow  the  blind  laws  of  nature;  that  no 
ethical  law  or  moral  obligation,  only  the  fear  of  the  stronger, 
holds  them  in  check;  and  that  neither  right  nor  law,  treaty 
nor  league,  can  restrain  the  stronger  from  seeking  its  own 
interests  when  the  opportunity  is  offered. 

The  same  is  true  of  the  struggle  of  the  social  groups  in 
general.  It  is  conducted  not  by  individuals  but  by  socie- 
ties and  communities. 

The  lack  of  moral  principle  is  nowhere  more  conspicuous 
than  in  the  leagues  into  which  societies  unite  for  the  sake 
of  assuring  success.  The  overmatched  horde  makes  terms 
with  its  recent  enemy  in  order  to  fall  with  superior  force 
upon  the  present  foe;  civilized  states  consider  only  their  own 
advantage  in  making  alliances.  No  consideration  of  prin- 
ciples, intimacy  of  relations  or  community  of  ideas  avails; 
republican  France  and  America  ally  themselves  with  Russia 
without  scruple;  constitutional  and  liberty -loving  England 
upholds  Turkish  rule  and  aids  American  slaveholders,  and 
social  units  behave  in  the  same  way.  The  extreme  con- 
servatives fight  side  by  side  with  the  social  democrats  to-day 
for  the  sake  of  defeating  the  middle  classes,  and  to-morrow 
perhaps  will  join  their  defeated  foe  to  overcome  their 
quondam  ally. 


148          ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

But  these  ' '  perfidious  ' '  struggles  do  not  show  the  indi- 
viduals to  be  utterly  base.  They  only  prove  that  in  the 
struggle  of  the  wholes  individual  opinions  play  no  part,  that 
here  social  groups  struggle  inexorably  to  satisfy  their  own 
interests,  to  demonstrate  their  own  power.  Blind  natural 
law  controls  the  actions  of  savage  hordes,  of  states  and  of 
societies. 

THE  STRUGGLE   FOR   EMANCIPATION. 

Though  the  exercise  of  legislative  power,  as  we  have  said, 
is  indispensable  in  conducting  the  social  struggle  those  who 
do  not  possess  it  are  not  condemned  to  perpetual  passivity. 
The  unique  method  which  they  employ  against  the  ruling 
classes  is  aptly  called  the  struggle  for  emancipation.  The 
might  of  ideas  is  on  their  side,  a  significant  statement  which 
needs  careful  explanation. 

The  superior  classes,  as  we  have  seen,  cannot  rest  content 
with  the  fact  of  superiority;  political  relations  need  to  be 
confirmed;  might  must  be  turned  into  right.  It  seemed 
simple  enough  for  them  to  say :  Let  this  be  right.  But  every 
right  has  its  obverse  obligation;  however  comprehensive,  it 
has  its  limits  at  which  obligations  begin,  the  rights  of  those 
who  hitherto  have  had  none.  So  the  rights  of  the  rulers 
produced  the  rights  of  the  ruled.  The  germ  was  there  and 
it  must  develop. 

But  more  than  this;  the  human  mind  probes  to  the  foun- 
dation of  things  seeking  the  principle  of  causation  and 
analyzing  the  changing  phenomena  to  find  their  eternal 
unchanging  essence.  Now  in  the  changing  phases  of  right 
the  enduring  principle  is  the  idea.  Thus  rights  not  only  led 
to  obligations  but  also  to  the  idea  of  right. 

If  the  obligation  could  be  called  the  consequence  of  right 
in  space,  the  idea  was  its  consequence  in  time.  Whoever 
asserts  his  rights  can  not  escape  their  consequences.  Thus 
the  rulers  themselves  forge  weapons  with  which  the  ruled 
and  powerless  classes  successfully  attack  them  and  complete 
the  natural  process.  The  egoism  of  the  powerful  prepares 
the  way  for  the  uprising  of  the  weak. 

The  idea  of  right  is  not  a  purely  fanciful  conception.  It 
has  power  to  influence  men  and  can  be  practically  applied. 
Men  grow  accustomed  year  by  year  to  submit  to  rights;  they 
use  legal  forms  constantly  and  learn  to  respect  rightful 
limitations,  until  finally  the  conception,  the  very  idea,  of 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  149 

rights  pervades  and  controls  them.  In  this  way  the  idea 
of  right  becomes  the  fit  weapon  for  those  who  have  no 
other. 

But  its  application  is  not  simple.  The  legal  bulwarks  of 
the  powerful  will  not  yield  to  a  simple  appeal  to  ideas  as 
Jericho's  walls  fell  at  the  blast  of  trumpets;  and,  besides,  the 
propertyless  and  powerless  are  unable  to  use  such  mental 
weapons  immediately.  Again  we  see  the  egoism  of  one 
class  promoting  the  social  evolution  of  the  whole.  The 
bourgeoisie  in  the  struggle  with  the  other  property  classes  is 
the  first  to  appeal  to  universal  human  rights,  to  freedom  and 
equality.  It  claims  to  be  contending  not  for  itself  alone 
but  for  the  good  of  the  whole  folk.  And  it  succeeds  not 
without  the  support  of  the  masses  whom  it  flatters  and 
to  whom  it  discloses  the  resplendent  goal  of  freedom  and 
equality.  Its  might  like  that  of  the  higher  class  is  now 
based  on  right,  and  though  for  the  moment  what  it  has  won 
seems  to  be  clear  gain,  it  has  found  the  yoke  of  legal  logic 
about  its  neck  and  must  submit  to  its  ideas. 

For  the  lowest  classes  participation  in  the  struggle  was  a 
profitable  experience.  Even  the  slight  amelioration  of  their 
condition  was  an  advantage.  It  taught  them  many  a  lesson. 
But  it  is  hard  for  them  relying  simply  on  ideas  to  undertake 
the  social  struggle,  for  political  regulations  are  firmly  based 
on  the  possession  of  material  goods  and  are  defended  by  the 
middle  class  also,  and  moreover  as  time  goes  on  some  of 
their  ideas  prove  false  and  indefensible.  But  in  spite  of 
exaggerations  they  are  logical  consequences  of  principles 
which  the  ruling  class  asserted  in  its  own  interest  and  from 
which  the  middle  class  profited  declaring  them  at  the 
time  to  be  universal.  They  cannot  be  wholly  eradicated; 
they  aid  the  struggle  for  the  emancipation  of  the  fourth  class 
powerfully.  They  inspire  the  masses  with  fanaticism  and 
the  struggle  for  emancipation  succeeds. 

Meanwhile,  however,  an  unsocial  compound  of  societies 
has  taken  the  place  of  the  primitive  horde.  The  principles 
suited  to  one  condition  are  unsuited  to  another  and  cannot 
be  permanent.  The  false  consequences  must  be  corrected 
step  by  step  back  to  the  point  where  might  of  its  ' '  own 
right ' '  as  spontaneous  factor  of  public  life  undertakes  the 
control  of  a  society  tired  of  revolution.  This  completes  the 
period  of  evolution  in  the  social  struggle:  from  the  freedom 
and  equality  of  the  anarchic  horde  through  might  and 


150          ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

inequality,  right  and  law  to  the  freedom  and  equality  of 
revolution  and  state-destroying  anarchy;  and  from  this 
unbearable  condition  to  the  despotic  might  of  reaction  and 
the  beginning  of  a  new  period  of  evolution. 

THE   GROWTH   OF  STATES. 

Semper  Augustus,  always  augmenting  the  empire,  the 
characteristic  title  of  honor  borne  by  the  Roman  and  Ger- 
man emperors,  is  a  naive  recognition  of  the  nature  of  the 
state;  for  its  most  natural  tendency  (here  predicated  of  the 
ruler)  is  incessant  increase  of  power  and  territory. 

It  is  inherited  from  the  horde  and  characterizes  every 
social  community.  A  roving  horde  subjects  strangers  and 
uses  as  many  of  them  as  possible  for  servants  and  slaves. 
After  permanent  settlements  have  been  made  and  states 
founded  the  object  of  the  raids  must  be  either  to  levy  con- 
tributions and  exact  tribute  or  to  annex  territory.  As  the 
latter  is  the  most  successful  way  of  augmenting  the  state  it 
is  the  most  frequent  and  desirable;  it  is  the  general  rule  of 
history,  and  all  great  states  have  attained  most  of  their 
greatness  in  this  way.  So  long  as  inherent  strength  and 
external  circumstances  allow  the  process  is  continued;  but 
there  must  be  some  natural  limit  to  the  tendency,  otherwise 
the  whole  inhabited  world  would  long  since  have  become 
one  state. 

The  first  condition  precedent  to  external  growth  is  rela- 
tive stability  of  political  authority  within.  If  the  political 
authority  is  not  firmly  established;  if  there  are  no  firm 
bonds  of  reciprocal  interest  between  rulers  and  ruled,  or  of 
common  interest  in  the  state  the  rulers  cannot  undertake 
foreign  conquest  without  risking  their  position,  as  many 
historical  examples  show. 

A  state  can  undertake  foreign  conquest  with  prospect  of 
success  only  when  by  shrewd  and  strong  political  organiza- 
tion or  through  community  of  interests  it  has  succeeded 
outwardly  at  least  in  giving  its  constituent  parts  the  nature 
of  a  social  element.  It  must  come  into  action  as  a  unit. 

Hence  follows  the  social  law  that  a  state's  ability  to  under- 
take foreign  activity  grows  as  the  process  of  unification 
proceeds  within  it.  Since  every  new  conquest  adds  a  new 
element  no  conquest  can  be  undertaken  successfully  until 
the  spoils  of  the  former  have  to  some  degree  been  assimilated 
and  social  unity  is  re-established. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  151 

It  is  a  simple  consequence  of  this  social  law  that  states- 
men have  always  looked  upon  internal  divisions  in  neighbor- 
ing states  as  security  against  attack  upon  their  own.  For 
as  soon  as  the  state  is  strong  internally  it  must  utilize  its 
power  externally,  though  in  some  cases  an  enterprise  which 
promises  advantage  to  all  will  even  relieve  considerable  in- 
ternal friction.  So  necessary  and  so  strong  is  the  tendency  to 
foreign  conquest  that  no  state  can  escape  it  what  ever  may 
be  the  feeling  of  the  ruler  at  the  time.  The  method  will 
vary  with  the  circumstances;  and  unfavorable  circumstances 
will  be  circumvented  or  overcome. 

So  long  as  a  compact  and  powerful  body  politic  finds 
itself  in  the  midst  of  weaker  states  it  will  continue  its 
policy  of  conquest  and  annexation  to  the  last  possible  limit, 
as  Rome  did  in  Italy  and  as  Russia  is  doing  in  the  East 
where  its  neighbors  are  weak  and  loosely  organized. 

If  all  are  equally  powerful  so  that  no  one  can  hope  to 
overthrow  any  other  one  then  two  or  more  will  form 
alliances  in  order  to  conquer  the  selected  object  of  attack. 
If  a  weaker  state  happens  to  be  neighbor  to  several  more 
powerful  it  must  supplement  its  strength  by  alliances  or 
they  will  not  fail  to  partition  it  among  themselves.  No 
code  of  private  morals  can  successfully  oppose;  even  the 
men  who  are  individually  the  most  exemplary  are  forced  to 
act  in  harmony  with  their  surroundings.  The  scruples  of 
individual  feeling  and  sentiment  are  unknown  in  politics;  as 
Emperor  Francis  said:  "  The  state  has  no  daughter." 

Political  conditions  are  peremptory.  Natural  law  pre- 
vails though  the  will  of  the  individual  seems  to  be  "  free. ' ' 
Those  who  suffer  speak  of  "  crimes."  As  well  call  an  earth- 
quake by  which  thousands  have  perished  a  crime,  for  the 
only  difference  is  that  in  the  one  case  we  think  we  see  the 
responsible  agents  while  in  the  other  we  can  find  none. 

But  the  conditions  of  the  party  attacked  may  present  ser- 
ious obstacles  to  the  policy  of  conquest.  For  a  folk,  which 
is  the  product  of  a  long  period  of  development,  is  such  an 
exclusive  unit  that  the  attempt  to  incorporate  it  must  tax 
the  strength  of  the  conquering  state  and  leave  it  for  a  long 
time  incapable  of  future  external  activity.  That  is  to  say, 
it  is  not  easy  neither  does  it  promote  humanity  nor  good 
morals  to  subject  a  foreign  folk  by  violence.  Though 
simple  conquest  and  annexation  cannot  be  treated  as 
' '  crimes ' '  without  characterizing  the  whole  history  of 


152          ANNAI<S  OP  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

mankind  as  one  long  crime,  yet  every  violent  attempt  to 
destroy  a  folk,  which  is  a  product  of  history,  is  after  all 
immoral  and  inhuman. 

To  profit  by  the  conquest  of  a  neighboring  folk  a  state 
must  sometimes  resort  to  war  indemnities.  Plundering 
expeditions,  conquest,  annexation,  incorporation  and  war  in- 
demnities: these  are  the  various  forms  in  which  the  natural 
tendency  of  the  state  to  augment  its  power  and  extend  its 
authority  is  manifested.* 

It  would  not  be  hard  to  set  a  limit  to  the  increasing  size 
of  a  state.  But  in  fact  the  tendency  is  ceaseless  and  may 
lead  on  to  destruction  as  history  proves.  Every  great  state 
has  striven  to  increase  its  authority  and  the  greatest  have 
striven  to  rule  the  world;  the  end  has  come  only  in  their 
sudden  downfall,  in  an  historical  catastrophe. 

The  social  law  thus  illustrated  is  not  peculiar  to  the 
growth  of  states  but  is  manifested  in  all  other  social 
domains.  The  periodical  crises  of  economic  production,  for 
instance,  are  due  to  it.  Each  lucrative  process  of  produc- 
tion is  repeated  until  the  limits  of  present  need  have  been 
far  exceeded  and  business  breaks  down  for  lack  of  demand. 
The  experiment  though  often  tried  is  constantly  repeated. 
Admonitions  avail  nothing  and  ' '  wise  moderation ' '  will  at 
most  influence  a  few  individuals;  the  tendency  of  social 
communities  knows  no  limit  but  the  "crash."  In  trade 
and  commerce,  everywhere,  social  strife  for  power  or  for 
wealth  and  property  lasts  until  all  energy  is  exhausted. 
Disruption,  crisis,  panic  are  then  unavoidable. 

So  long  as  the  state  has  aggressive  power  it  strives  to 
augment,  to  increase  its  territory,  to  conquer,  to  colonize, 

*  To  illustrate  the  whole  range  from  the  most  primitive  to  the  most  modern 
manifestations  of  this  tendency  I  compared  ("  Der  Rassenkampf ',"  p.  166)  the 
Apaches  and  the  Kirghese,  who  are  content  to  capture  a  few  horses  or  asses 
or  a  herd  of  cattle,  with  the  modern  "  European  victor  '*  who  knows  how  straight- 
way to  force  the  payment  of  several  milliards.  This  passage  offended  some  of 
my  honored  German  reviewers,  though  it  is  plain  that  no  exception  could  be 
taken  save  on  the  supposition  that  Bismarck  was  referred  to.  But  he  is  neither 
the  first  nor  the  only  "European  victor  *'  who  has  won  his  milliards.  But  if  he 
were  the  only  one  still  the  insinuation  is  unjustifiable  considering  my  contention 
that  historical  events  are  subject  to  natural  laws  and  independent  of  individuals. 
But  they  should  not  have  applied  to  the  German  war,  of  which  I  said  nothing, 
what  should  be  applied  to  false  idealism  which  I  have  always  attacked.  I  confess 
that  in  politics  I  fully  accept  the  realistic  standpoint  of  Prince  Bismarck,  He 
has  never  spoken  of  the  great  indemnity  with  false  pathos,  and  in  his  report  to 
Herr  von  Manteuffel,  from  Frankfort  in  July,  1853,  he  said:  "The  other  German 
states  have  the  same  interests  that  we  have,  to  be  left  in  peace  where  there  is 
nothing  to  be  gained,"  and  weighing  the  chance  of  war  he  added:  "If  we  can 
profit  by  it  then  the  case  is  difierent."  If  those  who  to-day  write  upon  politics 
would  study  the  works  of  Prince  Bismarck  there  would  be  much  less  pathos, 
fewer  Chauvinistic  phrases  and  fewer  political  quarrels. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  153 

etc.  This  continues  until  strength  fails  from  internal  or 
external  causes;  or  until  it  is  surpassed  by  other  states  and 
crippled.  Only  when  strength  fails  does  strife  cease. 

STATE    AND    FOLK. 

Since  each  political  organization  creates  a  civilization  and 
each  localized  civilization  is  with  the  aid  of  such  spon- 
taneous moral  agencies  as  language,  religion,  custom  and 
rights*  transformed  into  a  folk,  it  follows  that  with  the 
development  of  a  number  of  states  side  by  side  a  number  of 
folk  must  arise  also.  If  the  mere  fact  of  common  allegiance 
is  sufficient  to  bind  the  subjects  into  a  social  unit  it  is  clear 
that  as  the  number  of  mutual  relations  between  the  subjects 
increases  the  unity  will  be  more  pronounced.  In  this  way 
the  folk-state  acquires  greater  offensive  and  defensive 
power.  But  in  the  course  of  time  the  folk-states  will  fall 
into  opposition;  the  original  contest  will  be  repeated  in 
higher  form;  and  as  the  perpetual  strife  for  power  animates 
them  also  it  cannot  fail  to  happen  that  some  are  disrupted 
and  others  grow. 

As  the  impulse  to  increase  power  is  not  checked  by  the 
establishment  of  any  political  or  national  relations  whatever, 
a  great  variety  of  social  and  political  combinations  are 
bound  to  arise  in  the  course  of  history  and  it  cannot  fail  to 
happen  that  there  will  be  political  organizations  consisting 
of  different  folk  and  parts  of  folk. 

The  greater  difficulties  which  the  conquering  state  must 
encounter  and  the  scruples  it  may  entertain  at  annexing 
foreign  folk  in  whole  or  in  part  we  have  already  discussed. 
But  if  the  margin  of  superiority  is  not  too  narrow  the 
foreign  folk-elements  will  eventually  be  assimilated  by  the 
conquering  race  and  blended  into  a  social  unit,  a  new  folk. 
There  have  always  been  composite  folk-states;  they  are  the 
necessary  result  of  the  historical  process  which  is  constantly 
breaking  down  the  old  and  establishing  the  new.  To  deny 
their  right  to  exist  or  to  justify  them  less  fully  than  folk- 
states  would  display  crass  ignorance  of  history.  Social 
relations  tend  to  develop;  and  as  surely  as  history  produces 
only  what  is  reasonable  this  higher  order  of  political  organi- 
zation will  overcome  the  internal  struggle  of  the  composite 
folk  and  justify  itself. 

*  For  an  explanation  of  this  process,  see  "Der  Rassenkampf"  pp.  z^etseq.  and 
253  et  seq. 


154          ANNAI.S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

The  struggles  are  severe;  they  are,  so  to  speak,  higher 
powers  of  the  simple  social  struggles.  To  the  social  con- 
trasts of  the  unitary  folk-state  the  contrasts  between  the 
different  folk  are  added.  As  the  most  conspicuous  difference 
is  in  language  the  contest  centres  about  the  right  of  one  or 
the  equal  right  of  several  in  official  business.  But  the 
essential  point  is  the  struggle  for  authority;  the  contest  over 
the  language  is  only  an  excuse  to  make  the  tendency  seem 
plausible. 

The  question  at  issue  is  whether  the  authority  shall  be 
monopolized  by  a  privileged  folk  speaking  a  privileged  mother- 
tongue.  The  struggle  becomes  justified  when  the  unprivi- 
leged folk-elements  possess  sufficient  social  and  political 
power  and  have  acquired  sufficient  mastery  of  the  official 
language  to  oppose  the  ruling  folk  successfully.  Other 
things  being  equal  the  folk  which  can  use  more  than  one  of 
the  competing  languages  will  win,  the  polyglots  will  over- 
come the  ruling  class  which  remains  monoglot. 

But  when  the  victory  has  once  been  secured  the  unpracti- 
cal idea  of  the  equality  of  tongues  must  yield  to  the  real 
needs  of  the  state.  Either  there  must  be  one  official  lan- 
guage or  the  whole  people,  or  at  least  the  ruling  classes, 
must  speak  several.  In  a  composite  folk -state  there  can  be 
no  serious  question  which  should  be  the  official  language. 
As  it  is  simply  the  means  for  promoting  general  intercourse 
throughout  the  state  plainly  the  most  available  one  must  be 
chosen,  and  this  must  be  the  one  most  generally  used  or 
rather  the  one  most  widely  diffused  among  the  educated 
classes  of  all  the  different  folk-elements.  Generally  this  will 
be  the  language  of  the  older  civilization.  Only  living 
tongues  of  course  can  be  considered.  But  its  rank  will  be 
questioned  so  long  as  its  natural  representatives  enjoy  any 
political  advantage  or  other  folk-elements  suffer  political 
prejudice.  In  a  word  the  struggle  which  begins  with  the 
battle-cry  ' '  no  discrimination  on  account  of  language  ' '  will 
continue  until  the  actual  relations  are  so  altered  that  the  com- 
plete equality  before  the  law  of  all  the  elements  is  no  longer 
imperiled  by  the  official  preference  accorded  to  the  language 
of  the  oldest  civilization;  or  a  general  polyglottous  condi- 
tion of  all  the  folk-elements  may  end  the  struggle. 


IV.  THE  PSYCHO-SOCIAL  PHENOMENA  AND  THE 
INDIVIDUAL. 

INDIVIDUALISM    AND    COLLECTIVISM. 

The  point  of  view  from  which  social  phenomena  are  con- 
sidered has  oscillated  between  two  opposite  principles — 
individualism  and  collectivism.  Not  only  the  attempts  at 
explaining  "the  social  world,"  but  also  all  propositions 
that  aimed  at  shaping  it  in  virtue  of  its  accepted  nature,  and 
all  the  differences  and  disputes  in  the  domain  of  social 
science  turn  upon  the  antithesis  between  "mankind"  and 
the  individual.  There  was  no  third  standpoint,  no  middle 
way  known  to  the  theorists. 

While  Smithianism  and  materialistic  philosophy  consid- 
ered egoism  and  self-interest  the  source  of  social  develop- 
ment and  the  sole  motive  of  human  behavior;  others  pointed 
to  the  self-sacrifice  of  the  individual  and  contrasted  egoism 
and  self-interest  with  "  charity  "  and  "altruism."  While 
some  sought  to  explain  social  phenomena  by  the  egoistical 
nature  of  the  individual,  the  statisticians  pointed  to  the 
"community,"  "society,"  "mankind"  and  its  nature  and 
"  development  according  to  law  "  for  explanation.  The  real 
truth  was  overlooked.  Neither  one  alone  and  neither  to  the 
degree  supposed  is  the  cause  and  motive  of  social  develop- 
ment. If  we  prefix  to  each  the  adjective  "  social,"  giving 
it  the  meaning  not  of  the  abstract  whole  but  of  the  limited 
social  circle,  like  the  syngenetic  group,  we  shall  have  found 
the  middle  way  which  social  philosophy  has  hitherto  missed. 

Not  personal  but  social  egoism  is  the  motive  of  social 
development;  not  devotion  to  the  world  at  large,  nor 
' '  charity  ' '  in  the  broad  universal  sense  of  Christian  theory, 
not  fellow  feeling  with  mankind;  but  social  sympathy,  self- 
sacrificing,  loving  devotion  to  the  natural  social  community. 
Man  is  not  so  bad  as  crass  materialism  pictures  him;  neither 
is  he  so  large  hearted  as  Christian  philosophy  in  vain 
requires  him  to  be.  He  is  neither  devil  nor  angel,  simply 
human.  Fettered  to  the  community  by  natural  ties  of 
blood,  habit  and  mode  of  thought,  his  egoism  is  social,  his 
sympathies  are  social;  to  demand  more  than  social  sympathy 
is  to  demand  something  unnatural  and  superhuman  and  to 
credit  him  with  less  than  social  egoism  is  to  do  him  wrong. 
But  social  egoism  includes  social  sympathy,  social  sympathy 
is  social  egoism.  L^et  us  call  their  union  syngenism  and  we 

(i55) 


156  ANNALS   OF  THE   AMERICAN   ACADEMY. 

have  identified  the  motive  of  all  social  development  and  the 
key  to  its  solution. 

Those  who  conceive  the  whole  social  world  from  the  indi- 
vidualistic standpoint,  who  explain  all  development  by 
reference  to  the  individual  and  look  upon  his  development 
as  the  highest  goal  and  simple  object  of  all  that  transpires 
in  society,  want  to  heal  all  the  hurts  and  ills  of  the  social 
world  by  freeing  the  individual  and  proclaiming  his  rights.* 

Doctrinaire  liberalism  and  abstract  constitutionalism  both 
occupy  this  position.  Every  individual  as  such  must  have 
every  possible  right  and  enjoy  every  privilege  of  the  "  most 
favored"  individual — that  it  may  be  well  upon  the  earth. 
The  plan  has  been  tried  in  Europe  repeatedly  and  has  failed, 
for  the  individual  profited  nothing  from  all  these  rights; 
relying  upon  them  alone  he  hurled  himself  against  the 
unyielding  barriers  of  social  institutions  which  no  proclama- 
tion of  individual  liberty  can  force. 

At  the  opposite  pole  is  socialism,  communism  and  every 
other  form  of  collectivism.  The  collective  whole,  preferably 
the  largest  at  hand,  must  labor  for  and  protect  the  indi- 
vidual; the  worry  and  the  care  fall  upon  it;  the  labor  must 
be  performed  in  common;  the  individual  must  be  directed 
and  utilized:  but  also  supported. 

Unfortunately  the  legislative  conditions  have  never  been 
adequate  for  an  experiment  or  it  would  appear  that  a  collec- 
tive whole  caring  for  the  individual  so  providently  is  as 
Utopistic  as  a  self-determining  individual. 

In  truth,  everywhere  and  from  the  very  beginning  the 
social  world  has  moved,  acted,  fought  and  striven  only  by 
groups.  Legislation  to  be  wise  and  true  must  take  account 
of  the  actual  conditions,  neither  being  blind  to  them  like 
the  ' '  constitutionalist ' '  nor  imagining  with  the  collectivist 
that  it  can  change  them.  The  only  possible  solution  of  the 
social  question  lies  in  the  harmonious  co-operation  of  the 
social  groups  so  far  as  that  is  possible. 

THE   INDIVIDUAL   AND    HIS    SOCIAL   GROUP. 

The  great  error  of  individualistic  psychology  is  the  suppo- 
sition that  man  thinks.  It  leads  to  the  continual  search  for 
the  source  of  thought  in  the  individual  and  for  the  reason 

_*  Marx  was  quite  right  when  he  said:  "The  real  insignificance  of  the  indi- 
vidual is  in  strong  contrast  with  the  importance  conceded  to  him  in  scientific 
speculations.  His  insignificance  is  apparent, not  only  in  political  affairs  but  in 
economic."— "Capital  "  pp.  235,  236. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  157 

why  the  individual  thinks  so  and  not  otherwise;  and  prompts 
naive  theologians  and  philosophers  to  consider  and  even  to 
advise  how  man  ought  to  think.  A  chain  of  errors;  for  it  is 
not  man  himself  who  thinks  but  his  social  community;  the 
source  of  his  thoughts  is  in  the  social  medium  in  which  he 
lives,  the  social  atmosphere  which  he  breathes,*  and  he  can- 
not think  ought  else  than  what  the  influences  of  his  social 
environment  concentrating  upon  his  brain  necessitate.  There 
is  a  law  of  mechanics  and  optics  by  which  we  compute  the 
angle  of  refraction  from  the  angle  of  incidence  and  in  the  realm 
of  mind  there  is  a  similar  law  though  we  cannot  observe  it  so 
exactly.  Every  ray  of  thought  falling  in  on  the  mind  is 
reflected  in  our  views.  What  we  think  is  the  necessary 
result  of  the  mental  influences  to  which  we  have  been 
subjected  since  childhood. 

The  individual  simply  plays  the  part  of  the  prism  which 
receives  the  rays,  dissolves  them  according  to  fixed  laws  and 
lets  them  pass  out  again  in  a  predetermined  direction  and 
with  a  predetermined  color. 

The  influence  of  environment  upon  the  human  mind  has 
always  been  recognized  by  psychologists  and  philosophers; 
but  it  has  been  considered  a  secondary  factor.  On  the 
contrary  the  social  medium  which  the  child  enters  at  birth, 
in  which  he  lives,  moves  and  has  his  being,  is  fundamental. 
Toward  this  environment  the  individual  from  childhood  to 
ripest  old  age  is  more  or  less  receptive;  rarely  can  the 
maturest  minds  so  far  succeed  in  emancipating  themselves 
from  this  medium  as  to  undertake  independent  reflection 
while  complete  emancipation  is  impossible,  for  all  the  organs 
and  modes  of  thought,  all  the  organs  for  constructing 
thoughts,  have  been  moulded  or  at  least  thoroughly  imbued 
by  it.  Granted  that  very  mature  and  independent  thinkers 
have  passed  the  age  of  receptivity,  still  it  is  questionable 
whether  the  most  eminent  and  original  philosopher  in  the 
world  can  so  far  dissociate  himself  from  the  acquired  modes 
and  organs  as  to  substitute  independent  creations  in  their 
place. 

Consider  the  mental  make-up  of  the  ordinary  or  ' '  average ' ' 
man.  The  child  gets  his  first  impressions  from  his  earliest 
surroundings.  His  earliest  ethical  ideas  come  from  the  con- 
duct of  his  nurses  and  early  tutors!  Praise  and  blame, 

*  "  To  think  is  to  be  conscious  ot  the  growth  of  psychological  activity.     ..." 
Bastian,  "  Ethnologic,"  xii. 


158          ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

reward  aiid  punishment,  the  hopes  and  fears  that  are  raised, 
the  frights  which  he  is  given,  all  go  to  make  up  his  first 
impressions  and  educate  his  mind.  Before  it  is  noticed  the 
little  world-citizen  has  become  the  exact  mental  image  of  his 
"family,"  giving  the  word  its  broadest  Roman  meaning. 
His  childish  mind  corresponds  exactly  to  the  many-sided 
mould  in  which  it  was  cast;  it  bears  the  impress  on  every 
hand  stamped  upon  it. 

Thus  prepared  the  youngster  comes  in  contact  with  the 
"  world  "  in  the  shape  of  a  troop  of  playmates  and  compan- 
ions for  the  most  part  cast  in  the  same  mould.  Their  im- 
pressions are  much  the  same;  all  have  been  inspired  with 
the  same  admiration  for  certain  things  and  persons,  and 
filled  involuntarily  with  the  same  hate  and  abhorrence  for 
others  which  prevailed  about  them.  Even  for  food  and 
drink  they  have  received  the  same  tastes  and  distastes. 
They  are  mere  clockwork,  which  runs  as  it  is  regulated. 
Who  is  it  who  feels,  thinks,  tastes;  not  the  individual  but 
the  social  group.  Its  thoughts,  feelings,  tastes,  impressions, 
hence  also  its  plans  and  purposes,  its  objects  and  its  conduct 
re-live  again;  as  the  elders  sung  so  chirrup  the  young. 

Who  can  comprehend  all  that  has  been  accumulated  in  the 
mind  of  this  new  individual  ?  The  mental  precipitate  of 
generations  long  gone  is  condensed  in  the  mind  of  one 
person.  There  are  experiences  thousands  of  years  old  which 
have  been  inherited  for  generations  as  completed  intuitions; 
destinies  historic,  and  prehistoric,  with  their  effects  upon 
mental  character  and  inclination,  with  their  forms  of  thought 
and  mode  of  reasoning;  sympathies,  prejudices  and  prepos- 
sessions deeply  seated  and  concentrated  in  the  mind  of  the 
"  free  "  individual  like  countless  rays  in  a  focus.  They  live 
in  him  as  thought,  though  the  crowd  imagines  that  he  thinks 
freely;  and  as  feeling,  though  the  crowd  imagines  that 
whether  right  or  wrong,  praiseworthy  or  blameworthy,  it  is 
he  that  cherishes  them. 

For  the  great  majority  of  men  intellectual  development, 
strictly  so-called,  ends  with  this;  the  educative  impressions 
of  childhood  and  youth  suffice  for  the  whole  life.  Only  an 
insignificant  minority  continue  their  education  by  receiving 
mental  impressions  and  influences  from  without  their  social 
group  as  they  have  opportunity.  How  much  we  overrate 
the  efficacy  of  classical  antiquity  and  the  accumulated  culture 
of  other  nations  in  this  particular !  How  insignificant  it  is  in 


THE  OUTLINES  OP  SOCIOLOGY.  159 

comparison  with  the  inherited  and  inculcated  culture  in 
which  the  spirit  of  the  social  group  is  manifest! 

Unprejudiced  consideration  will  convince  us  that  all  the 
"education,"  especially  that  of  our  schools,  is  scarcely 
sufficient  to  varnish  over  the  mental  heritage  which  each  has 
received.  None  of  it  ever  penetrates  into  the  depths  of  the 
soul  unless  the  pre-existing  conditions  are  favorable. 

What  do  the  so-called  educated  men,  doctors,  teachers, 
officials,  etc.,  generally  get  from  their  education,  whether 
acquired  in  school  or  not,  save  a  little  knowledge  ?  But 
knowledge  is  not  thought,  neither  is  it  feeling.  What  does 
knowledge  profit  if  it  cannot  alter  thought  or  influence 
temperament?  and  it  can  do  neither.  Hence  the  sad 
sight  of  people  who  with  a  little  knowledge  so  much  the 
more  easily  conceal  from  the  world  the  vulgarity  of  their 
ideas  and  their  inborn  baseness;  who  varnish  over  rudeness 
by  pretending  special  knowledge  and  vainly  cloak  a  coarse 
nature  in  ' '  education. ' ' 

Even  if  it  were  as  Buckle  contends  in  his  great  work  that 
mankind  is  improved  by  knowledge  and  by  that  alone;  it 
must  first  improve  the  mass  or  at  least  the  group  which  in 
turn  would  ennoble  the  individual. 

Though  paradoxical  it  is  true  that  the  knowledge  of  the 
mass,  of  the  social  environment,  benefits  the  individual, 
while  the  knowledge  which  he  acquires  comes  too  late  to 
affect  him.  Like  a  piece  of  coin  he  is  complete  when  he 
steps  out  into  the  world. 

A  mature  young  man  is  bound  to  his  family,  class,  or 
social  group  by  ties  of  common  interest.  He  is  treated  by 
the  world,  that  is  by  the  other  social  groups,  simply  as  a 
member  of  his  syngenetic  circle  and  so  feels  that  his  identity 
with  it  is  involuntary  and  often  a  misfortune.  However 
much  he  may  know  he  is  only  what  his  social  medium 
makes  out  of  him,  subject  however  to  modification  by  the 
heterogeneous  social  elements  that  confront  him.  Though 
there  are  rare  and  exceptional  cases  where  individuals, 
whether  living  in  isolation  or  separated  from  their  own  circle 
by  force,  have  been  thoroughly  absorbed  by  a  strange  group 
or  have  of  purpose  submerged  their  identity  in  it,  a  com- 
plete transformation  of  character  taking  place,  they  simply 
confirm  the  rule. 

The  fate  of  the  youth  determines  the  destiny  of  the  man 
in  his  broader  sphere.  Hard  conflicts  of  interests  arise  and 


160          ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

struggles  with  powerful  currents  which  the  individual  can 
neither  cause  nor  control,  but  by  which  he  is  tossed  to  and 
fro,  with  which  he  must  swim  lest  he  sink.  Does  he 
choose  ? 

The  current  beats  him  back;  of  what  avail  is  his  knowl- 
edge? He  must  struggle,  but  if  he  would  not  sink  he  must 
swim  with  the  favoring  tide;  and  his  freedom  consists  only 
in  holding  himself  as  much  above  it  as  possible  and  warding 
off  the  opposing  flood  as  best  he  may.  To  get  into  an 
entirely  different  current,  or  to  change  his  course  is  a  matter 
of  accident,  not  of  choice. 

The  struggle  of  life  brings  the  individual  to  self-conscious- 
ness indeed  and  he  obtains  an  unobstructed  view  of  the  field 
of  conflict;  he  has  acquired  personal  knowledge,  not  simply 
adapted  another's.  But  it  cannot  transform  him  for  he  is 
at  the  end  of  his  career  and  cannot  begin  life  anew.  lyike 
the  youth  of  Sais  he  has  drawn  the  veil,  and  knows  the 
secret;  he  knows  what  he  was  and  must  make  his  exit. 
His  own  knowledge  is  his  only  comfort — or  disappointment. 

Between  the  cradle  and  the  grave  one  thread  is  spun 
which  breaks  not  and  cannot  be  reunited;  a  chain  is 
extended  whose  every  link  is  wrought  into  the  preceding. 
Man  may  choose  to  break  it  by  violence,  but  not  to  re-weld 
it.  He  may  die  by  his  own  hand,  but  can  never  be  born 
again,  though  even  the  self-determination  to  die  must  be 
conditioned  in  the  whole  preceding  life. 

The  whole  belief  in  the  freedom  of  human  action  is  rooted 
in  the  idea  that  man's  conduct  is  the  fruit  of  his  thoughts 
and  that  his  thoughts  are  exclusively  his  own.  This  is  an 
error.  He  is  not  self-made  mentally  any  more  than  he  is 
physically.  His  mind  and  thoughts  are  the  product  of  his 
social  medium,  of  the  social  element  whence  he  arose,  in 
which  he  lives. 

Those  who  doubt  whether  the  influence  of  the  social 
medium  can  be  so  powerful  must  consider  what  is  more 
remarkable,  that  the  social  element  in  which  a  man  moves 
exercises  an  undeniable  influence  upon  his  physical  features. 
The  fact  is  well  known  to  physiognomists  and  is  too  appar- 
ent to  be  seriously  contradicted.  Who  does  not  recognize 
an  Englishman,  a  Frenchman,  an  Italian,  a  north  or  a  south 
German  among  a  hundred  different  nationalities?  It  is  diffi- 
cult to  say  exactly  how  we  recognize  them;  only  the  artist's 
crayon  can  express  it;  but  we  recognize  John  Bull,  the 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  161 

"honest  Swabian,"  the  Frenchman  polite  and  tractable  and 
even  the  Parisian,  the  Italian  somewhat  uncanny  and 
Mephistopheliau,  and  so  on. 

Who  has  not  observed  how  living  for  years  among  a  peo- 
ple of  a  pronounced  type  of  culture  conforms  a  foreigner's 
whole  external  appearance  and  bearing  to  theirs  ? 

Does  not  the  German  become  a  perfect  John  Bull  after 
living  a  decade  or  two  in  England  ?  Who  has  not  observed 
the  remarkable  orientalizing  effect  of  life  in  the  Hast  upon 
the  European  ?  We  have  known  Poles,  offspring  of  old 
Polish  families,  who  after  a  long  residence  in  Turkey  have 
assumed  the  oriental  type  completely.  But  it  is  useless  to 
cite  further  instances.  Those  who  have  no  experience  can 
neither  comprehend  nor  believe  it;  but  those  who  have  will 
certainly  corroborate  us. 

To  these  alone  we  turn  with  a  logical  demonstration.  That 
which  works  the  greater  may  also  work  the  less;  if  the 
social  element  changes  a  man's  physical  features  surely  it 
has  already  changed  his  mind,  has  more  easily  transformed 
his  thoughts  and  opinions  and  exerted  upon  his  feelings  and 
disposition  an  influence  which  betrays  itself  in  his  whole 
outward  bearing;  for  this  is  nothing  but  the  expression  of 
the  mental  man,  the  mirror  in  which  his  soul  is  reflected. 

Human  speech  may  never  be  sufficiently  discriminating 
nor  our  thoughts  clear  enough  to  express  what  we  recog- 
nize as  characteristic  in  the  different  types,  though  the 
artist's  crayon  already  does  it  in  the  illustrated  comic 
papers.  Still  we  must  confirm  the  fact  that  there  is  some- 
thing by  which  we  recognize  the  members  of  various  nations, 
peoples  and  social  groups,  etc. ,  that  it  is  transferable  to  the 
individual  by  means  of  the  social  influence  regardless  of 
descent  or  relationship;  that  this  influence  seizes  upon  and 
transforms  the  human  mind  quicker  and  easier  than  the 
body,  but  that  after  a  while  it  seizes  this  also  and  transforms 
it  by  its  power. 

While  we  are  considering  the  action  of  the  social  factor  on 
the  individual  whom  it  surrounds,  we  must  not  fail  to  notice 
that  the  character  of  a  social  group  is  developed  by  the  con- 
tinuous assimilating  action  of  the  whole  on  its  parts.  We 
distinguish  different  nationalities  not  so  much  by  physiog- 
nomy, figure,  complexion  or  proportions,  for  our  eye  is  not 
sensitive  enough  to  perceive  all  this  without  practice  and 
without  the  aid  of  scientific  apparatus.  But  what  strikes  us 


1 62  ANNAI<S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

is  the  type — something  inexpressible  and  indefinable — which 
is  the  effect  of  social  influence,  z.  <?.,  of  the  influence  of  the 
social  factor. 

It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  this  should  be  fairly 
appreciated  for  it  shows  us  that  the  character  of  the  social 
group  depends  more  on  its  mental  than  on  its  physical  con- 
stitution. In  a  word  the  type  or  physiognomical  character 
of  a  folk  or  social  group  is  not  anthropological  but  social. 
On  the  one  hand  this  explains  how  it  is  possible  for  a 
foreigner  to  assume  the  type  of  the  group  into  which  he  has 
fallen;  while  on  the  other  the  transformation  of  the  indi- 
vidual by  the  group  proves  that  we  are  dealing  with  purely 
social  and  sociological  facts;  for  if  the  type  were  anthropo- 
logical the  transformation  and  assimilation  of  the  individual 
through  the  group  would  be  inconceivable. 

After  the  influence  of  the  social  medium  upon  the  indi- 
vidual has  been  established  it  only  remains  to  investigate 
the  nature  of  the  factor  which  exercises  it.  If  it  is  not 
anthropological  what  is  its  character? 

After  what  has  been  already  said  no  one  will  expect  a 
precise  answer.  The  most  that  can  be  said  is  this:  Between 
each  thought  or  desire  and  the  accompanying  act  intervenes 
man's  <pu<Ji<Z.  We  know  that  violent  thoughts  and  efforts 
are  expressed  externally  in  the  ^w<«C,  because  we  see  it 
daily  and  hourly  in  cases  of  sudden  anger,  joy,  pain  or 
despair;  the  effect  follows  the  cause  immediately.  But  a 
natural  result  which  is  real  and  true  where  we  can  observe 
it  is  no  less  so  where  our  eye  is  too  weak  to  notice  it.  If  an 
internal  emotion,  thought  or  effort  exercises  an  influence 
upon  our  body,  upon  our  deportment  and  bearing,  it  may 
exercise  it  in  such  infinitesimal  degrees  that  our  sense  is 
too  weak  to  perceive  the  separate  and  distinct  effects.  Our 
perception  does  not  begin  until,  after  a  long  series  of  effects, 
the  completed  type  confronts  us. 

But  can  we  designate  the  effective  agents  more  exactty  ? 
Thoughts  and  desires  produce  the  type,  we  said.  Life  in 
turn,  social  life,  produces  them.  As  it  differs  from  zone  to 
zone  and  land  to  land  among  men  of  different  races  and  dif- 
ferent ethnical  composition  so  their  thoughts,  their  entire 
conceptions  and  their  efforts,  are  different  and  difference  of 
type  follows  necessarily.  As  a  people's  conceptions  and 
thoughts  stand  also  in  the  perpetual  stream  of  evolution  and 
alter  from  time  to  time,  there  arises  the  well-known  variety 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  163 

of  type   among  members  of  the  same  folk    in    successive 
generations. 

INFLUENCE  OF   ECONOMIC   STATUS   ON   THE 
INDIVIDUAL. 

Our  assertion  that  thoughts  and  opinions  are  created  by 
the  social  life  can  be  made  still  more  specific.  A  man's 
behavior  is  determined  immediately  by  his  economic  status, 
which  constrains  him  to  follow  a  certain  mode  of  life  and 
awakens  the  corresponding  mental  conditions  within  him. 
In  all  freely  organized  states  amid  the  multitude  of  divisions 
and  subdivisions  there  are,  as  we  have  seen,  three  grand 
social  circles  distinguished  by  economic  status:  the  ruling 
class,  the  middle  class  including  merchants  and  tradesmen, 
and  the  peasantry.  They  bring  up  their  members  differently 
by  accustoming  them  to  their  respective  opinions,  customs, 
legal  usages  and  principles  and,  by  offering  them  and  even 
imposing  upon  them  a  particular  calling,  compel  them 
through  self-interest  to  continue  in  the  path  traversed  by 
the  whole  circle. 

Thus  the  nobleman  is  accustomed  to  rule  and  command 
and  to  have  his  life  made  comfortable  for  him  by  others  in 
the  hereditary  way.  Higher  appreciation  of  personality 
arises  naturally,  and  self-assurance,  depreciation  of  others 
and  the  thousand  and  one  traits  which,  independent  of 
land,  folk,  nation,  religion,  race  or  individual  peculiarity, 
characterize  aristocracy  universally. 

The  peasants  and  slaves  of  every  land  and  people  cherish 
deep,  suppressed  ill-will  towards  the  lords.  It  is  inherited 
from  generation  to  generation,  and  is  held  in  check  by  the 
consciousness  of  mental  inferiority  and  economic  weakness; 
but  when  opportunity  offers  it  bursts  into  flame  with  the 
wildness  of  a  barbaric  horde. 

Neither  persuasion,  kindness  nor  advances  can  uproot  it. 
In  stolid  resignation  the  peasant  closes  his  social  circle  to 
the  higher  classes — which  however  do  not  open  theirs  to 
him,  — hears  the  consolations  of  religion  as  a  matter  of  habit 
without  the  least  reflection,  and  throws  the  blame  for  all  the 
misery  of  his  life  upon  the  lords.  Yet  habit  and  inherited 
notions  have  taught  him  to  bear  his  hard  lot  calmly,  and 
acquired  feelings  of  respect  make  it  easier  for  him  to  do  so; 
though  all  together  they  would  be  insufficient  to  maintain 


164          ANNAI<S  OP  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

the  political  organization  were  it  not  protected  by  the  strong 
arm  of  the  state's  power. 

The  member  of  the  middle  class  is  educated  in  ' '  busi- 
ness ' '  traditions.  Trade,  commerce  and  business  profits 
are  his  ideals  from  childhood  on  and  he  sees  many  examples 
of  accumulated  riches.  Fortune-hunting,  an  idea  that  the 
peasant  never  knows  and  which  seldom  incites  the  noble- 
man, is  the  great  object  which  attracts  the  middle  class. 
They  soon  learn  that  skillful  labor  and  inventiveness  lead  to 
success  and  every  thought  turns  in  that  direction. 

Seldom  can  the  peasant,  bound  to  the  soil  by  law  or  by 
the  force  of  circumstances,  think  of  leaving  his  hereditary 
pursuit.  As  a  rule  he  is  unable  to  conceive  of  such  a  thing. 
So  overwhelming  are  the  legal  and  political  regulations  that 
it  does  not  even  occur  to  him  to  oppose  them.  As  a  result 
of  his  inertia  his  horizon  grows  narrower  and  narrower,  not 
extending  beyond  the  neighboring  village;  he  must  either 
give  up  and  labor  and  adapt  himself  to  the  circumstances  or 
pine  away  and  die  in  misery — or  in  prison;  there  is  no 
alternative. 

It  is  otherwise  with  the  townsman.  Trade  extends  his 
horizon;  the  world  lies  open  before  him;  his  plans  are 
ambitious;  but  the  narrow  limits  of  political  regulation  hold 
him  in  check.  What  is  more  natural  in  such  circumstances 
than  the  attempt  to  break  through  or  circumvent  them! 
This  it  is  which  causes  the  social  fermentation  and  starts  the 
social  struggle.  In  such  an  atmosphere  as  this  the  quick- 
witted townsman's  thoughts  and  opinions  germinate  and 
grow;  and  his  eternal  discontent  opposes  the  contented  con- 
servatism of  the  ruling  classes.  He  it  is  also  who  first  stirs 
up  the  resigned  conservatism  of  the  "  masses." 

Lord,  townsman,  peasant:  these  would  be  the  three  types 
of  individuals  if  the  state  had  not  progressed  beyond  the 
primitive  stratification  of  society.  But  we  know  how  com- 
plex the  social  structure  has  become  and  how  the  different 
types  have  multiplied. 

It  is  impossible  for  the  scientist  to  distinguish  them  all; 
art  alone  can  present  the  typical  and  the  sociologist  must 
yield  to  the  delineator.  We  will  only  add  that  as  civiliza- 
tion advances  and  the  sphere  of  the  state  enlarges  the  ruling 
class  subdivides  into  the  civil  class,  the  military  class  and 
the  large  landholders  and  transfers  its  various  functions  to 
particular  organs. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  165 

Each  of  these  smaller  circles  has  its  particular  interests, 
its  peculiar  calling  and  its  corresponding  views  and  manner 
of  life.  The  subdivision  into  classes  determines  also  the 
method  of  participating  in  the  government  of  the  state. 
Compare  the  general  who  remains  a  soldier  and  stakes  his 
professional  honor  on  fulfilling  the  royal  orders  even  against 
his  own  convictions;  the  minister  who  feels  in  honor  bound 
to  hand  in  his  resignation  on  account  of  some  difference  of 
opinion  with  his  monarch,  or  incident  which  does  not  please 
him;  and  the  "  great  lord  "  who  will  accept  a  royal  invita- 
tion to  hunt  but  will  politely  decline  a  minister's  portfolio  in 
order  not  to  sacrifice  his  freedom.  How  different  the  views 
of  life's  duties  and  principles!  What  different  ideas  in  one 
and  the  same  ruling  class  through  the  social  differentiation 
of  pursuits ! 

With  the  middle  class  it  is  the  same.  How  different  is  the 
artisan's  line  of  thought  from  that  of  the  merchant  or  ship- 
owner! How  different  the  type  of  mind  among  merchants 
themselves  according  as  one  stays  in  a  shop,  another  is 
engaged  in  foreign  trade,  and  a  third  trades  on  the 
exchange!  Yet  these  are  not  individual  fortunes,  but  social 
destinies,  social  fates. 

What  must  be  the  mental  character  of  the  workman's 
child,  accustomed  to  uninterrupted  labor  in  the  family, 
meagre  earnings  and  the  monotony  of  the  small  tradesman's 
life;  and  how  different  in  the  circle  of  the  traders  on 
exchange  with  the  abrupt  alternations  of  wealth  and  misery 
and  the  continual  excitement  of  speculation  where  success 
depends  on  the  turn  of  events  the  world  over. 

How  many  educated  professions  are  differentiated  in  the 
middle  class:  doctors,  attorneys,  judges,  teachers,  officials, 
master  mechanics,  engineers.  Each  circle  creates  its  own 
peculiar  spirit,  so  to  say,  a  moral  atmosphere  of  principles, 
ideas,  views  and  conceptions,  in  which  its  members  live  and 
in  which  their  posterity  is  born  and  educated. 

The  number  of  types  is  endless.  But  it  must  be  pointed 
out  that  in  every  case  the  individual's  thought  and  conduct, 
feeling  and  effort  is  not  created  in  him  but  in  his  social 
circle.  Least  of  all  is  it  created  by  him  freely  and  independ- 
ently; it  is  laid  upon  him  without  his  knowing  it;  and  soci- 
ology must  emphasize  some  of  the  fundamental  factors  in 
the  process. 

It  follows  from  what  has  been  already  said  that  it  is  the 


1 66          ANNAI.S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

moral  force  alone  which  transforms  the  individual.  The 
group  affects  him  through  his  moral  nature,  his  thoughts 
and  views;  he  is  only  a  part  of  it,  growing  up  in  its  moral 
atmosphere,  drawing  his  intellectual  life  from  it.  In  this 
process  bodily  descent  and  long  lineage  is  not  the  decisive 
factor.  Whatever  the  anthropological  material,  if  it  comes 
early  enough  into  a  group  however  strange,  if  it  is  unin- 
fluenced by  any  other  and  is  treated  like  the  other  members 
it  will  be  as  completely  assimilated  as  though  it  had  been 
born  there.  Hence  it  is  that  while  anthropologists  assure 
us  that  no  race  in  the  world  is  pure;  and  while  expe- 
rience daily  shows  us  the  greatest  variety  of  anthropologi- 
cal types  in  one  and  the  same  society,  the  members  of  each 
group  show  a  unitary  moral  type.  Anthropological  variety 
and  moral  unity  is  characteristic  of  every  social  community, 
not  simply  in  Europe,  but  of  the  whole  world.  Yet  so  pre- 
dominant is  the  impression  made  upon  us  by  the  latter  that 
the  impression  of  the  former  disappears  in  comparison.  As 
we  are  in  general  more  impressed  by  what  is  human  in  man, 
/'.  e. ,  by  his  intellectual  and  moral  faculties,  than  by  what  is 
animal,  so  we  are  most  impressed  with  a  man's  social  type 
and  the  anthropological  escapes  our  observation.  Thus 
when  an  individual  has  certain  outward  marks  denoting 
membership  in  a  group,  such  as  costume,  head-dress  and  the 
like,  the  moral  type  of  the  group  is  still  more  striking  in 
him  and  we  do  not  notice  his  anthropological  type  or  deceive 
ourselves  about  it  unless  it  is  very  conspicuously  unusual. 

The  notorious  fact  that  all  Chinese  seem  alike  to  us  is  due 
to  the  fact  that,  being  struck  with  the  well-known  outward 
characteristics,  queue,  clean-shaven  crown  and  the  like,  we 
observe  nothing  else  except  the  moral  type,  although  there 
are  as  different  anthropological  types  among  them  as  in  any 
other  folk.  Similarly,  to  a  negro  all  the  soldiers  in  a  regi- 
ment of  European  grenadiers  will  look  exactly  alike  because 
in  addition  to  the  similarity  of  costume,  head-dress,  etc.,  he 
notices  only  the  moral  type,  the  expression,  mien  and  bear- 
ing. Nevertheless  an  anthropologist  or  craniologist  would 
certainly  find  in  such  a  regiment  sufficient  data  for  a  classifi- 
cation into  many  races  and  anthropological  types. 

But  some  social  circles,  as  we  have  seen,  are  very  firmly 
bound  together,  compact  and  cohesive,  while  others  are 
loosely  connected  and  less  cohesive.  The  degree  of  cohe- 
sion depends,  as  we  have  further  seen,  on  the  number  of 


THE;  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  167 

group-making  factors,  on  the  interests  holding  the  group 
together  and  on  their  permanency;  for  some  are  inherited 
and  will  endure  while  others  are  temporary,  ephemeral  and 
momentary. 

The  difference  in  the  degree  of  social  cohesion  has  great 
influence  upon  the  creation  and  the  endurance  of  moral 
types,  and  we  do  not  hesitate  to  formulate  a  sociological 
law  that  the  tenacity  and  endurance  of  a  moral  type  is 
directly  related  to  the  degree  of  cohesion  and  firmness  of 
social  structure,  and  so  to  the  number  of  group-making  factors. 

It  is  as  if  their  greater  number  put  the  individual  under 
better  control;  for  highly  cohesive  social  circles  are  well 
adapted  to  create  firm  characters.  The  individual  members 
seem  to  be  cast  from  one  mould,  to  be  flesh  of  its  flesh  and 
blood  of  its  blood;  nothing  more  nor  less  than  pieces  of  it. 
Hence  the  elemental  moral  power  of  men  contending  for 
their  class,  their  rank — their  folk,  to  which  every  group- 
making  factor  and  every  heartstring  binds  them. 

Contrast  with  this  the  vacillation  and  unsteadfastness 
when  one  of  the  forces  binding  a  man  to  his  own  is  dissolved; 
and  the  unnaturalness  and  artificiality  of  the  individual  who 
presumes  to  represent  a  group  with  which  he  has  only  a 
loose,  ephemeral  connection,  the  most  of  the  group-making 
factors  being  absent.  Therein  lies  the  perpetual  ridiculous- 
ness of  the  parvenu,  which  meets  us  not  only  where  the 
' '  upstart  without  family  connections' '  puts  on  airs  on  account 
of  his  intimate  relations  with  counts  and  princes  (who  is  not 
familiar  with  this  type)  but  also  where  the  townsman  among 
peasants  would  demean  himself  like  a  peasant  or  the  aristo- 
cratic candidate  explains  his  political  and  industrial  program 
to  his  agricultural  constituents.  The  ridiculous  effect  in 
every  case  lies  in  the  absence  of  every  natural  bond  of 
union  between  the  individual  and  the  group  which  he  would 
have  it  appear  he  belongs  to  or  represents,  for  unnaturalness 
is  always  ridiculous.  With  such  comical  figures  compare 
the  man  who  represents  his  own  social  group.  His  ap- 
pearance commands  respect  everywhere;  its  very  naturalness 
is  imposing.  Kven  an  individual  of  little  importance  must 
be  taken  seriously  for  his  coming  is  natural  and  in  good 
character. 

But  social  life  is  not  confined  within  the  exclusive  social 
circles.  In  the  very  nature  of  political  and  social  develop- 
ment there  is  an  incessant  movement  of  individuals  back 


1 68  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

and  forth,  up  and  down,  so  that  the  social  circles  lap  and 
overlap  in  the  greatest  confusion  and  individuals  stand  in 
the  greatest  variety  of  relations  to  their  own  and  to  foreign 
groups. 

Thus  life  is  richly  provided  with  every  degree  of  varia- 
tion from  cheerful  pleasantry  to  bitter  earnest,  from  delight- 
ful comedy  to  shocking  tragedy.  But  it  is  a  barren  task 
for  science  to  distinguish  the  countless  shades  of  individual 
form  and  situation,  though  not  for  history  and  art. 

MORALE. 

We  have  tried  to  explain  how  the  moral  type  of  the 
individual  is  produced  by  the  group  and  have  already 
pointed  out  that  the  social  group  not  only  creates  the  indi- 
vidual's thoughts  and  opinions,  sentiments  and  feelings  but 
builds  up  what  we  call  morals  also.  For  morals  is  nothing 
but  the  conviction  implanted  by  the  social  group  in  the 
minds  of  its  members  of  the  propriety  (Statthaftigkeif)  of 
the  manner  of  life  imposed  by  it  on  them.  This  conviction, 
the  individual's  innermost  thought  concerning  his  whole 
conduct  and  that  of  others,  is  the  second  factor  in  the 
development  of  morals.  The  first  is  the  acquired  and  cus- 
tomary habits,  the  manner  of  life  and  conduct.  There  are 
certain  rules  and  principles  which  the  individual  receives 
from  his  group  applicable  to  all  spheres  of  life  and  to  all 
possible  situations. 

Consider  a  man  who  is  firmly  rooted  in  his  group.  In  no 
situation  which  is  accessible  to  it  considering  its  nature  and 
position  is  he  in  doubt  how  he  should  proceed.  He  has 
acquired  a  standard  of  conduct  and  possesses  a  moral  code 
which  guides  him  everywhere. 

While  the  simple  unitary  group  (Spencer's  "small  and 
simple  aggregate"  )  constitutes  the  individual's  whole  world, 
in  the  primitive  horde  and  wild  natural  stock, he  knows  what 
is  right,  proper  and  permissible  toward  his  fellows  and  toward 
strangers. 

But  as  soon  as  two  or  more  groups  have  been  united  and 
sovereignty  has  been  organized  the  different  moral  views 
begin  to  contend  in  the  larger  social  circle.  The  primitive 
moral  codes  are  useless  and  a  new  one  must  be  formed  if 
the  union  is  to  continue.  Not  only  do  the  relations  of  sove- 
reign and  subject  peremptorily  demand  this,  but  they  pro- 
vide it  for  themselves.  The  members  of  the  new  union 


THE;  OUTUNKS  OP  SOCIOLOGY.  169 

become  habituated  to  the  new  institutions  which  become 
necessary  to  sustain  sovereignty;  and  new  conceptions  of 
what  is  right,  proper,  allowable  and  good  grow  up;  and  as  the 
new  political  organization  grows  and  is  perfected  the  new 
moral  code  gives  forth  rights,  i.  e.,  statutes  promulgated  by 
the  state  the  transgression  of  which  is  punishable  by  the 
state. 

Hence  there  is  a  fundamental  difference  between  rights 
and  morals.  The  former  is  a  product  of  the  union  \Zusam- 
mentreffen\  of  different  social  elements,  the  latter  is  the 
product  of  the  relations  between  the  simple  social  group  and 
the  individual.  Rights  never  arise  except  in  a  union  of 
societies  however  simple  it  may  be;  organized  sovereignty 
is  always  presupposed.  Morals  arise  in  the  most  primitive 
social  element,  in  the  simple  aggregate  or  horde. 

Every  complex  community,  consisting  of  parts  which  are 
united  by  certain  group-making  bonds,  constitutes  in  so  far 
a  social  unit  aside  from  the  social  circles  comprised  within  it. 
Necessarily  the  very  fact  of  the  existence  of  this  social 
community  will  create  a  common  moral  code  binding  on  all 
its  members.  But  on  account  of  the  weaker  cohesion  of 
the  whole  it  will  of  course  not  have  the  effective  power  and 
intensity  of  the  moral  codes  of  the  several  social  elements 
and  will  frequently  come  in  conflict  with  them  and  some- 
times be  broken  down  by  them.  It  may  be  confidently 
asserted  that  probably  the  greater  part  of  the  crimes  and 
offences  occurring  in  the  state  arise  from  the  conflict  between 
the  general  and  the  particular  moral  codes.  Thus  the 
poacher  does  not  offend  against  the  morals  of  his  group 
when  he  hunts  game  in  the  mountains  although  in  so  doing 
he  violates  not  only  the  rights  but  also  the  moral  code  of 
the  political  whole. 

Many  infractions  of  right  in  the  mercantile  world,  such  as 
usury  and  the  like,  result  from  the  antagonism  between  its 
moral  code  and  that  of  the  political  whole  and  prove  that 
the  higher  unity,  the  state,  has  not  succeeded  in  reducing 
the  social  elements  to  a  homogeneous  community  and  imbu- 
ing every  individual  with  that  higher  morality  which  is  as 
needful  for  the  welfare  of  the  whole  as  the  primitive  morality 
of  the  horde  is  for  its  welfare. 

It  is  the  state's  supreme  object  to  do  this.  Consciously  or 
unconsciously  it  strives  toward  it  and  though  it  should 
never  be  quite  accomplished,  no  higher  sanction  or  more 


170          ANNAI<S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

complete  justification  of  the  state  can  be  given  than  the 
determination  to  educate  mankind  to  a  higher  moral  plane. 
But  the  ideal  moral  code  must  never  be  limited  to  national 
sentiment  which  is  nothing  more  than  a  potentialized  love 
of  the  horde.  It  should  at  least  embrace  mankind  so  far  as 
it  is  civilized  or  capable  of  civilization.  The  way  to  its 
realization  has  been  entered  upon  by  the  construction  of 
political  systems  like  the  European,  which  will  in  time 
reduce  Europe  to  a  social  unit,  however  loose;  the  process 
may  then  be  extended  to  other  portions  of  the  world.  Al- 
though its  realization  may  lie  in  the  unseen  future,  civiliza- 
tion must  hold  fast  to  it  if  it  would-  be  anything  more  than 
a  blind  natural  process;  and  it  is  certainly  the  noblest  func- 
tion of  social  science  to  point  out  the  wearisome  way  along 
which  mankind,  dripping  with  blood  yet  pants  for  the 
distant  goal. 

MORAI,S  AND  TRUTH  PERCEPTION. 

It  has  undoubtedly  already  become  clear  that  morals  are 
not  the  result  of  human  reflection,  the  conscious  product  of 
the  human  will  and  understanding;  but  are,  like  all  social 
institutions,  the  result  of  natural  development,  a  product  of 
the  natural  and  necessary  feelings  and  thoughts  of  man  in 
connection  with  the  active  impelling  forces  of  life,  the  result- 
ant as  it  were  of  the  mutual  action  and  reaction  of  nature 
and  human  life. 

Hence  we  can  distinguish  two  elements  in  the  result,  the 
natural  and  the  human.  The  former  is  everlasting  and 
unchangeable  and  is  constantly  and  universally  repeated. 
The  latter  is  perpetually  changing  because  it  represents  the 
ways  in  which  individuals  react  upon  natural  realities  and 
forces. 

Hence  it  is  that  in  the  morals  of  all  ages  and  peoples  we  find 
something  similar  and  typical  and  also  something  changing 
and  individual,  for  while  the  social  process  that  produces 
morals  is  always  the  same,  its  various  contingencies  make 
the  psycho-social  result  different. 

Placed  by  nature  in  a  sequence  of  necessities  which  he 
cannot  alter,  man  strives  naturally  to  adapt  himself  to  them 
as  best  he  can  and  to  make  life  as  pleasant  as  possible;  habit 
helps  him  over  the  worst  difficulties  by  deadening  his  sensi- 
bilities. He  gets  accustomed  to  the  rack  on  which  he  is 
stretched  and  ceases  to  feel  it.  He  attributes  his  sufferings 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  171 

to  a  higher  necessity  and,  knowing  the  uselessness  of  pro- 
test, gives  up  the  futile  fight  and  looks  instinctively  for 
means  to  alleviate  his  hard  lot. 

In  following  this  natural  tendency,  or  rather  in  being 
driven  to  do  whatever  his  nature  and  conditions  compel,  he 
reflects  (which  again  is  a  part  of  his  nature)  and  believes 
that  he  acts  freely,  finding  a  proof  of  his  freedom  in  the 
individual  shading  of  his  acts,  though  this  happens  simply 
because  reflection,  in  essence  the  same,  is  individualistic  in 
form. 

If,  acting  as  he  must  though  reflecting  as  he  acts,  he  hits 
upon  a  mode  of  behavior  which  long  experience  proves  to  be 
the  most  suitable  and  appropriate  to  his  conditions,  he  takes 
this  to  be  the  right,  the  only  good  and  the  moral  way;  the 
contrary  is  to  him  immoral. 

Thus  the  man  acquires  moral  ideas  which  correspond 
to  the  larger  or  smaller  extent  of  his  needs  and  experi- 
ences, the  higher  or  lower  stage  of  his  civilization,  the  more 
or  less  complex  relations  of  his  life,  growing,  broadening 
and  developing  with  them. 

But,  as  we  have  seen,  an  individual's  moral  feelings  all 
develop  within  the  sphere  of  his  social  group  through  its 
influence  upon  him. 

Take  a  primitive  savage,  a  gregarious  human  being;  what 
are  his  moral  ideas?  He  is  bound  to  his  fellows  by  the 
natural  feeling  of  connection.  They  help  him  in  his  need; 
to  hold  to  them,  help  them  and  stand  by  them  loyally 
is  one  of  his  moral  ideas.  But  strangers  from  another  horde 
waylay  them,  try  to  get  their  property,  invade  their  hunting 
ground,  slay  them  occasionally  and  steal  them;  therefore  to 
kill  these  strangers  and  rob  them  is  another  of  his  moral 
ideas. 

Now  the  element  in  these  ideas  which  is  natural  and 
eternal  inheres  in  the  mind  of  man,  surviving  savagery  and 
appearing  in  changing  garb  and  more  refined  form  through- 
out the  whole  period  of  human  existence.  To-day  as  thou- 
sands of  years  ago  there  is  the  struggle  with  the  foreigner 
for  lordship.  Between  strange  social  groups  to-day  as  always 
there  are  only  two  possible  relations:  conflict  or  alliance 
against  a  third.  After  century  upon  century  of  develop- 
ment, in  the  midst  of  high  civilization,  the  primitive  moral 
idea  of  the  savage  meets  us  in  the  form  of  patriotism,  hero- 
ism and  bravery. 


172  ANNAI<S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

The  savage  feels  more  keenly  than  the  civilized  man  that 
he  is  only  a  part  of  the  community;  for  without  his  own 
horde  his  life  is  every  moment  exposed  to  the  superior  force 
of  hostile  beasts  and  alien  hordes. 

It  cannot  appear  to  the  savage  immoral  to  satisfy  hunger 
and  thirst;  and  to  feed  the  helpless  children  of  his  own  horde 
must  seem  to  him  good,  profitable  and  a  moral  duty. 

Between  young  and  old,  helpless  and  strong,  arises  a 
mutual  relation  of  protection  and  gratitude  which  with  the 
changes  of  years  becomes  reversed;  protection  of  children 
and  the  infirm  creates  a  moral  idea.  But  if  times  and  cir- 
cumstances and  also  individual  dispositions  cause  a  horde  to 
put  an  end  to  the  misery  of  old  age  by  violent  death,  this 
practice  also  becomes,  locally  and  temporarily,  a  moral  act; 
and  the  same  is  true,  locally  and  temporarily,  of  fostering  or 
exposing  children.  The  essence  of  the  moral  idea  is  the 
same:  practices  springing  from  natural  tendencies  take  on 
one  form  or  another;  whichever  one  lasts  and  proves  to  be 
suitable  comes  to  be  considered  moral. 

The  relation  of  the  sexes  and  the  division  of  industrial 
labor  between  them  is  regulated  by  time  and  circumstances, 
the  temperament  of  the  particular  horde,  and  its  physical 
and  mental  constitution.  Whether  the  result  is  promiscuity, 
polygamy  or  polyandry,  whatever  practice  persists  and  is 
recognized  as  suitable  becomes  a  moral  duty  and  command, 
a  part  of  morals. 

When  one  horde  establishes  lordship  over  another,  when 
two  make  offensive  or  defensive  alliance  against  a  third,  or 
finally  when  captured  aliens  are  reduced  to  servitude  and 
slavery,  the  circle  of  life's  relations  broadens,  a  new  series 
of  practices  begins  and  a  new  sphere  of  moral  ideas  arises. 

The  best  method  of  handling  captives,  slaves  and  ser- 
vants, and  the  best  conduct  toward  allies  offer  new  grounds 
for  moral  opinions;  and  the  most  reasonable  and  appropriate 
government  of  subjects  becomes  the  only  moral  one. 
Fidelity  towards  allies  produces  a  new  moral  idea.  The 
different  treatment  of  members  of  different  social  circles 
makes  in  time  moral  principles,  conforming  to  the  usage, 
which  eventually  settle  into  rights. 

As  a  different  treatment  seems  wise  and  appropriate  for 
each  condition  of  life,  so  different  moral  standards  grow  up 
according  to  the  different  social  position  of  the  younger  or 
older  generation,  of  able-bodied  or  infirm  men,  of  women 


THE;  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  173 

in  different  periods  of  life,  of  masters  and  dependents,  of 
the  rich  and  the  propertyless.  Unconditional  obedience  is 
recognized  as  moral  in  servants  and  slaves;  inflexible  energy 
and  strict  discipline  in  masters.  The  killing  of  a  master  is 
recognized  as  immoral  conduct  in  a  slave,  the  killing  of  a 
slave  is  by  no  means  immoral  in  a  master. 

Now  men  are  never  satisfied  with  actual  occurrences 
simply;  it  is  a  peculiarity  of  the  reflecting  human  mind  to 
ascribe  them  to  causes  which  have  no  relation  whatever  to 
the  natural  causes  and  to  give  the  most  far-fetched  expla- 
nation possible.  A  myth-maker  and  poet  by  nature,  man 
ascribes  poetical  and  generally  anthropomorphic  significa- 
tions and  derivations  to  natural  phenomena  and  he  treats 
social  occurrences  in  the  same  way. 

As  man  at  first  ascribes  his  own  existence  to  the  creation 
of  a  supersensual  being  so  he  traces  all  social  differences  to 
different  creative  acts  of  the  same  being.  Social  organiza- 
tions which  the  force  of  circumstances  has  produced  he  pre- 
fers to  ascribe  to  an  original  arrangement  of  the  creator  of 
the  world,  being  led  by  an  unconscious  desire  to  give  a 
higher  sanction  to  his  various  moral  ideas.  Thus  when 
social  relations  have  been  so  far  developed  that  murder  is 
interdicted  and  to  spare  a  fellow- being's  life  is  a  moral  com- 
mandment, the  myth-making  mind  has  a  god  appear  in 
flames  and  deliver  to  the  law-giver  in  the  midst  of  thunder- 
ings  and  lightnings  a  table  on  which  stand  the  words:  Thou 
shalt  not  kill. 

Every  code  of  human  morals  from  the  earliest  times  to  the 
present  day  has  this  thoroughly  characteristic  peculiarity; 
the  product  of  actual  occurrences  and  real  relations  is 
everywhere  explained  by  and  derived  from  imaginary  cir- 
cumstances, and  men  cannot  comprehend  a  moral  idea 
otherwise. 

Whether  theologians  base  morals  upon  divine  command- 
ments, or  philosophers  derive  them  from  ideas  inherent  in 
man,  fact  and  fancy  are  blended  together  until  one  seems 
incapable  of  existing  without  the  other.  As  moral  ideas 
take  root  in  men's  hearts,  get  control  of  their  dispositions 
and  become  a  part  of  their  mental  ego,  the  myths  which 
support  them  take  root  there  also;  until  it  appears  as  if 
morals  could  not  be  maintained  without  myths  and  every 
attack  on  the  latter  must  cause  the  former  to  fall. 

Socrates  was  accused  of  undermining  virtue  and  morality, 


174          ANNALS  OF  THE;  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

the  real  forces  of  life,  because  he  questioned  the  existence  of 
those  creatures  of  the  imagination,  the  Olympian  gods. 
And  so  to-day,  whoever  ventures  to  criticise  and  doubt  one 
of  the  myths  which  have  been  put  forward  as  the  explana- 
tion and  foundation  of  our  morals,  whoever  denies  the 
"universal  and  eternal  truth  of  inherent,  moral  ideas," 
and  seeks  to  represent  them  as  the  product  of  actual  social 
relations  changing  with  them  and  taking  manifold  forms  and 
shapes,  is  considered  a  dangerous  enemy  to  them. 

This  fight  of  nai've  ignorance  against  truth  in  the  name 
of  morality  is  observable  in  very  many  spheres  still. 

Advanced  moral  sentiment  seeking  to  explain  and  sup- 
port the  idea  and  the  feeling  of  brotherly  love  produced  the 
mouogenetic  myth  of  the  descent  of  all  men  from  one  pair 
of  parents;  and  so  polygenism,  which  is  thought  to  menace 
the  myth,  is  immoral,  though  brotherly  love  might  just  as 
plausibly  be  founded  upon  the  unity  of  species  in  a  polygen- 
etic  mankind.  Its  real  explanation,  however,  is  quite  dif- 
ferent: the  development  of  human  society. 

The  history  of  sectarianism  presents  the  same  spectacle 
under  countless  different  forms.  The  simplest  religious 
ceremonies  are  connected  directly  with  certain  moral  ideas 
and  an  attack  on  the  former  is  denounced  as  an  attack  on  the 
latter,  when  in  truth  they  do  not  need  to  stand  in  any  con- 
nection whatever.  Every  new  system  of  philosophy,  every 
hard- won  scientific  acquisition  has  the  same  contest  against 
the  alleged  ' '  guardians  of  morals. ' ' 

When  the  intellectual  revolution  and  the  materialistic 
philosophy  of  the  eighteenth  century  overthrew  some  of  the 
prevailing  prejudices  the  Jesuitical  alarm  cry  was  every- 
where raised  that  morals  were  being  undermined.  Because 
in  a  certain  age  the  stock  of  moral  ideas  corresponded  to  a 
certain  degree  of  scientific  knowledge;  because  at  a  given 
time  the  opinion  was  universal  that  the  soul  is  a  temporary 
occupant  of  the  human  body  and  after  its  decay  will  rise 
straight  to  heaven  and  begin  a  new  life  there:  the  whole 
moral  and  ethical  code  was  thought  to  depend  upon  the 
maintenance  of  this  belief.  Whoever  dared  to  doubt  the 
immortality  of  the  soul  was  thought  to  have  sinned  against 
morality  and  virtue  as  though  immortality  and  the  dualism 
of  soul  and  body  were  the  only  conditions  on  which  they 
could  thrive.  Many  a  time  indeed  have  men  sought  to 
uphold  the  existing  moral  order  by  this  fable;  and  when  no 


THE  OUTLINES  OP  SOCIOLOGY.  175 

one  knew  better  the  effort  was  praiseworthy.  But  every 
such  prop  is  ready  to  fall  the  moment  advanced  knowledge 
lays  bare  its  untruthfulness;  though  it  by  no  means  follows 
that  morality  is  undermined  and  threatened  by  the  removal 
of  the  alleged  prop;  for  the  basis  of  morals  is  truth  and  not 
fiction  and  all  these  pious  fictions  have  not  prevented  the 
grossest  immoralities,  the  horrors  of  the  inquisition  and 
trials  for  witchcraft,  the  greatest  crimes  mankind  has  ever 
committed. 

The  alleged  descent  of  man  from  lower  animals  is 
denounced  by  the  church  as  undermining  the  whole  ethical 
and  moral  code;  as  if  this  had  some  connection  with  the 
alleged  creation  of  man  by  a  god  or  was  indeed  the  result 
of  it. 

Following  natural  and  necessary  tendencies  the  human 
state  has  grown  up  and  has  become  in  civilized  regions  what 
it  is  to-day,  the  guardian  of  right  and  custom,  the  promoter 
of  welfare  and  culture.  Corresponding  to  this  fact  a  moral 
theory  of  the  state  has  been  produced  in  the  human  mind,  a 
pretty  myth,  according  to  which  the  state  sprang  from  a 
social  contract  which  the  citizens  once  made  for  protecting 
rights  and  securing  justice;  and  it  gives  adequate  expres- 
sion to  the  ideas  which  the  actual  evolution  of  the  state  has 
produced. 

But  when  it  is  announced  as  the  result  of  modern  objec- 
tive investigation  that  the  state  arose  by  violence  and  owes 
its  existence  to  the  superiority  of  some  over  others,  the 
"  moral"  heresy-hunters  {Angstmeier)  and  hypocrites  raise 
the  alarm  that  the  moral  idea  of  the  state  is  undermined,  right 
is  uprooted  and  public  morals  corrupted.  It  is  the  policy 
of  stupid  parents,  who  expect  to  inculcate  morals  and  a 
sense  of  obligation  in  a  child  by  telling  him  all  sorts  of 
ghost  stories.  Science  should  not  be  misled  by  such  ungen- 
erous and  narrow  views.  Morals  is  the  ripened  fruit  of 
the  actual  development  of  civilization  and  cannot  be  harmed 
by  the  scientific  investigation  of  its  real  foundation ;  on  the 
contrary  the  truth  will  certainly  be  much  more  wholesome 
for  its  promotion  than  the  stupid  lie  upon  which  it  has  been 
sought  hitherto  with  little  success  to  base  it. 

As  the  origin  of  moral  ideas  is  a  very  difficult  problem 
and  a  dark  region  in  human  knowledge,  it  has  always  been 
easier  to  explain  it  in  poems  and  fairy  tales.  Nevertheless 
it  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  every  progress  in  the  perception 
of  truth,  and  especially  of  nature,  must  promote  morals. 


1 76  ANNAI£  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

For  as  nature's  sway  and  the  acts  of  man  go  to  make  up 
the  events  of  life,  human  acts  are  reasonable  when  they 
correspond  to  natural  tendencies  and  complement  them;  and 
unreasonable  if  they  mistake  these  tendencies  and  oppose 
them. 

There  can  be  but  one  principle  of  human  rationality  and 
of  human  morals  and  ethics:  to  be  governed  by  the  import 
and  tendency  of  nature's  sway.  Hence  knowledge  of 
nature,  natural  science  in  its  full  scope,  embracing  every 
department  of  human  life,  is  the  only  and  the  necessary 
basis  of  the  science  of  morals  and  ethics. 

Without  natural  science  no  moral  science.  Hence  the  low 
state  of  morals  where  natural  science  is  neglected,  and  the 
higher  and  purer  morality  with  greater  progress  in  the 
knowledge  of  nature's  sway. 

The  explanation  is  simple.  Nature  has  all  the  character- 
istics which  oriental  monotheism  ascribes  to  its  god:  omni- 
presence and  omnipotence;  everything  everywhere  happens 
as  nature  wills,  according  to  nature.  Indeed  at  bottom  the 
idea  of  god  is  only  a  symbol  of  nature,  perhaps  unconscious 
and  poetical  at  first,  later  misunderstood  and  misinterpreted. 

As  man  himself  is  subject  to  nature,  is  constrained  by  her 
demands,  must  satisfy  his  natural  needs,  lives  according  to 
the  measure  of  the  strength  and  capacity  she  has  given  him, 
and  following  her  commands  must  close  it,  so  his  mind  is 
deeply  impressed  by  her  omnipotence  and  the  resulting 
course  of  events.  He  can  scarcely  conceive  another  mode 
of  existence;  and  this  one  seems  right  and  just,  reasonable 
and  moral  (sittlicK).  He  has  no  other  standard  for  the 
events  of  life  than  the  assumed  will,  i.  e. ,  the  visible  tend- 
ency, of  nature;  while  "unnatural"  is  synonymous  with 
unreasonable  and  immoral.  Man's  ethical  sense  has  been 
engrafted  upon  nature's  sway.  Her  norms  even  in  social 
life  have  been  transformed  and  condensed  in  his  mind  into 
moral  ideas.  By  nature  the  parents  and  elders  assume 
direction  of  the  rising  generation — and  the  honor  and  respect 
which  the  younger  pay  the  elder  accords  with  our  moral 
ideas.  Whatever  is  natural  is  moral.  Therein  lies  the 
eternal,  fixed  and  unchangeable  basis  of  all  ethics  and 
morals. 

Hence  there  is  really  but  one  code  of  ethics  and  morals 
which  has  been  and  always  will  be  as  fixed  and  unchange- 
able as  the  forces  of  nature.  But  if  nevertheless  there  have 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  177 

been  temporary  and  local  differences  in  ethical  views  it  is, 
first,  because  knowledge  of  nature  has  not  everywhere 
reached  the  same  stage  of  advancement  and  men  often  yield 
to  the  grossest  self-deceptions  in  respect  of  it;  secondly, 
because  there  are  whole  spheres  of  human  life,  like  the 
social  sphere,  which  on  account  of  meagre  knowledge  are 
not  considered  natural,  in  which  the  sway  of  nature  is  not 
conjectured  or  presupposed,  in  which  therefore  a  correction 
of  inherited  moral  conceptions  in  accord  with  the  recognized 
"  will  of  nature, "  or  a  concession  to  nature's  tendencies  is 
entirely  out  of  the  question. 

By  searching  for  truth,  therefore,  and  by  investigating 
nature  and  her  sway,  in  the  social  sphere  as  well  as 
elsewhere,  science  labors  in  the  service  of  morals  and  breaks 
the  way  for  its  progress,  although  incidentally  old  and 
cherished  idols  may  be  overthrown  and  the  wail  of  the 
"  moralists ' '  aroused. 

RIGHTS. 

Heretofore  rights  have  always  been  treated  from  the  stand- 
point either  of  individualism  or  of  a  very  indefinite  collecti- 
vism. As  these  two  extremes  contended  against  each  other, 
progress  swayed  from  one  to  the  other  in  literature.  But 
since  neither  was  true,  it  ought  not  to  be  surprising  that 
neither  the  philosophy  of  rights  nor  the  prevailing  scientific 
treatment  of  them  is  satisfactory,  and  that  the  schools  of 
the  philosophers  have  produced  nothing  but  disgust  and 
rancor  after  centuries  of  labor. 

Let  us  briefly  review  the  dreary  maze.  The  original  rules 
of  human  conduct  receive  their  sanction  in  part  from  prece- 
dent and  custom  and  in  part  by  reference  to  the  will  of  the 
gods.  Belief  and  custom  are  the  earliest  sources  of  right, 
of  that  which  is  the  standard  of  conduct.  As  reflection 
awakens  it  distinguishes  between  these  precepts  of  religion 
and  morals  and  the  laws  which  the  rulers  set  up,  and  hence 
the  earliest  jurisprudence  could  consider  political  law  alone 
to  be  the  source  of  right.  Upon  further  scientific  investi- 
gation this  naive  conception  was  found  unsatisfactory;  and 
then  began  the  argumentation  in  a  circle.  Some  sought  the 
source  of  right  in  man  immediately,  in  his  nature,  in  his 
social  instincts  or  in  similar  characteristics  which  were 
ascribed  to  him.  Others  believed  that  they  had  found  the 


178  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

source  in  the  community,  the  folk,  in  society  and  its 
' '  common  will. ' '  * 

The  truth  lies  between  the  two,  as  we  have  shown. f 
Rights  are  not  the  product  of  the  individual  and  his  nature 
and  constitution,  nor  are  they  the  creation  of  the  folk  or  of 
a  common  will  or  national  spirit  invented  ad  hoc.  Rights 
are  a  social  creation,  a  form  of  communal  life  produced  by 
the  conflict  (Zusammenstoss)  of  unlike  social  groups  of 
unequal  power;  such  unlikeness  and  inequality  is  the  neces- 
sary precondition  of  all  rights.  In  the  primitive  horde,  a 
homogeneous,  simple,  undifferentiated  group,  there  are  no 
rights,  nor  are  they  necessary.  Complete  equality  prevails; 
it  is  not  the  soil  in  which  rights  are  wont  to  grow.  There 
are  neither  family  rights  (promiscuity  prevails)  nor  property 
rights — hence  no  rights  of  inheritance;  nor  any  sort  of 
rights  in  personalty  where  there  is  no  trade  and  commerce. 
Life  is  not  regulated  by  published  ordinances;  whatever  is 
is  holy.  The  forms  of  life  produced  in  the  course  of  time 
to  satisfy  wants,  which  we  call  custom,  are  fully  sufficient 
to  regulate  the  life  of  the  primitive  horde.  No  one  marks 
their  gradual  rise  and  they  are  generally  ascribed  to  the  will 
of  the  gods.  Custom  and  a  few  religious  precepts  suffice 
for  men  in  such  a  state. 

But  when  unlike  groups  come  together  and  different  ethni- 
cal elements  have  to  live  side  by  side  the  custom  of  neither 
is  sufficient,  for  it  is  not  recognized  by  the  other.  One  sub- 
jects the  other,  sovereignty  is  organized,  and  the  superior 
power  of  the  stronger  makes  existence  side  by  side  possible 
by  regulating  the  manner  of  life.  The  regulations  thus 
built  up  for  the  existence  of  unlike  elements  side  by  side 
are  reduced  by  practice  to  rules  and  principles  which  create 
rights. 

Thus,  as  we  have  seen,  by  the  rape  of  women  from 
another  tribe  arose  the  first  family  right,  the  right  of  the 
man  over  his  wife;  thus  also  by  reducing  the  foreign  element 
to  servitude  arose  the  right  of  the  lord  over  his  slave;  and 
from  the  resulting  distinction  between  the  lord  to  whom  the 
fruits  of  the  soil  belong  and  the  slave  who  cultivates  the  soil 
for  his  master  arose  the  right  of  property.  The  soil  together 
with  the  acquired  sovereignty  passed  from  father  to  son  in 

*  Cf.  "  Philosophisches  Staatsrecfit,"  sees.  4  and  ai;  "  Rechtsstaat  und  Socialismus," 
I^sec.  4  et  seg. 

t  See  Part  IV,  sec.  i  above. 


THE;  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  179 

the  father-family — hence  the  right  of  inheritance  arose.  If 
an  alien  trading  element  invaded  this  primitive  sovereign 
organization  the  exchange  of  goods  produced  other  property 
rights,  first  of  all  the  rights  of  debtor  and  creditor  with  all 
the  complications  to  which  the  development  of  trade  and 
commerce  give  rise. 

Rights  are  always  due  to  the  contact  of  unlike  social 
elements  and  every  right  bears  evidence  of  such  an  origin. 
There  is  not  one  which  does  not  express  inequality,  for  each 
is  the  mediation  between  unlike  social  elements,  the  recon- 
ciliation of  conflicting  interests  which  was  originally  enforced 
by  compulsion  but  has  by  usage  and  familiarity  acquired  the 
sanction  of  a  new  custom. 

Thus  family  right  subjects  the  wife  and  children  to  the 
control  of  the  father  and  compels  the  reconciliation  of  oppos- 
ing interests  until  in  time  usage  and  familiarity  substitute 
new  customs  and  new  morals  for  the  original  constraint. 
Property  rights  regulate  the  inequality  between  owner  and 
non-owner  in  respect  of  the  thing  owned;  the  rights  of 
inheritance  regulate  the  inequality  between  the  heir  and  the 
non-heir  in  respect  of  the  inheritance;  the  rights  of  debtor 
and  creditor  regulate  the  inequality  between  them  in 
respect  of  the  object  of  the  obligation.  In  short  every 
right  arises  from  an  inequality  and  aims  to  maintain  and 
establish  it  through  the  sovereignty  of  the  stronger  over  the 
weaker.  In  this  respect  every  right  is  a  true  reflection  of 
the  state  to  which  it  owes  its  existence,  and  which  also  aims 
only  at  the  maintenance  and  regulation  of  the  life  of  unlike 
elements  side  by  side  through  the  sovereignty  of  one  over 
the  other.  And  since  the  maintenance  of  inequality  is  the 
soul  and  real  principle  of  every  right,  corresponding  to  each 
there  is  a  duty;  corresponding  to  each  one  entitled  to 
receive  there  are  one  or  more  obligated  to  give;  just  as  in 
the  state  by  its  nature  there  are  rulers  and  ruled. 

RIGHTS    AND    THE    STATE). 

Thus  it  is  plain  that  rights  can  arise  only  in  the  state  and 
nowhere  else  for  they  are  eminently  political  institu- 
tions, flesh  of  the  state's  flesh  and  blood  of  its  blood, 
containing  as  it  were  a  particle  of  political  sovereignty. 
For  whence  comes  the  grain  of  sovereignty  in  every  right  if 
not  from  the  great  reservoir  of  sovereignty  which  we  call  the 


i8o          ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

state's  power  ?  From  this  great  reservoir  political  sove- 
reignty flows  like  water  through  an  aqueduct  into  a  network 
of  rights.  It  is  only  necessary  to  turn  the  cock  of  execu- 
tion, and  political  sovereignty,  the  state's  power,  is  there. 
In  civilized  states  a  small  fee  is  paid,  generally  in  the  form 
of  a  stamp  tax,  for  the  privilege  of  drawing  upon  political 
sovereignty.  Rights  can  no  more  be  conceived  without  the 
state  than  an  aqueduct  without  a  reservoir  and  pipes  and 
cocks. 

Nevertheless  scholasticism  succeeded  in  building  up  count- 
less systems  of  ' '  natural  rights ' '  which  were  alleged  to 
exist  without  the  state,  beyond  its  borders  and  superior  to 
its  authority.  Fortunately  they  are  all  overthrown,  dead 
and  buried.  But  their  spirit  hovers  over  the  sea  of  juris- 
prudence where  ' '  innate  ' '  human  rights  are  still  spoken  of; 
in  addition  to  those  "  proclaimed  by  the  French  revolution," 
such  as  freedom  and  equality,  other  "  inalienable  rights " 
also,  such  as  the  right  "to  live,"  "to  work"  and  so  on. 
They  are  deduced  either  from  the  ' '  conception  of  man ' '  as 
a  "free,  sentient  and  reasonable  "  being  or  more  generall}' 
from  the  "conception  of  justice."  We  have  elsewhere 
shown  the  arbitrariness  and  insipidity  of  these  deductions.* 
They  are  simply  deductions  from  natural  rights  though 
every  premise  is  false  and  the  whole  system  is  buried  in  its 
grave.  That  man  is  a  "  free  ' '  being  is  pure  imagination, 
still  less  is  he  a  "  reasonable"  being,  if  by  "  reason"  we 
mean  the  peculiarity  that  a  person  is  led  in  his  action  by 
reason  and  not  by  blind  impulse. 

The  premises  of  ' '  inalienable  human  rights ' '  rest  upon 
the  most  unreasonable  self-deification  of  man  and  overesti- 
mation  of  the  value  of  human  life,  and  upon  complete  mis- 
conception of  the  only  possible  basis  of  the  existence  of  the 
state. 

This  fancied  freedom  and  equality  is  incompatible  with 
the  state  and  is  a  direct  negation  of  it.  But  the  only  choice 
for  men  here  below  is  between  the  state  with  its  necessary 
servitude  and  inequality,  and — anarchy. 

There  is  much  unavoidable  evil  in  the  former;  but  on  the 
other  hand  it  promotes  and  protects  the  greatest  good  that 
man  can  experience  on  earth.  Anarchy  raises  to  infinity 
the  evil  which  is  unavoidable  in  the  state  without  affording 

*'' Philosophisches  Staatsrechi,"  sec.  21-23;"  "  Rechtsstaat  und  Socialismus,"  sec. 
33  et  seg. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  181 

even  the  least  of  its  advantages,  for  the  greatest  human 
evil  here  below  is  human  stupidity  and  baseness.  Scarcely 
can  the  state  hold  it  in  check;  in  a  condition  of  anarchy  it 
rages  without  restraint  heaping  horror  on  horror.  There  is 
no  third  choice,  for  it  is  impossible  to  return  to  the  primi- 
tive horde;*  and  between  these  two  modes  of  social  existence: 
the  state  and  anarchy,  it  is  not  hard  to  choose. 

It  is  no  less  an  error  to  deduce  rights  from  "justice"  or  a 
"  feeling  of  justice,"  to  place  them  above  the  state  and  to 
propose  their  realization  in  the  state.  This  procedure  rests 
on  an  optical  illusion.  For  what  is  justice?  Whence  do  we 
get  our  conception  of  it  ?  It  is  created  only  by  the  actual 
rights  as  they  exist  in  the  state.  Our  conception  of  justice  at- 
taches itself  to  political  rights;  our  receptivity,  our  sense 
and  feeling  of  it  have  no  other  source.  It  is  no  contradiction 
that  occasionally  we  have  reason  to  acknowledge  that  a 
political  right  is  wrong  and  violates  justice;  for  the  develop- 
ment of  our  sense  of  justice,  which  takes  place  under  the 
influence  of  political  rights,  may  apparently  outrun  their 
development  in  that  all  institutional  rights  exist  only  in 
virtue  of  written  law  or  deep-rooted  usage  and  tradition  while 
political  relations  together  with  our  sense  of  justice  go 
right  on  developing.  In  such  a  case  our  yearning  for  justice 
is  only  the  forerunner  of  a  new  statutory  right  which  has 
been  previously  grounded  in  the  conditions  and  in  the 
degree  of  the  state's  development  and  which  it  might  be 
said  is  already  recognized  though  as  yet  unwritten.  In  a 
word  we  must  distinguish  between  justifiable  reform  move- 
ments based  in  the  nature  of  the  state  and  mere  Utopias. 
The  former  spring  of  themselves  from  its  whole  previous 
development;  the  latter  are  separated  in  thought  from  the 
state  and  stand  upon  ground  upon  which  no  political  institu- 
tion has  ever  stood  such  as  freedom,  equality  and  absolute 
justice,  apart  from  the  state  and  based  on  "  natural  rights." 

What  "justice  "  in  this  sense  is  and  how  it  is  found  we 
do  not  and  cannot  know.  To  us  justice  is  the  simple  abstrac- 
tion of  political  rights  and  it  stands  and  falls  with  them.  If 
we  imagine  our  past  apart  from  political  development  and 
political  rights  the  conception  of  justice  vanishes  utterly 
from  our  mind.  Plato  recognized  this,  and  as  he  was  about 

*  Enijels,  in  his  "  Ursprung  der  Familfe,  des  Pnvateigenthums  und  des  Staates." 
and  Marx  too,  has  in  mind  such  a  return  to  the  "gentile  constitution."  It  takes 
a  large  amount  of  naivete  to  conceive  of  the  return  of  forms  of  social  existence 
Joug  since  surmounted.  It  is  as  though  an  old  man  would  become  a  youth  again. 


182          ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

to  explain  in  the  "Republic"  what  a  "just  man"  and 
what  "justice  "  were  he  began  by  describing  the  founding 
of  the  state  out  of  heterogeneous  unequal  elements.  Pre- 
supposing that  each  part  would  assume  the  most  fitting  role 
that  befell  it  in  the  state  he  called  this  organization  of  the 
state  and  of  political  sovereignty  just;  hence  this  normal 
condition  of  the  state  in  which  each  accommodates  himself 
to  the  role  that  befalls  him  is  his  type  of  justice.  By  this 
shift,  starting  from  the  state,  which  is  really  the  only  pos- 
sible way,  Plato  reaches  his  conception  of  justice  which  he 
then  applies  as  a  standard  to  the  individual.* 

The  words  of  Thrasymachus  in  the  same  dialogue:  "  My 
doctrine  is  that  justice  is  the  interest  of  the  stronger," 
(338)  might  be  applied  to  justice  in  the  state,  for  in  fact 
the  weaker  must  accommodate  himself  to  the  stronger;  the 
state  can  be  regulated  by  no  other  rights  than  such  as  are 
most  agreeable  to  the  stronger.  Indeed  this  is  relatively 
best  for  the  weaker,  and  in  this  sense  political  order  presents 
the  only  conceivable  idea  of  justice,  the  only  source  from 
which  we  can  draw  conceptions  of  the  just  and  justice. 
But  it  is  universally  the  very  contrary  of  freedom  and  equality 
and  indeed  naturally  must  be.  In  fact  justice  has  universally 
been  the  real  expression  of  the  relative  power  of  the  social 
elements  in  the  state.  With  changing  conditions  and  espe- 
cially with  progressive  development  of  the  state  in  agricul- 
ture and  industry,  in  science  and  art  the  relations  gradually 
became  more  humane  and  lenient.  Rights  and  legal  regula- 
tions are  humanized  and  the  idea  of  justice  in  the  abstract 
grows  more  perfect.  But  to-day  no  less  than  in  Plato's  time 
the  state  is  the  only  standard  of  justice.  The  necessary 
conditions  of  its  perpetuation  determine  the  concept.  What 
the  state  must  do  is  right  and  that  can  never  be  "justice" 
which  the  state  cannot  do. 

RIGHTS   AND   MORALS. 

We  have  seen  that  rights  arise  at  the  point  where  the  new 
whole  composed  of  unlike  social  elements  cannot  longer  be 
held  together  merely  by  customs  and  morals  since  the  cus- 
toms and  morals  of  one  party  are  not  the  same  as  those  of 

*Let  us  complete  the  investigation  which  we  undertook  in  the  belief  that,  if  we 
first  endeavored  to  contemplate  justice  in  some  larger  object  which  contains  it, 
we  should  find  it  easier  to  discern  its  nature  in  the  individual  man."  Plato, 
"  Republic,"  Bk.  iv,  p.  434,  Jowett's  Translation. 

This  greater  object  was  wisely  chosen.  Only  by  starting  from  the  state  was  it 
possible  to  arrive  at  a  conception  of  justice. 


THE  OUTLINES  OP  SOCIOLOGY.  183 

the  other.  Into  this  discord  in  moral  views,  with  which 
social  unity  is  incompatible,  rights  first  entered  in  the  form 
of  the  commands  of  the  rulers;  but  in  time,  as  we  said,  they 
are  transformed  into  customs  and  morals  so  that,  being 
rights,  they  become  the  substance  of  new  moral  ideas.  The 
apparent  contradiction  between  morals  that  precede  rights 
and  morals  that  in  turn  are  produced  by  them  needs  some 
elucidation. 

The  customs  and  morals  of  the  primitive  horde  come  from 
the  necessities  of  life  and  the  common  wants  of  the  primi- 
tive social  unity;  but  needs  change  in  the  new  social  whole 
composed  of  two  or  more  unlike  elements.  At  first  indeed 
because  there  are  no  common  customs  and  morals,  force, 
compulsion  and  political  rights  must  bind  the  new  whole 
together;  but  usage,  habit  and  all  the  forces  which  conduced 
to  fixed  customs  and  morals  in  the  primitive  horde  will  not 
fail  of  their  effect  in  the  new  social  unity  also. 

The  new  rights  only  indicated  the  line  along  which  the 
forms  of  life  necessary  in  the  new  social  unit  must  be  devel- 
oped. In  time  they  will  enter  into  the  moral  consciousness, 
for  plainly  the  new  social  unity  will  consolidate.  In  one 
way  or  another  certain  modes  of  peaceable  communal  exist- 
ence will  be  discovered;  people  will  adapt  themselves  to  their 
necessities  and  by  recognizing  and  accepting  them  create  new 
customs  and  morals  to  which  rights  gave  the  first  impulse. 

The  old  morals  of  the  respective  social  elements  must 
necessarily  be  subordinated  to  the  new  morals  of  the  com- 
plex whole,  for  while  the  former  insures  the  existence  of 
the  simple  group  only  the  latter  preserves  the  complex  com- 
munity. 

For  example,  to  a  primitive  horde  and  an  unmixed  stock 
alien  and  enemy  are  synonymous  terms;  its  morals  command 
the  sparing  of  fellow  members  and  the  ruthless  destruction 
of  aliens.  But  as  soon  as  any  foreigners  become  a  part  of 
the  community,  whether  received  as  slaves  or  allies  or  to 
serve  some  other  interest  of  the  new  whole  (the  relation  will 
be  determined  by  a  treaty  from  which  rights  will  arise), 
instantly  the  interest  of  the  new  community  which  produces 
the  new  right  begins  to  set  aside  the  old  morals  which  made 
"alien  and  enemy"  equal  and  prepares  the  way  for  new 
ones  which  give  the  slave,  the  ally  and  whoever  else  has 
been  taken  into  the  social  union  a  claim  to  protection  and 
respect.  However  long  rudiments  of  the  old  morals  may 


184  ANNALS  OP  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

persist  in  opinions  and  sentiments  the  new  interest  of  the 
new  whole  has  framed  new  morals  which  prove  victorious 
over  the  old. 

Wherever  there  are  rights  the  process  is  the  same. 
Although  in  primitive  times,  or  even  in  the  feudal  state  of 
Mediaeval  Europe,  the  wealth  of  tolerated  classes  such  as  the 
traveling  merchants  may  have  been  good  booty  to  the  ruling 
classes  and  robber  knights,  the  theft  of  which  did  not  offend 
against  the  old  morals  or  detract  from  knightly  honor,  yet 
the  new  rights  which  protected  the  property  of  the  burghers 
in  the  interest  of  all  prepared  the  way  gradually  for  the  new 
morals  which  to-day  forbid  the  nobility  to  seize  the  property 
of  other  classes.  With  difficulty  and  after  centuries  of  trial, 
but  with  final  success,  political  rights  have  provided  new 
morals  concerning  property  and  it  is  now  inconceivable  that 
in  the  Middle  Ages  knights  and  noblemen,  who  made  so 
much  of  honor,  did  not  scruple  to  surprise  a  city  and  rob 
its  citizens  of  their  hard-earned  goods. 

The  displacement  of  the  old  morals  by  new  rights  due 
to  the  wants  and  interests  of  the  new  whole  is  seen  most 
plainly  in  the  development  of  patriotism.  The  original 
tribal  consciousness  of  the  respective  social  elements  of  the 
state  is  changed  in  time  into  a  folk  or  national  consciousness. 
While  the  old  morals  recognized  only  the  duty  of  the  indi- 
vidual to  sacrifice  himself  for  the  narrowest  syngenetic  group 
the  common  interests  of  the  new  whole  have  created  new 
morals  which  demand  his  unconditional  sacrifice  for  a  whole 
which  is  ethnically  and  socially  complex. 

If  we  must  cite  examples  at  least  we  shall  not  need  to  go 
far  afield  for  them.  What  was  the  nature  of  that  patriotism 
to  which  every  German  was  morally  bound  not  many 
decades  ago  ?  If  we  characterize  it  in  one  word  as  ' '  par- 
ticularism ' '  we  shall  at  the  same  time  have  indicated  the 
powerful  change  through  which  morals  have  passed  in  this 
respect  as  the  result  of  events  and  new  rights.  The  Rhenish 
Union  was  commensurate  with  the  older  morals,  though  the 
same  thing  to-day  by  the  same  people  in  the  same  land 
would  be  called  the  height  of  immorality,  treason  and 
infamy.  These  moral  changes  have  taken  place  since  the 
events  of  Jena  and  the  war  for  freedom,  since  the  rights  of 
the  German  Union  and  the  new  German  Empire.  The 
former  morals  of  the  parts  must  yield  to  the  new  morals  of 
the  new  whole  to  the  making  of  which  the  new  rights  gave 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  185 

the  impulse.  As  the  new  rights  paved  the  way  for  the  new 
morals  and  made  them,  so  now  the  new  morals  will  con- 
tinue to  be  the  strongest  prop  of  the  new  rights — until  in 
the  perpetual  change  of  earthly  things  new  events  and  cir- 
cumstances make  new  rights  again  to  which  existing  morals 
must  be  sacrificed. 

The  objections  that  can  be  made  to  our  presentation  of 
the  relation  between  rights  and  morals  are  easily  foreseen, 
for  frequently  the  relation  is  apparently  reversed.  Even  in 
the  present  century  how  often  have  we  seen  decayed  rights 
swept  away  by  the  powerful  current  of  "public  morals;" 
and  yet  it  was  only  apparently  so,  for  in  fact  every  such 
right  was  merely  a  screen  behind  which  other  conditions 
came  into  existence  peremptorily  demanding  recognition  as 
rights,  and  although  existing  written  rights  seemed  to  pre- 
vent the  realization  of  the  demand  nevertheless  moral  ideas 
were  created  which,  exerting  a  powerful  influence  and  taking 
possession  of  the  consciousness  of  the  masses,  suddenly 
rose  like  a  tornado  overthrowing  the  old  rights  as  though 
they  were  paper;  whereupon  the  rights  which  the  conditions 
had  long  since  demanded  and  which  had  already  entered 
the  moral  consciousness  procured  legal  expression  and 
validity. 

If  I  might  use  a  somewhat  questionable  metaphor  to 
illustrate  I  should  say  that  behind  the  regular  rights  legiti- 
mately wedded  to  the  nation  and  known  as  such  there  appeared 
secretly,  from  the  force  of  circumstances,  illegitimate  rights 
which  shunned  the  light  and  in  illicit  intercourse  with  the 
nation  begat  morals;  and  as  these,  still  illegitimate,  came 
into  the  world  and  grew  up  they  helped  to  set  the  betrayed 
old  rights,  which  had  lost  their  force  and  justification, 
violently  aside;  whereupon  the  legitimation  of  the  new 
morals  followed  by  subsequent  marriage,  per  subsequens 
matrimonium. 

"So  there  was  an  unwritten  natural  right  based  in 
reason,"  cries  some  supporter  of  natural  rights  triumph- 
antly. Not  so  fast.  It  is  true  that  in  such  moments  of 
development  rights  rise  through  hard  birth  pains  from  the 
dark  womb  of  actual  conditions  into  the  light  of  existence. 
But  they  are  not  natural  rights,  based  on  reason  and  inde- 
pendent of  time  and  conditions.  On  the  contrary  they  are 
always  conditioned  in  the  actual  circumstances.  In  the 
sense  that  they  correspond  to  the  conditions  from  which  they 


186  ANNAI^  OF  THE;  AMERICAN  ACADEMY 

spring  they  are  natural  and  reasonable,  but  not  in  the  sense 
that  their  source  is  in  a  natural  consciousness  of  right  or  in 
reason  and  that  they  always  remain  the  same.  The  require- 
ments which  arise  from  actual  conditions  according  to  time 
and  place,  which  correspond  to  them  and  are  therefore 
natural  and  reasonable,  being  formulated  into  laws,  become 
rights  after  having  struck  deep  root,  as  has  been  said,  in 
moral  consciousness. 

Thus  the  objection  that  the  source  of  rights  is  moral  is 
based  on  a  misconception  of  the  actual  forces.  Equally 
unfounded  also  is  the  doctrine  of  natural  rights.  But  there 
is  another  objection  which  seems  to  be  supported  by  the 
facts.  Political  rights  do  not  always  enter  into  the  moral 
consciousness  of  the  community.  However  long  they  may 
endure  they  have  public  morals  against  them  and  eventually 
must  succumb.  This  frequently  occurs  and  though  it  seems 
to  establish  the  moral  source  of  rights,  in  truth  it  does  not. 

We  often  see  valid  political  rights  stand  like  dead 
machines  in  spite  of  the  application  of  the  state's  whole 
power,  never  operating  without  the  display  of  the  political 
force,  disliked  and  repudiated  by  public  morals,  unable  to 
create  new  morals  and  finally  ending  their  burdensome 
existence  somehow  unregretted.  Upon  closely  examining 
what  sort  of  rights  these  are  which  cannot  produce  a  moral 
ground  into  which  they  may  strike  firm  root,  we  observe 
that  there  was  no  pressing  need  for  them,  that  they  arose 
from  the  momentary  caprice  of  one  party,  from  false  ideas 
and  theories,  from  misconceptions  of  the  actual  conditions, 
etc.  Such  rights  always  hang  in  the  air  without  footing 
and  are  powerless,  valid  only  through  external  support  and 
protection,  without  internal  living  force,  a  stranger  and  an 
enemy  to  public  morals,  unable  to  create  new  morals  and 
hence  from  the  start  ordained  to  perish.  Such  rights  are 
not  rights  at  all.  They  have  no  vital  force,  they  are  still-born. 

All  that  has  been  said  of  the  mutual  relation  of  rights  and 
morals  applies  to  private  as  well  as  to  public  rights  and 
morals.  The  former  generate  their  own  moral  atmosphere 
as  well  as  the  latter  and  are  equally  dependent  on  it  for 
existence. 

For  example,  take  the  changes  in  interest  (usury  laws) 
during  the  last  three  decades  in  certain  states  of  Europe, 
especially  Austria.  First,  the  severe  old  usury  laws  accord- 
ing to  the  intent  of  the  canonical  law  (Rechf),  dating 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  187 

from  the  period  of  industrial  servitude  and  guilds.  Over- 
stepping the  minimum  rate  of  five  or  six  per  cent  was  not 
only  made  punishable  by  the  state,  but  was  also  contrary 
to  public  morals.  The  industrial  conditions,  the  restraints 
upon  trade,  commerce  and  agriculture  fully  justified  the  laws 
of  usury.  The  severe  right  was  the  outcome  of  actual  con- 
ditions and  produced  in  public  opinion  a  moral  consciousness 
of  the  objectionable  character  of  usury.  Meanwhile  indus- 
trial development  went  ceaselessly  forward,  economic  bar- 
riers fell;  trade,  commerce  and  land  became  free;  productive 
industry  felt  an  expansion  hitherto  unknown;  productivity 
far  exceeded  former  limits,  and  the  old  interest  right  was 
felt  to  be  oppressively  narrow.  Behind  the  screen  of  this 
written  right  the  need  for  a  new  one  more  commensurate 
with  the  conditions  made  itself  felt  and  began  to  undermine 
the  morals  based  on  the  old.  The  latter  lost  its  footing  and 
was  overthrown  and  a  new  right — complete  freedom — was 
proclaimed,  which  soon  made  way  with  the  old  morals  and 
created  new  which  saw  nothing  immoral  in  the  free  contract 
of  the  parties  about  the  rate  so  long  as  no  other  immoral 
factor  was  involved  such  as  taking  advantage  of  youth, 
inexperience,  necessitous  predicament  and  the  like.  Then 
the  state  permitted  and  even  incited  the  erection  of  institu- 
tions of  credit  which,  even  when  lawfully  managed,  brought 
such  rates  of  interest  as  two  decades  before  had  been  repu- 
diated and  denounced  by  both  rights  and  morals,  while 
prominent  men  of  spotless  character  who  esteemed  honor 
and  morals  highly  competed  for  their  management. 

Meanwhile  the  industrial  boom  wore  itself  out  for  accord- 
ing to  economic  laws  a  relapse  must  come.  Trade,  commerce, 
industry,  agriculture  again  declined  and  their  productivity 
fell  off.  Again  safety  was  sought  in  erecting  old  barriers 
and  returning  to  the  former  restraints  and  unfreedom.  But 
above  all  else  the  new  right  of  unlimited  freedom  in  interest 
rates  contrasted  with  the  industrial  decline  and  lost  footing 
in  the  actual  conditions  which  demanded  something  else. 
The  need  of  change  became  manifest;  the  new  morals  wav- 
ered; the  new  rights  had  to  fall  and  the  old  restrictions  on 
the  rate  of  interest  became  statutory  rights  again.  At  first 
the  newly  resurrected  rights  struggled  with  the  vanishing 
remnants  of  the  morals  which  were  based  on  the  fallen 
rights.  But  they  were  victorious,  "  for  only  the  living  is 
right,"  and  soon  morals  will  be  completely  transformed, 


1 88          ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

especially  as  political  power  and  criminal  courts  pave  the 
way  for  the  new  rights  in  public  morals. 

In  every  department  of  private  rights  examples  may  be 
multiplied  at  will  of  rights  arising  from  actual  conditions 
and  shaping  morals.  Permit  us  further  to  point  to  the 
many  changes  in  the  law  (Recht}  of  marriage  and  the  result- 
ing change  in  morals.  Wherever  for  centuries  the  marriage 
tie  has  been  indissoluble  by  statutory  right  a  taint  of  immor- 
ality is  attached  to  divorce;  and  if  the  law  is  compelled  by 
actual  conditions  and  the  freer  development  of  modern 
society  to  sanction  the  dissolution  of  marriage,  as  recently 
in  France,  the  new  rights  have  still  to  struggle  a  long  while 
with  the  old  morals.  A  recent  article  in  the  Paris  Figaro 
occasioned  by  the  new  law  read  somewhat  as  follows: 
"Divorce — well;  but  remarriage?  Public  morals  will  not 
endure  that  in  France  (!)"  The  Figaro  need  not  worry.  In 
Europe  and  even  in  France  public  morals  have  at  times 
endured  worse  things  than  that  in  marriage  rights;  for 
example  the  jus  primes  noctis.  They  will  soon,  if  they  have 
not  already,  come  to  terms  with  the  new  rights,  divorce  and 
remarriage,  which,  supposing  them  to  last,  are  reasonable 
because  they  take  account  of  existing  needs  and  conditions. 

One  more  question  in  conclusion.  If  morals  are  constantly 
changing  and  follow  almost  slavishly  the  rights  which 
originate  in  actual  conditions,  why  do  men  always  conceive 
of  them  as  changeless  in  the  midst  of  change,  the  unvary- 
ing source  of  rights  and  the  eternal  idea  throned  high  above 
all  transitory  things  of  earth  ?  Why  do  they  thus  appeal  to 
them  and  regard  them  as  the  standard  of  rights  and  political 
institutions  ? 

The  explanation  is  very  simple.  The  changeableness 
of  rights  and  political  institutions  is  visible  and  appreci- 
able; they  cannot  possibly  pass  as  changeless.  Official 
announcements  annul  to-day  the  rights  of  yesterday.  A 
ministerial  ordinance  suspends  an  existing  political  institu- 
tion and  substitutes  another.  But  the  change  in  morals  is 
slow  and  unmarked  as  the  progress  of  the  hour  hand  of  a 
clock.  A  generation  is  often  but  a  minute  on  the  moral 
dial — who  can  detect  such  a  slight  progression  !  Generations 
later  the  historian  and  the  philosopher  notice  that  the  pointer 
has  moved.  The  average  man  ' '  hears  it  told  indeed  but  lacks 
believing  faith."  Naturally  so,  for  in  the  flowing  stream  of 
events  man  must  lay  hold  on  something  fixed  and 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  189 

unchanging  or  lose  his  bearings.  Until  Copernicus,  the  earth 
at  least  stood  fast  under  his  feet;  since  then  it  moves  in  a  circle 
and  not  even  the  sun  stands  still.  What  wonder  that  men 
grow  dizzy  and  look  hither  and  thither  for  some  fixed  point 
by  which  to  direct  their  unsteady  course  in  the  ocean  of  life  ! 
It  is  an  absolute  necessity  of  human  temperament  to  have 
such  fixed  points  like  stars  on  the  horizon.  To  it  all  the 
' '  eternal  powers  ' '  which  man  worships  owe  their  existence, 
nor  will  they  pass  away  while  man  lives  on  earth.  Among 
them  are  found  the  moral  ideas;  for  in  them  man  seeks  and 
hopes  to  find  a  firm  point  of  support  for  all  his  actions,  a  guid- 
ing star  by  which  to  regulate  all  his  acts  and  undertakings, 
a  fixed  standard  by  which  to  judge  between  good  and  bad, 
noble  and  ignoble;  and  indeed  lie  finds  in  the  moral  idea 
what  he  seeks.  It  is  really  a  basal  point  and  a  guiding  star 
for  the  whole  life.  The  error  lies  in  each  one  believing  his 
moral  ideas  are  the  only  ones,  changeless  and  the  same  for 
all  times  and  peoples.  It  is  no  more  true  than  that  the 
earth  is  a  fixed  point  in  the  universe.  But  just  as  the  earth 
in  spite  of  its  ceaseless  revolutions  affords  a  firm  enough 
ground  for  human  efforts,  so  the  individual's  moral  ideas 
afford  him  a  solid  support  upon  which  to  base  his  character, 
his  efforts  and  his  will.  What  cares  the  landlord  or  the 
houseowner  that  the  soil  he  tills  or  the  ground  on  which  he 
builds  revolves  with  the  whole  globe  !  It  is  just  as  little 
concern  to  the  individual  that  his  morals  will  seem  immoral 
to  future  generations;  to  him  it  is  the  one  possible  fixed 
ground  which  he  can  cultivate  and  build  upon. 

For  the  individual,  however  transient  he  himself  is,  ulti- 
mately finds  in  himself  the  firm  support  to  which  he  can 
cling  in  the  wild  tumult  of  life  for  protection — and  woe  to 
him  if  he  does  not  find  it  !  It  is  only  shortsightedness  and 
pardonable  weakness  in  man  to  believe  that  it  is  external  to 
himself,  for  he  seeks  it  there  in  vain.  "It  is  not  from 
without  that  it  conies,  thine  inner  self  creates  it."  Thus 
whether  it  be  purely  personal  feelings  like  real  love  and 
friendship  which  accompany  man  through  life,  or  true  faith 
to  which  pious  temperaments  devote  themselves,  or  higher 
ideas  like  enthusiasm  for  folk  and  fatherland,  for  truth  and 
science,  to  which  the  individual  unselfishly  sacrifices  himself, 
every  feeling  and  every  idea  is  a  ' '  fixed  pole-star  in  the  flood 
of  events"  which  shines  before  him,  consoles  and  comforts 
him  and  ennobles  him,  too,  though  after  all  it  is  purely 


1 90          ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

subjective  and    passes    away   with   him.      So  it   is  with 
morals. 

Thus  though  philosopher  and  sociologist  inquire  how 
morals  arose,  what  changes  they  have  undergone,  whether 
they  are  justified  or  not,  the  individual  finds  it  sufficient  for 
his  life  that  he  has  them.  But  whether  he  has  any  and 
what  they  are  depends  upon  the  degree  of  development  of 
his  social  group,  upon  the  family  in  which  he  was  born  and 
brought  up,  upon  his  environments,  upon  the  impressions 
received  in  tender  years,  upon  the  experiences  he  has  passed 
through,  perhaps  also  upon  the  knowledge  he  has  gathered, 
but  certainly  to  a  high  degree  upon  the  rights  which  the 
state  has  maintained  and  to  which  he  has  had  to  conform. 

INDIVIDUAL    EFFORTS     AND     SOCIAL  NECESSITIES. 

Thus  by  observing  the  social  world  and  its  phenomena  we 
come  to  perceive  that  there  is  a  necessity  immanent  in  the 
condition  of  things  according  to  which  they  move,  by  which 
they  act  and  which  sooner  or  later  reaches  fulfillment. 

It  is  not  in  man's  power  to  suspend  or  check  it.  He  is 
himself  a  part  of  that  world  and  an  element  in  those  phe- 
nomena and  all  his  actions  are  subject  to  this  all-embracing 
and  universally  immanent  necessity.  His  alleged  and 
apparent  freedom  cannot  alter  or  prevent  its  fulfillment. 

The  common  understanding  recognizes  indeed  that  the 
so-called  ' '  natural  laws  ' '  are  fulfilled  on  a  grand  scale. 
But  in  the  fine,  microscopical  details  of  individual  action  it  is 
not  so  easily  apparent. 

Concede  for  a  moment  the  beautiful  illusion  that  the 
individual  acts  "freely,"  and  consider  what  significance  it 
has  in  view  of  the  fulfillment  of  natural  necessity  in  indi- 
vidual life  and  human  society.  All  of  man's  "  free  acts  " 
may  be  reduced  to  a  universal  concept  and  a  common 
denominator:  preservation.  likewise  all  the  processes  in 
nature  and  human  life  which  take  place  of  immanent  neces- 
sity may  be  reduced  to  a  universal  concept  and  common 
denominator:  change  and  decay.  In  the  realm  of  nature  all 
is  perishable.  Man  would  preserve  everything. 

This  fundamental  antithesis  lies  like  a  curse  on  all  of 
man's  "  free  acts,"  which  are  condemned  to  be  exhausted  in 
fruitless  struggle  against  nature's  necessities.  Human 
"  freedom  "  is  but  the  freedom  of  the  captive  lion,  to  run  to 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  191 

and  fro  in  his  cage  and  to  follow  the  menagerie,  cage  and 
all,  hither  and  thither  through  city  and  country. 

But  the  general  perception  that  human  freedom  accom- 
plishes nothing  against  natural  necessity,  that  it  dashes  like 
waves  against  a  rock-bound  coast  only  to  be  broken  and 
scattered  in  spray,  is  of  little  worth.  It  is  more  important 
from  the  universal  relation  between  human  freedom  and 
natural  necessity  to  gain  some  insight  into  the  essence  and 
character  of  human  actions.  This  we  will  now  attempt. 

We  said  that  the  whole  tendency  of  man's  so-called  free 
activity  was  to  preserve  what  is  by  nature  perishable  and 
must  pass  away  to  make  room  for  the  new.  We  try  to 
preserve  our  health  while  nature  works  quietly  and  inces- 
santly for  its  decline.  We  try  to  prolong  our  life  as  long 
as  possible  even  when  nature  has  made  its  destruction 
necessary;  and  as  it  is  with  these  "  personal  "  goods  so  it  is 
with  all  the  rest  of  life's  goods.  Men  try  to  preserve 
economic  goods  beyond  the  end  of  their  lives  for  their 
descendants,  and  under  favorable  circumstances  their  efforts 
are  successful  for  generations.  Nevertheless  the  wealth  of 
the  Croesuses  of  antiquity  has  fallen  a  victim  to  the  all- 
powerful  law  of  natural  decay  and  perpetual  change  and  the 
Rothschilds  of  our  century  will  leave  as  little  trace  in  the 
future. 

Man  tries  also  with  his  whole  thought  to  preserve  ' '  for- 
ever "  all  the  social  institutions  which  he,  the  blind  instru- 
ment and  means  of  natural  impulses  and  inclinations,  creates 
and  all  the  mental  products  for  making  life  tolerable,  beau- 
tiful and  noble,  while  natural  and  necessary  decay  labors  to 
overthrow  them,  undermines  them,  gnaws  at  and  devours 
them.  We  would  preserve  the  social  community  in  which 
we  are  well  off ;  but  it  must  end  as  surely  as  the  life  of  the 
individual.  We  would  preserve  our  language,  religion, 
customs,  nationality  and  do  not  notice  how  they  daily  waste 
away  like  rocks  under  dripping  water. 

Self-sacrifice  to  preserve  what  is  inevitably  destined  to  fall 
is  considered  noble  and  heroic;  but  it  is  cowardly  and 
ignoble  to  submit  to  natural  necessity.  To  oppose  natural 
impulses  is  asceticism,  which  men  do  not  refuse  to  admire. 
To  follow  natural  impulses  and  necessities  is  generally  con- 
sidered low  "materialism."  Fanatics  who  have  neither 
eye  nor  mind  for  the  omnipotence  of  natural  conditions  are 
our  heroes  in  art  in  whom  we  delight.  The  more  fanatical 


192  ANNALS  OP  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

the  ' '  greater  ' '  they  are.  The  founders  of  univeral  empires, 
the  Cyruses,  Alexanders,  Caesars  and  Napoleons  won  our 
admiration  because  they  perished  trying  to  accomplish  the 
impossible  and  unnatural.  The  simple  man  who  adapts 
himself  to  the  natural  and  necessary  conditions  of  his  envi- 
ronment is  not  worth  consideration. 

Our  freedom  of  action  and  heroism  may  make  the  inevit- 
able fulfillment  more  painful  for  us,  but  it  cannot  prevent  it, 
or  delay  it  a  single  moment.  The  necessity  immanent  in 
things  and  natural  conditions  is  fulfilled  however  much  we 
oppose  it;  and  it  is  quite  proper  to  picture  human  life  as  a 
perpetual  struggle  against  nature  though  it  is  false  to  believe 
that  man  could  ever  at  any  point  be  victorious.  What  is 
fulfilled  is  always  and  exclusively  natural  necessity,  never 
man's  ' '  free  will. ' '  Man's  efforts  vacillate  from  side  to  side 
until  finally  they  fall  into  the  line  of  necessity — that  is 
decisive  for  fulfillment.  If  we  may  be  allowed  to  use  a 
trivial  illustration,  let  us  suppose  that  from  a  number  of 
stoppers  of  different  sizes  we  have  to  select  one  for  an  open 
bottle.  The  relation  between  the  open  bottle  and  the  pile 
of  stoppers  is  controlled  by  an  immanent  natural  necessity  in 
consequence  of  which  only  one  stopper,  of  suitable  size,  will 
fit  it.  This  necessity  will  be  fulfilled  if  we  cork  the  bottle 
from  the  supply  of  stoppers  at  hand,  and  it  will  be  fulfilled 
in  spite  of  our  ' '  free  acts, ' '  which  consist  in  applying  a 
number  of  stoppers,  some  too  small,  some  too  large,  to  the 
mouth  of  the  bottle  and  convincing  ourselves  that  they  do 
not  fit.  Eventually  one  will  fit,  the  one  of  proper  size,  and 
when  we  find  it  we  cork  the  bottle  with  satisfaction,  proud 
of  our  "free  action."  A  trivial  illustration  to  be  sure,  in 
which  other  openings  might  be  found  besides  the  one  in  the 
bottle.  But  let  us  pass  to  a  more  serious  example,  better 
fitted  for  scientific  investigation. 

Probably  human  freedom  seems  under  less  restraint  in  the 
sphere  of  scientific  and  philosophical  thought  than  any- 
where else.  "Thoughts  are  free  "  and  the  field  not  subject 
to  censorship  nor  made  unsafe  by  the  state's  attorney  is 
large  enough.  Free  man  may  gambol  there  at  will  and 
enjoy  his  freedom,  and  he  has  always  done  so  to  the  fullest 
extent.  But  the  object  of  intellectual  labor  is  the  discovery 
of  truth  or  knowledge;  and  what  has  been  the  result  of 
these  "  free"  efforts  for  thousands  of  years?  It  is  the  old 
story  of  the  bottle  and  the  stoppers.  After  thousands  of 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  193 

failures  somebody  makes  a  lucky  grab  and  seizes  the  right 
stopper  for  the  philosophical  hole.  But  is  that  the  work  of 
a  free  mind  or  of  meritorious  intellectual  labor  ?  The  neces- 
sity immanent  in  things  and  conditions  was  simply  fulfilled. 
Groping  in  the  dark  we  hit  upon  a  truth. 

Scientific  and  philosophical  investigation,  that  noblest 
occupation  of  "free  minds,"  is  a  pure  game  of  chance. 
Philosophical  and  scientific  truths  stand  like  rare  prizes 
among  thousands  of  blanks  in  a  wheel  of  fortune  revolving 
about  us.  We  ' '  free  thinkers, ' '  so  proud  of  our  ' '  intellec- 
tual labors,"  grab  awkwardly  like  innocent  children  and  lo! 
among  a  million  blanks  somebody  gets  a  prize.  This  makes 
him  a  thinker  of  great  renown  whose  "  merits  "  are  praised. 
Yet  he  is  not  at  all  accountable  for  the  result  of  his  intellec- 
tual labor.  He  is  no  more  and  no  less  meritorious  than  the 
"dunces,"  scorned  and  ridiculed,  who  had  the  misfortune 
to  draw  nothing  but  scientific  and  philosophical  errors.  No 
more  meritorious,  we  say!  Indeed  "the great  philosopher" 
who  appears  once  in  ' '  thousands  of  years ' '  is  less  meritorious 
than  the  crowd  of  little  philosophers  who  by  drawing  count- 
less blanks  made  it  possible  for  him  to  win  the  great  prize. 

Ivet  us  go  to  another  field  of  ' '  free ' '  human  actions,  leg- 
islation, and  see  what  relation  human  freedom  there  bears  to 
the  necessity  immanent  in  things  and  conditions.  How 
proud  and  self-conscious  the  gentlemen  of  the  majority  are, 
whether  of  the  parliamentary  right  or  left.  They  make  the 
laws  for  the  state  to-day.  They  stake  their  best  knowledge, 
they  would  apply  all  their  wisdom,  they  appoint  their  best 
minds  on  the  committees  and  entrust  their  shrewdest  jurists 
with  the  drafting  of  the  bills;  and  then  the  amendments  by 
sections!  Every  one  bestirs  himself  to  furnish  the  greatest 
acuteness  his  cranium  can  supply  —and  what  is  the  result 
of  all  this  application  of  "  mind  "  and  "  free  "  thought? 

For  the  most  part  a  miserable  botch  which  the  real  con- 
ditions of  life  and  the  necessity  immanent  in  them  must 
correct  in  order  to  meet  the  wants  of  the  case  and  be  endur- 
able. Savigny  denominated  it  inaptitude  {Mangel an  Beruf} 
for  legislation  and  ascribed  it  to  "  our  times. ' '  As  to  the 
inaptitude  he  was  right;  but  no  period  has  been  or  ever  will 
be  better  than  our  own  in  this  respect.  Only  by  adapting 
themselves  to  immediate  wants  and  taking  account  of  real 
interests,  in  short  by  bending  to  social  necessities,  can  law- 
givers make  useful  laws — and  it  has  always  been  so.  But 


194  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

as.  soon  as  they  mount  the  high  horse  of  theory,  set  up  ideal 
principles  and  deduce  laws  to  bring  about  ideal  right  and 
justice;  when  instead  of  submitting  to  social  necessity  they 
enter  the  sphere  of  free  intellectual  activity  in  order  to  make 
laws  in  accordance  with  ideas  and  not  in  accordance  with 
real  needs  and  interests,  the  inaptitude  is  clearly  demon- 
strated. 

This  inaptitude  for  ' '  free  ' '  origination  is  manifested  in  a 
still  higher  degree  in  politics.  Every  institution  ' '  freely  ' ' 
made  is  a  wretched  experiment  which  must  be  thoroughly 
transformed  by  the  powerful  currents  of  real  interests  and 
needs  in  order  to  answer  to  social  necessities  and  gain  any 
permanence  at  all.  Human  freedom  (diplomatic)  is  the 
worst  sort  of  bungler  and  must  be  forced  into  the  right 
course  by  social  necessity. 

What  makes  the  institutions  of  human  freedom  especially 
frail  in  the  sphere  of  politics  is  the  fact  that  the  fundamental 
tendency  of  all  free  human  action,  preservation  and  acquisi- 
tion, is  most  pronounced  right  here  where  the  natural  neces- 
sity of  eternal  change  and  decay  holds  most  inexorable 
sway. 

The  aspirations  of  statesmen  are  directed  toward  political 
and  national  preservation  and  expansion.  The  natural 
necessity  to  perish  and  decay  can  go  on  only  by  violently 
overthrowing  every  free  human  institution.  Hence  no  new 
political  institution  can  come  to  light  without  force  and 
destruction,  struggle  and  bloodshed.  Here  human  freedom, 
bent  on  preservation  and  acquisition,  plays  a  most  lament- 
able part;  and  social  necessity,  tending  to  change  and  decay, 
is  revealed  in  its  most  awful  sublimity. 

There  is  still  another  important  question  to  be  decided. 
What  is  the  relation  of  this  pernicious  human  freedom  to 
man's  happiness  in  life  ?  and  can  a  better  insight  into  its 
nothingness  and  vanity  help  him  in  avoiding  evil  and  being 
happier  ?  Let  us  see. 

Certainly  if  men  always  recognized  inevitable  necessity 
in  advance  they  might  escape  much  evil  fortune  by  quietly 
resigning  to  it.  But  this  is  impossible,  first  because  such 
knowledge  is  never  vouchsafed  to  mankind  as  a  whole,  at 
most  to  exceptional  individuals,  and  again  because  human 
freedom,  that  oscillation  back  and  forth  on  both  sides  of  the 
line  of  necessity,  is  based  in  human  nature  and  is  therefore 
a  necessity. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  195 

Although  it  is  thus  impossible  for  mankind  as  a  whole  to 
avoid  the  disappointments  and  escape  the  evil  results  of  the 
opposition  of  individual  freedom  and  social  necessity  still  it 
is  worth  while  to  inquire  whether  a  more  correct  knowledge 
of  necessity  does  not  in  many  relations  of  life  and  spheres 
of  human  -activity  lessen  the  sum  of  evil  allotted  to  man 
here  below,  or  better  expressed,  whether  through  such 
knowledge  much  superfluous  evil  due  to  human  freedom 
might  not  be  avoided.  Let  us  see  how  far  this  is  possible. 

It  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  we  can  never  con- 
ceive of  man  as  an  isolated  being :  for  he  never  has  existed 
and  never  can  exist  in  isolation.  If  then  we  conceive  of 
him  as  having  always  been  a  member  of  a  swarm  or  horde — 
and  we  cannot  reasonably  do  otherwise — his  life  and  well- 
being  depend  upon  his  environment  and  is  conditioned  by 
it.  Now  the  impulse  of  self-preservation,  the  source  of  the 
most  powerful  motive  of  human  efforts  and  ' '  free' '  activi- 
ties, is  by  origin  not  simply  individual  but  social.  It  finds 
expression  in  attachment  for  one's  own  and  desire  to  subdue 
others. 

This  social  impulse  of  self-preservation,  the  reverse  side 
of  which  is  the  necessary  desire  to  subdue  and  exploit  the 
alien,  opens  new  fields  for  human  desires  and  activities,  for 
example  the  economic  and  the  political,  the  technical,  the 
scientific  and  even  the  artistic.  In  most  of  them  individual 
desires  come  in  conflict  with  social  necessities  and  since,  as 
is  self-evident,  the  latter  assert  themselves  over  the  former 
there  is  a  preponderance  of  ' '  misfortune ' '  and  ' '  evil ' '  in 
human  life.  If  now  man  could  know  the  necessities  imma- 
nent in  things  and  conditions  and  had  strength  to  reduce  his 
desires  to  their  measure  his  life  would  surely  be  much  happier. 
Generally  this  is  impossible  for  reasons  both  subjective  and 
objective.  However  let  us  consider  in  what  spheres  it  is 
possible  to  subordinate  individual  desires  to  social  necessi- 
ties, to  adapt  and  accommodate  one's  self  to  the  circum- 
stances. 

Now  the  sphere  of  human  efforts  best  adapted  for  this 
will  be  the  one  in  which  knowledge  of  natural  necessity  is 
farthest  advanced,  the  sphere  of  personal  life.  Here  men 
are  least  deceived  and  have  long  since  learned  to  subordinate 
their  efforts.  Every  half-way  reasonable  man  suppresses  the 
desire  to  preserve  his  life  beyond  the  limits  set  by  nature  and 
submits  to  the  natural  necessity  of  death. 


196          ANNAI<S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

One  thing,  however,  many  people  have  not  yet  learned,  or 
perhaps  an  artificially  cultivated  trend  of  thought  has  made 
them  forget:  the  low  value  of  life.  Its  overvaluation  is  the 
source  of  great  personal  ill,  especially  is  it  an  unfortunate 
conceit  of  the  ' '  civilized ' '  nations  to  place  too  high  value 
upon  the  "  good  "  of  life. 

Yet  if  man  would  measure  the  ' '  natural ' '  worth  of  human 
life  by  nature's  forbearance  and  by  the  productiveness  which 
she  allows  play  to  in  this  realm,  how  low  the  value  would 
be  set.  A  subterranean  quake  and  thousands  of  human 
lives  are  sent  to  destruction.  Thousands  perish  in  every 
storm  at  sea.  A  plague  here  to-day  and  there  to-morrow 
and  hundreds  of  thousands  fall  victims.  A  bad  summer, 
the  failure  of  harvest  and  hunger  frequently  snatch  off  mill- 
ions in  overpopulated  regions. 

But  on  the  other  hand  nature  can  indulge  in  lighter  play 
with  human  life — millions  of  children  see  the  light  daily 
and  nature  has  shrewdly  provided  that  this  productivity 
should  not  cease. 

Considering  these  natural  conditions  is  there  any  sense 
or  justification  in  overestimating  the  worth  of  an  individual 
life  as  civilized  nations  do?  How  much  misfortune  and 
evil  men  might  be  spared  if  all  the  social,  political  and  jurid- 
ical institutions  which  follow  from  such  an  exaggerated 
estimation  of  human  life  should  fall  away. 

Next  to  the  preservation  of  life  the  satisfaction  of  natural 
wants  is  the  most  important  content  of  human  endeavors. 
Here  too  the  wants  produced  by  man's  freedom  are 
directly  opposed  to  natural  necessities  and  fill  the  life  of 
civilized  man  especially  with  useless  torment  and  strife. 
Nature  directs  man  to  an  unhampered  satisfaction  of  these 
material  wants  according  to  his  physical  powers.  An  un- 
natural trend  of  thought  produced  forms  of  life  which 
increase  the  sum  of  evils  incident  to  life  and  run  counter  to 
natural  necessity  without  being  able  to  check  it. 

The  impulse  to  satisfy  wants  forces  man  into  the  economic 
£eld.  How  hard  his  struggle  with  nature  is  needs  no 
lengthy  explanation.  Natural  necessities  press  him  hard  and 
close.  He  endeavors  to  make  head  against  the  embarrassments. 
Apparently  he  succeeds  frequently,  but  at  last  succumbs. 
His  efforts  are  expended  in  two  chief  directions.  He  strives 
greedily  for  possessions  which  he  must  ultimately  leave 
behind,  and  he  endeavors  to  get  still  more  in  order  to  be 


THK  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  197 

equal  with  the  more  opulent,  whereas  economic  inequality 
is  a  natural  necessity. 

The  economic  wants  lead  men  into  the  political  sphere; 
for  the  state  is  expected  to  furnish  to  some  the  means  of 
satisfying  their  higher  economic  and  cultural  wants  at  the 
expense,  though  not  to  the  harm,  of  others.  But  the  state, 
like  all  human  institutions,  is  perishable,  and  the  older, 
already  in  decline,  must  give  place  to  the  new,  developing  in 
power;  and  yet  how  much  energy  will  be  devoted  to  checking 
the  uncheckable,  to  preserving  alive  what  is  doomed  to  perish. 

In  the  internal  organization  of  states  also  human  freedom 
overshoots  the  limit  of  natural  necessity  either  to  force  the 
natural  development  of  social  relations  prematurely  or  to 
suppress  it  unduly  and  cause  stagnation.  Hence  comes  that 
perpetual  oscillation  in  the  inner  life  of  a  state  which  Comte 
supposed  to  be  the  result  of  two  opposing  principles,  the 
theological  and  the  metaphysical,  and  which  he  expected 
would  disappear  with  the  dawn  of  positive  political  science, 
but  we  consider  it  simply  the  natural  process  of  "  human 
freedom." 

But  human  freedom  celebrates  its  greatest  triumphs  in  the 
sphere  of  technics,  science  and  art.  For  the  simple  reason 
that  it  is  only  a  question  of  discovering  what  are  the  natural 
necessities,  the  actual  facts  and  the  laws  of  nature  or  (in 
art)  of  reproducing  her  productions.  Men  need  only  to  sniff 
about  in  technics  or  science  until  they  discover  how;  or  to 
experiment  in  art  until  they  strike  it  right;  and  this  they  do 
with  great  patience  and  with  assurance  of  ultimate  success. 

Technics  and  science  have  no  higher  task  than  to  discover 
nature  and  learn  her  laws.  Since  she  is  always  the  same 
and  the  stream  of  mankind  flows  ceaselessly  and  man's 
thirst  for  knowledge  is  always  the  same,  he  must  eventually 
succeed  in  learning  her  secrets  from  her.  But  the  whole  of 
man's  freedom  here  consists  in  submitting  to  nature's  neces- 
sity— his  great  success  is  in  recognizing  what  it  is;  in  adapt- 
ing himself  to  it  in  technics  and  learning  it  in  science.  Thus 
human  endeavors  are  in  no  wise  opposed  to  natural  necessi- 
ties here;  hence  their  greatest  success  and  man's  greatest 
good  lie  in  this  sphere.  likewise  in  art.  Free  reproduction 
is  the  highest  aim.  The  impulse  thereto  lies  in  human 
nature  and  hence  its  satisfaction,  like  that  of  every  other 
impulse,  yields  human  pleasure.  But  the  better  he  succeeds 
in  reproducing,  the  more  faithfully  he  clings  to  nature  and 


198          ANNAJLS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY 

her  necessities,  the  truer  the  expression,  so  much  the  greater 
his  triumph  and  his  good  fortune.  He  meets  with  success 
all  the  oftener  because  he  does  not  act  contrary  to  nature 
but  rather  takes  her  for  his  chief  example  and  teacher. 

The  result  of  our  investigations  is  indeed  not  very  com- 
mendatory of  mankind  in  general.  For  since  the  sum  of 
human  ill  increases  in  the  degree  that  ' '  free ' '  human 
endeavors  are  shattered  fruitlessly  on  natural  necessities  it 
follows  from  what  precedes  that  real  success  and  good  fortune 
can  be  found  only  in  the  domains  of  technics,  science  and 
art,  which  is  accessible  to  only  a  small  minority  of  mankind; 
whereas  in  the  sphere  of  economic  and  political  life,  where 
these  endeavors  run  powerlessly  to  waste  against  natural 
necessities,  very  little  real  happiness  is  to  be  obtained,  and  in 
the  sphere  of  personal  life  only  discreet  resignation  can 
ameliorate  the  necessary  evil  at  all. 


V.     THE    HISTORY    OF    MANKIND   AS    LIFE    OF 
THE  SPECIES. 

SOCIOLOGY   AND   THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   HISTORY. 

The  relation  between  sociology  and  the  philosophy  of  his- 
tory is  similar  to  that  between  statistics  and  history.  The 
former  has  been  called  a  cross-section  of  the  latter.  That 
is  to  say,  statistics  is  occupied  with  a  given  condition,  while 
history  would  embrace  the  entire  course  of  human  destiny 
(die  Geschicke)  as  a  whole.  But  it  is  very  plain  that  this 
is  an  impossible  task;  so  far  as  its  accomplishment  is  con- 
cerned, statistics  has  a  great  advantage  in  the  temporal  and 
local  limitations  which  it  assumes. 

So  with  sociology  and  the  philosophy  of  history.  The 
latter  would  give  us  the  idea  of  human  history  in  its  entirety, 
would  set  forth  the  theory  of  the  whole  course;  and  hence 
it  must  fail  through  inability  to  survey  it  all,  for  the  idea  of 
a  part  conceived  to  be  the  whole  always  falsifies  the  idea  of 
the  whole. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  task  of  sociology  is  more  capable 
of  solution  because  of  the  limitations  which  it  assumes.  It 
disclaims  embracing  the  history  of  mankind  as  a  whole.  It 
is  content  with  investigating  the  process  of  human  group- 
making,  the  constant  repetition  of  which  makes  up  the 
content  of  all  history.  Without  inquiring  the  import  of 
the  whole  course  of  history,  which  it  does  not  know,  it  is 
content  to  show  its  conformity  to  law,  to  investigate  the 
manner  of  social  evolution,  in  a  word  to  describe  the  pro- 
cesses which  regularly  arise  from  a  certain  contact  of  human 
societies  and  the  mutual  effects  displayed.  We  would  treat 
the  principal  questions  of  sociology:  conformity  to  law  in 
the  course  of  political  history,  the  way  societies  develop,  and 
the  problem  whether  in  historical  periods  of  considerable 
length  we  meet  with  certain  ideas,  general  tendencies  (like 
progress,  improvement,  and  so  on),  or  even  general  forms  of 
social  process. 

CONFORMITY  TO   LAW   IN  DEVELOPMENT. 

Conformity  to  law  in  the  events  and  developments  of  polit- 
ical history  has  been  often  suspected  and  much  discussed, 
and  even  positively  asserted.  But,  as  we  have  pointed  out 

(199) 


200          ANNAI<S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

elsewhere,*  no  one  has  succeeded,  so  far  as  we  know,  in 
demonstrating  it  concretely  and  clearly;  while,  on  the  con- 
trary, the  shallow  objections  of  antagonists  who  denied  its 
existence  and  spoke  of  free  will  and  the  guidance  of  Provi- 
dence seemed  to  be  growing  more  formidable. 

But  it  is  a  very  interesting  fact  that  in  spheres  which  are 
very  near  to  political  and  social  life  and  which,  though  not 
identical,  are  connected  with  it  by  an  intimate  bond  of 
causal  relation,  such  conformity  is  so  plain  and  apparent 
that  it  cannot  be  questioned  by  even  the  most  zealous  adher- 
ents of  free  will  and  of  the  guidance  of  Divine  Providence; 
and  yet  they  have  never  realized  that  by  conceding  develop- 
ment according  to  law,  independent  of  the  will  of  the  indi- 
vidual, in  art  and  science  for  example,  they  concede  it 
eo  ipso  in  these  deeper,  fundamental  domains. 

Let  us  therefore  consider  those  spheres  in  which  con- 
formity to  law  is  doubted  by  no  one,  in  order  next  to  show 
the  intimate  connection  between  this  conformity  to  law  and 
that  in  the  social  and  political  sphere  upon  which  this 
depends. 

Is  it  not  a  scientific  commonplace  to  speak  of  the  evolu- 
tion of  a  people's  art,  science  and  philosophy?  What  do  the 
modern  historians  do  but  demonstrate  their  development  in 
conformity  to  law  in  each  several  nation;  an  evolution  in 
which  plainly  the  individual  must,  and  unconsciously  and 
involuntarily  does,  accommodate  himself  to  the  law  of  the 
whole  and  the  movements  of  the  community  ?  What  does 
it  signify  that  for  example  the  connoisseur  can  tell  almost 
exactly  when  a  work  of  art  was  created,  the  school  to  which 
it  belonged  and  almost  the  place  whence  it  must  have  come, 
without  knowing  the  artist  ?  What  but  that  it  is  not  the 
individual  fashioning  according  to  his  own  arbitrary  will 
but  the  community  and  its  evolution,  whose  slave  he  is  born 
to  be,  as  whose  slave  he  works  and  creates  ?  The  individual 
does  not  compose;  it  is  the  poetic  mood  of  his  age  and  social 
group.  The  individual  does  not  think;  it  is  the  spirit  of  his 
age  and  social  group.  Otherwise  the  connoisseur  could  not 
tell  whether  the  picture  exhibited  belonged  to  the  school  of 
Tintoretto  or  Rubens;  whether  a  rediscovered  Latin  poem  is 
classic  or  post-classic;  whether  a  philosophical  fragment 
belongs  to  the  Aristotelian  or  Alexandrian  age.  That  the 
connoisseur  can  tell  is  the  best  proof  that  the  individual's 

*  See  "  Rasstnka mpf,"  p.  6  et  seq. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  201 

thoughts,  feelings  and  actions  are  influenced  and  determined 
by  his  age  and  social  environment. 

Thus  we  recognize  these  facts  generally  and  without  con- 
tradiction, while  refusing  to  draw  the  necessary  conclusions 
from  them  elsewhere.  But  we  have  seen  that  the  mode  of 
a  man's  feeling,  thought  and  action  simply  result  from  the 
stage  of  social  and  political  development  upon  which  he 
happens  at  the  time  to  be.*  Can  it  still  be  doubted  that  the 
social  and  political  situation  exercises  a  determining,  con- 
structive influence  on  the  mental  constitution  and  endow- 
ments of  men  which  are  on  the  whole  always  equal  ? 

The  peasant  boy  with  artistic  talents  will  draw  rude  figures 
in  the  sand  or  carve  in  wood  with  a  pocket  knife  all  his  life 
long.  Raised  upon  a  higher  social  plane,  educated  in  an  art 
school  in  a  cultivated  community,  he  will  become  a  repre- 
sentative of  his  time  and  people,  that  is,  of  the  educated 
classes  that  stand  at  the  top  of  the  historical  development  of 
the  nation.  What  he  has  become  is  due  not  only  to  his 
natural  endowments  but  especially  to  the  social  environment 
in  which  he  was  educated  and  its  degree  of  development. 
But  he  cannot  arbitrarily  be  anything;  he  can  be  only  one 
stone  more  in  the  mental  structure  which  the  community 
and  its  grade  of  development  necessarily  determine,  a  stone 
whose  place  is  assigned  to  it  by  the  development  of  the 
whole. 

There  is  therefore  no  doubt  and  it  will  be  generally  con- 
ceded that  the  joint  mental  development,  or,  as  it  is  also 
called,  the  development  of  the  human  mind,  or  of  the  mind 
of  mankind,  follows  fixed  laws  and  that  the  individual  so  far 
as  he  participates  in  it,  actively  or  passively,  must  patiently 
endure,  doing  nothing,  thinking  nothing  which  does  not  of 
necessity  follow  from  the  given  historical  premises  of  the 
evolution.  There  is  therefore  no  individual  freedom  of  will 
here;  only  all-controlling  law. 

But  how  is  this  mental  evolution  related  to  evolution  in 
the  social  sphere  ?  That  the  former  is  not  possible  or  even 
conceivable  without  the  latter  conclusively  follows  from  the 
close  causal  connection  between  mental  development  and 
social,  political  and  economic  conditions  which  we  have  else- 
where demonstrated.! 

Man's  mental  character,  his  mental  evolution  and  so  also 

*Cf.  Part  IV,  sec.  2. 
^"Rassenkampf,"  p.  Betsey, 


2O2          ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

his  mental  activity  is  conditioned  upon  the  stage  of  his 
political  and  social  evolution.  The  nomad  wandering  about 
with  his  horde  has  one  set  of  thoughts;  the  hunter  pursuing 
game  in  the  forests  has  another;  the  subjected  slave  has 
another;  the  townsman  living  by  trade  and  commerce 
another;  the  member  of  the  ruling  caste  another;  and  the 
priest  whose  power  is  in  the  mysterious  charm  of  religion 
another.  Their  thinking  is  determined  by  the  place  which 
they  occupy  in  society  and  by  the  degree  of  its  evolution. 

But  though  we  can  comprehend  how  collective  mental  life 
and  activity  is  connected  in  a  general  way  with  the  stage  of 
social  evolution,  we  lack  the  microscopical  insight  to  see 
how  each  individual  is  connected  with  it  and  how  his 
thought,  feelings  and  behavior  are  influenced  by  it. 

Similarly  the  physicist  is  able  to  explain  the  appearing  of 
the  rainbow  from  the  position  of  the  sun  and  the  stratifica- 
tion of  the  clouds;  but  he  has  not  the  means  to  show  how 
each  atom  of  steam  and  water  acts  in  relation  to  each  ray 
of  sunlight,  nor  how  the  refraction  of  the  prismatic  colors 
arises  from  the  action  of  each  ray  of  sunlight  on  each  atom 
and  drop.  Nevertheless  after  the  general  demonstration  of 
the  necessity  of  the  phenomenon  who  would  doubt  that  the 
same  necessity  which  sways  the  collective  whole  constrains 
each  little  part  to  take  its  appropriate  place! 

We  see  and  know  the  whole  mental  evolution  to  be,  like 
the  rainbow  in  the  heavens,  a  matter  of  necessity;  we  know 
that  a  condition  of  society,  like  a  particular  position  of  the 
sun,  must  deflect  culture  and  civilization  just  so  and  not 
otherwise,  and  that  with  a  given  degree  of  social  evolution 
we  must  meet  with  one  set  of  mental  colors  in  art  and 
science  and  not  another,  although  we  lack  the  means  to 
show  microscopically,  so  to  speak,  the  necessary  influence 
and  effect  of  the  passing  social  conditions  upon  each  indi- 
vidual's acts,  thoughts  and  feelings.  Who  can  consider  the 
necessary  total  effect  and  doubt  that  it  is  the  sum  of  neces- 
sary individual  influences  and  effects  which  no  man  can 
escape? 

Intermediate  between  the  individuals  and  the  general 
mental  effect  are  social  structures  whose  necessary  evolution 
in  conformity  to  law  must  be  concluded  from  the  necessity 
and  the  conformity  to  law  of  the  total  effects  though  there 
were  no  more  direct  or  immediate  indications  of  it. 

Thus  whoever  concedes  conformity  to  law  in  the  evolution 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  203 

of  art  and  literature,  science  and  philosophy  (and  who  will 
deny  it?)  must  grant  the  same  conformity  to  law  in  the 
evolution  of  social  structures  and  the  consequent  restraints 
upon  the  individual. 

THE   EVOLUTION   OF    MANKIND. 

We  have  learned  that  social  evolution  is  always  partial, 
local  and  limited  in  time;  and  it  has  been  especially  empha- 
sized that  we  can  form  no  conception  of  the  evolution  of 
mankind  as  a  unitary  whole  because  we  have  no  comprehen- 
sive conception  of  mankind  as  a  whole.  But,  let  us  ask, 
can  we  not  form  a  conception,  broader  than  the  evolution  of 
individual  groups  and  social  communities,  of  mankind  so  far 
as  known  to  us;  and  if  so  how  should  we  have  to  conceive 
this  relative  whole  (relative,  i.  e.,  to  our  knowledge)  ? 

For  we  know  that  Biblical  naivete,  corresponding  to  a 
' '  theological  way  of  looking  at  things, ' '  to  quote  Comte, 
likened  the  evolution  of  man  to  a  genealogical  tree  spring- 
ing from  Adam  and  Kve;  and  it  has  been  repeatedly  pointed 
out  that  the  same  view  still  prevails  in  the  domain  of  social 
science,  in  which  Comte  rightly  recognizes  the  persistence  of 
the  theological  phase  down  to  the  present. 

The  polygenetic  view  which  prevails  quite  generally  at 
present  necessarily  does  away  with  the  conception  of  a  uni- 
tary genealogical  evolution.  But  the  change  only  involves 
assuming  several  or  innumerable  starting  points;  precisely 
speaking  it  is  a  change  of  form  only,  or  rather  of  number, 
that  is,  there  is  the  evolution  of  several  genealogical  trees 
instead  of  one.  There  is  assumed  to  be  a  steady  progress,  as 
before,  along  a  line  of  evolution  from  simple  to  complex, 
from  rudimentary  leaf  to  full  grown  tree,  from  primitive  to 
refined  and,  what  is  decisive  in  evolution,  from  some  given 
original  point  of  incipiency  to  our  time  ' '  of  great  progress, 
the  summit  and  climax  "  of  all. 

It  is  plain  that  such  a  conception  is  irreconcilable  with  a 
duration  of  life  upon  the  earth  that  surpasses  comprehension. 
Starting  from  the  idea  which  the  results  of  the  modern 
investigation  of  nature  make  clearer  and  clearer  we  dare  not 
liken  the  social  evolution  described  above  to  any  such  single  or 
even  multiple  genealogical  scheme.  For  such  a  scheme 
proceeds  only  from  our  inclination  to  investigate  beginnings 
above  all  else,  while  in  the  nature  of  the  case  we  are  only 
capable  of  knowing  the  becoming. 


204         ANNAI,S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

True  science,  or,  again  to  quote  Comte,  ' '  positivism ' ' 
begins  only  when  we  overcome  the  desire  to  know  the  begin- 
ning of  things  and  are  content  with  a  knowledge  of  their 
becoming.  If  we  keep  in  mind  the  two  ideas  of  the  eter- 
nality  of  life  upon  the  earth  and  our  inability  to  know  the 
origin  of  things,  we  shall  obtain  an  entirely  different  scheme 
of  social  evolution.  We  have  a  conception  of  its  becoming 
formed  upon  the  basis  of  facts;  if  now  we  banish  all  thought 
of  the  unity  and  the  commencement  of  evolution,  we  have 
left,  as  concrete  remnant,  a  process  of  evolution  going  on  at 
different  times  and  in  different  places  but  always  according 
to  the  same  laws.  Thus  those  transitions  which  we  described 
above,  from  what  is  to  us  the  primitive  horde  with  promis- 
cuity and  the  mother-family  to  woman -stealing  and  marriage 
by  capture,  and  then  to  a  simple  organization  of  sovereignty, 
to  property,  state  and  "  society,"  must  not  be  conceived  to 
be  processes  which  befall  mankind  developing,  as  it  were, 
from  a  certain  point  of  beginning  onward  whether  along 
single  or  multiple  lines,  but  processes  which  are  always 
being  completed  and  renewed  wherever  the  requisite  ante- 
cedents occur.  With  such  a  conception  only ,  and  in  no  wise 
with  the  contrary  one  named,  can  we  reconcile  the  fact  that 
the  primitive  stages  of  this  process  are  still  observable  in 
distant  parts  of  the  world  as  fresh  and  original  as  they 
must  once  have  been  in  our  own  past. 

Evolution  as  we  have  presented  it  is  no  chronological  or 
local  verity  and  applies  to  no  particular  subject;  it  is  a  typi- 
cal truth — in  so  far  as  it  presents  a  process  which  is  always 
true  of  human  species  wherever  groups  of  men  are  found  in 
the  proper  social  condition. 

It  is  erroneous  and  entirely  false  to  speak  of  the  "  evolu- 
tion of  mankind"  ("/<?  dSveloppement  de  I'humanitS"}  as 
Comte  does.  For  we  can  speak  only  of  social  evolution 
within  the  compass  of  the  human  species.  It  always  begins 
wherever  and  so  soon  as  suitable  social  conditions  are  at 
hand  and  it  runs  in  conformity  to  law  to  a  conclusion,  dying 
out  and  disappearing  because  there  is  no  further  manifesta- 
tion of  necessary  social  energy.  It  is  impossible  to  doubt 
that  evolution  really  dies  out  and  becomes  extinct  in  view 
of  the  countless  sites  of  whilom  culture  and  mighty  social 
evolution  which  now  lie  waste  and  barren.  There  are  many 
examples  in  Asia,  America  and  Africa  of  extensive  regions 
from  which  all  life  has  now  disappeared,  yet  upon  which 


THE  OUTLINES  OP  SOCIOLOGY.  205 

social  development  once  brought  forth  the  most  magnificent 
results  of  civilization. 

These  facts  are  calculated  to  support  the  idea  of  a  cyclical 
course  of  social  development  in  general,  an  idea  which  gains 
a  foothold  just  from  the  cyclical  development  of  states.  I 
have  discussed  this  point  often  and  must  here  return  to  it 
again. 

THE  CYCLE  OF   DEVELOPMENT. 

It  sounds  like  Hegel  or  Schaeffle  to  assert  that  the  life  of 
every  people  runs  in  a  cycle,  that  once  it  has  arrived  at  its 
highest  stage  of  development  it  hastens  to  its  decay;  and 
that  the  first  best  barbarians  will  make  ready  its  extinction. 
Sober  minds  are  not  inclined  to  take  it  seriously. 

Nevertheless  it  is  not  difficult  to  show  the  causes  of  this 
cyclical  motion  in  the  natural,  economic  and  social  conditions 
of  folk-life.  The  causes  are  so  plain,  their  operation  so  very 
powerful  and  general  and  at  the  same  time  so  obvious  and 
indisputable  that  the  knowledge  of  them  ought  to  convince 
that  their  effects  will  fitly  and  necessarily  follow;  for  they 
are  economic  and  demographic  and  thus  lie  in  the  region 
where  man's  unfreedom  and  his  dependence  on  physical 
wants  are  wholly  undeniable;  where  irrefutably  men  must 
be  reckoned  with  as  blind  natural  forces  pursuing  their 
courses  in  conformity  to  law. 

Men's  wants  and  desires,  as  we  have  seen,  cause  them  to 
raise  themselves  by  groups  and  societies  from  a  primitive 
condition  to  a  condition  of  culture  and  civilization;  and, 
having  once  attained  it,  so  to  conduct  themselves  that  their 
fall  necessarily  follows  through  other  groups  and  societies 
in  a  progressive  state. 

In  a  primitive  political  body,  which  is  economically  poor, 
men  have  only  one  want  beyond  the  desire  of  self-preserva- 
tion, the  reproduction  of  the  species.  On  this  stage  many 
children  are  begotten  and  population  grows  with  great 
rapidity.  The  wish,  which  emerges  on  a  higher  'plain  of 
culture,  so  far  as  possible  to  insure  a  better  material  exist- 
ence for  the  descendants  is  not  effective  to  check  the  increase 
of  births  for  the  reason  that  future  members  will  be  no 
worse  off  than  the  present  so  far  as  property  goes  while 
every  living  human  being  represents  one  more  unit  of  labor, 
which  of  itself  may  conduce  to  betterment  of  condition. 


206          ANNAI.S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

For  this  reason  political  bodies  in  the  lower  stages  of  cul- 
ture and  welfare  increase  rapidly  and  so  make  a  great  rela- 
tive gain  in  numerical  strength  which  can  be  sustained  by 
increasing  productivity  and  economic  prosperity  at  home. 
A  population  in  such  a  state  of  progressive  development  is 
very  likely  to  lay  the  foundation  for  a  body  politic  over 
which  a  highly  civilized  and  cultivated  minority  will  rule. 

But  if,  with  the  development  of  the  body  politic,  the  lowest 
classes  also  rise  to  a  higher  degree  of  civilization  and  become 
prosperous,  and  it  cannot  be  otherwise,  anxiety  for  the 
future  welfare  of  posterity  begins  to  exert  a  restraint  upon 
the  natural  increase  of  the  people.  The  former  heedlessness, 
companion  of  poverty,  gives  way  to  a  "wise  care"  and 
population  begins  to  stagnate  and  finally  to  decline.  Thus 
the  collective  body  becomes  numerically  weaker  than  those 
which  have  not  yet  reached  this  degree  of  "  refinement, " 
and  this  further  conduces  to  economic  weakness  and  political 
decline;  while  the  community  that  still  stands  lower  in 
development,  that  still  has  a  poor  proletariat  in  process  of 
sound  development,  carries  off  the  victory  through  its 
numerical  strength. 

These  are  the  real,  ever  active  causes  which  bring  about 
the  cyclic  movement  in  the  life  of  folk  and  state  and  which 
explain  why  it  is  always  the  highly  cultivated  state  that  is 
destroyed  by  "  barbarian  hordes." 

But  such  hordes  are  not  necessarily  external,  and  if  they 
were  they  alone  would  not  be  able  utterly  to  destroy  power- 
ful civilized  states.  But  unfortunately  every  state  conceals 
in  its  own  bosom,  and  the  higher  it  rises  in  the  scale  of 
civilization  so  much  the  more,  barbarian  hordes  enough  who 
only  await  the  given  signal,  the  critical  moment  of  civil  or 
foreign  war,  to  begin  the  work  of  destruction.  The  fall  of 
many  a  powerful  civilized  state  under  the  assault  of  rather 
small  barbarian  hordes  could  not  be  comprehended  if  it  were 
not  known  that  domestic  social  enemies  of  the  existing  order 
let  the  secretly  glimmering  hatred  of  the  property  and  ruling 
classes  burst  into  bright  flame  in  the  moment  of  danger; 
and  this  alone  is  often  sufficient  to  turn  the  toilsome  labor  of 
centuries  into  dust  and  ashes.  This  inner  enemy  necessarily 
increases  with  the  development  of  civilization  so  that  every 
centre  of  civilization,  apart  from  the  danger  threatening 
it  from  without,  fosters  the  seeds  of  destruction  within 
itself. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  207 

PROGRESS  AND  INNOVATION. 

But  the  fact  of  cyclical  development  in  state  and  folk  is  also 
decisive  of  the  question  of  ' '  progress ' '  in  the  sphere  of  human 
activity.  Two  assertions  which  I  made  in  "  Rassenkampf'1 
have  given  considerable  offence  and  provoked  lively  contra- 
diction, viz. ,  that  there  is  no  progress  and  that  there  can  be 
nothing  essentially  new  in  the  realm  of  mental  knowledge. 

That  I  of  course  recognize  progress  in  the  development  of 
an  isolated  centre  of  civilization,  each  time  beginning  and 
running  to  its  end,  has  been  brought  out  conspicuously  by 
the  briefest  of  my  reviewers  in  the  English  periodical 
"Mind."  "The  general  conclusion  to  which  he  finally 
comes,"  it  reads,  "  is  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  either 
progress  or  regress  in  the  course  of  history  taken  as  a  whole, 
but  only  in  the  particular  periods  of  a  process  that  is  going 
on  forever  in  a  circle — in  particular  countries  where  the  social 
process  is  forever  recommencing."  It  is  indeed  remarkable 
that  the  English  critic  who  reviewed  my  book  in  fourteen  lines 
caught  my  thought  correctly  while  so  many  German  critics 
who  made  extended  reviews  of  it  are  of  the  opinion  that  I 
deny  all  progress  whatsoever.*  However  I  see  from  this 

*On  the  other  hand  Maurice  Block,  in  the  "Journal  des  Economistes"  was  inclined 
to  accept  the  complete  negation  of  progress  (though  I  do  not  go  so  far)  if  I  had 
made  a  reservation  in  respect  of  science  and  its  technical  application.  The  pas- 
sage is  so  remarkable  that  I  quote  it.  "  One  of  the  author's  views,"  says  M.  Block  in 
concluding  his  discussion  of  the  "  Rassenkampf;  "  "will  meet  with  many  objections: 
it  is  the  negation  of  progress.  Things  change  apparently  but  not  in  reality.  The 
vesture  changes,  so  to  speak,  but  not  the  body  nor  the  spirit;  and  yet  there  is  some 
truth  in  the  proposition  and  if  the  author  had  taken  the  oratorical  precaution  to 
except  science  and  its  industrial  applications  I  should  have  been  persuaded 
that  he  was  right,  for  I  have  asked  myself  more  than  once  whether  it  could  be 
proven  that  there  were  in  Memphis,  Babylon  and  Nineveh  less  good  men  in  pro- 
portion to  the  whole  population  than  in  Paris,  London  or  Berlin."  I  readily  assent 
to  the  reservation  in  favor  of  science  and  art  which  M.  Block  requests,  only  how- 
ever with  the  counter  reservation  set  forth  in  the  text  above  respecting  the  unin- 
terrupted development  of  human  civilization.  Who  will  guarantee  that  its 
thread,  and  even  the  thread  of  mental  development,  will  not  be  completely  sun- 
dered from  time  to  time  so  that  for  later  generations  trying  to  rise  again  nothing 
will  remain  of  all  the  former  achievements?  What  profit  did  the  entire  European 
Middle  Ages  draw  from  the  astronomical  knowledge  of  the  Chaldeans  and  old 
Egyptians,  thorough  as  it  doubtless  was?  Was  not  the  thread  completely  sundered  ? 
ana  if  we  compare  the  grotesque  sculpture  of  Christian  Europe  in  the  Middle 
Ages  with  the  works  of  Greek  art  must  we  not  confirm  the  fact  that  the  stream  of 
development  of  human  civilization  from  time  to  time  disappears  in  the  earth 
without  trace  only  to  reappear  after  a  long  while  in  some  far  distant  place,  work- 
ing; its  way  laboriously  up  through  rifts  and  fissures?  Or  is  the  opinion  justified 
perhaps  that  such  catastrophes,  suddenly  destroying  results  of  civilization  hun- 
dreds of  years  old  and  causing  them  to  disappear  utterly  were  only  possible  in 
"  earlier  times  "  but  that  we,  armed  with  the  printing  press  and  the  steam  engine, 
are  entirely  free  from  them  and  that  our  mental  labor  will  not  perish  ?  We  would 
gladly  share  this  opinion  if  only  the  authorities  will  set  us  at  rest  upon  one  point, 
the  cosmic  stability  of  our  planet.  For  to  judge  from  some  very  recent  indica- 
tions the  forces  seething  under  our  feet  in  the  interior  of  our  planet  seem  to  have 
very  little  respect  for  our  mental  and  our  artistic  productions  and  to  care  as  little 
for  laws  of  the  development  of  human  civilization.  Indeed  human  civilization  is 
threatened  by  two  distinct  anarchistic  forces:  social  and  cosmic.  The  former  we 
may  indeed  resist — may  gracious  destiny  long  preserve  us  from  the  latter.  Then 
would  we  be  assured  of  endless  progress  in  science,  art  and  technics. 


208          ANNALS  OP  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

circumstance  that  I  could  not  have  expressed  myself  clearly 
enough  on  this  point  and  therefore  feel  bound  to  carry  out 
my  views  further  or  rather  to  express  myself  more  clearly. 

As  I  consider  man  to  be  a  permanent  type  not  only  phys- 
ically, with  Kollman,*  but  mentally,  I  am  of  the  opinion 
that  there  is  a  fixed  upper  limit  to  his  mental  activity  also, 
to  which  individual  natures  fortunately  endowed  have 
always  been  able  to  attain,  but  which  no  man  can  ever  pass. 

Man's  physical  strength  in  the  nature  of  the  case  can 
never  exceed  a  certain  maximum,  which  of  course  certain 
individuals  have  at  all  times  attained  to.  In  morals  there 
have  always  been  good  and  noble  natures  everywhere;  and 
low  and  bestial  ones  too  in  the  greatest  variety  of  grada- 
tions; and  it  is  recognized  that  a  real  improvement  in  men 
is  scarcely  to  be  noticed  here  and  that  an  apparent  improve- 
ment is  brought  about  locally  and  temporarily  only  by  con- 
ditions, institutions  and  measures  introduced  from  the  out- 
side. It  is  quite  the  same  in  intellectual  matters. 

Man's  intellect  is  ever  the  same — it  moves  in  a  sphere 
having  a  fixed  and  inexpansible  upper  limit  which  has  been 
reached  from  time  to  time  by  individual  geniuses.  But 
there  is  an  apparent  progress  arising  from  the  fact  that  from 
place  to  place  and  time  to  time  an  intellect  of  equal  power 
finds  footing  upon  the  total  accomplishments  of  his  prede- 
cessors and  uses  them  as  the  starting  point  for  further  suc- 
cesses; not  that  later  generations  work  with  higher  or  more 
complete  intellects  but  with  larger  means  accumulated  by 
earlier  generations,  with  better  instruments,  so  to  speak, 
and  so  obtain  greater  results.f  So  it  is  of  course  impossible 
to  deny  progress  in  the  field  of  invention  and  discovery — but 
it  would  be  a  mistake  to  explain  it  from  the  greater  perfec- 
tion, or  the  progress  of  the  human  intellect.  An  inventive 
Greek  of  ancient  times,  if  he  had  followed  Watt,  would  have 
invented  the  locomotive — and  if  he  could  have  known  the 
arrangement  of  the  electrical  telegraph,  it  certainly  might 
have  occurred  to  him  to  construct  a  telephone. 

Between   human   intellect  four  thousand  years  ago  and 

*  See  above,  Part  II,  sec.  4. 

tQuetelet,  vol.    ii,  p.   393.     "Newton  deprived  of  all   the  resources  of  science 


ition  ;  ii  only  a  part  ot  science,  greater  or  less,  had  been  put  within  nis  reacn 
he  would  have  been  a  Pythagoras,  an  Archimedes  or  a  Kepler;  but  with  all  the 
resources  which  his  century  presented  to  him  he  was,  and  he  had  to  be,  a 
Newton." 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  209 

to-day  there  is  110  qualitative  difference  nor  any  greater 
development  or  perfection — only  the  completed  labor  of 
all  intervening  generations  inures  to  the  advantage  of  the 
modern  intellect,  which  with  this  accumulated  supply  to-day 
accomplishes  apparently  greater  ' '  miracles  ' '  than  the  like 
intellect  four  thousand  years  ago  did  without  it.  But  in 
fact,  laying  aside  the  advantages  of  the  former,  the  latter 
accomplished  no  less  wonderful  things. 

Fortified  with  this,  one  could  object  to  my  assertion  that 
progress  is  relative  and  appears  only  in  separate  periods  of 
development  by  saying  that  it  only  needs  such  a  continuity 
of  mental  labor  to  lead  mankind  into  unsuspected  and  indefi- 
nitely prolonged  progress. 

The  conclusion  would  be  impregnable  if  the  premise,  the 
uninterrupted  development  of  human  civilization  in  general, 
were  equally  certain;  but  it  is  to  be  doubted,  for,  first,  we 
find  proof  in  well-known  history  of  the  continual  recurrence 
of  catastrophes  which  send  centres  of  civilization  precipi- 
tately to  destruction.  What  happened  in  India,  Babylon, 
Egypt,  Greece  and  Rome  may  sometime  happen  in  modern 
Europe.  European  civilization  may  perish,  overflooded  by 
barbaric  tribes. 

But  if  any  one  believes  that  we  are  safe  from  such 
catastrophes  he  is  perhaps  yielding  to  an  all  too  optimistic 
delusion.  There  are  no  barbaric  tribes  in  our  neighborhood 
to  be  sure — but  let  no  one  be  deceived,  their  instincts  lie 
latent  in  the  populace  of  European  states.  The  deeds  of 
anarchists  are  only  scattered  flashes  of  lightning — who  will 
guarantee  that  the  storm  will  not  some  time  break  ?  The 
barbarians  do  not  live  so  far  from  Europe  as  appears  to  be 
generally  assumed  and  the  insurance  of  Europe  against 
these  infernal  powers  would  not  be  entirely  free  from  risk. 

Thus  the  proposition  that  the  development  of  civilization 
is  perpetual  and  uninterrupted,  as  premise  to  the  conclusion 
that  progress  may  be  indefinitely  prolonged,  could  have 
only  a  potential  value. 

But  it  must  also  be  considered  a  proof  of  the  stability  of 
the  human  intellect  that  in  spheres  which  have  no  connec- 
tion with  invention  and  the  discovery  of  natural  forces,  in 
moral  and  social  philosophy,  not  only  is  there  no  indication 
of  progress  but  nothing  new  whatever  has  been  said  for 
thousands  of  years.  "There  is  nothing  new  under  the 
sun  "  and  nothing  new  can  be  "  invented. ' '  Our  cognitions 


210  ANNAIvS   OF  THE  AMERICAN   ACADEMY. 

respecting  virtue  and  custom,  human  happiness  and  social 
relations  are  no  more  mature  than  those  of  the  oldest  peo- 
ples of  antiquity;  on  the  contrary  we  often  become  aware 
that  we  are  behind  them  in  many  things.  Though  brotherly 
love  has  been  taught  at  different  times  to  very  different  peo- 
ples by  individual  law-givers  and  founders  of  religions,  our 
attitude  toward  relatives  and  kinsfolk  is  just  as  different 
from  our  attitude  toward  strangers  as  ever.  To  make  war 
upon  strangers  and  overpower  them  is  a  virtue;  to  betray 
one's  fellow  citizens  is  a  crime.  Respecting  the  value  of 
life,  the  mutual  relation  of  the  sexes,  the  institution  of 
marriage  and  the  like  the  individual  centres  of  civilization 
continue  to  revolve  in  the  same  vicious  circle,  from  every 
particular  point  of  which  the  point  opposite  seems  the 
lower.  Whatever  strikes  us  as  new  and  original  is  only  a 
new  combination  of  very  old  thoughts  and  opinions — a  com- 
bination springing  of  course  from  a  new  individual  concep- 
tion, for  in  nature  only  individuality  is  endlessly  varied. 

Individuality  is  always  producing  new  combinations  from 
the  ancient  store  of  human  thought,  and  if  it  were  possible 
for  a  man  to  know  all  the  thoughts  of  past  ages,  if  he  could 
even  know  all  the  philosophers  and  thinkers  of  olden  times 
and  peoples,  he  could  easily  reproduce  his  own  most  original 
systems  and  his  most  characteristic  conceptions  of  the  world 
merely  by  citing  from  his  predecessors.  In  fact  Bastian  does 
something  similar;  we  often  find  his  phenomenal  mind 
working  out  entirely  original  ideas  with  simple  citations 
from  other  authors.  The  whole  is  the  most  original  product 
of  his  individuality;  but  his  remarkably  comprehensive 
memory  enabled  him  to  gather  up  the  ready  cut  stones  for 
his  system  from  the  works  of  thinkers  of  all  ages  and  peo- 
ples. 

The  individual  conception  is  new,  but  the  material  is 
exclusively  old.  Consciously  or  unconsciously  it  is  con- 
stantly repeated,  never  newly  created.  For  here  where  no 
invention  or  discovery  in  the  field  of  natural  forces  is 
involved  the  human  intellect  has  from  the  first  traversed  the 
whole  sphere  of  perception  possible  in  the  nature  of  its 
organization  and  can  never  rise  beyond. 

The  conceptions  of  the  human  mind  in  this  sphere  are  just 
like  kaleidoscopic  views.  Philosophers  and  thinkers  have 
been  turning  the  kaleidoscope  for  ages,  and  it  is  impossible 
but  that  particular  portions  have  often  been  exactly  repeated 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  211 

though  probably  the  whole  picture  never  will  be,  since  the 
combinations  are  infinite.  The  difference  in  the  picture  we 
ascribe  to  the  difference  in  individuals,  and  perhaps  cor- 
rectly. 

JUSTICE   IN    HISTORY. 

Nothing  so  shakes  the  conception  of  a  "  just  providence  " 
in  simple  devout  souls  as  the  perception  of  the  "  world's  " 
"injustice"  obtruding  itself  at  every  step  in  human  life. 
In  spite  of  toilsome  theological  explanations  and  justifica- 
tions simple  faith  in  God  is  disturbed  and  pious  hearts  are 
stung  by  the  doubt  whether  all  the  injustice  with  which 
human  life  overflows  can  be  the  work  of  a  good  and  just 
God  ?  It  is  the  necessary  and  inevitable  consequence  of  an 
anthropomorphism  which  conceives  of  God  in  the  likeness 
of  man  and  hence  ascribes  to  him  human  "justice."  But 
that  which  comes  to  pass  in  the  world  and  in  life,  or  properly, 
in  life  and  history  is  in  no  sense  human  justice,  rather  it  is 
historical  justice  which  to  man's  mind  must  seem  to  be 
harsh  injustice;  though  here  again  the  fault  is  due  to  that 
false  individual  standard  which  man  applies  to  the  events  of 
life — whereas  they  come  to  pass  according  to  an  entirely 
different,  so  to  say,  a  great  social  standard  by  which  they 
must  be  judged.  If  we  measure  them  with  individual 
human  measure  we  suffer. 

What  is  commonly  meant  by  justice  ?  A  certain  standard 
in  the  distribution  of  material  and  moral  goods — in  fact 
there  are  two  conceptions  of  justice.  One  starts  from  the 
complete  equality  of  all  men  and  hence  requires  an  equal 
measure  of  rights  and  possessions  for  each  individual.  The 
other  takes  into  consideration  the  unequal  value  of  individuals 
and  their  powers  and  doings  and  is  content  with  a  propor- 
tional distribution.  Both  take  the  individual  as  the  object 
and  standard  in  exercising  justice  and  in  every  transaction 
having  man  for  its  object  ask  whether  it  is  commensurate 
with  the  value  of  the  object.  If  so  it  is  pronounced  just;  if 
not,  unjust.  There  is  no  opportunity  for  variety  of  judg- 
ment save  as  difference  of  opinion  prevails  concerning  the 
value  of  the  object  or  the  proper  conception  of  justice. 

These  conceptions  of  justice  start  from  the  consideration 
of  man's  conduct  toward  man  to  construct  their  criteria  of 
judgment,  which  have  a  certain  justification  in  themselves. 
But  men  are  not  content  to  apply  them  to  human  conduct 


212  ANNAIvS  OF  THE   AMERICAN   ACADEMY. 

alone,  but  transfer  them  to  historical  events  also  and  even  to 
natural  events  in  general. 

In  the  case  of  historical  events  the  transference  is  due  to 
the  false  hypothesis  that  they  are  brought  about  by  men 
through  their  free  will;  and  in  the  case  of  natural  events  it 
is  due  to  an  anthropomorphism  which  represents  God  as  act- 
ing after  the  manner  of  men  and  bringing  them  about. 

No  elaborate  proof  is  necessary  to  show  how  incongruous 
such  an  idea  is.  Historical  events  are  not  brought  about 
by  men  any  more  than  natural  events  by  God;  and  if  they 
have  no  author  whose  conduct  can  be  regulated  according 
to  the  value  of  the  objects  affected  nothing  can  be  said  about 
justice  or  injustice  in  connection  with  them. 

In  a  somewhat  different  sense,  however,  without  regard 
to  the  subject  acting,  the  question  could  be  raised  whether 
the  course  of  history  and  of  natural  events  strikes  individuals 
according  to  their  merits,  i.  e. ,  whether  the  good  are  spared 
or  rewarded,  the  bad  fallen  upon  and  punished;  hence 
whether  there  be  justice  or  not  in  history  and  nature.  But 
even  in  this  form  such  a  question  is  inadmissible  because  the 
individual  is  never  the  object  of  history  or  nature;  with 
them  nothing  depends  upon  him,  and  we  have  no  criteria 
of  his  worth  even  if  we  should  conceive  him  to  be  the  sub- 
ject of  the  historical  and  the  natural  process. 

History  and  nature  are  visible  and  recognizable  only 
through  their  effects  on  masses — indeed  they  may  be  said  to 
occupy  themselves  only  with  certain  natural  groups  and 
quantities  consisting  of  a  number  of  individuals — that  is  with 
folk,  stems  or  families  existing  either  together  or  in  the  rela- 
tion of  successive  generations.  But  the  only  possible  relation 
which  is  perceivable  between  the  effects  and  the  existence  of 
the  objects  is  that  of  causality,  the  connection  between  their 
natural  constitution  and  the  fate  that  falls  to  their  lot. 

In  other  words,  these  natural  human  groups  under  the 
action  of  history  and  nature  play  precisely  the  part  of  any 
other  natural  objects  exposed  to  the  workings  of  natural 
forces.  Natural  forces  will  produce  effects  upon  them 
according  to  their  character — rotten  limestone  will  yield  to 
the  process  of  weathering  quicker  than  hard  granite;  rain 
will  change  a  treeless  declivity  into  a  bare  rock,  while  a 
wooded  slope  will  gain  fresh  strength  and  luxuriance  from  it. 
In  this  interplay  of  cause  and  effect,  of  occasion  in  the  objects 
and  action  by  the  natural  forces  can  we  speak  of  justice  and 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  213 

injustice  ?  No  more  can  we  in  the  destinies  of  a  folk  or  an 
individual.  They  are  the  results  of  causes  lying  partly  in 
the  object,  partly  in  the  natural  forces  of  history  and  nature. 
Hence  there  is  no  justice  in  history  unless  we  wish  to  apply 
this  category  to  the  conformity  of  results  to  causes.  Such 
justice  as  this  we  always  find  everywhere  realized  with 
inexorable  rigor. 

In  life  and  in  history  every  man  suffers  whatever  fate  is 
conditioned  by  his  natural  constitution.  Yet  his  natural 
constitution  depends  not  on  him,  but,  as  we  have  seen,  upon 
the  social  medium  from  which  he  emerges.  This  is  to  blame 
if  individual  fates  are  so  seldom  proportional  to  individual 
merits.  For  fate  strikes  the  individual  in  proportion  to  the 
merits  of  the  species,  so  to  speak.  His  own  merits  may  be 
different.  Historical  development  cares  nothing  for  that. 

Hence  the  individual  often  suffers  wrongs  which  he  does 
not  deserve,  but  which  are  the  natural  results  of  causes  lying 
in  the  past  of  his  social  medium,  as  when  the  children  atone 
for  the  ' '  sins ' '  of  their  ancestors,  of  which  there  are  so 
frequent  examples  in  history.  It  is  quite  natural;  for  the 
development  of  the  natural  forces  of  history  depends  upon 
the  character  and  the  conditions  of  its  subjects.  But  the 
subjects  are,  as  we  have  seen,  not  the  individuals,  but  the 
social  media  in  which  the  individuals  are  included  as  results. 

The  course  and  the  events  of  history  are  commensurate 
with  the  character  and  conditions  of  the  social  media;  and 
this  we  must  recognize  as  historical  justice.  There  is  none 
other  in  history  or  even  in  nature. 

Hence  the  alpha  and  omega  of  sociology,  its  highest  per- 
ception and  final  word,  is:  human  history  a  natural  process; 
and  even  though,  shortsighted  and  captivated  by  traditional 
views  of  human  freedom  and  self-determination,  one  should 
believe  that  this  knowledge  derogates  from  morals  and 
undermines  them  yet  it  is  on  the  contrary  the  crown  of  all 
human  morals  because  it  preaches  most  impressively  man's 
renunciatory  subordination  to  the  laws  of  nature  which  alone 
rule  history.  By  contributing  to  the  knowledge  of  these 
laws  sociology  lays  the  foundation  for  the  morals  of  reason- 
able resignation,  higher  than  those  resting  on  imaginary 
freedom  and  self-determination  and  resulting  in  the  inordi- 
nate overestimation  of  the  individual  and  those  unreason- 
able aspirations  which  find  expression  in  horrible  crimes 
against  the  natural  law  of  order. 


SUPPLEMENT. 
ADDENDUM  TO  PART  I.  HISTORY  OF  SOCIOLOGY. 

GUSTAVB    LB   BON. 

The  rise  of  sociology  in  our  day  from  anthropology,  eth- 
nography, the  study  of  prehistoric  times,  and  the  history  of 
civilization,  is  easily  explainable.  First  anthropology 
treated  physical  man  simply,  and  the  chief  races  of  mankind. 
Ethnography  constantly  added  new  material  from  the  living 
human  world  and  raised  the  number  of  varieties  almost  to 
infinity.  Then  prehistoric  man  was  studied  in  order,  from 
his  condition,  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  historic  man. 
Making  the  phenomena  of  prehistoric  civilization  the  subject 
of  their  investigation,  scholars  passed  unexpectedly  from 
this  introduction  into  the  history  of  civilization  as  a  whole, 
treating  also  the  later  period  of  the  same  subject.  But  at 
last  it  appeared  that  all  four  disciplines  were  merely  descrip- 
tive, furnishing  material  for  a  science  of  man  which,  if  it 
would  be  a  science,  must  for  the  reasons  above  laid  down 
be  occupied  not  with  the  individual,  but  with  social  groups 
and  societies.  In  this  way  it  becomes  sociology.  But  the 
principal  difference  between  these  four  disciplines  and 
sociology  is  that  the  latter  is  in  no  sense  descriptive;  but, 
supported  upon  material  from  the  former,  undertakes  scien- 
tific investigation  in  order  to  establish  scientific  laws. 

While  various  authors  have  severally  set  forth  the  disci- 
plines named  with  more  or  less  significant  digressions  into 
neighboring  spheres,  Gustave  Le  Bon,  in  a  noteworthy 
book,  "  L* Homme  etles  Societh,  leurs  Origines  et  leur  His- 
toire,"*  gives  the  chief  features  of  them  all,  together  with  a 
thoughtful  presentation  of  sociology  (in  Part  II)  based  upon 
them,  so  that  his  work  presents  to  view  the  entire  course  of 
scientific  development  beginning  with  anthropology  and 
ending  with  sociology. 

In  the  first  part  Le  Bon  simply  gives  short  sketches  of  the 
sciences  preliminary  to  sociology.  After  an  ' '  Introduction  ' ' 
upon  the  changes  in  our  knowledge  and  opinions,  in  which 
the  author  shows  that  he  is  at  once  monist  and  positivist  in 

•Paris,  1881. 

(214) 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  215 

the  best  sense  of  the  word,  he  subjects  the  "  Universe,"  in 
Book  I,  to  a  rigid  realistic  examination.  In  Book  II  ' '  The 
Origin  and  Evolution  of  Living  Creatures  "  is  portrayed 
according  to  the  theory  of  Darwin  and  Haeckel.  Book  III, 
entitled  "The  Physical  Evolution  of  Man,"  gives  a  descrip- 
tion of  anthropology  and  prehistory.  It  treats  of  primitive 
man,  the  formation  of  races  and  the  several  prehistoric 
ages  according  to  the  usual  divisions.  Book  IV,  "The 
Mental  Evolution  of  Man,"  gives  a  sketch  of  psychology 
on  a  physiological  basis.  Upon  the  broad  foundation  of 
such  disquisitions  upon  these  broad  sciences  which  have  to 
do  with  the  universal  and  the  individual,  Le  Bon  constructs 
his  sociology  which  occupies  the  second  part  of  his  work. 

Aside  from  Book  I  of  Part  II,  which  simply  contains  a 
special  introduction  to  sociology  ("Sociology  and  its 
Limits,  Uses  and  Methods  "),  the  substance  of  what  he  has 
to  say  falls  into  two  books:  "  Factors  of  Social  Evolution," 
Book  III,  and  "The  Development  of  Societies,"  Book  IV. 
However  excellent  all  that  Le  Bon  offers  us  in  these  two 
books,  however  willing  we  are  to  subscribe  to  the  most  of  the 
sociological  views  and  considerations  which  he  advances, 
still  we  must  say  that  in  spite  of  the  broad  foundation  which 
he  has  given  to  his  .sociology,  there  is  a  very  serious  mistake 
in  the  superstructure.  He  has  missed  the  real  subject- 
matter  of  sociology  and  has  not  really  found  a  single  socio- 
logical law  although  he  set  out  with  that  purpose.  A 
detailed  examination  will  confirm  our  judgment. 

Le  Bon  first  treats  ' '  The  Factors  of  Evolution. ' '  •  What  he 
understands  them  to  be  appears  from  the  titles  to  the  several 
chapters  on  the  influence  of  milieu,  of  intelligence  and  feel- 
ings, of  the  acquisition  of  language,  of  commercial  rela- 
tions, of  the  progress  of  industry,  of  literature  and  art,  of 
the  struggle  for  existence,  of  the  development  of  military 
institutions,  of  the  knowledge  of  agriculture  and  the  growth 
of  population,  of  stability  and  variation,  of  race,  of  the 
past  and  heredity,  of  illusions  and  religious  ideas,  of  politics 
and  administration,  of  education  and  instruction.  With- 
out doubt  these  are  very  important  questions  touching  the 
sphere  of  sociology.  But  these  ' '  influences  "  are  in  no  sense 
"  factors  of  social  evolution."  They  are  all  simply  "  influ- 
ences" acting  on  them.  The  factors  of  social  evolution,  as 
has  been  shown  above,  are  the  social  groups  themselves,  and 
they  are  influenced  by  the  physical  and  moral  agencies 


216  ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

surrounding  them,  which  L,e  Bon,  as  shown,  enumerates 
correctly.  But  it  is  a  mistake  to  confuse  these  conditions, 
these  influences  and  agencies,  with  the  real  factors  or  sub- 
jects. So  Le  Bon  in  the  chapter  on  ' '  Factors  of  Evolution  " 
really  says  nothing  that  he  had  not  already  said  in  Part  I 
where,  speaking  of  the  development  of  the  individual,  he 
showed  the  influence  of  all  these  same  agents  and  circum- 
stances upon  it.  Hence  the  repetitions  which  the  author 
cannot  escape  in  spite  of  his  great  literary  skill  and  his 
evident  pains  to  present  the  same  thing  in  different  lights 
and  to  illustrate  it  by  a  great  variety  of  examples,  because 
they  follow  necessarily  from  the  false  plan  of  his  sociology, 
false  because  too  limited  and  scanty.  Thus  for  example,  he 
treats,  in  Part  I,  page  190,  of  "  The  Physical  Condition  of 
the  First  Human  Beings."  In  Part  II,  Book  II,  on  "  The 
Factors  of  Social  Evolution,"  he  is  forced  to  return  to  the 
same  theme  and  treats  of  the  "Existence  of  the  First 
Human  Beings  ' '  again  in  connection  with  the  ' '  Influence 
of  Milieu  upon  Social  Evolution. ' '  To  be  sure  he  strives 
here  in  Part  II  to  relate  other  details  about  primitive  man; 
but  the  subject  is  the  same  and  what  is  said  in  Part  II  could 
have  been  said  pertinently  at  the  appropriate  place  in  Part  I. 

Again  another  illustration:  In  Part  II  L,e  Bon  treats  the 
"  Past  and  Heredity"  as  a  factor  of  social  evolution.  But 
he  treated  the  same  thing  in  Part  I  in  connection  with  the 
"development  of  instinct"  in  the  individual,  where  he 
speaks  of  ' '  habits  gradually  modified  and  preserved  by 
heredity."  In  short  Le  Bon  knows  no  "  factors  of  social 
evolution  ' '  to  present  other  than  the  same  agents  and  forces 
which  influence  the  individual. 

In  the  second  half  he  does  not  fare  much  better.  Here 
too  the  contents  do  not  correspond  with  what  the  title 
promises.  The  latter  reads,  as  has  been  mentioned: 
"  Development  of  Societies;"  and  what  do  the  several 
chapters  offer  us  instead?  First  comes  "development  of 
language."  Is  language  a  society?  No  doubt  language 
has  great  influence  upon  the  development  of  society.  But 
can  the  development  of  language  for  that  reason  be  regarded 
as  the  development  of  society  ? 

The  same  is  true  of  the  chapters  on  the  development  of 
religion  (chapter  iv),  morals  (chapter  v),  rights  (chapter 
vi)  industry  and  agriculture  (chapter  vii).  The  last  is  an 
economic  phenomenon;  the  others  are  simply  psycho-social. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  217 

Their  development  is  conditioned  upon  that  of,  societies; 
their  development  presupposes  social  development  and  in 
turn  exerts  a  certain  influence  upon  it.  Yet  the  develop- 
ment of  religion,  morals,  rights,  etc.,  is  not  the  development 
of  societies.  So  L,e  Bon  has  not  offered  us  here  what  he 
wished  to  offer  and  what  sociology  ought  to  offer.  He 
undoubtedly  came  nearer  solving  the  real  problem  in  the 
two  chapters  on  the  development  of  the  family  and  of  prop- 
erty (chapters  ii  and  iii).  For  as  we  shall  see  both  these 
institutions  are  eminently  social  and  immediately  connected 
with  social  development,  rising  directly  from  it,  forming 
indeed  an  essential  part  of  it;  only  he  should  have  presented 
them  in  this  connection  as  we  shall  demonstrate  and  insist 
below.  He  has  indeed  done  so  in  part  but  not  entirely. 
For  though  he  does  not  present  each  phase  in  the  develop- 
ment of  these  institutions  as  the  direct  result  of  the  contact 
and  reciprocal  effect  of  unlike  social  groups,  yet  he  makes  a 
beginning  of  seeking  the  cause  of  changes  in  these  institu- 
tions in  such  transformations  as  alterations  in  the  relations 
of  the  social  ingredients  to  each  other.  For  example  he 
inquires  (pt.  ii,  p.  294)  how  maternal  kinship  passed  into 
paternal  kinship?  how  the  father  became  the  head  of  the 
family?  and  answers  the  question  correctly  on  the  whole. 
"  It  seems  to  me,"  he  says,  "  that  it  (this  transformation) 
must  have  come  to  pass  at  the  time  when  man  began  the 
pastoral  and  agricultural  life  and  had  need  of  slaves  to  aid 
him  at  his  work.  Instead  of  killing  his  prisoners  he  kept 
them  to  aid  him  and  became  the  sole  proprietor  of  those  he 
had  conquered,  of  the  women  especially."  Here  L,e  Bon's 
acumen  led  him  aright,  even  though  he  did  not  take  for  his 
starting  point  the  reciprocal  action  of  unlike  \heterogen\  social 
groups  as  the  only  impelling  factor  in  all  social  development  as 
we  shall.  Indeed  had  he  done  so  too,  he  would  not  only  have 
struck  that  transformation  in  the  form  of  the  family  correctly, 
but  he  would  also  have  had  in  hand  the  right  key  to  solve 
the  not  less  difficult  problem  of  the  changes  in  property. 
But  as  it  is  he  stands  helpless  and  at  a  loss  before  it,  for  this 
time  the  lucky  idea  did  not  occur  to  him.  He  knows  that 
' '  property  has  not  always  existed  in  the  form  in  which  we 
know  it  to-day.  The  idea  that  soil,  air  or  light  could  belong 
to  any  one  could  not  have  been  comprehended  by  our  first 
ancestors  and  mankind  had  to  run  the  greater  (?)  part  of 
its  cycle  before  this  notion  could  arise. ' '  But  in  what  way, 


2i8  ANNAI,S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

from  what  impelling  causes  the  change  in  property,  or  better 
the  establishment  of  private  property,  took  place  L,e  Bon 
cannot  explain.  He  is  confronted  with  a  conception  that 
arose  in  the  human  brain  one  fine  day,  an  idea  that  sprang 
up  suddenly.  "  When  agriculture  had  become  known  and 
mankind  already  had  an  immense  past  behind  it,  a  very 
long  time  had  still  to  elapse  before  the  idea  of  personal 
property  appeared.  The  ground,  like  the  women,  belonged 
at  first  to  all  the  members  of  a  community.  Only  very 
slowly  did  it  become  the  property,  at  first  temporarily  and 
then  permanently,  of  a  family  and  then  of  an  individual." 
Thus  we  see  that  without  any  attempt  whatever  to  explain 
the  causes  of  these  changes  in  property,  he  here  simply 
takes  refuge  in  that  phrase  with  which  we  have  become 
acquainted  *  that  it  "  arose  gradually."  Doubtless  every- 
thing arose  gradually,  but  how?  in  what  way?  It  is  the 
task  of  sociology  to  explain. 

The  fundamental  failure  in  the  construction  of  his  soci- 
ology of  which  we  spoke  is  to  blame  for  his  failure  to  give 
us  the  explanation.  If  he  had  comprehended  that  the  first 
and  most  important  sociological  task  was  to  investigate  the 
mutual  relations  and  reciprocal  effects  of  unlike  social 
groups,  he  would  himself  necessarily  have  found  out  that 
changes  in  the  family  and  in  property  are  nothing  but  the 
result  of  these  reciprocal  relations  and  effects.  He  would 
have  reached  another  result  also  which  in  the  beginning  of 
his  undertaking  he  confessedly  strives  for  but  completely 
fails  of  in  consequence  of  the  entirely  wrong  path  into 
which  he  struck.  We  mean  the  discovery  of  those  "  invari- 
able laws  knowing  no  exceptions,"  those  "  fixed  and  inex- 
orable laws"  (Part  I,  chapter  viii),  which,  as  he  quite 
correctly  assumes,  control  historical  events  as  well  as  the 
evaporation  of  a  drop  of  water  or  the  movement  of  a  grain 
of  sand.  We  find  indeed  the  recital  of  events  and  develop- 
ments conforming  to  law  in  the  psycho-social  sphere  (lan- 
guage, religion,  rights,  morals,  political  economy  and  so 
forth),  but  of  real  social  laws,  of  such  laws  as  control  the 
relations  and  reciprocal  connections  of  social  elements,  we 
find  no  trace  with  him. 

In  view  of  this  it  is  certainly  characteristic  of  Le  Bon 
that  he  treats  all  the  secondary  social  phenomena,  like  lan- 
guage, religion,  rights,  etc.,  at  great  length;  but  has  not 

*Cf.  p.  63  note. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  219 

devoted  a  single  chapter  of  his  "  social  science  "  to  the  most 
important  and  primary  social  phenomenon,  the  state.  This 
is  indeed  a  gross  and  obvious  omission,  but  it  is  also  merely 
a  consequence  of  the  entirely  mistaken  plan  of  his  sociology. 
Nevertheless  it  must  be  recognized  that  L,e  Bon's  sociology 
is  one  of  the  most  valuable  achievements  of  scientific  labor 
in  this  field.  He  is  distinguished  for  thorough  knowledge 
of  all  pertinent  disciplines,  comprehensive  view  and  above 
all  for  a  sober  unprejudiced  mind.  His  work  unquestionably 
forms  an  important  landmark  in  the  development  of  soci- 
ology; and  we  greatly  regret  that  in  the  foregoing  discus- 
sions we  have  not  been  able  to  appeal  to  his  coinciding  views 
frequently.  He  would  have  afforded  us  welcome  support  on 
many  a  hazarded  point. 

ADDENDUM   TO   PART  IV.      MIGHT  AND   RIGHT. 

There  are  several  omissions  in  the  "  Outlines  "  before  us. 
For  example  I  have  not  treated  the  psycho-social  phenomena 
of  language  and  religion  because  I  discussed  them  at  length 
in  my  "  Rassenkampf"  to  which  I  must  refer  the  reader, 
especially  as  I  should  like  to  have  the  ' '  sociological  investi- 
gations "  appearing  under  that  title  considered  preliminary 
in  part,  and  in  part  also  supplementary  to  these  ' '  Outlines. ' ' 
For  a  similar  reason  I  have  given  no  space  in  the  statement 
before  us  to  the  special  question  concerning  the  relation  of 
might  and  right,  because  in  the  first  place  I  treated  it  at 
great  length  in  my  ' '  Rechtsstaat  und  Socialisrmis  ' '  and  so 
would  have  to  repeat  here,  and  moreover  the  criticisms  made 
on  many  sides  failed  to  make  me  change  my  views.  Further, 
my  position  on  the  question  is  sufficiently  characterized  in 
the  present  ' '  Outlines ' '  in  the  thorough  treatment  of  the 
origin  and  development  of  rights  as  also  in  the  examination 
of  the  essence  of  the  state  and  the  social  struggle. 

Nevertheless  I  should  consider  it  a  serious  omission  if  I 
failed  at  this  point  to  consider  the  criticism  made  upon  my 
position  in  this  question  by  a  highly  esteemed  scholar  and 
juristic  philosopher,  Professor  Merkel,  of  Strassburg,  who 
did  me  the  honor  to  review  my  book  in  Schmoller's  Jahr- 
buch* 

This  review  refers  me  to  an  article  by  my  honored  critic 
on  ' '  Right  and  Might ' '  in  the  preceding  number  of  the 

*  1881,  Heft  iv,  p.  301. 


220          ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

same  magazine,  and  I  am  probably  not  mistaken  in  believ- 
ing that  that  article  was  written  after  he  knew  the  contents 
of  my  book,  l*  Rechtsstaat  und  Sotialismus  "  and  with  refer- 
ence to  it;  and  that  I  am  justified  in  considering  it  an  integral 
part  of  the  review.*  In  fact  Merkel  has  so  divided  his 
critical  material  as  to  enumerate  concisely  in  the  short  notice 
in  Heft  IV  his  doubts  about  my  position,  but  to  put  the  solid 
reasons  for  them  in  the  previous  article  on  ' '  Right  and 
Might. ' '  This  appropriate  division  of  the  material  greatly 
facilitates  my  reply  to  the  objections  made. 

First  of  all  I  notice  with  satisfaction  that  Merkel's  posi- 
tion is  in  fact  not  so  far  from  mine  as  it  might  seem  from  his 
"  notice,"  for  between  my  discussions  and  his  "  article  "  I 
can  discover  no  essential  difference.  I  shall  therefore  confine 
myself  to  showing  that  the  objections  which  are  made  in  the 
' '  notice  ' '  are  considerably  weakened  if  not  entirely  removed 
by  the  concessions  made  in  the  previous  article. 

The  first  objection  is  that  I  assert  an  "  essential  "  differ- 
ence between  political  and  private  rights  whereby  ' '  the  dif- 
ferences really  existing  between  these  subdivisions  of  rights 
are  in  part  expressed  correctly,  though  generally  with  exag- 
gerations;" but  that  I  do  not  recognize  "what  they  have  in 
common." 

The  objection  is  correct  in  so  far  as  the  entire  plan  and 
economy  of  my  work  aimed  at  proving  the  essential  differ- 
ence, toto  genere,  between  public  and  private  rights;  to  which 
end  I  was  in  that  place  only  interested  in  emphasizing  the 
prevailing  differences.  I  have  not  denied  ' '  what  they  have 
in  common  ' '  and  it  would  be  hard  ' '  not  to  recognize  ' '  it 
after  the  whole  juridical  literature  had  based  the  identity  of 
the  two  ' '  rights  ' '  on  it.  But  it  could  not  fall  into  the  plan 
of  my  work  to  enumerate  it  for  the  hundredth  time,  because 
it  would  be  superfluous.  However,  that  the  really  essential 

*  "  Rechtsstaat  und  Socialismus  "  appeared  in  the  summer  of  1880  and  shortly 
after  a  copy  was  sent  to  Schmoller's  Jahrbuch  for  review.  A  year  later,  in  the 
summer  of  1881,  appeared  a  double  number  (2  and  3)  of  the  fahrbuch  with  Merkel's 
article  on  "  Right  and  Might"  at  the  head.  At  the  same  time  my  book  was  men- 
tioned among  the  "books  received"  with  the  remark  that  the  "  next  number 
would  contain  a  notice  of  it  from  the  pen  of  Professor  Merkel."  Thus,  plainly,  he 
had  knowledge  of  the  contents  of  my  book  at  that  time.  Besides  I  think  that  I 
find  in  the  article  unambiguous  allusions  to  it:  e.  g.,  p.  16,  where  it  reads;  "Schol- 
ars of  former  and  of  quite  recent  times  have  thought  that  they  could  prove  that 
the  sovereign  power  in  the  state  could  not  be  surrounded  with  effectual  barriers 
and  restraints,"  etc.;  a_nd  again,  p.  18:  "  The  arguments  just  recently  urged  with 
especial  emphasis  against  the  possibility  of  such  progress  (in  the  sphere  of  inter- 
national law),"  and  so  forth.  The  attempts  and  the  arguments  mentioned  are 
in  fact  contained  in  "  Rechtsstaat  und  Socialismus"  which  Professor  Merkel  should 
have  had  in  hand  some  time  before  this  number  appeared. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  221 

-differences  which  I  asserted  exist,  in  spite  of  what  there  is 
in  common  between  these  two  subdivisions  of  rights,  can  be 
proven  from  Merkel's  article  on  "Right  and  Might  "by 
showing,  in  particular,  that  the  statements  and  assertions 
concerning  rights  therein  contained  are  inexact  and  incorrect 
just  because  the  author  does  not  make  the  distinction  which 
I  demand;  but  rather  formulates  his  propositions  upon 
"rights"  in  general.  In  consequence  it  happens  that  he 
asserts  something  false  about  the  one  subdivision  every  time 
that  he  states  something  true  about  the  other.  Thus,  for 
example,  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  article  cited,  Merkel 
says:  "Rights  in  their  origin,  their  stability  and  their 
changes,  as  witnessed  by  history,  appear  to  be  dependent 
upon  might  in  many  respects  and  questions  of  right  not 
infrequently  find  their  solution  in  the  guise  of  decisions  by 
might  which  combine  the  effects  of  the  proof  of  the  better 
right  with  the  proof  of  the  greater  strength.  Events  of  that 
sort  are  difficult  to  harmonize  with  the  prevalent  ideas  of 
right."  What  Merkel  says  here  is  only  true  of  public 
rights,  for  whenever  anywhere  "private  rights  "  are  settled 
by  the  "  decision  of  might, "  we  speak  not  of  "  rights  "  but 
of  caprice  and  wrong.  Public  rights  alone  may  be  settled 
in  this  way  without  sacrificing  their  character. 

In  view  of  such  an  assertion  as  this,  intended  to  hold  of 
both  "subdivisions  of  rights,"  but  really  true  of  only  one, 
shall  I  withdraw  my  proposition  that  the  difference  between 
private  and  public  rights  is  fundamental  ?  I  think  not.  So 
much  the  less  as  I  see  my  honored  reviewer,  in  consequence 
of  falsely  grouping  two  fundamentally  different  things  under 
one  concept,  ensnared  in  a  net  of  doubts  and  contradictions 
from  which  he  tries  very  hard  to  escape  without  success; 
though  in  my  humble  opinion  they  disappear  upon  holding 
fast  to  the  essential  distinction  between  public  and  private 
rights  as  I  formulated  it  in  "  Rechtsstaat  und  Socialismus" 
possibly  with  somewhat  too  much  bias  but  correctly  in  the 
main.  Thus,  let  us  hear  Merkel's  lament  over  the  impossi- 
bility of  reconciling  the  concept  of  "  rights  "  with  the  solu- 
tion of  questions  of  right  by  appeals  to  might. 

"  It  is  hard  to  bring  such  events  into  consonance  with  the 
prevailing  ideas  of  right.  Right  is  here  determined  by 
factors  which  seem  foreign  and  even  contradictory  to  our 
ideas  of  its  nature,  since  according  to  them  questions  of 
right  are  not  questions  concerning  the  relative  power  of  the 


222          ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

contending  parties  but  rather  concerning  the  truth  and  merits 
of  their  assertions  and  the  value  of  their  claims  before  a  higher 
forum." 

What  Merkel  here  says  of  ' '  rights  ' '  applies  only  to  pri- 
vate rights.  For  only  questions  of  private  rights  concern 
' '  the  truth  and  merits  of  the  assertions  of  the  contending 
parties  and  the  value  of  their  claims  before  a  higher  forum  ' ' 
and  not  rather  "  their  relative  power." 

But  questions  of  public  right  are  different,  even  though 
they  are  often  put  in  this  form.  One  example  among  many : 
Shall  the  Duke  of  Cumberland  succeed  his  uncle  in  the 
government  of  Brunswick  ?  Is  that  a  question  ' '  of  the  truth 
and  merits  of  the  assertions  of  the  contending  parties  and 
the  value  of  their  claims  before  a  higher  forum  ?" 

By  no  means,  because  it  is  not  a  question  of  private  rights; 
because  it  therefore  does  not  depend  upon  the  ' '  truth  and 
merits  of  the  assertions;"  because  there  is  herein  fact  no 
' '  higher  forum, ' '  for  the  German  Empire  is  at  once  party 
and  judge.  Thus  it  is  in  fact  a  question  of  public  rights,  a 
question  which  will  undoubtedly  be  determined  by  factors 
which  are  foreign  to  the  nature  of  "rights"  (political 
interests) ;  a  question  undoubtedly  ' '  of  the  relative  power  of 
the  contending  parties, ' '  one  of  whom,  the  German  Empire, 
does  not  need  to  recognize  a  higher  forum  over  it,  because 
within  the  sphere  of  its  operations  it  is  itself  the  highest 
forum.  Whoever  insists  upon  grouping  public  and  private 
rights  together  under  one  general  concept  will  never  escape 
from  doubts  and  obscurities  and  is  necessarily  forced  into  the 
delicate  situation  of  setting  himself,  for  the  sake  of  ' '  rights," 
in  opposition  to  the  most  vital  interests  of  his  folk  and  state 
in  questions  of  public  rights.  Now  I  consider  this  false 
doctrinarian  ism,  and  perceive  the  occasion  of  the  error  in 
the  incomplete  distinction  between  public  rights  and  private 
rights.  Though  they  have  much  in  common  it  is  only  in 
form;  in  principle  they  are  fundamentally  different.  But 
Merkel' s  whole  argument  rests  on  their  identity  and  he  pro- 
cures the  appearance  of  confirmation  for  his  view  only  by 
alluding  to  private  rights,  which  of  course  do  not  stand 
under  the  criterion  of  might,  to  prove  the  inadmissibility  of 
that  criterion,  and  then  appealing  from  the  arbitrary  vacilla- 
tion of  the  decisions  of  might  to  the  higher  idea  of  right — 
which  unfortunately  avails  nothing  in  questions  of  public 
right. 


THE  OUTUNRS  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  223 

The  consistent  disregard  of  this  essential  difference  runs 
through  the  entire  article  and  even  leads  to  absolutely  incor- 
rect statements  of  fact.  When,  for  example,  it  is  said  that 
"  statesmen  have  always  shown  an  inclination,  seldom  unre- 
servedly confessed  however,  to  treat  questions  of  right  as 
questions  of  might  .  .  .,"  the  statement  is  incorrect 
when  referred  to  private  rights.  It  is  correct  only  when 
applied  to  public  and  international  rights. 

They  would  be  strange  ' '  statesmen ' '  who  threw  the 
weight  of  their  influence  and  power  on  the  side  of  private 
rights.  I  should  not  be  able  to  name  a  single  one,  and 
they  would  certainly  not  deserve  the  title.  But  even  Merkel 
is  not  thinking  of  such  a  meddling  with  private  rights  here 
for  he  immediately  adds  as  example  that  these  statesmen 
1 '  generally  stand  in  the  position  of  the  Athenians  of  old 
whom  Thucydides  makes  to  say  in  a  dispute  with  the 
Medians:  '  As  to  the  Gods  we  believe  and  as  to  men  we 
know  that  of  necessity  every  one  lords  it  over  whomsoever 
he  has  power.  .  .  . '  " 

Thus  "rights"  in  the  broader  sense,  including  private 
rights,  are  not  brought  in  question  here,  only  public  rights. 
Sovereignty  {Herrscheri)  alone  is  spoken  of,  not  doing 
justice  or  acting  the  judge.  But  if,  as  Merkel  says  later  on, 
' '  theory  in  the  greater  number  of  its  advocates  affirms  the 
independence  of  rights  and  the  essential  difference  between 
right  and  might,"  in  the  first  place  theory  has  been  largely 
and  chiefly  occupied  with  private  rights,  a  field  in  which  the 
state  has  left  it  full  authority  (juristic  rights,  responsa  pru- 
dentum,  etc. ) ,  and  if  there  are  isolated  cases  in  which  it  has 
drawn  public  rights  into  the  scope  of  its  discussion  it  was 
still  only  theory — and  we  know  what  that  signifies  in  relation 
to  public  rights,  for  whose  advocates,  the  statesmen,  no 
reproach  can  be  more  bitter  than  "doctrinarianism." 

Thus  after  all  there  has  never  been  any  contradiction 
within  the  several  subdivisions  of  right;  for  the  statesmen 
never  troubled  themselves  about  private  rights;  and  their 
assertions,  like  those  of  the  Athenians  of  Thucydides, 
applied  only  to  public  rights.  But  the  jurists  have  always 
been  up  to  the  ears  in  the  latter  and  still  have  the  most 
narrow  views  of  the  state;  so  that  their  opinions  and 
assertions  are  serviceable  only  for  private  rights;  for  public 
rights  they  have  never  given  anything  but  "theory," 
"  precious  material  for  the  waste-basket."  In  fact  there  is 


224          ANNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

no  real  contradiction  because  people  did  not  have  the  same 
thing  in  mind. 

Just  so  I  find  that  there  is  no  real  contradiction  after  all 
between  what  I  said  in  ' '  Rechtsstaat  und  Socialismus  ' '  upon 
public  rights  and  what  Merkel  says  in  his  article  on  the 
same  subject.  Though,  where  he  speaks  of  "rights"  in 
general  without  distinguishing  public  and  private  rights,  our 
assertions  appear  indeed  to  contradict  but  only  in  so  far  as 
they  do  not  apply  to  the  same  thing. 

So  if  Merkel  makes  the  essential  distinction  between 
public  and  private  rights  a  reproach  against  me,  it  would  be 
easy  for  me  to  show  that  his  discussion  would  have  gained 
much  in  clearness  and  verity  had  he  maintained  the  same 
distinction  throughout.  He  would  not  have  been  forced  to 
limit  every  proposition  upon  ' '  rights ' '  in  general  as  soon 
as  it  was  expressed  and  to  restrict  it  in  respect  first  of  public 
and  then  of  private  rights. 

For  example  when  he  says: 

"Where  this  might  [of  objective  right]  is  appealed  to  in  the 
struggle  over  subjective  right,  it  is  presupposed  that  its  activity  will 
issue  from  a  position  lying  outside  the  conflicting  claims  and  interests 
and  appearing  to  hold  a  neutral  relation  to  them.  .  .  ."  (p.  5), 

the  statement  holds  good  of  private,  but  not  at  all  of  public 
rights.  For  of  the  latter  he  himself  concedes  that 

"the  conditions  for  establishing  and  extending  the  sovereignty  of  the 
neutral  factor  [that  '  neutral  position  ']  are  less  favorable.  ...  in 
public  rights.  .  .  ."  (p.  16).  "That  factor  [objective  right  as  neu- 
tral might]  ,"  he  says  further  on,  "finds  itself  confronted  with  more 
powerful  forces  in  the  struggle  for  sovereignty  in  the  state  and  for 
limiting  or  extending  it  while  the  sources  of  its  own  might  flow  more 
sparingly  and  far  greater  hindrances  are  opposed  to  the  development 
of  its  organs  than  in  the  sphere  just  considered.  The  question  here 
is  to  surround  the  supporters  of  sovereign  power,  whom  right  itself 
furnishes  with  superior  weapons,  with  barriers  and  hinder  the  misuse 
of  its  weapons.  To  many  this  appears  a  self-contradictory  problem, 
which  must  therefore  simply  be  abandoned.  Scholars  formerly  and  in 
quite  recent  times  have  thought  they  could  show  that  the  supreme 
power  in  the  state  could  not  be  surrounded  with  barriers  because,  as 
they  say,  there  can  be  but  one  supreme  power  within  one  and  the 
same  sphere." 

The  last  expression  seems  to  imply  that  Merkel  does  not 
share  their  view. 

Is  it  really  so  ?  We  would  not  venture  to  affirm  it;  if 
there  is  any  difference  between  his  view  and  theirs  it  is 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  225 

certainly  not  fundamental.  We  will  show  from  his  article 
presently  that  he  is  not  so  very  far  from  those  ' '  scholars ' ' 
and  that  there  is  only  a  slight  shade  not  so  much  of  opinion 
as  of  scientific  tendency  separating  him  from  their  position 
and  ours. 

Merkel  is  wrong  in  charging  the  opposite  view  with  over- 
looking the  fact 

"that  the  force  of  the  neutral  factor  itself,  rooted  iu  common  and 
deep-seated  convictions  and  usages,  as  for  example  in  the  form  of 
traditional  constitutional  law  supported  by  a  feeling  of  right  and  a. 
lively  sense  of  need  in  all  classes,  may  conceivably  be  the  highest 
force  within  a  community." 

Without  overlooking  this  and  other  considerations  enumer- 
ated by  him,  it  is  possible  to  maintain  that  all  these  substi- 
tutes for  the  ' '  neutral  factor  ' '  will  not  suffice  in  a  given  case 
of  public  rights  to  take  the  place  of  that  higher  might 
which  stands  neutral  above  party.  For  even  Merkel  him- 
self who  overlooks  none  of  these  factors  speaks  of  a  '  'remnant 
which  no  progress  [in  the  development  of  rights]  can  over- 
power " — and  more  than  that  I  have  not  asserted;  only  I 
located  it  unequivocally  where  it  always  has  and  always 
must  appear,  that  is,  in  the  highest  sphere  of  public  and 
national  rights.  But  it  is  plain  from  more  than  one  state- 
ment in  his  article  that  even  he,  though  reluctantly  and 
with  evident  regret,  makes  the  unconditional  sovereignty  of 
rights  cease  in  that  sphere  where  we,  without  circumlocu- 
tion and  with  well-founded  resignation,  substituted  might 
for  it.  He  freely  concedes  that 

"in  the  field  of  international  rights,  down  to  the  present,  the  original 
connection  between  subjective  rights  and  subjective  might  "  has  been 
retained  "in  respect  not  only  of  the  acquisition  but  also  of  the 
enforcement  of  the  former  in  its  broadest  scope."  "  In  this  field,"  it 
is  said  again,  "in  consequence  of  the  weakness  and  slight  develop- 
ment of  the  neutral  factor  the  competition  for  more  favorable  condi- 
tions of  life  still  maintains  in  part  its  primitive  form.  Still  the 
existence  of  the  former  is  manifested  even  here  in  many  ways  that 
•will  be  referred  to  later,  among  others,  in  the  mutual  recognition  of 
rights  between  civilized  nations.  But  this  is  frequently  associated 
with  plain  decisions  of  might  made  in  the  most  primitive  way  and 
does  not  prevent  the  contest  for  rights  from  finding  its  solution,  in 
the  most  important  'cases  even,  in  the  form  or  upon  the  basis  of 
elementary  decisions  by  might." 

"  Acquisition  through  power  here  takes  the  form  of  acquisition  by 
rights,  in  so  far  as  this  is  affirmed,  without  the  necessity  for  a  direct 
genealogical  line  between  him  who  '  has  taken  possession"  [playing  on 
Goethe's  words:  "Whence  did  grandpapa  get  them?  He  took 


226         ANNALS  OP  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

them!"]  and  him  who  establishes  right  to  possession.  .  .  .  War 
here  proves  to  be  a  continual  and  abundant  source  of  new  rights,  the 
rule  for  whose  creation  is  not  to  be  sought  in  some  higher  principle 
but  in  the  result  of  the  test  of  strength  which  war  imposes  upon  the 
struggling  parties." 

Thus  there  is  no  disagreement  between  our  position  and 
Merkel's  in  reference  to  international  rights.  With  reference 
to  national  (state)  rights,  likewise,  he  concedes,  as  stated 
above,  that  "the  conditions  for  founding  and  developing 
the  sovereignty  of  the  neutral  factor  are  little  favorable;" 
and  he  does  not  allow  himself  to  be  led  astray  by  the 
favorite  formula  of  public  rights  which  speaks  of  ' '  sove- 
reignty in  virtue  of  one's  own  right." 
He  says  explicitly: 

"  Whenever  sovereignty  over  another  or  any  right  of  decision  in 
public  affairs  is  exercised  '  in  virtue  of  one's  own  right '  we  have  to  do 
in  truth  with  the  principle  of  might" 

But  thereby  he  too  strikes  ' '  rights ' '  from  the  supreme 
position  in  the  state.  We  expressed  the  same  thought  by 
saying  that  between  public  and  private  rights  there  is  an 
essential  difference.  He  objects  to  the  form  of  expression 
but  plainly  agrees  to  the  fact.  For  however  much  he  points 
to  progress  in  the  idea  of  rights,  with  which  the  neutral 
factor  acquires  an  ever  higher  and  more  dominating  position 
in  the  state,  which  we  do  not  deny,  he  has  to  concede  at  last 
that  "  the  problem  of  saving  right  from  its  dependence  on 
might  through  progressive  development  will  continually 
present  itself  anew  as  still  unsolved  in  spite  of  all  progress. '  '* 

Will  Merkel  in  spite  of  this  concession  reproach  me  fur- 
ther because  I  grant  the  possibility  of  "  limiting  the  state's 
power  through  judicial  decisions  "  only  to  a  very  limited 
degree  and  certain  extent  ?  Does  he  mean  that  what  I  say 
"still  remains  a  simple  assertion  ? ' '  But  if  such  a  limitation 
of  the  state's  power  through  "constitutions  and  judicial 
decisions"  were  possible,  as  Merkel  asserts  in  the  review, 
would  not  the  problem  of  "  saving  right  from  its  dependence 
on  might"  be  solved,  which,  he  says  in  the  article,  "will 
continually  present  itself  as  unsolvable  in  spite  of  all 
progress  ?  ' ' 

Merkel  should  not  have  referred  me  to  his  article;  for  in 
it  he  takes  away  the  ground  from  the  objections  which  he 

•P.  30. 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  227 

makes  against  me  in  the  review.  Moreover  he  concedes, 
even  in  the  review,  that  "it  is  true  that  the  dependence  of 
right  upon  might  appears  more  palpable,  intensive  and  direct 
in  the  sphere  of  public  rights  than  in  that  of  private  rights;" 
only  he  considers  ' '  that  no  ground  for  denying  the  existence 
and  even  the  possibility  of  the  existence  of  real  rights  in  the 
former  sphere." 

Well,  that  depends  entirely  upon  the  view  a  man  has 
formed  of  "  rights."  Whoever  looks  upon  right  as  object- 
ive, throned  high  above  the  strife  of  parties,  proclaiming  its 
will  in  the  form  of  statutory  norms,  must  deny  its  existence 
and  even  the  possibility  of  its  existence  where,  even  as  Mer- 
kel  concedes,  ' '  the  problem  of  saving  right  from  its  depend- 
ence on  might  presents  itself  as  unsolved." 

As  I  hold  the  view  mentioned  I  must  of  necessity  draw 
the  conclusion  that  public  rights  are  entirely  different  from 
private  rights.  Whoever  on  the  contrary  holds  fast  to  the 
conception  of  ' '  rights  ' '  even  when  ' '  dependent  on  might ' ' 
may,  of  course,  discard  my  distinction. 

But  I  think  it  has  been  proven  in  what  precedes  that  there 
is  at  bottom  no  difference  between  the  actual  conception  of 
the  matter  itself  in  Merkel's  mind  and  in  mine,  between  his 
conviction  as  to  the  real  state  of  the  case  and  mine,  and  that, 
throughout,  the  difference  between  us  is  not  one  of  cognition 
but  of  tendency,  in  consequence  of  which  Merkel  lays  more 
stress  upon  the  fact  that  rights  must  tend  to  complete 
"release"  (Erloesung}  from  might,  while  in  my  book, 
"  Rechtsstaat  und  Socialismus"  stress  was  laid  on  the  fact 
that  "release"  was  impossible  and  that  we  must  make 
terms  with  the  dependence  of  national  right  on  might. 

But  whence,  I  ask  myself,  considering  the  similarity  in 
the  knowledge  and  conception  of  the  matter  itself,  whence 
comes  the  difference  of  standpoint  and  emphasis,  right  in 
Merkel's  case,  might  in  mine  ?  I  do  not  think  I  am  wrong 
in  referring  it  simply  to  the  difference  in  the  political  situa- 
tions of  Germany  and  Austria  in  the  seventh  decade  of  the 
present  century — for  finally  every  political  writer  unavoid- 
ably reflects  the  political  situation  surrounding  him  however 
objectively  he  wishes  and  proposes  to  proceed. 

No  German  of  the  seventh  and  eighth  decades  of  this 
century  has  had  need  to  be  anxious  about  might  under  the 
regime  of  the  Iron  Chancellor.  On  the  other  hand  he  has 
no  doubt  had  some  apprehension  about  "rights."  What 


228          ANNAI.S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 

is  more  natural  than  that  both  teachers  of  public  law  and 
philosophers  in  Germany  have  emphasized  the  pre-eminence 
of  right  over  might  and  postulated  the  independence  of  the 
former  from  the  latter. 

Not  so  in  Austria.  We  did  not  need  to  worry  over 
"rights."  They  throve  like  an  obtrusive  weed  in  every 
path  even  where  the  direction  ' '  reserved  for  might ' '  was  to 
have  been  expected.  At  the  helm  sat  a  party  calling  itself 
the  constitutionalist  and  fancying  that  the  entire  state  could 
be  subjected  to  the  regime  of  right.  In  particular  it 
expected  to  be  able  to  attain  this  object  by  holding  ready 
the  universal  remedy,  a  special  tribunal  constituted  ad  hoc 
for  every  possible  political  crime.  It  was  content  with  this 
— for  indeed  the  ' '  eye  of  the  law  ' '  in  the  form  of  a  court 
of  justice  watched  over  the  state.  Recently  this  party  has 
even  proposed  to  submit  certain  actions  of  parliament,  e.  g. , 
those  relating  to  election  cases,  to  the  jurisdiction  of  a  par- 
ticular court  of  justice  created  ad  hoc. 

This  effort,  which  is  certainly  well  meant,  proceeds  from 
the  erroneous  assumption,  is  controlled  by  the  delusion  we 
would  like  to  say,  that  an  ordinary  mortal  at  once  becomes 
an  angel  or  at  least  an  infallible  pope  upon  sticking  a  judge's 
commission  in  his  pocket.  It  needs  but  little  experience, 
however,  to  learn  that  every  judge  above  all  else  is  and 
remains  a  man,  and  in  spite  of  all  the  conscious  objectivity 
which  he  industriously  cultivates  (and  even  that  not  always) 
is  quite  as  much  the  slave  of  blind  impulses,  prejudices  and 
efforts  which  have  their  source  in  his  social,  political,  reli- 
gious and  national  position  as  every  other  mortal  and  certainly 
not  less  than  every  representative  of  the  people. 

It  must  not  be  ignored  that  at  some  point  in  the  state  right 
must  cease  and  might  begin.  The  creation  of  a  court  for 
constitutional  cases  would  only  transfer  the  point  from  the 
representative  body  to  the  court.  Would  this  be  better  ? 

The  constitutionalists,  so-called,  who  ought  really  to  be 
called  the  ' '  national  rights ' '  party  {Rechtsstaatliche) ,  because 
from  the  first  they  have  labored  under  the  delusion  that  the 
whole  state  could  be  represented  in  a  juristic  formula,  have 
deeply  atoned  for  their  error.  The  power  suddenly  fell 
from  their  hands  for  mere  right's  sake;  and  nothing  else 
could  have  happened,  for  the  state  belongs  to  might  and  not 
to  right  although  it  creates  and  forms  the  latter,  develops 
and  promotes  it.  This  latter  thought  I  have  discussed  in 
' '  Rechtsstaat  und  Socialismus. ' ' 


THE  OUTLINES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  229 

It  is  possible  that  this  witches'  Sabbath  of ' '  national  rights, ' ' 
which  raged  in  Austria  in  the  same  decade  that  Germany 
got  a  taste  of  the  ' '  might  before  right ' '  theory  of  the  Iron 
Chancellor,  has  a  share  in  the  Austrian's  somewhat  different 
standpoint  in  the  question  of  might  and  right.  The  Ger- 
man reacts  perhaps  unconsciously  against  the  all  too  power- 
ful interposition  of  might.  The  Austrian,  because  right 
has  been  so  emphasized,  may  have  become  a  little  anxious  for 
national  might.  I  can  see  no  other  difference  between 
Merkel's  standpoint  and  mine. 


THE  ACADEMY  AND  ITS  WORK. 

THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY  OF  POLITICAL  AND  SOCIAL  SCIENCE  was  formed 
in  Philadelphia,  December  4,  1889,  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  the  political 
and  social  sciences,  and  was  incorporated  February  14,  1891. 

While  it  does  not  exclude  any  portion  of  the  field  indicated  in  its  title,  yet 
its  chief  object  is  the  development  of  those  aspects  of  the  political  and  social 
sciences  which  are  either  entirely  omitted  from  the  programs  of  other  societies, 
or  which  do  not  at  present  receive  the  attention  they  deserve.  Among  such 
objects  may  be  mentioned  :  Sociology,  Comparative  Constitutional  and  Admin- 
istrative Law,  Philosophy  of  the  State,  Municipal  Government,  and  such  por- 
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The  first  scientific  session  of  the  Academy  was  held  on  March  14,  1890  ; 
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six  in  1894 ;  four  in  1895  ;  six  in  1896  ;  eight  in  1897,  and  eight  in  1898,  or  fifty- 
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ANNALS. 

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Essays  in  Economics  and  Sociology 


BY 


SIMON  N.  PATTEN,  PH.  D. 

Professor  of  Political  Economy  in  the  University  of  Pennsylvania 


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